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PREFACE, 
FICHTE'S  system of  philosophy is pre-eminently a philo- 
sophy  of  the  free will.  Free will  is  certainly  not  an 
object of external perception, but rather of introspection. 
When we look outwardly, and behold  things and events 
in time and space, we  contemplate each thing limited on 
all sides by other things;  each event limited  before and 
after by other events.  Such limitation, according to the 
philosophy of Kant and Fichte, belongs to the category 
of quality.  This category includes affirmation, negation, 
and limitation : affirmation  of  the thing or event ;  nega- 
tion  of  it  by  others  which  we  perceive  to exclude  it; 
limitation  of  the  thing  or event  by  others  and  their 
limitation by it.  This gives reciprocity for the third sub- 
category  of  quality.  In the "Science  of  Knowledge" 
Fichte deduces these three immediate categories of  con- 
sciousness :  the ego, the non-ego, and the mutual limita- 
tion of the ego and non-ego.  He  thus finds the category 
of quality as the first and most direct form of  conscious- 
ness.  This category of  quality considers all manner  of 
objects always under the condition of  being limited from 
outside. 
People  do most  of  their  conscious  thinking in the 
category of  quality, and consequently find  all thoughts 
that do not fit that category "  unthinkable!'  This is the vi  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  vii 
supreme category with '(  agnostics."  But all people do a 
great deal of thinking in the other great  category  of  the 
Mind-the  category  of  Freedom,  variously  called  self- 
activity and self-determination.  While quality or mut~~al 
limitation  is  the general  form  of  sense-perception  and 
the understanding, the category of self-activity (called by 
Spinoza  causa sui), or freedom, is the basis  of  the three 
great realms of  thought  that  are accounted  supreme in 
human life-the  realms of  rights and morals, of  art and 
literature,  and  of  the  revelation  of  the divine.  The 
realm  of  rights  and morals  concerns  the good,  a sub- 
category  under  the  idea  of  self-activity,  and itself  in- 
cluding many subordinate categories, like justice, virtue, 
duty,  obedience  to  the  authority  of  institutions,  &c. 
These categories can  have no  significance  in regard  to 
inanimate  things  and none  in  regard  to  living  beings 
which  have  not  developed  self-activity  to the point  of 
freedom and responsibility. 
The tealm  of  art  and  literature  is governed by  the 
category  of  the beautiful, another sub-category  of  free- 
dom.  For  the  beautiful  is  the  manifestation  of  free 
personality, and the epochs of  art  take  rank  in  accord- 
ance with  the adequacy  of  their  manifestation  of  this 
attribute.  Homer  taught  the  world  how  to recognize 
freedom under all phases  of  nature; the essence  of  the 
poetic is trope and personification.  It indicates a view 
of  nature  that  refuses  to  see  mechanical  forces,  but 
insists that all movement is free and personal.  Modern 
poetry  still  imitates  Homer, and modern art ornaments 
all things  by  decking them  out  with  shapes  that  seem 
to realize  inward  purposes.  Thus  the  real  intention 
(of  usefulness for man) is  concealed by  the appearance 
of  freedom.  The ornamented  utensil looks  as though 
it assumed its form for its own use and not for the sake 
of usefulness to others. 
The realm of religion, finally, implies the same funda- 
mental category of free personality  as all in all.  For it 
looks upon all things as creations of  an absolute Person 
who has made all things for the sake of the manifestation 
of His infinite freedom. 
This category  of self-activity  is the fundamental form 
of our inward sense-i.e.,  of introspection-just  as quality 
is the form of  our external sense-i.e.,  sense-perception. 
Quality is the form  of  fate, and its insight  sees that  all 
things are what they are because the totality of conditions 
has necessitated  them to be  so.  The category  of  self- 
activity is the form of freedom, and its  insight  sees that 
the supreme condition of everything is freedom, and that 
there is no fate  except  as  secondary  or derivative from 
freedom.  In other words, the ultimate motive power  in 
all force is will. 
Fichte's  system of philosophy sets out from the cate- 
gory of  quality  and  proceeds towards  the  category  of 
freedom, demonstrating at every  step  that self-activity is 
the foundation of  the  qualitative and showing how  the 
qualitative comes to arise from the self-active.  Being or 
existence is not a sort of  quiescent  substrate underlying 
all manner of  activity, but  the very substance  of  being 
itself is pure activity.  Having shown how the appearance 
of being and the  qualitative arises  in the mind  through 
the process  of  self-activity,  Fichte  has  completed  his 
theory  of the intellect and arrived  at  the beginning  of 
his theory of the will.  He  calls this the Practical Part of 
the Science of  Knowledge.  It is  this Practical Part of 
the Science of  Knowledge which furnishes the standpoint 
of the present work. viii  PREFACE.  PREFACE.  ix 
The one supreme fact in the universe, from  Fichte's 
point of view, is the free will.  To  discuss this idea in its 
relation  to civil  society  and  the  State, both  of  which 
institution6 arise from  the recognition of  freedom as the 
most sacred object in the secular world, is  the object  of 
the book before us-"The  Science of Rights," or of juris- 
prudence. 
Mr. Kroeger, the translator, says in regard to it : ''  The 
Science  of  Knowledge having  been  established as the 
science of  all  sciences,  Fichte, soon after its discovery 
and publication, deemed it advisable to illustrate by an 
example in what manner other sciences  take their start- 
ing point from it, and apply the form which it prescribes 
for  all  sciences.  Intensely  interested  in  the  political 
state  of  affairs  in  Europe,  he naturally  hit  upon  the 
Science of  Rights, or  of  Law generally, as  the science 
which it would be most congenial  for him  to treat;  and 
this preference  was  strengthened  by  the reflection  that 
the  deduction  of  the  principle  of  law  would  involve 
a  circumstantial  deduction  of  the  principle  of  indivi- 
duality-an  extre-mely difficult and important  point  in 
the science  of  knowledge.  . . . .  What our law-books 
and political treatises lack, the dpriori deduction of  our 
fundamental principle of  government  and law from  the 
conception  of  reason  as  reason  (or  from  the  ego), 
Fichte's Science of Rights supplies." 
The present  work  is  a  translation  of  Fichte's  first 
sketch  of  the Philosophy of  Rights which  appeared in 
1796 mder the title : "  Grundlage des Naturrechts nach 
Principien  der Wissenschaftslehre  von  Johann  Gottlieb 
Fichte.  Jena and Leipzig." 
It seems that Kant published a little later in the same 
year a work on the Science of  Right (Rechtslehre), as the 
first  part  of  his  Metaphysic  of  Morals.  (An  English 
translation  of  Kant's  work,  by  W.  Hastie,  B.D.,  1887, 
is published by T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh). 
There  is  an  essential  agreement  between  the  two 
works.  Fichte held substantially the Kantian doctrine. 
The two works deserve the careful  study of all who wish 
to see the profound  rational principles that  exist  in  the 
complex  of usages  and compromises  that  have  grown 
into our system of law.  Hegel wrote  his  first  sketch of 
a Philosophy of  Rights in 1802-3,  and published a more 
elaborate work in 1821.  These three works respectively 
by the three greatest thinkers in modern times  furnish  a 
great storehouse of  ideas on the subject of jurisprudence 
and the constitutional framework of States.  As a sample, 
one  may  refer  to Kant's  discussion  of  the  three  &eat 
fundamental powers into which the government is divided, 
and especially  their  co-ordination  (see  pp.  165-173  of 
Hastie's translation), as a treatment that cannot fail to be 
of great interest to Englishmen and to all  peoples  deri- 
vative from  England.  To the English  nation  belongs 
the great honour of having invented local self-government 
and the complete co-ordination of the three departments 
of  government-the  executive,  the  judiciary,  and  the 
legislative.  In Great  Britain  this  constitution  grew as 
a  natural  growth.  In  English  colonies  its  essential 
principles are in process of being reformulated with great 
success. 
In the  present  active  state  of  the  public  mind  on 
questions of the ownership of property and the socialistic 
reorganization  of  society,  it is  necessary  to appeal  to 
reason rather than to tradition, and show the rationale of 
the  institutions  that  have  come  down  to us  from  our 
forefathers.  It has become essential to know what this or X  PREFACE. 
that right brings with it-what  coheres with the ownership 
of  land,  what  with  the  use  of  money,  or  the  right  of 
taxation,  or of  the ballot.  The system  is  so  conlplex 
and the interdependences are so subtle that if  one link is 
thrust  out  there  follow  entirely  unexpected  results  in 
apparently  disconnected  spheres of  rights.  The reflec- 
tions  of  a  Kant, a  Fichte,  or a  Hegel  will  doubtless 
provoke  dissent  in  the reader's  mind.  But  they  will 
already have served a good purpose when they have been 
the  occasion  for  so  much  study  as  dissent  implies. 
There is one thing that  their  study  will  surely  produce. 
This  is  the  conviction  that  the progress  of  the  world 
moves  from  the  consolidation  of  the  three  powers  of 
government in one person to the  co-ordination of  those 
powers in separate departments ;  fro1.11 the constitutional 
forms in which one type prevails  (as  that  of the  family 
prevails in the patriarchal  government  of  China)  to the 
form in which the family, civil society, the State, and the 
Church are independent and complete in their functions 
without  usurping  the  functions  of  one  another.  This 
will  destroy the illusion  of  socialism, which  wishes the 
State to absorb civil society, as well as the illusion of the 
"Nihilist,"  who wishes civil society to absorb the State. 
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HOW  A  REAL  PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCE  IS  DISTIN- 
GUISHED  FROM  A  MERE  FORMULAR  PHILOSOPHY. 
THE character  of  Reason  consists in this,  that 
the acting and the object of  the acting are one and 
the same ;  and this description completely exhausts 
the sphere of  Reason.  Use of language has desig- 
nated  this  sublime conception  for  those  who  are 
able to think it, that is, for those who are able to 
abstract  from  their owtz  Ego,  by  the word  Ego. 
Hence, Reason generally has been characterized as 
Egohood  Whatsoever  exists for  a rational  being 
exists in it; but  nothing  is in  it except by virtue 
of  an acting upon  itself; what it contemplates it 
contemplates in itself, but there is nothing to be con- 
templated  in it but its acting ;  and the Ego itself 
is  nothing  but  an acting upon  itself."  To enter 
into explanations  about  this  matter  is  not  worth 
* I should not even like to say an artivr, lest I might  suggest 
the conception of  a substrate, in which this power of  acting would 
be supposed to be wrapped up.  Such a substrate would be again 
the thing pw  se, only in the present  case  it would  make  the Ego 
itself such a thing per sc, while.  This insight is the exclusive  condition of 
all philosophizing; and unless a person has attainea 
this  insight,  he  is  not  yet  ripe  for  philosophy 
And,  indeed,  all  true philosophers  have  philoso- 
phized  from  this stand-point ;  only without  being 
clearly conscious of  it. 
This inner acting of  the  rational  being  occurs 
either ?zecessari& or throz~gh  freedom. 
The rational being is simply in so far as it  posits 
itself  as being;  that is, in so far as it is self-con- 
scious.  All Being, that of  the Ego as well as that 
of the Non-Ego,  is a  determined  modification  of 
consciousness ;  and without consciousness there is 
no  Being.  Whosoever assumes the latter assumes 
a  substrate of  the Ego, which  is to  be  an  Ego 
without  being such, and thus contradicts  himself. 
Hence, only those are necessary acts which  result 
from the conception of the rational being, or through 
which  the possibility of  self-consciousness is con- 
ditioned ; but  these  acts  are  most  certainly  all 
necessary, and result as certainly as there is a ra- 
tional being.  The  rational being necessarily posits 
itself; hence, it necessarily does also all  that may 
belong to this act of  positing itself  through itself 
The rational  being  in  acting does not  become 
conscious of its acting, since itsedfis its acting, and 
nothing more ;  but that whereof  we are conscious 
is  assumed  to be  external  to consciousness, and 
hence external to the acting-it  is the o6ject of  the 
acting.  The Ego becomes  conscious only of  that 
which arises for it in and through this acting;  and 
that which  thus arises is the object  of  conscious- 
ness,  or the thing.  No other sort of  thing exists 
for a rational  being ;  and since we  can  speak of  a 
thing  and of  being only in their relation  to a ra- 
tional being,  no  other  sort of  thing exists at all. 
Whosoever speaks of  another thing does not know 
what he says. 
That which  arises in a  necessarym  acting of  the 
Ego, but  whereof  the Ego does  not become  con- 
scious, from  the reason  adduced, itself  appears  as 
necessary ;  that is, in representing it the Ego feels 
itself  not  free.  Hence, objects  are  said  to  have 
Reality.  The criterion of  all  reality is the feeling 
of  being forced  to represent something in the man- 
ner in which it is represented.  The ground of this 
necessity we have seen ; if  the rational being is to 
be as such, it must act in  this necessary manner. 
Hence,  the  expression  of  our  conviction  of  the 
reality of  a  thing is this:  as true as I  live, or as 
true as I am. 
If  the object has its ground  solely in the acting 
of  the Ego, and is completely determined through 
the Ego alone, it follows that, if  there be distinc- 
tions amongst  the objects, these their distinctions 
can arise only through different modes of acting on 
* When the  Science of  Knowledge  said :  Every thing which is 
exists through an acting of  the Ego, (particularly through the pro- 
ductive power of  imagination,) it was interpreted  as if the science 
had spoken of  a  free acting.  Thus it became easy to cry down the 
whole system as most visionary.  But to say visionary is not to  say 
nearly  enough.  To mistake  the products  offree  acting  for  the 
products of  necessary acting, and Yice  versa,  is insanity.  B 12  ImoDUcTIoN:  INTRODUCTION:  I3 
the part of  the Ego.  Every object became for the 
Ego determined in this particular manner, in which 
it is determined, simply because the Ego acted in 
the manner in which it did  act ;  but that the Ego 
did so act was  necessary, for just  such an act was 
one of  the  conditions  of  self-consciousness.  By 
reflecting on the object, and distinguishing  from it 
the mode of  acting whereby it arises, this mode of 
acting becomes-since  the object appears,  as we 
have shown, as not the product of  the  free  Ego-a 
mere comprehending, a mere taking hold of  a given 
object.  Hence, also, this mode of acting, whenever 
it occurs in the (described) abstraction, is called a 
comprehe?zzsio?z,  or a conception." 
Only through a certain determined  mode of  act- 
ing does a certain  determined object  arise in  us ; 
but if this acting is necessary, then also this object 
surely arises.  The conception (or comprehension) 
and its object are, therefore, never separated ; nor 
can they be  separated.  The object is not without 
the comprehension, for  it is through the compre- 
hension ;  and the comprehension is not without the 
object, for it is that through which the object neces- 
* A reader-who  in his joy at having finally found a well-known 
word, should hurry to transfer to it all that he may heretofore have 
thought as characterized  by this word, conception-would  soon be 
utterly confused, and unable to understand  any thing further;  and 
this by his own fault.  The word conception is here used to desig- 
nate neither more nor  Iess than I have  described, no matter what 
the reader may have heretofore understood it as designating.  I do 
not appeal to a conception already in him, but wish to develop one 
in his mind. 
sarily arises.  Both  are one and the same, viewed 
from  different sides.  If you  view  the act of  the 
 go as such, that  is, in  its form, then  it  is com- 
prehension;  but  if  you  view  the content  of  the 
act, the what  is  done-abstracting  from  the that 
is  done-then  it is  an object.  When  one  hears 
some  Kantians speak about d prism' conceptions, 
olle would  believe  that they existed in the human 
in advance of  all experience, like empty rows 
of shelves, waiting to have something put on them. 
What can such people take a conception to be, and 
what can have induced them to accept KANT'S  doc- 
trines thus interpreted ? 
We have said that, itz aadvance of  that which arises 
through a?z acti?zg, the acting itself  and the deter- 
mined  mode  of  acting  can  not  be  perceived. 
Hence, for the common  man, and upon the stand- 
point  of  common  consciousness,  there  are  only 
objects  and  no conceptions ; the comprehension 
vanishes  in the object,  and becomes  one with  it. 
The philosophical  genius, that is, the talent to find 
in and during the acting not only that which arises 
in it, but also the acting itself, as such, and to unite 
these utterly opposite directions in one comprehen- 
sion, thus to catch one's own  mind in the act, as it 
were ;  this talent first discovered the conception in 
the object, and it was  thus that  a  new  field  was 
added to the sphere of  consciousness. 
Those men  of  philosophical  mind  made known 
their  discoveries.  Nothing  is easier than to pro- 
duce with freedom, and under no necessity of think- I4  INTRODUCTION. 
ing, every possible determination in our minds, and 
to cause our mind  arbitrarily to act in every possi- 
ble  manner; but nothing is more difficult than to 
observe  that  mind  as  acting  in real,  that is,  in 
necessary acting.  The former mode of proceeding 
gives us conceptions without  objects, or an empty 
thinking ; and only in the second manner does the 
philosopher become the observer of an actual think- 
ing of  his mind."  The former  is an arbitrary re- 
petition  of  the original modes of  Reason's acting, 
after the necessity, which  gave  them  significance 
and reality, has passed  away; the latter alone  is 
the true observation of  reason in its modes of  pro- 
ceeding.  From the former arises an empty, fomu- 
Zar-pkiZoso$hy,  which  considers  itself  as  having 
* The formular-philosopher thinks this or that, observes himself 
in this  thinking,  and then  places  the whole series of thoughts, 
which  occurred to him, before the public as truth, and this simply 
Jecause he could think them.  The odjet of  his observation is him- 
self, in his  free productions, which he either undertakes without any 
clear direction, as chance may determine,  or with a direction given 
him externally.  But the true philosopher has to observe Reason in 
its original and necessary procedure, by which his Ego, with every 
thing which exists for it, has first derived Being.  But since he can 
no longer find this originally acting Ego in empirical consciousness, 
he,  by the only  act of arbitrariness  which  is permitted  to him, 
namely, by the free resolve  to philosophize, places that Ego back 
at its first  starting-point, and then causes it to describe all its act- 
ing from that point  after it;  own laws, which to the philosopher 
are well-known.  Hence, the object  of  his observation is general 
Reason itself, following its own laws of development, and having 
no external object in view.  The former  observes  an individual, 
(his own,)  lawless thinking ;  the other, Reason  itself, in its neces- 
sary acting. 
INTRODUCTION.  1.5 
done enough when it has proved that one may think 
any  thing without  being  anxious  concerning  the 
object,  that  is,  concerning  the  conditions  of  the 
necessity of  this thinking.  A real  philosophy po- 
sits  conception  and  object  together,  and  never 
treats one without  the  other.  To introduce such 
a real  philosophy, and to abolish all merely formal 
philosophy, was the object of  KANT'S  writings.  I 
can not say whether this his object has as yet been 
observed  by but one philosophical author.  But I 
can say this, that the misunderstanding of  that sys- 
tem has shown  itself in a two-fold manner:  firstly, 
through  the  so-called  Kantians  in this, that  they 
also conceived KANT'S  system to be such an empty 
formular-philosophy, and held the difference to be 
only  that  it was  the former  one  reversed ; and 
hence they continued  to philosophize in the same 
empty manner, as had  always  been done  before- 
only from an opposite side ; and secondly, through 
some sharp-sighted skeptics, who saw clearly enough 
where philosophy was at fault, but who did not see 
that  KANT  had  remedied  this fault.  Mere formal 
thinking has been  indescribably injurious in philo- 
sophy, in mathematics," in the natural Sciences, and 
indeed in all pure Sciences. 
* In mathematics  this  is  shown, particularly in  the  abuse  of 
algebra by mere  formal  minds.  Thus, to cite  an example, it has 
not  yet  been rightly comprehended that it is impossible to square 
a circle, and that this is contradictory to the conception of  a circle. 
A critic has asked me, "  Whether the squaring of  the circle is im- 
Possible  because straiglrtness and crookedmss have nothing in com- 
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AS  A  REAL  PHILOSOPHICAL  SCIENCE,  WILL  BE. 
To say, therefore, a certain determined  concep- 
tion is originally contained through and in Reason, 
question,  looks around,  laughs,  and leaves me to sink under  my 
disgrace.  But I look  at him and laugh at his question.  "Most 
truly, such is my serious opinion, dear sir !"  "Ansam philosojhic 
nun ha6e~  P'  says  he pityingly ;  and I reply, "  Your great wisdom 
has run away with your common sense.  ICcowledge on this point, 
my dear sir, I do not lack exactly ;  but understanding of it-most 
sorely.  When I was  still at college, I heard often enough that the 
circumference is equal to a polygon of  an infinite number of sides, 
and that we can square the circle when we  get the content of  that 
content.  But I never could  understand  it.  And I hope to God 
that I shall never understand how it is possible  to measure that 
content.  For what  is the conception  of  an Infinite ! I suppose 
that of  aproblem, to divide infinitely the side of  the polygon ;  and 
hence the problem of  an injnite dete~minins.9 But what, then, is a 
measure,  for which you want to use the infinitely-sided  polygon? 
I suppose a detprmined something.  Now, if you  keep on dividing 
ad injnitum, as the problem requires  you, you  will  never  get to 
measuring it.  Rut if  you  proceed to measure it, you  must  first 
stop dividing, and then your polygon is finite, and not, as you have 
posited it, infinite.-But  because you can take hold of  your manner 
of acting in describing  an Infinite, that is, because  you  can seize 
the empty comprehension of  the Infinite, and designate  it, for in- 
stance, as  A, you now pay no further attention, to  whether you have 
really accomplished  the act-no,  not even to whether you  can ac- 
complish  it ;  you  take  your  A  calmly  and proceed  to business. 
Common sense looks at your doings admiringly, and cheerfully con- 
fesses it its own fault that it does not understand you ;  but when 
some one who is not JO  modest  takes it upon  himself  merely to 
utter his opinion on the subject, you can not explain his inability to 
understand  a  matter which  to you  seems so very clear, except on 
the presumption that the poor man has not gone through the rudi- 
ments of  the Sciences." 
cm only signify : a  rational being, as sure as it is 
such, acts in a determined  manner.  The philoso- 
pher has to show of  this determined act, first, that 
it js  a  condition of  self-conscioz~sness,  and this fur- 
nishes the deduction  thereof; but he has  also  to 
describe  this  determined  act  as  well  in  regard, 
secondly, to its form, to the fnanner of  acting in it, 
as, thirdly, in  regard  to its content, to that which 
ayises  i~z  this act for  the rejection.  He thus  fur- 
nishes at the same time the proof  of  the necessity 
of  this  conception, determines  it, and  shows  its 
application.  None of  these parts can be separated 
from  the  others,  without  wrongly  treating  even 
these  separates, and  without  falling  into  formal 
philosophy.  The conception of  Rights is assumed 
to be  an original conception of  Reason ;  it must, 
therefore, be treated in the above manner. 
I. Now, in regard to this  conception of  Rights, 
it results-as  we shall hereafter show in its deduc- 
tion-that  this  conception  becomes  a  necessary 
condition  of  self-consciousness, because  a  rational 
being  can not  self-consciously posit  itself as such, 
without  positing  itself  as an individual, or as one 
of  many  rational  beings, which  many  it assumes 
outside of  it by assuming itself. 
2.  What the manner of  acting in the positing of 
the conception of  Rights is, can be even sensuously 
I 
represented.  I  posit myself  as rational, that is, as 
free.  In doing  so I have  the  representation  of 
freedom.  In the same undivided act I posit  other 
free beings.  Hence, I describe through my power 18  INTRODUCTION:  INTRODUCTION;  '9 
of  imagination  a  sphere of  freedom,  which  these 
many separate beings  divide  amongst  themselves. 
I do not ascribe to  myself  all the freedom which I 
have  posited, because I must also posit  other free 
beings, and must ascribe part of it to them.  Thus, 
in appropriating freedom to myself, I at the same 
time restrict myself, by leaving  freedom to others. 
The conception of  Rights is, therefore, the concep- 
tion of the necessary relation of free beings to each 
other. 
3.  Finally, as regards the contelzt of  the concep- 
tion  of  Rights.  The conception  of  freedom  in- 
volves originally only the power, through  absolute 
spontaneity, to  form  conceptions  of  our  possible 
causality ; and it is only this power which  rational 
beings necessarily ascribe to each other.  But that 
a  rational individual, or a  person, should jnd  him- 
self to be free requires something more, namely, that 
a  result  in  the  external world  should  follow  the 
thinking of  his  activity, or that he should perceive 
the effect of  his free causality. 
Now, if  the causalities of  rational  beings should 
work upon the same world, and should thus be able 
to influence, check,  and oppose each other, as is 
indeed the case, then freedom-in  the latter signifi- 
cation of  the word-would  be possible  for  persons 
who  stand under this reciprocal  influence, only on 
condition  that all  of  them restrict  their  causality 
within  certain  limits, and divide the world,  as  it 
were, amongst  them.  But since they are posited 
as free, such a limit to their  freedom  could  not lie 
beyond freedom-since  then the limit would canrel, 
but not restrict it as freedom ;  but must rather  be 
free&  posited by all ;  in other words, all must have 
it  their  rule, not  to disturb the freedom of 
those with whom they are placed  under reciprocal 
influence. 
And thus we  have the whok object  of  the con- 
ception  of  Rights, namely,  a  community  between 
free Beings as such.  It  is necessary that every free 
being should  assume  other free  beings  as  exist- 
ing ;  but it is not necessary that all these free be- 
ings, as free  beings,  should  coexist  together ;  the 
thought  of  such  a  community and its  realization 
are, therefore, altogether arbitrary.  But when it is 
thought,  through  what  conception or  determined 
mode of acting is it thought ?  It appears that it is 
possible  in thought to have  every member of  this 
community  so restrict  his  own  external  freedom 
through  inner  freedom as to make it possible that 
all other members shall  also be free.  Now, this is 
the conception  of  Rights.-If  this  conception  is 
thought  as  a  practical  conception-because  the 
thought as well as the realization of such a commu- 
nity is arbitrary-then  it is purely of  a technical- 
practical  character ;  that is to say, the conception 
of  Rights does not demand that such a community 
be erected, but merely demands that, if  it be erect- 
ed, it shall be established on the basis of  the con- 
ception of  Rights. 
In all this our representation of  the conception 
of  Rights we  have refrained  from  expressly refut- INTRODUCTION.  21 
ing those who attempt to deduce the conception of 
Rights from the Moral Law, because, as soon as the 
true deduction of  that conception  has been  estab- 
lished,  every impartial mind  will  accept it as the 
true one without demanding that the incorrectness 
of  other deductions be  shown  up.  But for parti- 
sans and  narrow-minded  disputants,  it would  be 
lost time to write.  The rule of  law, Restrict your 
freedom  through the conception of  the freedom of 
all other persons with whom  you come in contact! 
receives,  it is true, a new  sanction for  conscience 
through the Moral Law ; but the deduction of  this 
sanction forms  a  part of  the Science of  Morality, 
and does not belong to the Science of  Rights.  It 
might  be  said  that many learned  men, who  have 
written  systems  of  natural  law,  have  treated  in 
them  without  knowing  it  that  very  part  of  the 
Science of Morality, had they not forgotten to state 
why obedience to the Moral Law always conditions 
absolute inner harmony of the rational Being.  In- 
deed, most  teachers of  morality seem  not to have 
considered  that the  Moral  Law  is purely formal, 
and hence empty ; and that a content  for  it must 
not be surreptitiously obtained elsewhere, but must 
be thoroughly deduced.  We can state at once how 
the matter stands in our case.  I must necessarily 
think  myself  in contact with the men  nature has 
placed  me  amongst, but this I can not do without 
thinking my freedom as restricted by their freedom, 
and hence I must act in accordance with this neces- 
sary thinking, or my thinking and  my acting* are 
in contradiction,  and I am not in that absolute har- 
mony with  myself  which  constitutes morality.  I 
am,  therefore,  bound  in  conscience,  through  my 
knowledge of what shall be, to restrict my freedom ; 
or,  in  other  words,  morally bound  to respect  the 
conception of  Rights.  Now, it is this moral aspect 
of the question which  belongs  to the  Science of 
Morality, and not to the Science of  Rights ; in the 
latter  science men are bound  only  by  their arbi- 
trary resolution to live in  community with others ; 
and if  any one is not willing to restrict his arbitra- 
riness at all, the Science of  Rights has nothing to 
say to him  other than this : that he must, in  that 
case, remove from all human society. 
In the present work the conception of Rights, as 
the condition of  self-consciousness,  is deduced  at 
the same time with its object ;  it is derived, deter- 
mined, and secured in its application, as should be 
done by a real science.  This has been done in the 
first, second, and third books of  our science.  It  is 
then further determined in the second part, and the 
manner stated, in which it must be  realized  in the 
sensuous world. 
* I have  read somewhere that the fundamental  principle of  the 
Science of Morality is, that "The  manifold  acts of  the free  will 
should be in harmony."  This is a very unfortunate  application  of 
my statement of the absolute self-harmony of  rational beings in my 
Lectzrres on the Vocation of the Scholar.  For if it were correct, a man 
might merely resolve to be  a very thorough  and consequent rascal 
-in  which case  all the acts of his free will would  perfectly agree, 
being, all of them, opposed to the condition of  what skull be ;  and 
he would have done enough to satisfy such a morality. INTRODUCTION.  23 
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CONCERNING  THE  RELATION OF THE  PRESENT TRE- 
ORY  OF  RIGHTS  TO  KANT'S  SCIENCE. 
With  the exception  of  some  excellent  sugges- 
tions in recent writings by Mr. EHRHARDT  and Mr. 
MAIMON,  the writer of this had discovered no trace 
of a distrust in the manner in which the Science of 
Rights  had  been  heretofore  treated,  until-after 
the completion of  the present work-he  was  most 
agreeably surprised  by KANT'S  important  work, A 
Perennial Peace. 
A comparison of  KANT'S  doctrines of  Rights, as 
they appear from  that work, and the principles of 
the  present  science  may  not  be  disagreeable  to 
many readers. 
It can  not be  clearly  seen from  KANT'S  work, 
whether he deduces  the conception of  Rights, ac- 
cording to the usual method, from Morality, or whe- 
ther he assumes  another deduction.  But some re- 
marks  (page  15) concerning  the  conception  of a 
Law of  Permission  make it very probable that his 
deduction agrees with our own. 
A Right is evidently something which one may 
use  or  not use, and is,  therefore,  the result  of  a 
pure  Law of  Permission ;  of  a law which  simply 
allows you rights, leaving you at liberty to use them 
or not as you please-a  law, moreover, which, being 
restricted to a certain  sphere, permits  the conclu- 
sion, that beyond  that sphere each one is left to his 
own  free will.  This  permission  does  not  lie  ex- 
pressly  in the law, but is merely argued  from  the 
limitedness of  the law.  The limitedness of  a  law 
shows  itself  in this, that  it is a  conditioned  law. 
Now, it is absolutely not comprehensible how from 
the unconditionally commanding and thus universal 
Law of  Morality it were  possible to derive  a  Law 
of  Permission. 
KANT'S  assertions that the state of  peace  or of 
law amongst  men  is not a condition of  nature, but 
of  art ;  and that we  have the right to compel  per- 
sons, though they have not attacked us, to submit 
to the supremacy of  government as the only secu- 
rity against  future  possible  attacks  from  them ; 
agree wholly with our science, and are deduced  in 
our  science  in the  same  manner  as  in  KANT'S 
work. 
Our science also agrees with KANT'S  work in its 
deduction of  the principle, that a state government 
can be erected only on the basis of  an original but 
necessary  compact ;  and, furthermore, of  the prin- 
ciple, that the people must not themselves exercise 
the executive  power, but confer it, and that hence 
a Democracy, in the pure significance of  the word, 
is an utterly unlawful form of  government. 
But I differ with KANT  in his statement, that the 
division of  legislative and executive power is suffi- 
cient to secure the maintenance of rights in a state. 
The chief  points which I hold on this subject, and 
which are developed at length in the present work, 
I shall here state as concisely as possible. 
The conception  of  Rights  involves  that when men are to live in a community, each must so re- 
strict his  freedom as to permit  the coexistence of 
the freedom of  all others.  But  it does not involve 
that this particular person, A, is to restrict his free- 
dom  by  the freedom  of  those  particular  persons, 
B,  C, and D.  That it has  happened so that I, A, 
must conform myself particularly to the freedom of 
these, B, C, and D, of  all  other men, is  purely the 
result of  my living together with  them ; and I  so 
live with them, simply by my free-will, not because 
there is  an obligation  for  me  to do  so.  Thus it 
is  originally  within  the free-will  of  every citizen, 
whether he chooses to live in this particular state 
or not-though  he must live  in  some state, if  he 
wants to live at all with other men.  Now, as soon 
as he expresses the  resolve  to enter a  particular 
state, and is accepted as a member of it, then he is, 
by this simple, natural declaration, subjected to all 
the restrictions which law prescribes for that state. 
By his mere  statement, I will  live in this state, he 
has adopted  all  its laws.  The laws  of  the state 
become formalty  his  laws  by his resolve to live in 
the state ; but,  material&, they  have  been  deter- 
mined  without  his  consent  by  the conception  of 
Rights and the position  of  the state.  Again, the 
law, Restrict  your  freedom  by the freedom  of  all 
others, is a purely formal law, and as such not capa- 
ble of  application.  For how far  is the sphere to 
extend, within which no one may hurt him, but be- 
yond which  he may also not go, without  being re- 
garded  as a  disturber of  the freedom  of  others? 
This the parties must arrange amongst themselves. 
Applying this to the state:  each one, on entering 
the state, must arrange with the state  what is to be 
his particular  sphere of  free activity, (his property 
and his civil rights.)  When he has so arranged, by 
what has his sphere been determined ?  Evidently, 
by his own  free resolve ;  for  without  it he would 
have had as much right to what the others possess 
as they have themselves.  But how is it determined, 
how  much  can  be  allowed  to  each  individual ? 
Clearly, by the common will in accordance with the 
rule :  This number of  men  are to be  free  in  this 
particular  sphere of  general  freedom, hence, each 
one has as his share so much. 
Now, within  these self-imposed  restrictions, the 
citizens must be kept by force, and a certain threat 
of  punishment, should  they transgress them, must 
keep  them  from  such transgressions.  It is  also 
clear that this punishment must be known to them 
if  it is to affect their wills ; that they must have 
consented to receive such punishment for a trans- 
gression of  their sphere of  freedom upon  entering 
the state. (In other words, no expost  facto  laws are 
admitted.) 
But who is to  proclaim the common will, thus de- 
termined in all respects, regarding the rights of the 
individual citizen  as well as regarding the punish- 
ment to be inflicted upon their transgression ? Who 
is  to  interpret  this  necessary  arrangement  and 
agreement ?  The masses themselves would be the 
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the expressed wills of the individuals, the true com- 
mon will could scarcely be obtained in its purity. 
This business  can only belong to him who con- 
tinually  overlooks  the whole  community and  its 
requirements,  and  who  is  responsible  for  the 
continuous  supreme  rule  of  the law : to the ad- 
ministrator  of  the  executive  power.  He pro- 
claims the matter of  the law, as given in  the con- 
ception of  Rights and in the geographical position 
of the state ;  which matter receives its  form, that is, 
its binding power over each individual, only by that 
individual's  consent, that is, his consent to remain 
in the state, but not expressly his consent to any 
particular law. 
From  these  reasons  we,  in  our  theory,  have 
asserted,  that in  civil !.aw  the legislative  and  the 
executive powers  are inseparable,  and  not  to be 
divided.  Indeed, civil Iegislation is itself a branch 
of the egecutive, if the law is really to be executed. 
The administrator  of  the executive  power  is the 
natural interpreter of the common will, announcing 
the relations of the individuals to each other in the 
state ; not exactly  of  the will  which  they actually 
nave, but of the will which they must have, to make 
heir coexistence in a community possible. 
Of quite a different nature is the law concerning 
the manner in which  the laws are to be executed, 
or  the  constitution.  The  constitution  must  be 
adopted  by the vote  of  every citizen, and  can  be 
adopted only by unanimity ;  since it is the guaran- 
tee which each one has given him by all others for 
the security of all his rights in the community.  The 
essential  component  of  every  constitution  is the 
@hornte, explained  in  our work.  Whether this is 
sufficient to secure the rights of  all-without  the 
separation of  the legislative and executive powers, 
which  t~  me seems  inadmissible, I must leave  to 




CONCEPTION  OF  RIGHTS. A  FINITE,  RATIONAL BEING  CAN  NOT POSIT ITSELF 
WITHOUT  ASCRIBING  TO  ITSELF A  FREE  CAUS- 
ALITY. 
PROOF. 
A. If  a rational being is to josit it.seGf as such, it 
%#st ascribe to  itseGf an activity which shall have 
its last ground  in itse& 
An in itself returning activity (Egohood, subjec- 
tivity) is character of the rational being.  The  posit- 
ing of itself (reflecting about itself) is an act of this 
activity.  Let  this  reflection  be  called  A.  The 
rational being posits itself through the act of  such 
an activity.  All reflection reflects something as its 
object ;  let this object be called B.  Now, what sort 
of  a something must this object be as object of the 
reflection A ?  In A  the rational being is to posit 
itself, is to be  its own object ; but its character is 
in itself returning activity.  The last highest object 
(B) of  its reflection must therefore also be in its@ 
yekyni~zg,  or itseg  determining activity, since other- 
wise  it would  not posit itself  as a  rational being, 
and hence would not posit itself at all. 
This assumed rational being is afinite being ;  but THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGUTS.  3 3  3" 
THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS. 
a finite rational being  is one which can  re$ect  on& 
upon a limited.  Hence, the in itself  returning ac- 
tivity B, must be a limited activity, that is, beyond 
this activity B there must be, and must be posited 
by the reflecting, a  C, which  is not  this in  itself 
returning activity, but rather its opposite. 
B.  Its activity in contemplating the world can not 
be posited  by the ratio?zal being as sztch an activity, 
which has its last grou~zd  in itsev: 
For this contemplating activity is posited by its 
very conception as an activity which does  not re- 
turn into the Contemplating, but  rather has an ex- 
ternality, an opposite of the Contemplating, a World 
for its object. 
(After the contemplation, the activity in this con- 
templating may certainly also be ascribed by the ra- 
tional being to itself, or raised into its consciousness ; 
that is, the rational being may posit itself as  the Con- 
templating.  Nay,  from  the  stand-point  of  tran- 
scendental philosophy, it appears quite clearly that 
even this Contemplating is nothing but an in itself 
returning Ego, and that  the World is nothing but 
the Ego contemplated in its original limits.  But if 
the Ego is to ascribe that activity  in  the contem- 
plation of  the world  to itself, it must already have 
existence ;  and, at present, the question is only, how 
the Ego can  originally  be  for  itself,  and this we 
can not explain from the  world-contemplation, since, 
on the contrary, the latter becomes  possible  only 
through the former, which we are in search of) 
C. But the ratiorznl being can oflosit such an ac- 
tivity as zoe  are ilt  search  of, to  the world as that 
liwzits this activity, arzd  in order to opposit it 
ca~z  generate it.  Moreover, z;f szrch an activity is the 
sole condition of  the possibility of seF-co;lzscious~zess, 
nlld z;f  sev-consciozrs~zess  must be  ascribed to a ra- 
tjolial bcilzg, as indeed  that which constitzdtes it a m- 
tiorzal beins, then it tmz~st  oflosit and gejzerate such 
an activity. 
The activity  of  the rational  being,  in  contem- 
plating  the world,  which  must  be known  to  the 
philosopher, when  his speculation  has advanced to 
the Science of  Rights, but which may  not yet be 
known to the rational being, about which he philo- 
sophizes, is ~zecessitated  and bound, if not in regard 
to its form, that is, that it occurs at all, at least in 
regard to its content; that is, that, if  it occurs, it 
must occur  in such or  such a manner.  We must 
represent objects as they are-in our belief-without 
our  coijperation ; our  representation  must be de- 
termined  by  their  being.  An  activity  opposed to 
this activity would  therefore, in order to be its op- 
posite, have to be free in regard to its content ; or, 
there must be in it a possibility of  acting thus or 
othewise. 
Again, this free activity is to be limited by the 
activity in contemplating the world ;  that is, the  ac- 
tivity in  the world-contemplation is itself that free 
activity, but in, a state of limitedness ;  and vice versa, 
the free activity is the activity in the world-con- 
templation,  whenever  that limitedness  falls  away. 
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far  as and  through  this,  that  they do  not  exist 
through  free  activity;  and  this free activity must 
be checked  and limited, if  objects are to be.  For 
free  activity tends  to  cancel  these  objects, in  so 
far as they bind it.  Hence, free activity is causality 
upon  the objects,  and  contemplation  is  cancelled 
causality,  causality  voluntarily  renounced  by  the 
rational being itself 
We  have now  described  what  the  activity  B is 
in  its relation  to the world-contemplation, and to 
the world itself  But it is also to be a return of the 
rational being  into itself, and  in  so far as it is di- 
rected upon  objects, it is not  this.  Hence, when 
related to the rational being itself, it must be a free 
determining of  itself  to have  causality.  Only in so 
far as this activity is directed upon objects, is it de- 
termined in  its content.  But originally, and in its 
J  essence, it must not be so determined.  Hence, it 
must be  determined  through  itself-must  be de- 
termined and determining at the same time, and is, 
therefore, most truly, an in itself returning activity. 
What we have just  said  may  be  systematically 
expressed  thus : The activity B, which we were in 
scarch of, must be posited as  arz  opposite to the con- 
templation,  and  is, in  so far,  absolutely free, prc- 
cisely  because  that  contemplating activity is  not 
free ; this  activity  B,  moreover,  is  directed  upon 
the rational being, or, which means the same, ret~~rns 
into itself, precisely because  the contemplating ac- 
tivity  is  directed  upon  something external to the 
rational being ; and  in so far this activity B is the 
crentifzg of the conception of an intentional causality 
outside of us, or of the conception of an end, (object.) 
At the  same time, this activity B must be related 
to the contemplation, that is,posited as equal to it; 
and in this relation  it is  a  causality directed upon 
objects.  But it is to be carefully remembered that 
this causality upon objects follows immediately from 
that conception of  an  end,  and  is the  very same, 
only viewed from another point of view. 
By  means  of  such  an activity  B  the  required 
self-consciousness  becomes  possible.  B  is  some- 
thing which has its last ground in the rational being 
itself, and can, as such, be posited only by means of 
the possible  opposition  of  a  something which has 
not its ground in the rational  being.  The Ego (the 
rational  being  itself  as such) is  thus now  limited 
and determined, and hence, can be taken hold ofby 
reflection ; that is  to say, the practical  Ego is the 
Ego for the reflection ; the reflection takes hold of 
this practical Ego, which is  posited  through itself, 
and  which,  in the reflection,  must  be posited  as 
through itself; and of  this Ego, as logical subject, 
a  possible  predicate  may assert something, as, for 
instance,  in  our  case-the  contemplation  of  the 
world. 
It is only by means of  such an activity that self- 
consciousness becomes  possible ; for  our result in- 
voives only  the characteristics, which, at the com- 3  6  THE  SC(ENCE  OF RIGHTS 
mencement, we showed to be the conditions of self- 
consciousness ; namely, first, the existence of  such 
an in itself returning activity, or of an activity which 
should  have  its last ground  in  the rational being 
itself; secondly, the jnity  and limitedness  of  this 
activity ; and thirdly,  the being posited of  this ac- 
tivity in opposition and relation to the limiting ;  as 
which it is posited indeed by merely being reflected 
about. 
Hence, such an activity, aand  the positing  thereof; 
is necessariGy assumed when seedf-consciousness  is as- 
sumed;  and both concepons are identicad 
I.  It is here maintained, that the practical  Ego 
is the Ego of  original  self-consciousness ; that  a 
rational being perceives  itself immediately only in 
Willing, and that it would  not perceive  itself, and 
hence would also not perceive the world, and that it 
would therefore not be Intelligence, if  it were not a 
practical  being.  Willing is the real essential cha- 
racter of  reason ; and representation-although  in 
the insight of  the philosopher  it stands in recipro- 
cal causality with willing-is  posited as the acciden- 
tal.  The practical faculty is the inmost root of the- 
Ego ;  to it every thing else is attached, and with it 
connected. 
All other attempts to deduce the Ego in self-con- 
sciousness have  failed,  because they must always 
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presuppose what they wish to deduce ;  and we here 
see why they must fail.  How was it indeed possi- 
ble to assume, that the Ego arises through the con- 
nection of  many representations, in none of  which 
the Ego is contained ?  that an Ego is produced by 
the mere connection ?  On the contrary, only after 
the Ego is, can any thing be connected in it.  The 
Ego must, therefore, exist *-of  course for the Ego 
-in  advance of  all connection. 
2. Willing  and  Representing  are,  therefore,  in 
continual  and  necessary  reciprocal  causality,  and 
neither is possible unless the other is at the same 
time.  The first assertion, that willing is not possi- 
ble  without  representing, will be admitted without 
much trouble : I must represent what I will.  The 
other,  that every representing  is conditioned  by a 
willing, may, however, meet difficulties.  But a rep- 
resentation can not be without a Representing sub- 
ject, and can not be posited in consciousness unless 
this  representing  subject is posited.  This  repre- 
*The Ego, which is to reflect, or which is to determine itself to 
have causality, or which  is to contemplate the world, is the prior- 
of course, for the philosophizing Ego, which, however, let us hope, 
is also an Ego, and follows the laws of  its being--by  virtue of  those 
very Caws;  and it  is this prior Ego, of which  the first fundamental 
principle of  the Science of Knowledge speaks. 
Now another Ego is to be object  for this reflecting Ego ;  that is, 
this Ego is to be object for itself.  How is this possible ?  Such is 
the question we are here answering. 
Attentive readers must pardon this note.  It  is not for them, but 
for the careless and superficial readers, who need such a reminder ; 
and these are requested to recall it to mind whenever they need it 
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senting subject is-not  accidentaliter, in so far as it 
now represents, but substa?ztialiter, in so far as it is 
at all, and as it is a somewhat-either  a really Will- 
ing, or, at least, a something, which  is posited  and 
characterized  through  its ability to will.  Not  In- 
telligence  alone constitutes a rational being, for it 
alone is not possible ;  nor does the practical activity 
alone constitute a rational  being, for it also is not 
possible  alone ; it is  only both  united which  com- 
plete it and make it a Whole. 
3.  It is through this reciprocal causality between 
the Contemplation and Willing of  the Ego, that the 
Ego and every thing which  is for the Ego, that is, 
every thing which is at all, first becomes possible. 
First of all, the Ego itself  It might be said, that 
a  reciprocal  causality  between  the Contemplation 
and the Willing of the Ego must precede the possi- 
bility of  the Ego itself; that there must  be some- 
thing in the Ego, which stands in reciprocal causal- 
ity, before the Ego is itself; and that this is a con- 
tradiction.  But here lies the very deception which 
we  wish  to remove.  Contemplation  and  Willing 
neither  precede  nor  follow  the Ego, but  are  the 
Ego ; occur only in so far as the Ego posits itself; 
occur only in this positing and through this positing 
of  its occurrence ; and it is nonsense to  think of 
any occurrence  outside of  and independent of  this 
positing.  Vice versa, the Ego posits itself  in so far 
as both  occur  and in so far as it posits  the occur- 
rence of  both ; and it is equally nonsense to think 
of  any other  positing  of  the  Ego.  It is, at any 
rate, very unphilosophical  to believe, that the Ego 
is something else than both its deed nndproduct at 
once.  Usually,  however,  as soon  as we  hear  the 
Ego spoken of  as an active, we hasten to picture a 
substrate, of which we proclaim  this activity to be 
mere power or faculty.  This substrate, however, is 
not the Ego, but is a product of our own imagination, 
which we sketch in consequence of the demand made 
upon us to think the Ego.  The Ego is not some- 
thing, which has powers ; it is no power at all ;  but 
it is simply Acting;  it is what it acts, and when it 
does not act, it is not at all. 
It has been  asked : How does the Representing 
subject arrive at the conviction that there exists an 
object of  its representation  outside of  it,  and that 
this object is determined precisely as it represents 
it?  If those who asked this question had but con- 
sidered what it really meant, they would themselves 
have arrived at the correct conception. 
The Ego itself, through its acting, makes the ob- 
ject ; the form of  its acting is itself the object, and 
no other object is to be thought of  That, the man- 
ner of acting whereof necessarily becomes an object, 
is an Ego; and the Ego is nothing  but  that, the 
mere manner of  acting whereof  becomes an object. 
If  it acts with  its whole  power-I  must  use  this 
expression if  but to express myself-then  it is ob- 
ject  to itself; but  if  it acts only  with  part of  its 
power, then it acts upon something which is exter- 
nal, or upon an object. 
To grasp itself  in this identity of  acting and be- 40  THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
ing acted upon-not  in the acting, nor in the being 
acted upon, but in the identity of  both ;  and to sur- 
prise itself  as it were in this act of  grasping itself, 
is to comprehend the pure Ego and to get posses- 
sion of  the stand-point of all transcendental philoso- 
phy.  This talent seems to be altogether deficient 
in some men.  He  who  can  only view each  apart 
and separate, and who, though he takes the greatest 
pains, always grasps either the active or the object 
of  the activity, obtains through both in  their sepa- 
ration  utterly distinct  results,  which  can  only  be 
seemingly  united,  because  they have  not  been  so 
united from the beginning. 
THROUGH  THIS  POSITING  OF ITS  POWER  TO HAVE 
FREE  CAUSALITY,  THE  RATIONAL  BEING  POSITS 
AND  DETERMINES  A  SENSUOUS WORLD  OUTSIDE 
OF ITSELF. 
A.  Itposits this external sensuous world.  Only 
the absolutely self-active, or practical, is posited as 
subjective,  as  belonging  to the  Ego,  and  by its 
limitation  the  Ego  is  limited.  Whatsoever  lies 
beyond this  sphere of  the absolutely self-active, is 
posited, for the very reason that it lies beyond it, as 
not produced nor producible through the activity of 
the Ego ; hence, it is excluded  from the sphere of 
the Ego, and the Ego is excluded from  its sphere ; 
and thus there arises a system of objects, that is, a 
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world, which exists i?zde$endefzt& of  the Ego, that is 
to say, of the practical Ego, which  here  stands for 
the Ego  generally,  and  independently  of  which 
world the  Ego (also,  of course,  the practical Ego, 
which determines its ends) exists likewise;  both of 
which, therefore, exist independently and externally 
of  each  other, and  have  both  their  separate  ex- 
istences. 
COROLLARIA. 
I. The transcendental philosopher must  assume 
that every thing which  is, is only for an Ego ;  and 
whatsoever is for an Ego, can only be  through the 
Ego.  But common  sense, on the contrary, claims 
an independent existence for  both ;  and maintains 
that the world would be, though it (common sense) 
were  not.  The latter has  no  need  to take  cog- 
nizance of the assertion of the philosopher, and can 
not do so, for it stands on a lower stand-point ;  but 
the former must certainly take cognizance of com- 
mon sense; and  his  assertions  are indefinite, and 
hence, in part, incorrect, until  he has  shown how, 
from  these very assertiofzs,  the precise results of  COVZ- 
mofz  seme follow,  azd how they can  indeed o?t@  be 
cxplaiizcd by those  assertions.  Philosophy must de- 
duce our conviction of the existence of a world. 
Now, this has been done here from the possibility 
of self-consciousness ; and that conviction has been 
shown up as a condition of  this self-consciousness. 
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can posit itself  in  self-consciousness  only as prac- 
tical  activity; and  because, since it can not  posit 
any thing but  a  limited,  it must  posit  a limit  to 
this, its practical activity.  This is the original pro- 
cedure of  every  rational  being,  and  is,  doubtless, 
also the procedure of the philosopher. 
Now, although the philosopher immediately after- 
ward  sees that  the rational being must first posit 
its suppressed practical  activity before  it can posit 
and determine the object, and that thus the object 
itself is not immediately given, but is originally pro- 
duced only by virtue of another-this  need not dis- 
turb common  sense; for  it can not  become  con- 
scious of  the just now postulated process, since that 
process conditions  the possibility of  all conscious- 
ness, and is  therefore  beyond  its  sphere ; it even 
does not disturb the philosopher as soon as he gets 
to the sphere of common sense. 
It  might be asked, What reality shall be ascribed 
to those acts which  lie beyond  the sphere of  con- 
sciousness, and are not posited in consciousness, if 
reality  is properly  ascribed  only  to  that which is 
necessarily posited by the Ego  ?  Of  course, no re- 
ality, except in so far as it is thus necessarily posited. 
Those acts beyond common consciousness have re- 
ality, therefore, only for the philosopher who posits 
them.  Ifthe activities  of  the human  mind are to 
be systematically united in an ultimate ground, then 
this and that must be assumed as necessary acts ; 
such, and  nothing  more, is  what  the  philosopher 
asserts.  Those  original  deed-acts  have  :he  same 
reality which the causality of things upon each other 
in the sensuous world, and  their universal recipro- 
cal  relation,  claim  to have.  For those primitive 
peoples, of which we still have memorials, who little 
united  their experiences,  but rather allowed  their 
observations to lie scattered and separate in their 
consciousness, no such  causality or universal rela- 
tion of  things  had  existence.  They  gave  sepa- 
rate life to almost every object of the sensuous world, 
and thus  made  those  objects first free  causes, as 
they were  themselves.  The universal connection 
we speak of,  had not only no realig for them, it even 
did fzot exist for them.  But the man who connects 
his  experiences  into  unity-and  this problem lies 
in the way of  the synthetically progressive human 
reason, and  had  to be  taken  up sooner or later- 
must  necessarily  connect  in  such  a  determined 
manner; and for  him  the whole connection  thus 
obtained  has reality.  Moreover,  as soon  as this 
problem had been  taken up and solved, and as hu- 
man reason had once again returned into itself-as 
it did for the first time with clear consciousness, and 
completely, in one of  its sublimest representatives, 
KANT-and  had thus discovered, that all its seem- 
ing external  perceptions  were,  after  all, produced 
by itself ;  the following additional problem proposed 
itself  to the still synthetically progressive reason : 
namely, to unite all these, its modes of acting, also in 
an ultimate ground ;  and this proceeding had reality 
from  the same ground which  gave  reality  to the 
category of  causality,  of  a universal connection of 
D 44 
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objects, etc.  etc.  This final  problem  for the syn- 
thetical faculty, moreover, after the solution of which 
mankind  returns  forever again to analysis,  which 
analysis has thus, however, received quite a different 
significance-had  also to be solved sooner or later ; 
and all we  might  wish  is this, that those  persons 
who are not  called  by their talents to  take part in 
this branch of science, would also take no notice of 
it, would  leave, as has been  heretofore customary, 
philosophy to the philosophers, and would  not be 
so foolish in their anxiety for the reality of  the re- 
sults of that science, as  to demand that we ought to 
give to those results the same kind of reality which 
alone is known to them.  To say, "  A pure Ego and 
its acts have no reality prior to consciousness," is as 
foolish as if  a  savage were to say, "Your  causality 
and your reciprocal connection have no reality, be- 
cause I can not eat them." 
2. From the deduction  of  our  conviction of  the 
existence of a sensuous world, it results at the same 
time, how far  this conviction  extends, and in what 
condition of  mind  it occurs :  for no grounded goes 
further than the ground,  and as soon as we know 
the ground of  a  certain mode of  thinking we  also 
know its extent.  It extends so far as our practical 
faculty  is distinguished  from  and  opposed  to  the 
theoretical faculty ; so far as our representation of 
the influence of  things upon us and of  our reaction 
upon  them extends, since only by this representa- 
tion is our practical faculty posited as limited.  This 
is the reason why philosophers have always proved 
the reality of an external world by its influence upon 
us;  a proof  which  certainly presupposes  what  it 
would  prove, but which  pleases common sense, be- 
cause it is the same proof common sense makes use 
of  for itself. 
But  how  does  the speculative  philosopher  pro- 
ceed in  order to remove  this conviction for  some 
time, so that he may investigate beyond  its range ? 
Evidently by not drawing the distinction which con- 
ditions this conviction.  As soon as we look merely 
at the activity in the representation and seek only 
to explain it, a necessary doubt regarding the exist- 
ence of external things will arise.  The  transcenden- 
tal idealist comprehends the practical and theoretical 
activity at the same time as activity generally ; and 
hence-there  being now no passivity in the Ego, as, 
indeed, there can not be-he  arrives at the result, 
that the whole system of  objects must be produced 
for  the Ego by the Ego itself.  But for  the very 
reason that he has thus comprehended  both  activi- 
ties,  he can also,  at the proper  time,  distinguish 
both,  and show up the stand-point which  common 
sense  must  necessarily  occupy.  The dogmatic 
idealist  excludes the practical  activity wholly from 
his investigations, looks only at the theoretical  ac- 
tivity, which  he desires  to ground  through  itself; 
and hence he naturally makes the theoretical activ- 
ity unconditioned. 
But these speculations are possible for both sorts 
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solitude of  thinking ; as soon as their practical ac- 
tivity is excited, both immediately forget their spec- 
ulative convictions  and return to the ordinary hu- 
man  view  of  things,  simply  because  they  must. 
There never has been an idealist who extended his 
doubts or his certitude to his  actions,  and  there 
never will be one ; for if  he did, he could  not  act 
at all, and hence could not live at all. 
B.  The rational being also deternzi?zes  the sensu- 
ous world by that positing of  its free activity ; that 
is, in positing that sensuous world  it at the same 
time invests it with certain general and unchange- 
able characteristics. 
Firstly.  The conception  of  the causality of  the 
rational being  is produced through  absolute  free- 
dom ; and hence the object of  this causality in the 
sensuous world,  being  its  opposite,  must be fixed 
and unalterably determined.  The Ego is infinitely 
determinable ; the object, because it is an object, is 
once and for ever determined.  The Ego is what it 
is in Actiug; the object is what it is in Bei~zg.  The 
Ego is incessantly becoming, and there is nothing 
permanent in it ;  the object  is, as it is, forever ; is 
what it is and is what  it will be.  In the Ego lies 
the ultimate  ground  of  its  acting ; in  the object 
lies  the ultimate  ground  of  its being;  for  it has 
nothing but being. 
Secondly.  The conception of  causality, produced 
through absolute freedom,  and which,  under  this 
same  circumstance,  might  be  infinitely  different, 
tends upon  a  causality in the object.  Hence the 
object  must  br  infinitely  changeable  through  an 
infinitely changeable  conception ; that is to say, it 
must  be poss~ble  to make  out of  the object what- 
ever one may possibly will to make out of  it.  The 
object is fixed, is  permanently  determined,  as we 
said at first, and may, therefore, by virtue of  this its 
permanency, resist the causality of a rational being ; 
but it can not change itself through itself, (it can not 
rom~ne~zce  any effort ;)  and hence it can not act  con- 
trary or in opposition to this causality of  a rational 
being. 
Finally, the rational being  can not posit itself  as 
having causality, without positing itself, at the same 
time, as representing ;  it can not posit itself as act- 
ing upon a determined object, without constantly re- 
presenting this determined object ; it can not posit 
a determined causality as completed, without posit- 
ing  the  object  upon  which  it was directed.  For, 
since the object is posited as annihilating  the cau- 
sality, although the causality must remain together 
with  the  object,  there  arises  here  an  opposition, 
which  can  only  be  mediated  by  a  floating  of  the 
imagination  between  object and causality, through 
which  floating  there  arises  a Time.  Hence,  the 
causality,  in  its working  upon  the  object,  occurs 
successively in Time.  Now, if  the causality is  di- 
rected  upon  one and  the same object, and if  thus 
the causality is regarded in  every present  moment 
as conditioned  by the previous  moment, then the 
condition of the object is also regarded in each mo- 4s  THE  SCIENCE OF RIGXTS. 
ment as conditioned by its condition in all previous 
moments, beginning  at the first  cognition  of  the 
object ; and  thus  the object  remains  the same, al- 
though it is  incessantly  changed ;  that is to say, 
the substrate produced  by imagination, in order to 
connect  in it the manyfold  of  the qualties,  or in 
other words, the basis of the incessantly each other 
excluding  accidences,  which  is  called  their  sub- 
stance, always remains the same.  This is the  rea- 
son why we  can  posit  ourselves  only as changing 
the form of the things, and not their substance, and 
why we are well conscious of the power to infinitely 
alter the shapes of  things, but also of  our inability 
to produce or annihilate  them, and, likewise, why 
matter can be neither increased  nor diminished for 
us.  On this stand-point of  common consciousness 
-but  by no means on the stand-point of  transcen- 
dental  philosophy-it  is true that matter is origi- 
nally given to us. 
THE FINITE  RATIONAL  BEING  CAN  NOT ASCRIBE  TO 
ITSELF  A  FREE  CAUSALITY  IN  THE  SENSUOUS 
WORLD,  WITHOUT  ASCRIBING  THE  SAME  TO 
OTHERS,  AND,  HENCE,  WITHOUT  LIKEWISE  AS- 
SUMING  OTHER  FINITE  RATIONAL  BEINGS  OUT- 
SIDE  OF ITSELF. 
PROOF. 
A.  We have shown in $  I  that  a  rational being 
can not posit (perceive and comprehend) an object, 
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in the same undivided synthesis, ascribing 
to itself a causality. 
But it can not ascribe to itself a causality without 
having posited an object, upon which that causality 
is directed.  The positing of the object, as a some- 
thing  determined  through  itself,  and  in  so  far 
checking  the  free  activity  of  the  rational  being, 
must  be posited  in  a  previous  time-moment,  and 
it is only through this positing of  a previous time- 
moment, that the time-moment, in which we  com- 
prchend  the  conception of  causality, becomes the 
present.  All comprehending is conditioned by the 
positing of  a causality of  the rational being, and all 
causality is conditioned  by a previous comprehend- 
ing of the same.  Hence, every possible moment of 
consciousness is conditioned by a previous moment 
of the same ;  and thus, in the explanation of the pos- 
sibility  of  consciousness,  consciousness is already 
presupposed.  Consciousness can only be explained 
through a circle ; hence  it can not be explained at 
all, and appears impossible. 
The problem  was  to show: how  self-conscious- 
ness  can  be  possible.  Our reply  was : self-con- 
sciousness is possible, when the rational being can 
ascribe to itself  a  causality in one and the same 
undivided  moment  wherein  it opposes  something 
to this causality.  Let us suppose this to occur in 
the  time-moment  2.  You ask now,  under what 
condition  this  occurrence  is possible?  and  it ap- 
pears at once that the causality, which the rational 
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relation  to a  determined  object, A, upon  which  it 
is directed.  For no  one must  say that a general 
czusality, a merely possible  causality might be posi- 
ted,  since such would  be  an indefinite  thinking ; 
and  Philosophy has already received injury enough 
from this sort of  arguments.  Such a merely possi- 
ble causality, or causality in general, is posited only 
through abstraction from a certain or from all actzral 
causality ;  but you can not abstract from any thing, 
unless  it has been  previously posited ; and  hence 
here, as ever, the indefinite conception of  the gem- 
ral is preceded by a definite conception of  a definite 
actual, and  the former  is conditioned  through the 
latter.  Nor must any one say that the causality 
might  be posited  as directed  upon  the object  B, 
which  is posited  in the same moment, Z, for  B  is 
posited as ovect solely in so far as no causality is 
directed upon it. 
Hence, the moment  Z  must  be  explained  from 
another moment, in which  the object A must have 
been posited  and  comprehended;  but A  also can 
be comprehended  only  under  the same conditions 
under which alone B could be comprehended ;  that 
is to say, the moment in which A is comprehended, 
is also possible only on co~dition  of  a previous mo- 
ment, and so on, ad infiniturn.  We find no possible 
point wherein we might connect the thread of  self- 
consciousness, through which all consciousness first 
becomes  possible, and  hence  our  problem  is not 
solved. 
It is important  for  the whole  science which  w 
here to be  established,  that the reader  should ob- 
tain a clear insight into this argument. 
B.  The ground of  the impossibility of explaining 
without constantly presupposing 
it as already existing, lay  in this : that in order toa 
be able  to posit  its causality, the  subject of self- 
consciousness must previously have posited an ob- 
ject, merely  as such; and  that thus, whenever  we 
wanted to connect the thread of  self-consciousness 
to  a  time-moment,  we  were  always  forced to go 
to  a  previous  moment,  wherein  the  connections 
must have  been  already made.  This ground must 
be removed ; but  it can  be removed  onl~  by  as- 
suming that the causality of  the su@ect  is syntheti- 
cally united with  the object  in one and the same 
time-moment ; that the causality of  the subject is 
itself  the perceived and comprehended  object, and 
this object  that causality of  the subject,  and that 
thus both  are the  same.  Only from  such a  syn- 
thesis can we not be driven to a previous one ;  only 
it contains all  the conditions of  self-consciousness, 
and gives us the point in which we can connect the 
thread  thereof.  Only  on  this  condition  is  self- 
consciousness possible.  As  sure, therefore, as self- 
consciousness  occurs, must we make  this  assump- 
tion.  The strict  synthetical proof  is,  therefore, 
completed ; for  what  we  have  stated has  shown 
itself to be the absolute condition of self-conscious- 
ness. 
The only question is yet, what our synthesis may 
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ments  may  be  possible.  Our  business  now  is 
therefore to analyze what has been proven. 
C.  It seems as if  the synthesis we  have under- 
taken,  in place  of dispelling  the  mere incompre- 
hensibility which it undertook to clear up, proposes 
to us  a  complete contradiction.  That which  the 
synthesis  has  established,  must  be  an  object; 
but it is  the characteristic of  the object, that the 
free activity of  the subject in  taking hold of  it be 
posited as checked.  Now, the object in the present 
case is to be a causality of the subject ;  but it is the 
character of such a causality that the activity of the 
subject  be  absolutely free,  and  determine  itself. 
The activity of the subject is therefore by this syn- 
thesis required  to be both  checked  and  absolutely 
free.  How  is  this  contradiction  possible ?  It is 
possible, and  both  activities  are  united,  when we 
think the subject as bekzg  determilzed to detemzitzze 
itself;  or when  we  think a requirement  addressed 
to the subject to resolve  on  manifesting its  cau- 
sality. 
In so far as that which the synthesis establishes 
is an object, it must be given in  sensation, and in 
exterzal, not  in internal sensation ; for  all internal 
sensation arises solely  through reproduction gf an 
external  sensation,  and  hence  presupposes  the 
latter ; and thus, we  should again  by the assump- 
tion  of  such  sensation,  presuppose  that  self-con- 
sciousness,  the  possibility  whereof  is  to be  ex- 
plained.  But that object is comprehended, and can 
be comprehended  only as a requirement addressed 
to the Ego to act.  As sure, therefore, as the sub- 
ject  con~prehends  it,  it has  the conception of  its 
own freedom  and  self-activity, and of  this freedom 
and self-activity  as given to it externally.  It ob- 
tains  the "conception  of  its free  causality,  not  as 
something which in the present moment zs,  for this 
were  a  real  contradiction ; but  as  something 
which in the future moment shall  be. 
The  question was, How can the subject find itself 
as object?  To find  itse&  it could  find itself  only 
self-active ;  for  else  it would  not  find  itsey;  and 
since it does not find at all  unless it is, and is not 
unless it finds itself, it would not find at all.  Again, 
in order to find itself  as oyect, (of its reflection,) it 
could not find itself as deter?nilzi?zg  itsey  to be self- 
active,* but as determined to self-activity  through 
an  external requirement, which requirement  must 
leave  it,  however, in possession  of its full  freedom 
of.  self-determination;  for  otherwise, the  subject 
would not find itself as Ego. 
To make the latter point clearer, I shall here pre- 
state some future results.  The subject can not find 
itself  compelled  to act ; for  then  it  would not  be 
free, would  not  be Ego ; nor, when  it resolves  to 
act, can it find  itself  necessitated  to act in this or 
that determined manner ; for then, again,  it would 
not  be free, would not  be  Ego.  How, then, must 
* The question here is not how the matter  may be when viewet 
from  the transcendental stand-point,  but  simply, how ~t must ap 
pear to the subject under investigation. 54 
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we think it as  jetermined  to be active, in order to 
find itself as object ?  Only in so far, that the sub- 
ject  finds itself as something which  may be  active 
or not, to which a requirement is  addressed to be 
active  or not, but which  may also  not  follow that 
requirement. 
The rational being shall realize its free activity ; 
this requirement addressed to it lies in its very con- 
ception, and as sure as it comprehends that concep- 
tion it realizes that free activity.  This it only can re- 
alize either through actztalacting.  All that is requir- 
ed is activity in general, but the conception expressly 
involves that the subject must choose in the sphere 
of  possible acts one act through its free self-deter- 
mination.  It can  act  only in wnekay; can deter- 
7nim its power of  sensation, which is here the pow- 
er of  sensuous  causality, only in one  manner.  As 
sure as it acts, it chooses  through absolute self-de- 
termination this one way, and is in so far absolutely 
free and a rational being ; and posits itself  as such. 
Or it can realize that free activity through not act- 
ing.  In this  case it is  also free, for  according to 
our presupposition,  it has comprehended  the con- 
ception of  its causality as something required of  it. 
Now, in resisting this requirement and not acting, it 
chooses freely between acting and not acting. 
The conception here established is that of  a free 
rec$rocal  causality,  in  its greatest  precision,  and 
is, therefore, nothing but this.  I could add, for in- 
stance, to  any free  causality a  free  opposing cau- 
sality as accidental;  but that would not be the pre- 
cise conception here required.  In our conception 
Causakty and a Counter Causality can not be thought 
apart at all.  Both are the integral parts of a whole 
event ;  and such an event is now postulated as the 
necessary condition  of  the self-consciousness of  a 
rational being.  It  must occur, as we have shown. 
Only to such an event is it possible to attach the 
thread of  consciousness, which can then, we appre- 
hend,  pass  through  all other objects without diffi- 
culty. 
This thread has been attached by our present rep- 
resentation.  Under this condition the subject can 
and must posit  itself  as a free acting being : such 
was our proof  If it does posit itself  as such, then! 
it can and must posit a sensuous world and must op- 
posit itself  to the sensuous world.  And now, after 
the chief problem has been solved, all the workings 
of  the human mind  proceed  according to the laws 
thereof  without further difficulty. 
D.  Hitherto our analysis of  the established  syn- 
thesis  has been simply explanatory:  all we had  to 
do was  to make clear to ourselves what the mere 
conception of  that synthesis involved.  This anal- 
ysis still continues, but it now begins  to draw coon- 
clzdsions;  that is  to say, perhaps the subject must 
posit many other things in consequence of  the pos- 
ited influence upon it ; if  so, how does it posit  this 
other, or what does it posit, by virtue of the laws of 
its being, in consequence of  its first positing ? 
The described influence was necessary condition 
of  all self-consciousness ;  it occurs as sure as self- 56 
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consciousness occurs, and is, therefore, a necessary 
fact.  If, by virtue of  the necessary laws of  rational 
beings, something else must be posited at the same 
time with  this  influence,  then the positing of  this 
other is a necessary fact like the former. 
In so far as the described influence enters sensa- 
tion, (is felt,) it is a limitation of  the Ego ; and the 
subject must have posited  it as such ; but there is 
no limitation without a limiting.  Hence the sub- 
ject, in positing that influence, must have posited at 
the same time something oatside of  itself as the de- 
termining ground of  that influence.  This is evi- 
dent at a glance. 
But  again :  This  influence is determitzed,  and 
through  the positing of  it as determined there is 
posited,  not  merely a general ground, but a deter- 
,mined ground  of  it.  What sort of  ground  must 
this be,  or  what  must  be  its  characteristic  as 
ground of  this  determined  influence?  This is a 
question we shall have to dwell upon more at length. 
The  influence was comprehended as a requirement 
addressed to the subject to manifest free causali'ty ; 
and (which is of  all-important significance) it could 
not be at all  comprehended  otherwise, and  could 
not have been comprehended, had it not been com- 
prehended in this manner. 
This requirement to act, is the content of  the in- 
fluence, and its ultimate  end is a free causality of 
the rational being, to which that requirement is ad- 
dressed.  The rational being is not determined or 
necessitated to act by this requirement-as  in the 
conception of  causality the effect is necessitated by 
the cause-but  merely seizes this requirement  as 
occasion  to determine  itself  to act.  To do  this, 
however, it must first have understood and compre- 
hended  the requirement,  and this  previous  cogni- 
tion  of  it is  taken  into  calculation.  Hence the 
posited  ground of  the influence, or of  the require- 
ment addressed to the subject, must, at least, pre- 
suppose the possibility, that the subject can under- 
stand and comprehend it, for otherwise its require- 
ment would have no End in view at all.  Its having 
such End is conditioned by the understanding and 
freedom  of  the rational  being,  to whom  it is ad- 
dressed.  This ground must, therefore, necessarily 
have the conception of  reason  and  freedom,  and 
must,  therefore,  be  itself a being, capable of  com- 
prehending, that is, an intelligence, and since this 
is  also not possible without freedom, it must be a 
free and hence a rational being, and must be posit- 
ed as such. 
In regard to the manner  of  drawing  a  conclu- 
sion, which  has here been  established, as a neces- 
sary manner,  which  is  originally  grounded in the 
nature of  reason, and which most assuredly follows 
without  our conscious  cooperation,  we  add a  few 
words of explanation. 
The  question has justly  been asked :  What effects 
can  be explained  only as the effects of  a  rational 
cause ?  The  answer : Those effects, which must be 
necessarily  preceded  by a  conception  thereof; is 
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difficult question  remains : What, then, are effects, 
of which  it must be said, that they were possible 
only after  a  previous conception thereof?  Every 
effect can  be taken up  in conception, after  it once 
exists,  and  the  manyfold  of  the  effect  arranges 
i,tself under the unity of the conception more easily 
and happily only as the observer  himself has more 
sense and understanding.  Now,  this is  a  unity, 
which the observer himself has transferred into the 
manyfold  through  what  KANT  calls  his  reflective 
power of judgment, and which he must so transfer, if 
only one effect is to exist for him.  But  who guarantees 
him that, just as he now arranges the actual many- 
fold under the unity of his conception, so, previously 
to the effect, the conceptzons of  the manyfold, which 
he perceives, were  subordinated by an understand- 
ing to the conception of  that unity, which  he now 
thinks; and  what  may justify  him  in  arriving  at 
such a result ?  There must be a higher ground of 
justification, or  the conclusion, that  the  effect  is 
that of a rational cause, is false throughout. 
There is no doubt : a rational being, as sure as it 
b this, sketches out for  itself the conception of the 
product, which is to be realized through its activity ; 
and by the conception thus traced out, it guides its 
activity, always looking at it in acting, as it were. 
This conception is  called the conception of an  ----  end. 
Now, a rational being cannot at all obtain a con- 
ception of its causality, unless it has a cognition of 
the object of this causality.  For it cannot determine 
itself to act-of  course, with a consciousness of this 
self-determination, for  only thereby does it become 
a free activity-unless  it has posited this its activity 
as checked ; and when it posits a determined activ- 
ity as  checked, it posits an external object  as the v 
&ecking.  This is  the reason, by the by, why na- 
ture,  even if  we  should  claim  for  her intelligence 
and freedom, cannot have  the power  to  form  the 
conception of  an end, (and for  that very reason, no 
one should claim for  her intelligence and freedom.) 
For there is nothing external to nature, upon which 
she could  direct  her  causality.  Every thing upon 
which causality can be directed, is itself nature. 
A sure criterion  of  the effect of  a rational  being 
would, therefore, be this : that the effect could only 
be thought possible  on  condition of  a cognition of 
its object.  Now, there is nothing which can not be 
thought possible through mere force of  nature, and 
which must be thought as possible only through cog- 
nition, except cognition itself  Hence, when the ob- 
ject-and  here also  the end of  an effect-can  only 
be, to produce a cognition, then it is necessaryto as- 
sume a rational cause of  the effect. 
But  the  assumption,  that  a  cognition  was  in- 
tended, must be necessary ; that is, it must be im- 
possible to think any other end of  the act, and the 
act  itself  it must be possible  to comprehend only 
when it is comprehended as intending to produce a 
cognition. 
(To illustrate  by the contrary: Nature,  we say, 
teaches us this or that by an event ;  but  in so say- 
ing, we do not  mean to assert  that nature had not 
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quite another end  in view  in producing  the event 
than to teach  us ; we only wish  to say that, if any 
one chooses to regard the event from such  a point 
of view, it may be instructive for him to do so.) 
The  above case arises here.  The  cause of the in- 
fluence upon us  has  no  end  at  all,  unless it has, 
above all, the end in  view,  that we  should  recog- 
nize  it as such cause.  Hence we must assume a 
rational being as this cause. 
We  have  now  proved  what  was  to be proved. 
The rational being can not posit itself  as such, un- 
less a  requirement  to act  free  is  addressed  to  it. 
When such a requirement to free self-determination 
is addressed to it, it must necessarily posit a rational 
being  outside of  itself,  as the cause thereof; and 
hence it must posit a rational being outside of  itself 
generally. 
COROLLARIA. 
I.  Man  becomes  man  only amongst  men ; and 
since  he can  only  be  man,  and would  not  be at 
all  unless  he were  man,  it follows, that  if  7nn7z  is 
to  6e at  nll,  theye  'IIZZLS~  be  ~IZE~Z.  This is  not  an 
arbitrary assumption, not an  opinion based on past 
experience  or on  other probability-reasons;  but  it 
is a truth to be strictly deduced  from  the concep- 
tion of man.  As soon as you proceed to determine 
this conception fully, you are driven from the think- 
ing of a single  man  to the assumption of  another 
one, by means of which to explain the first.  Hence, 
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the conception of  man  is not at all the conception 
of  a  single  one, for such a one is unthinkable, but 
of a race. 
The requirement addressed to the rational being 
to  manifest its free  self-activity, is what  is  called 
All  individuals must be educated to be 
men ; otherwise,  they would  not  be  men.  The 
question  here forces  itself  upon  every one :  If it 
should  be  necessary  to  assume  an origin  of  the 
whole human  race, and hence a first pair of human 
beings-and  from a certain standpoint of  reflection 
this assumption is assuredly necessary-who  educa- 
ted that first pair ?  They  must have been educated, 
for our   roof  is universal, and a man could not edu- 
cate them, since they are assumed as the first men ; 
hence it is necessary to assume that another ration- 
al being, not of the race of  men, educated them ;  of 
course,  only so  far,  until  they could  educate each 
other.  A spirit took them in his charge, precisely 
as it is represented in an old and venerable chroni- 
cle, which, indeed, contains throughout the profound- 
est,  sublimest wisdom,  and  establishes  results,  to 
which all philosophy must, after all, return. 
11.  Only  free,  reciprocal  causality  upon  each 
other through  conceptions  and  after conceptions, 
only this giving and receiving of  knowledge, is the 
distinguishing  characteristic of  mankind,  through 
which  alone  every  person  shows  himself  to  be 
man. 
If man is, then there must  also be necessarily  a 
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contains  irrational  objects  and  rational  beings. 
This is  not  the  place  to  proceed  further, and  to 
show up  the necessity of  all determined objects in 
nature,  and their  necessary  classification,  which, 
however,  can  be  demonstrated  quite as strictly as 
the necessity of a world generally." 
The question concerning the ground of  the re- 
ality of  objects  is  now  answered.  The reality  of 
the world-of  course  for  us, that  is,  for  all  finite 
reason-is  a condition of self-consciousness ; for we 
can not posit ourselves without  positing something 
outside of  us, to which we  must  ascribe the same 
reality  which we  ascribe to ourselves.  To ask for 
a reality which shall remain after having abstracted 
from  all  reason, is  contradictory ; for he who asks 
that question, has also, in all probability, reason, and 
is  impelled  by reasoil  to ask his question, and  de- 
sires a rational answer ; hence he has not abstract- 
ed from  reason.  We can not go out of  the sphere 
of  our  reason ; this  has  been  well  taken  care  of; 
and  philosophy desires only  that we shall  become 
aware  thereof, and  shall not believe  that we have 
gone beyond it, when we are always, as a matter of 
course, within it. 
S  4. 
The$?zite ratio~zal  beifzg  calz aot assume otherj,zitc 
rational bei7zg-r outside of  its&  withozt t posititzg it- 
* Readers who can not see this, should have patience, and should 
draw no other conclusions from their not seeing, than the only le- 
gitimate one, that they do not see it. 
$elf as occzlpying a determined reZatio?z toward them, 
is called the Legal Relation. 
PROOF. 
A.  The subject must disti~zgz~ish  itself throu~h  op- 
position fronz  the ratio?zal beifzg, which  it has  as- 
st~~~ed  outside of  itseg  The subject has posited it- 
self as one, which contains in  itself the last ground 
of  something  that  is  i7z  it, (for  this is the condi- 
tion of  Egohood, or of  Rationality generally ;)  but 
it has also posited  a being outside of itself, as the 
last ground of  this something in it. 
It is  to have the power of  distinguishing itself 
from this other being; and this is, under our pre- 
supposition, possible only, if  the subject can distin- 
guish in that given something how far the ground 
of  this  something lies in itsey  and how far it lies 
oz~tside  of  itsee 
The ground of  the acting of the subject lies both 
in the being ofrtside of  it, and in itself; that is, the 
ground of  the form of  that acting, or that the sub- 
ject  did act.  For if  the outside  being had  not in- 
fluenced the subject and thus called  upon it to act, 
the  subject would  not  have  acted.  Its acting,  as 
such, is  conditioned  by  the acting of  the outside 
being. 
But moreover, its acting is also conditioned nznte- 
rialiter;  for  to the subject  is assigned  its general 
sphere of  action. 
Within  this  sphere,  however,  the  subject  has 
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the further determination of  its acting ;  and of this 
further determination of its activity, the ground lies 
solely in the subject itself.  In so far alone, there- 
fore, can it posit itself  as an absolutely free being, 
and as the sole ground of  something ; in  so far 
alone can it separate itself  utterly from the free be- 
ing outside of  itself, and ascribe its causality to it- 
self  only. 
Within that sphere, that is, from the end point of 
the product of the outside being, X, to the end point 
of  its own product, Y,  it has chosen amongst the 
possibilities, which that sphere contains ; and from 
these possibilities and from  this comprehension of 
them,  as possibilities which  it might have chosen, 
the subject  constitutes for  itself  its  freedom  and 
self-determination. 
Within that sphere the subject had to choose, if 
the product, Y, was  to become possible as a sepa- 
rate one of  the effects given  through  that sphere. 
Again : 
Within this sphere oaCy  the subject could choose, 
and fzot the other being;  for the other being had left 
that sphere undetermined, according to our presup- 
position. 
That, which chose exclusively within this sphere, 
is its Ego,  is  the individual, is the rational being 
determined  as such through opposition  to another 
rational being ;  and this individual is characterized 
through a determined utterance of freedom, pertain- 
ing exclusively to it. 
B.  1,~  tAis distifzction throz~glz  opposition the con- 
c$tio,$ of  the szl&ect  as a free  beifzg,  and the concep- 
tiatz  of the outside ~atiofznb  being, as also a free  bcifzg, 
aye mutually deteymi7zed and conditiofzed th~oz~gh  the 
su~ect. 
Opposition is not possible unless in the same un- 
divided moment of  reflection the opposites are also 
posited as equals,  related to each other, and com- 
pared with each other : this is a  formal  theoretical 
which has  been proved  in its place in 
the Science of  Knowledge, but which we trust will 
be accepted here as self-evident by common  sense, 
even without that proof.  We shall now apply this 
proposition. 
The  subject determines itself as an individual and 
as a free individual through the sphere wherein it 
has chosen one of  the possible  acts given in  that 
sphere ;  and the subject also  posits  another indi- 
vidual  outside of  itself,  as its opposite, and as de- 
termined through another sphere, wherein this other 
individual  has  chosen.  Ilence the subject  posits 
both spheres at the same time, and only thus is the 
required opposition possible. 
The being  outside  of  the subject  is  posited  as 
free, hence as a being, which r7zight  also have over- 
stepped the sphere by which it is now determined, 
and might have overstepped it in such a manner as 
not to leave to the first subject the possibility of  a 
free acting.  It has voluntarily ?zot overstepped that 
sphere, and has, therefore, itself  restricted its own 
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the acts, which  its formal freedom could  have real- 
ized ;  and all this the subject also posits necessarily 
in that stipulated  oppositing,  (as  indeed  it posits 
every thing that follows, which the reader will please 
bear constantly in mind.) 
Again : This outside being has addressed  a  re- 
quirement to the subject to manifest free activity ; 
hence it has restricted its freedom  by a conception 
of  an end entertained  by the subject, wherein  the 
freedom of  the subject, be it only problematically, 
was  presupposed ; it  has  therefore  restricted  its 
freedom  through  the  conception  of  the  (formal) 
freedom of  the subject. 
Now, through this self-restriction of  the other be- 
ing its  cognition  by the subject as a rational and 
free being is conditioned.  For the subject has po- 
sited a free being outside of  itself only by virtue of 
a requirement addressed to itself  to manifest  free 
activity,  hence only  by virtue of  that self-restric- 
tion  of  the  outside  being.  But again: This self- 
restriction was conditioned also by the cognition on 
the part of  the outside  being of  the subject  as a 
possibly free being.  Hence the conception, which 
the subject has of  the outside being, as a free be- 
ing, is conditioned  by the same conception  on  the 
part of the outside being of  the subject, and by an 
acting, determined through this conception. 
On the other hand, the completion of  the cogni- 
tion on the part of  the outside being of the subject, 
as a free being,  is conditioned  by the same cogni- 
tion and a correspondent acting on the part of  the 
subject.  If the subject had not cognized a free be- 
ing outside of  itself,  then  something would  not 
have resulted, which, according to the laws of  rea- 
son, ought to have  resulted, and the subject would 
not be rational.  Or, if  this cognition did result  in 
the subject, but was  not  followed  by a correspon- 
dent restriction of  its freedom, in order to leave to 
that other outside being also the possibility to act 
free ; then the other outside being could not have 
concluded the subject to be  a rational being, since 
that conclusion  became necessary only by the sub- 
ject's  self-restriction of  freedom. 
Hence the relation of  free beings to each other is 
necessarily determined in the following manner and 
is posited  as thus determined : The mutual cogni- 
tion of  individuals is conditioned by this, that each 
treat  the  other  as  free,  (or,  restrict  his  freedom 
through  the conception of  the freedom of  the oth- 
er.)  But this manner of  treatment is  conditioned 
by the manner of  acting of  each toward the other; 
and this by the manner of  acting and by the cogni- 
tion of  the other, and so on ad i~@nitum. The re- 
lation of  free beings toward each other is therefore 
the  relation  of  a  reciprocal  causality  upon  each 
other  through intelligence and  freedom.  No  free 
being can recognize the other as such, unless both 
mutually thus recognize each other ;  and no one can 
treat the other as a free being, unless both mutually 
thus treat each other. 
The conception,  here established, is very impor- 
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theory of  Rights.  We shall try, therefore, to make 
it clearer bv the following syllogism : 
1  can suppose that a certain rational being will re- 
cognize 7ne as a rational  being on& in so far as I 
treat it mysev  as such. 
The Conditioned of  this  proposition  is, fzot  that 
that being  in  itself,  and  apart from  me  and from 
my consciousness, as, for  instance, in its own  con- 
science, (which falls within the sphere of  Morality,) 
or before others, (which  is a matter  for the State,) 
should recognize me as such a rational being ; but 
that it should  recognize  me as such according to 
its own consciousness  and mine synthetically uni- 
ted  in  one,  that  is,  according to a  consciousness 
common  to us  both ; and  in  such  a  manner, that 
I should be enabled to compel  it to acknowledge, 
as sure as itself wishes  to pass for a rational being, 
that it knows me to be one also. 
The Conditioned of  this proposition  moreover  is, 
not that I can prove generally that I have been re- 
cognized by rational beings as their eqzmls, but that 
this particular individual, C, has recognized  me as 
such. 
The Co~zditiolz  of  this  proposition  is, not  that I 
merely entertain the conception of  C  as a rational 
being, dzrt  that I actually act in the sensuous world. 
For the conception remains in my most inner con- 
sciousness, only mine, not accessible to the outside 
individual.  It is only through experience that the 
individual,  C,  obtains something ; and this experi- 
ence I  can  excite only  through  acting.  What I 
t/2ilZ,4,  the other one can not know. 
T,he Condition is, moreover, not that I shall only 
not act in opposition  to that conception, but that I 
&all  really act in  conformity to it,  or shall  really 
enter into mutual causality with C.  For otherwise 
\ve should remain separate, and should not exist the 
one for the other. 
The grozdnd of the conrzection is : 
Unless  I exercise causality upon  him, I can not 
know, or can not prove  to him, that hc has even a 
representation of  myself or of  my existence.  Even 
assuming that I appear as object in the sensuous 
world and that I am within the sphere of  his possi- 
ble  experience, the question  still remains, whether 
he has ever reflected  upon me ; and this question 
he can answer only himself. 
Again : Unless I act upon  him  according to the 
conception  of  a  rational being, I  can not prove to 
him  that he must necessarily have taken  me for a 
rational  being.  For every manifestation of  power 
can be the result of  a power of  nature working by 
mechanical laws ; and only the moderation of  pow- 
er through conception is the sure and exclusive cri- 
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But I must assume  that all rational beings mi- 
side of me will in allpossible cases r~cognize  meps  a 
rational being. 
The necessity of  this universal requirement must 
be shown up as condition of  the possibility of  self- 
consciousness.  But self-consciousness is not with- 
out  consciousness  of  individuality,  as  has  been 
shown.  All  that  needs,  therefore,  to  be  proved 
now  is,  that  no  consciousness  of  individuality  is 
possible  without  this recognition,  or that the lat- 
ter necessarily results from  the former.  We pro- 
ceed to establish this proof 
A.  I posit myself  in opposition to C as individu- 
al only by ascribing exclusively to myself  a sphere 
for my free activity, which sphere I deny to him. 
I posit myself in opposition  to C as a rational and 
free being only by ascribing also to him freedom and 
reason,  hence only  by assuming that he has  also 
chosen  a  sphere of  his free activity different  from 
mine. 
But I assume all this only on the presupposition 
that he, in choosing his sphere, has taken my free 
choice  into consideration,  and has voluntarily and 
with  fixed  purpose  left  my sphere  open  to  me. 
(Only by positing him as treating me like a ration- 
al being do I posit him at all  as a  rational being. 
My whole judgment proceeds from me and his treat- 
ment of  me, as could not well be otherwise in a sys- 
tem which has the Ego for its basis.  It is only from 
this dekrf~zkzed  manifestation of  his reason  that 1 
draw a conclusion as to his rationality generally.) 
But the individual, C, can not act upon me in the 
described manner without first, at least problemati- 
cally, recognizing me as such rational being ;  and I 
can not posit him as thus acting upon  me unless I 
posit  him  also as recognizing  me (at least proble- 
rnatically) in that manner. 
Every  thing  problematic  becomes  categorical 
when  the condition  is added.  The condition was, 
that I should  recognize  the individual, C, as a  ra- 
tional being in a manner valid for him and gns;  that 
is, that I should treat him as such, for ozly actilzg is 
szrcii  a universally valid recognitiolz.  Now, 1  gnust 
necessarily treat him  thus, as sure as I  posit  7ny- 
seg in  opposition  to  him  as  rational  being-of 
course in as far as I proceed at all rationally or logi- 
cally in my cognitions. 
As certain, therefore, as I now recognize, that is, 
treat him as a rational being, he is boztltd or obliged 
by his  first  problematical  recognition to recognize 
me categorically, and to recognize me thus in a uni- 
versally valid  manner, that is, to treat me  as a ra- 
tional being. 
There occurs in this instance a uniting of  oppo- 
sites into one.  Under the present presupposition, 
the point of  union  lies in me,  in my  consciousness; 
and  the uniting is  conditioned  by this, that I am 
capable of  consciousness. 
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cognize  him,  and  prescribes  now on  his  part the 
condition to me.  I, on my part, add the condition 
by actually recognizing him ;  and thus I compel him, 
in virtue of  the condition established by himself, to 
recognize me categorically, whilst I also oblige 79zy- 
se& by thus recognizing him, to treat him  as such. 
COROLLARIUM. 
The conception  of  individuality  is,  as we  have 
shown, a Rec$rocal  Conception, that is, a conception 
which  can be thought  only in relation  to another 
thinking, and which  in  its forwz  is conditioned  by 
this  other  thinking,  and  moreover  by  the  same 
thinking of it.  This conception is possible in every 
rational being only in so far as it is posited as com- 
pleted through another individual.  Hence the con- 
ception  of  individuality is  never mine;  but by my 
own confession  and the confession of  the other in- 
dividual, it is both mifze and  his;  and his and mine; 
a common conception, wherein two consciousnesses 
are united into one. 
Each one of  my conceptions determines its next 
succeeding one in my consciousness.  Through the 
given coriception of  individuality a community is de- 
termined, and the further results thereof depend not 
only upon me, but also upon the individual, who, by its 
means, has entered into community with me.  And 
since  the conception is necessary, this necessity COM- 
PELS  US  BOTII TO AGREE  TO AND ABIDE  BY ITS  RE- 
SULT~  : we  are both  now bound to each other and 
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obl&&  to each  other  through our very existence. 
There  must  be  a  law  common  to  us  both,  and 
which we  both  must  recognize in  common  as ne- 
cessary, which  determines us  both  in  common  to 
abide  by the results  of  that conception ; and this 
law must lie in the same character, which led us to 
enter that community, namely, the character of Rn- 
tianal&.  This law, which  compels us to agree to 
the  same results  of a  conception,  is  called Conse- 
qzdmce, and is scientifically established in common 
Logic. 
The whole  described  union  of  conceptions was 
~ossible  only  in  and  through  acts.  Hence,  the 
continued  consequence  also  is  such only in  acts ; 
and  can be required and is required  only for acts. 
The acts stand here for conceptions ; and of  con- 
ceptions  in  themselves,  without  acts,  we  do  not 
speak, because we can not speak of  them as such. 
B.  I must appeal to that recognition in every re- 
lation which I may occupy to the individual, C, and 
must always  judge him by that recognition. 
It is  presupposed  that I am  placed  in  many re- 
lations,  connections, and  mutual  communications 
with that one and the same individual, C.  Hence, 
I must be able to relate  given  effects to hinz, that 
is, to connect them with other effects, which I have 
already accepted as his. 
But when he is  posited, he is  posited both as a 
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both characteristics are synthetically united in him. 
The former, by virtue of the sensuous predicates of 
his causality  upon  me ; the  latter, solely by virtue 
of  my having recognized him as such.  Only in the 
union of  both predicates is he posited at all through 
me, and has he become  an object of  cognition  for 
me.  Hence, I can relate an act to him only in  so 
far as it is partly connected with the sensuous pre- 
dicates  of  his  previous  acts, and partly connected 
with his recognition through me ;  and in so far as it 
is determined through both. 
Assuming  him  to  act in such a  manner  as to 
make  his  act  determined  through  the  sensuous 
predicates  of  his previous acts, (which, indeed, the 
mechanism of nature itself has provided for,) but not 
determined through the recognition of  him  by me 
as a rational being ; that is to say, assuming him to 
treat  me as an object, and thus to deprive  me by 
his act of  the sphere of  freedom belonging to me : 
in that case I am nevertheless still forced to ascribe 
the act  to him,  to  that  same sensuous  being,  C. 
Now the conception of  this sensuous being, C, has 
heretofore, through  the common  recognition-and 
perhaps also through a series of previous acts, which 
were  determined by that recognition-been  united 
in my consciousness with the conception of  ration- 
ality, (he has been  accepted by me as not  only a 
sensuous but also a rational being,) and what I have 
once united I can not separate again.  Those con- 
ceptions were  posited  in my consciousness as ne- 
cessarily and essentially united ;  I had posited sen- 
suousness and rationality  in union as the essence 
of C.  But in this new act, X, I am called upon, ne- 
cessarily, to separate these conceptions ; and hence 
I  can  now  ascribe  rationality  to  him  only acci- 
dental&.  My own  treatment of  him, as a  rational 
being, becomes now accidental and conditioned, and 
holds good only if he should treat me as one.  Hence, 
I can in this case treat him  in strict logic, which is 
here my only law, as a  mere sensuous being, until 
sensuozisness and rationalzty  shall  again be  united 
in the conception of  his act. 
My assertion in such a case would be: Your act, 
X,  contradicts  your  confessed  recognition,  that I 
am a rational being ;  you have acted inconsequent- 
ly.  I, however, acted logically previous to your act, 
X ; and act now logically in treating you as a mere 
sensuous being, because by your  act, X,  you have 
confessed yourself  such. 
By making such an assertion I place myself on a 
higher stand-point over us both, go beyond my indi- 
viduality, appeal to a law which is valid for us both, 
and  apply it to the present  case.  Hence, I posit 
myself  as judge, that is,  as his superior.  This is 
the source of the superiority which every one claims, 
who believes to be in the right over his opponent. 
But, by appealing to this common law, I invite him 
to judge with me, and demand  that in the present 
case he shall himself  acknowledge my conduct to- 
ward him to be logical, and shall, forced by the laws 
cf  thinking, approve my conduct.  The community 
of  consciousness  continues  always.  For I judge 
F 76 
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him by a conception, xvhicil I hold that he  must have 
himself. 
This is the source  of  the Positive~zess  which lies 
in the conception of Rights, and whereby we believe 
we oblige our opponent  not to resist our treatment, 
but even to approve it.  This obligatoriness  arises 
by no means from the Moral Law, but from the law 
of  thinking ; and hence there  enters here a practi- 
o-ism.  cal validity of  the syllo,' 
C.  Whatsoever  is  valid  between  me and  C,  is 
valid between me and every individual with whom 
I ail1 placed in mutual causality. 
Every  other rational being  can be given to  me 
only in the same manner and under the same con- 
ditions as C was given ;  for only thus is the positing 
of  a rational being outside of  me possible. 
The new individual, D, is another one than C, in 
so far as its free act, i?z its setzsuouspredicatcs, is not 
relatable to the sensuous  predicates of  the acts of 
other individuals posited by me. 
The condition of  the cognition of the identity of 
the acting individual was the possibility of connect- 
ing the characteristic signs of  his present act with 
his previous  acts.  Where this possibility does  not 
exist, I can not refer  the act to any of  the rational 
beings known  to me ;  and since I must relate it to 
a rational being, I posit a new one. 
Perhaps  it may  be  well  to  gather  the  point 
of  the proof  here  undertaken-which  has  been 
somewhat diffused by its numbers of  links-into  a 
single view.  What we had to prove was this : As 
sure as I posit myself  as an individual, I require 
all  rational  beings  known to me to recognize  me 
in  all  cases  of  reciprocal  causality  as a  rational 
being.  A certain positing  of  myself  is therefore 
assumed to involve a postulate for o:i_er individuals, 
a postulate extending to all possible  cases  of  its 
application;  and this  postulate, if  involved  in  it, 
we must be able to discover in it by a mere analy- 
sis of  that certain act of  self-positing. 
I posit myself  as individual, in opposition to an- 
other  individual, by ascribing  to 7nysey a  sphere 
for my freedom, from  which  I  exclude  the other, 
and by ascribing to hiwz  a  sphere, from  which  I 
exclude myself-of  course, only in the thinking of 
a  fact  and by virtue  of  this fact.  Hence, I have 
posited myself as  free a side of  him without danger 
to  the  possibility of  his freedom.  Through  this 
positing of  my freedom I have deter??zi?zed  myself; 
to be free constitutes my essential character.  But 
what does to be free  mean ?  Evidet~tly  to be  able 
to carry out the conceptions of  acts I may enter- 
tain.  But the carrying out always follows the con- 
ception, and the perception of  the desired product 
of  my causality is  always-in  relation  to its first 
conception-a  matter of  the future.  Freedom  is 
therefore always posited in the future ; and if  it is 
to constitute the character of  a being, it is posited 
for all the future of  the individual; is  posited in 
:he  future as far as the i?zdividual  hiftzscGf is  posi- 
ted in the future. 
NOW,  my freedom  is  possible  only if  the  other 7s  TITE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
individual remains within  his  sphere ; hence, as I 
demand my  freedom  for  all  the future, I also de- 
mand his restriction to his  sphere, and since he is 
to be  free, his  restriction  through  himself  for a12 
the future; and  all this I demand immediately in 
positing myself as an individual. 
But he can restrict himself only in consequence 
of  a conception of  me as a rational being.  Never- 
theless, I demand this his self-restriction absolute- 
ly ; hence I  demand  of  him  Co~zsequenc~.  (logical 
consistency,) that is, that all his future conceptions 
shall be determined by one certain previous  con- 
ception, namely, his cognition of  me as a rational 
being. 
And since he can recognize me as such only if 
I  myself  treat  him  as such,  by virtue  of  such  a 
conception  of  him, I require of  myself  the same 
Co~zseqz~e~zcc,  and  thus  his  acting  is  conditioned 
through mine. 
The conclusion has been discovered already.  It 
is this : I  must recopzize the free beifzs as such in all 
cases, that is, !~?tust  restrict 772y  freedoln  throz~gh  the 
corzceptio?~  of  the Possibility of  his f~eedom. 
The deduced  relation  between  rational  beings 
-namely,  that  each  individual  must  restrict  his 
freedom through the conception of  the possibility 
of  the freedom of  the other-is  called the Xclatiolz 
of  LcgaZi~,  Legal Relation ; and the formula given 
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to it is called  the  Fundame?ztaZ P~&c$le  of  tAe 
S~ience  of  Rights. 
This relation has been deduced from the concep- 
tion of  the individual.  We have therefore proven 
what was to be proven.  Again :  the conception. of 
the individual has been proven to be the condition 
of  self-consciousness;  hence,  the  conception  of 
Law  (of  Rights)  is  itself  condition  of  self-con- 
sciousness ; and  hence,  this  conception  has been 
properly deduced  a priori, that  is,  from  the pure 
form of  Reason, from the Ego. 
COROLLARIA. 
I.  Our  deduction,  therefore,  asserts  that  the 
conception of  Law lies  in the conception of  Rea- 
son, and  that no  finite  rational being  is  possible 
wherein  it does  not  occur.  It does not occur in 
consequence  of  having  been  taught,  nor through 
experience, nor in virtue of arbitrary arrangements 
among men, etc., but in consequence of  man being 
a rational being.  It is a matter of  course that the 
ma~zz;fesi!atioyz of  this conception in empirical con- 
sciousness  is conditioned through a given case of 
application ; and that this conception does  not lie 
originally-like  some  empty  form-in  our  soul, 
waiting for experience to put something into it, as 
certain philosphers seem to hold in regard to a pri- 
ori conceptions.  But that the case of  application 
gnzlst occur, because man can not be man isolatecl, 
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Likewise have we  shown that a certain concep- 
tion,  that  is,  a  certain  modification of  thinking,  a 
certain manner of  judging things, must be necessa- 
rily pertaining to the rational being as such.  Let 
us  call  this  conception for  the present  X, if  the 
reader so chooses.  This X must operate wherever 
men live together,  and must manifest itself  among 
them and have a designation in their language ; and 
will do this of itself, without the laborious deduction 
of the philosopher.  Whether this X is precisely what 
the use of  language has named Law, is a question 
which common sense-that  is to say, common sense 
when  left  to itself, and not when confused and led 
astray by the arbitrary explanations and interpreta- 
tions of  philosophers-has  to decide.  For the pre- 
sent we  declare, as we  have a perfect right to do, 
that the deduced conception, X, the reality whereof 
has been proven in our deduction, is to be called in 
this  our  investigation  the  conception  of  Law or 
IZight.r,  holding  ourselves  responsible to prove  by 
it whatever questions common sense may raise ~011- 
cerning Law. 
11. The deduced  conception  has  nothing to do 
with  morality ; nay,  has  been deduced  without  it, 
and since only one deduction of  a conception is pos- 
sible, this fact is already in itself sufficient to prove 
that  the conception  of  Law is  not to be deduced 
from the conception  of  Morality.  Indeed,  all  at- 
tempts to so deduce it have failed  utterly.  The 
conception of  Duty, which  is involved in Morality, 
is  in  most of  its characteristics utterly opposed  to 
the conception of  Law.  Morality commands cate-- 
gorically ;  Law merely permits, and does not com- 
mand you to make use of  your rights.  Nay,  Mo- 
rality often  prohibits you  to exercise what  is  your 
Right, and what, in the admission of  all the world 
will, nevertheless, remain your Right.  You have a 
Right to it, undoubtedly,  the world  will  say,  but 
you ought not  to have used your  Right.  Now, if 
the conception of  Law were derived from Morality, 
Morality would be in contradiction to itself, since in 
such a case it would first grant a  Right and then 
prohibit its exercise. 
Whether, however, Morality may not give a new 
sanction to the conception of  Law is another ques- 
tion ; but this question belongs to the Science of 
Morality.  On the field of  Natural Law a good wilI 
is counted for nothing.  It must be possible to car- 
ry out the conception of  Law though not one indi- 
vidual had a good will ; and it is the very business 
and  object  of  the Science of  Rights to establish 
such a condition. 
And thus we need no artificial measures to sepa. 
rate Natural Law and  Morality ; for both Sciences 
are originally, and without any cooperation of  ours, 
separated  and  completely  opposed  to  each  other 
though and in Reason. 
111.  The conception of  Law is the conception of 
a relation  between  rational  beings.  Hence it re- 
sults only when such beings are thought as in re- 
lation  to each  other.  It is  nonsense to speak of 
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and the ground, soil, or animals, etc., as such ;  non- 
sense to speak of  such rights as existing direct be- 
tween  Man  and  Nature.  Reason  has only power 
over Nature, not a right in relation to Nature ; for 
the conception of  Rights does not  arise at all  in 
such a relation.  It is quite a different thing, when 
the question  is  asked, Whether we  may not have 
conscientious scruples  as to enjoying this or that 
portion  of  Nature?  For this  is  not  a question 
which  we  ask  because  we  feel  that we  may have 
invaded  the rights of  the things of  Nature, but we 
ask it because  we  are afraid  we  might  hurt  our- 
selves by indulging in such enjoyments of  things ; 
it is a moral, not a legal question. 
It is  only when  two persons are related  to one 
and the same thing that a question arises as to the 
Right to  the thing,  or,  more  properly  expressed, 
as to  the Right which  the o7ze  person  has against 
ihe other,  to  exclude  him  from  the use  of  such 
thing. 
IV. It is only through acts,  through manifesta- 
tions of  their freedom  in the sensuous world, that 
rational beings are placed  in  mutual causality with 
each other ; hence the conception of  Rights relates 
only to what manifests itself  in the sensuous world ; 
and  that which  has  no causality  in the sensuous 
world, but remains in the interior of  the Soul, is not 
subordinated to the conception of  Right, but to MO- 
rality.  It  is, therefore, nonsense to speak of a right 
to freedom of  thinking, freedom of  conscience, etc. 
You have apowey to do these internal acts, and you 
may have duties concerning them, but you can not 
speak of  rights in reference to them. 
V.  Only  in so far  as rational  beings  are really 
placed in relation  to each other and can really act 
in  such a  manner that the acting of  the one call 
have  results  for  the other, is a question  of  rights 
possible  between  them.  Between  persons  who 
do not know each other, or whose spheres of  action 
are utterly separated, a legal relation is not possible. 
It involves an utter misapprehension of  the concep- 
tion of  rights, when  people  speak of  the rights of 
the Dead upon the Living.  We may have  moral 
duties, to remember them, etc., but in no way legal 
obligations toward them. DEDUCTION 
OF THE 
APPLICABILITY 
OF  THE 
CONCEPTION  OF  RIGHTS. THE  RtlTIOXAL  BEING  CAN  NOT  POSIT  ITSELF  AS 
AN  INDIVIDUAL,  HAVING  CAUSALITY,  UNLESS  IT 
ASCRIBES  TO  ITSELF  A  MATERIAL  BODY  AND 
THEREBY  DETERMINES THAT  BODY. 
PROOF. 
ACCORDING  to our  previous  result,  the rational 
being  posits itself  as a rational individual, or, as we 
shall  say hereafter,  as a person,  only by ascribi~zg 
c~rcl~uively  to itselfa sphere  for its  freedom.  It says : 
I am the person which has exclusive freedom within 
this sphere, and I am no other possible person ;  and 
no  other person is ~~zyself,  that is, no other person 
bas  freedom  within  this  sphere  ascribed  to  me. 
This  constitutes its individual  character ; through 
this determination the person is this or that person, 
uearing this or that name, and is no other one. 
A11  we  have to  do is  to analyze this act; to see 
bvhat  takes place when it does take place. 
A.  The Subject ascribes this sphere to itself; de- 
termines itselfthrough this sphere.  Hence it oppos- 
its the sphere to itself.  Itself  is the logical subject, 
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predicate ; but  subject  and  predicate  are  always 
opposed to each other. 
The first question is : Which is the true subject? 
Evidently that which  is active purely in and upon 
itself;  that  which  determines  itself  to  think  an 
object  or to will  an end ;  the Spiritual,  the pure 
Egohood.  To this is opposed a limited, but exclu- 
sively its own sphere of  its possible  free acts.  By 
ascribing  this  sphere to itself,  it limits itself, and 
changes from  the absolute formal  to a determined 
material Ego or to a person ;  and I hope that these 
two distinct conceptions will not be mixed up with 
each other by the reader. 
The sphere is opposed to the subject signifies : it 
is excluded from  the subject, posited outside of  it, 
separated from  it.  Thinking this  still more  defi- 
nitely, it signifies :  the sphere is posited as not  ex- 
isting through the in itself  returning activity ;  and 
the latter  is  posited  as lzot  existi~zg  through  the 
sphere ; both  are mutually independent of  and ac- 
cidental for each other.  But that, which is thus re- 
lated to the Ego, as independent of  it, belongs-ac- 
cording to our previous deductions-to  the 1Vorld. 
This sphere is therefore posited  as n pmrt of  the 
World 
B.  This sphere is posited through an original and 
necessary activity of  the Ego, that is, it is contem- 
plated, and thus becomes a Real or an actual some- 
what. 
As certain results of  the  Science of  Knowledge 
can not be supposed to be known to all readers of 
this work, I here append such as relate to this par- 
agraph : Those persons have not the least concep- 
tion of  the  Science of  Knowledge and  of  KANT'S 
system  who  believe  that  in  contemplating,  there 
is,  besides  the  contemplating  subject  and  the 
moreover,  a  thing,  a  somewhat, 
upon which the contemplation is directed, as com- 
mon sense generally holds in regard to bodily see- 
ing.  On the contrary, through  the contemplating 
and only  through  it does  the contemplated  arise. 
The Ego returns  into itself, and  this act furnishes 
contemplation  and  contemplated  object  together. 
In contemplation,  reason  (or  the  Ego)  is  by  no 
means passive, but absolutely active.  In contem- 
plation, reason is the productive power of  imagitza- 
tion.  Through the seeing, or contemplating, some- 
thing is thrown out from the Ego, as it were, some- 
what in the manner that the painter throws out from 
his eye the completed forms upon the canvas, (looks 
them,  so  to  speak,  upon  the canvas,)  before  the 
slower hand can draw their outlines.  In the same 
manner  the  sphere  is  here  posited,  or  contem- 
plated. 
Again: The Ego in contemplating itself  as ac- 
tivity contemplates its own activity as a line-draw- 
ing.  This is the original scheme of activity in gen- 
eral,  as every one will  discover who wishes  to ex- 
cite in himself  that highest  contemplation.  This 
original line is the  pure extension, the common cha- 
racteristic of  Time and  Space, out of  which  Time 90 
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and Space arise only by distinction and further de- 
termination.  This line does not presuppose space, 
but space presupposes  it; and the lines in  space, 
that is, the limits of  the extended  things in space, 
are something utterly different. 
In the same manner the sphere is here producect 
in the form of  lines, and thus becomes an Extetzded 
Sonzewhat. 
C.  This sphere is determifzed;  hence the produc- 
ing has its limits, and the product is taken hold of 
in  the understanding  as  a  completed whole,  and 
thus first becomes truly posited, that is, fixed. 
This product determines the person ;  the person 
is the same person only in so far as the product is 
the same, and ceases to be the same when  the pro- 
duct ceases to be the same.  But, according to our 
previous results, the person must posit himself con- 
tinuing, as sure as he posits himself  free.  Hence 
he also posits that product as continuing the same ; 
as permanent, fixed, and unchangeable ; as a whole, 
completed at once.  But a fixed and forever deter- 
mined extension is extension i7z space.  Hence that 
sphere is  necessarilyposited,  as a limited  body ex- 
tended  in  space  and  filling  up  its space;  and it 
is  necessarily fozuzd  as such body in  the analysis, 
the consciousness whereof  alone is  possible to us ; 
since the synthesis, now described, or the produc- 
tion of  that sphere is presupposed only for the pos- 
sibility of  the analysis, and thus for the possibility 
of consciousness. 
D.  The deduced  material  body is  posited as the 
sp/zere  of  all  possible fhe acts of  the person, and as 
nothing else.  Therein alone does its essence con- 
sist. 
That a person is free, signifies, according to our 
former results : through his generating  a  concep- 
tion of  an End he at once  becomes  the cause of 
an object exactly corresponding to that conception ; 
or in other words, only and merely through his will 
does a person become a cause ; for, to trace out a 
conception of  an end  is,  to will.  Now,  the de- 
scribed  body is  to contain  the free  acts of  such a 
person; hence it is  in  that body that the person 
is  cause  in  the  manner  stated.  Immediately 
through his will, and without any other means, the 
will is realized in the body ;  as the person wills, so 
is the will accomplished  in the body. 
Again : Since the described body is nothing but 
the sphere of  free acts, the conception of  the body 
must  exhaust the conception of  that free sphere, 
and vice versa.  The person can  not  be absolutely 
free cause, that is, can  not have a causality result- 
ing immediately from the will-outside  of  his body." 
If a determined will  is given,  a corresponding  de- 
termined  change in  the body is  the necessary re- 
sult.  On the other hand, no change can occur  in 
the body  escept through  the will  of  the person; 
and hence you  can  with  equal  certainty conclude 
*How this result  is apparently contradicted by the phenomena 
of Mesmerism, and yet only apparently, this is not the place to ex- 
P~~~~.-TRANSLATOR, 
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from a given change in the body, as to a determin- 
ed conception of  the person,  corresponding to the 
change.  This last result will attain its proper de- 
terminateness  and  full  significance  only  in  the 
future. 
E.  But how and in what manner can the changes 
in a material body be made to express a conception ? 
Matter, in its essence,  is imperishable ; it can not 
be annihilated,  nor  can  new  matter be produced. 
The concept'ion  of  a  change in the body can  not 
apply to matter in this sense.  Again : The  posited 
body is to continue uninterruptedly ;  hence the same 
parts of the matter are toremain together and to con- 
tinue to constitute the body.  It  seems, therefore, as 
if  the conception of  a change could also not be ap- 
plied to the body in this sense. 
The  body is matter.  Matter is infinitely divisible. 
Now, the material parts of  the body would remain, 
and yet would also undergo change, if they changed 
their relation  to each other.  The relation  of  the 
manyfold to each other is called the fomn.  Hence 
the parts,  in so far as they constitute the forfn,  are 
to remain ;  but the form itself is to be changed.  (I 
say in so far as they constitute the form ;  and hence 
these  parts  may  constantly  separate  themselves 
from  the body-provided  they are replaced  in the 
same undivided  moment  by  other parts-without 
thereby destroying the required  permanency  and 
sameness of  the body.)  Our result is,  therefore, 
that the change produced in the body through the 
conception is in the form of  motion of  the payts of 
t/ze body,  and is, therefore, a change of  the form. 
F.  In the described body the conceptions of  the 
person are expressed through a change in the rela- 
tion  of  the parts to each  other.  These  concep- 
tions, or the will  of  the person,  may  be infinitely 
different;  and the body,  which  is to contain  the 
sphere of  freedom  of  such person,  must  be able 
to express  this  infinite  difference.  Hence,  each 
part must be able to change its position in relation 
to the other  parts, that is, must be able to move 
while  all  the others are at rest;  to each  infinite 
part  of  the body  must be  assigned a  mobility of 
its owtz.  The body must be so constituted, that it 
will always be a matter of  freedom  to think  a part 
larger  or  smaller, more complicated  or more sim- 
ple;  and  likewise  to think  each  multiplicity  of 
parts as a  whole,  and then again  as a part in re- 
lation to the more extended whole, etc.  It is alto- 
gether for thinking to determine every time what is 
to constitute a part.  Again :  When thinking thus 
determines what is  to be a part for the time, a pe- 
culiar  motion of  such part must  be the immediate 
result. 
Something, which is thought as a part in such a 
relation to a whole, is called a melzber.  Each mem- 
ber of  the body contains, therefore, members with- 
in  itself;  and these again contain members ; and 
so on ad  zilz/t;nitzrm.  Whatsoever is to be regarded 
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upon the causality-conception.  The member moves 
when  it is regarded  as such ; and  that, which  is 
the whole  in relation  to it, is  then  at rest;  and 
again, that which is a part in relation to this mem- 
ber, rests also ;  that is, it has no motion of  its own, 
only the motion in common with the member.  This 
is  called  ArticaZatio?z.  The deduced  body  is ne- 
cessarily articulated, and must be posited as such. 
Such  a  body,  to the continuance  and  identity 
whereof  we attach the continuance and identity of 
our personality,  and which  we  posit as a complete 
articulated  whole, and in which we  posit  ourselves 
as having  causality  immediately through  our will, 
is what we  call  our body.  We have  thus proved 
what was to be proved. 
THE  PERSON  CAN  ASCRIBE  TO  ITSELF  NO  BODY, 
WITHOUT  POSITING  SUCH  BODY  AS  UNDER  THE 
INFLUENCE  OF ANOTHER  OUTSIDE  PERSON,  AND 
WITHOUT,  THEREFORE,  FURTHER  DETERMINING 
SUCH  BODY. 
PROOF. 
A. We  have shown that the person can not posit 
himself  at all with consciousness,  unless he posits 
an influence as having occurred  upon  him.  The 
positing of such an influence was the exclusive con- 
dition of  all consciousness,  and was the first point 
to  which  the  whole  consciousness was  attached. 
This influence is posited  as having occurred upon 
the detem?zifzed  person,  the i7zdividzdaZ, as such;  for 
we have shown that the rational being can not posit 
itself  as a  rational  being  generally,  but  can  posit 
itself  only  as an individual ;  hence  an influence 
posited  by the person  upon  himself  is necessarily 
an influence upon  himself  as such individual, be- 
cause he is nothing for himself  and can be nothing 
else for himself  than an individual. 
We have also shown, that the proposition : an in- 
fluence occurs upon  a rational  being, signifies the 
same as :  its free activity has been canceled in part 
and in a  certain respect.  Only through  this  can- 
celing of  its activity does an object become for the 
Intelligence,  and  does  the  Intelligence  conclude 
that there is something which exists not through it. 
An influence has been directed upon the rational 
being, as individual, signifies, therefore : an activity, 
which belongs to it, as an individual, has been can- 
celed.  Now  the whole  sphere of  his activity,  as 
an individual, is his body.  Hence the causality of 
the individual in this body, or his power to be cause 
in it, through his  mere will, must be canceled ; in 
other words, the influence must have been directed 
upon the body of  the person. 
If  we,  therefore,  assume that one of  the acts 
which lie within the sphere of  the possible acts of 
a person has been canceled, or rendered impossible 
for the moment, we have explained the required in- 
fluence. 
But the person  is  to refer this influence to him- 
$66 that is to say, the person is to posit  that mo- 
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activities, as contained in the sphere of  the utter- 
ances  of  his  freedom.  Hence,  the person must 
posit  that canceled activity in order to be able to 
posit  it as canceled ;  or,  that activity must really 
exist, and must not be canceled.  The same deter- 
mined activity of  the person must, therefore, in the 
same  undivided  moment,  be  cameled, and also be 
not  canceled, if  a  consciousness is to be possible. 
Let us examine how this can be. 
B.  All activity of  the person  is a certain  deter- 
mination of  the articulated  body ;  that an activity 
of  the person is checked, signifies, therefore, that a 
certain determination of  the articulated body is im- 
possible. 
Now the person can not posit  at all that his ac- 
tivity is checked, or that in his articulated  body a 
certain determination  is impossible, without posit- 
ing at the same time such a determination as pos- 
sible ;  for only on the condition  that a  determina- 
tion  in  the  body  through  mere will  is  possible, 
does he posit something as his body.  Hence, the 
person must posit the very determination, which is 
to be impossible, as possible ; and since the person 
can posit nothing, unless it is, (for the person,) it fol- 
lows that the person must actually produce this de- 
termination.  And yet this activity, although it is 
thus actually produced, must always remain check- 
ed and canceled ; for the person only produces it in 
order to be able to posit it as canceled.  It  thus ap- 
pears that the same determination of  the articula- 
tion is both actually produced through the causality 
of the will  and canceled through an external influ- 
ence.  Again :  The person is to find himself in this 
moment as free in his sphere, is to ascribe the whole 
of his  body to himself.  It is, therefore, necessary 
that even in the sense in which  he posits a certain 
determination of  his  articulation as canceled,  the 
person  should retain the power  through  his  mere 
will to remove that canceling influence ; for else the 
person would  not  ascribe the body at all  to him- 
self, in this sense, and would  thus not posit an ex- 
ternal influence  as having  occurred  upon  it.  In 
short, the fact that the canceling remains, must de- 
pend upon the free-will of  the person ;  and the per- 
son must posit  it as possible to remove  that can- 
celing. 
How can he posit  this possibility ?  Clearly not 
in  consequence of  a  previous  experience,  for  we 
have here the beginning of  all experience.  Hence, 
in  positing, that the production of  that determina- 
tion,  in  the  manner  in which  it actually is pro- 
duced,  would  certainly remove  the canceling,  did 
not the person restrain his will to thus remove it. 
In positing this, there is evidently discovered and 
posited a double manner of  determining the articu- 
lation, which may be also called a  double articula- 
tion,  or a  double organ;  and the relation  of  this 
duplicity is this :  The first mode of  detern1inir.g the 
articulation-wherein  the person prodz~ces  the can- 
celed movement, and which we shall call the highw 
07.gnn-may  be  modified  through  the will  without 
the other-which  we shall call the lower erg-an-be- 98 
THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  99 
ing thereby modified.  Higher and lower  organs 
are in so far distinguished.  But again :  If the modi- 
fication of  the higher organ is not at the same time 
to modify the lower one, then the person must re- 
strain the will  to have the lower organ thus modi- 
fied.  Hence, higher and lower organ are also unita- 
ble through the will, and are in so far one and the 
same organ. 
The perception  of  the required  influence  upon 
the person requires,  therefore,  the following:  The 
person must give himself  up to the influence, must 
not cancel the modification produced thereby in his 
organ.  He has the power of  thus canceling  that 
influence through his mere will, and must restrict 
the freedom of  his will if  he does not want that in- 
fluence  canceled.  But furthermore : The person 
must  internally reproduce  that modification of  his 
organ, caused by the external influence upon it. 
We have said a possible manifestation of  the free- 
dom of  the person  is  canceled  by  that influence. 
This does not mean that the activity of  the person 
has been made impossible in a certain direction and 
for  a  certain purpose,  but merely that something 
has been produced  in the person which the person 
might himself  have produced, but which  has been 
produced in the person  in such a manner that the 
person must ascribe it, not  to his own, but to the 
causality of  a being outside of himself.  Indeed, no- 
thing occurs within the perception of  a rational be- 
ing, which it does not believe itself  capable of  pro- 
ducing itself, or the production whereof  it may not 
ascribe to iteslf; for any thing else the rational  be- 
ing has no sense.  What has thus been produced 
within its organ, the rational being reproduces with 
freedom  through its higher  organ,  but  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  reproduction  does not  influence 
the lower organ ;  for if  it did-although  it would re- 
sult in  precisely the same determination of  the ar- 
ticulated  body-it  would  now no longer be  a per- 
ceived determination, but a determination produced 
by the person himself.  It would  no longer be the 
product of a foreign and external object, but of  the 
own causality of  the subject.  You can not see, for 
instance, unless you first give yourself  up to an in- 
fluence, and then internally reproduce the form of 
the object and actively trace out within you its out- 
lines.  You can not hear, unless you internally imi- 
tate  the  tones  through  the same organ  through 
which, in speaking, the same tones were produced. 
If, however, this internal causality should extend to 
the external organ, you would  no longer  hear, but 
speak. 
In so far as the relation  is as we have described 
it, the articulated body of  man is  Sense.  But it is 
sense only, as every one must see, in relation to an 
influence upon  it on the part of  a causality, which 
might be its own, but which, in such a  case, is not 
its own, but is the causality of an external cause. 
The person  under this  sort of  an influence  re- 
mains  perfectly  and  completely free.  That which 
the external cause has produced in the person  may 
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person  posits expressly this power  of  removing it, 
and hence posits,  that  the  existence of  the influ- 
ence depends upon himself.  Again, if  such an in- 
fluence is to occur, the person  must with freedom 
~mitate  it,  and ~nzzust  thus express& realize his  free- 
dom in order to be  but able to perceive.  (We have 
here,  by the by,  described  and extensively  deter- 
mined the absolute  freedom  of  re$ectioa.) 
And thus the articulated body of  the person has 
indeed  been  further determined.  For it has also 
been posited as Sense; and to enable it to be posit- 
ed as such, higher and lower organs have been  as- 
cribed  to the  body;  of  which  the lower  organ, 
(sense) through which  it is related  to external ob- 
jects and to rational beings, can be placed under a 
foreign  influence, but the higher organ (reflection) 
never. 
C.  The described  influence  upon the subject is 
to be such that only a rational being outside of  the 
subject can be posited as its cause ;  namely, under 
the assumption that the purpose of  that outside ra- 
tional being was thus to influence the subject.  But 
it has been shown that no influence can occur upon 
the subject, unless that subject through its own free- 
dom causes the impression made upon it to halt, and 
does then reproduce it internally.  The subject it- 
self must act with a fixed end in view ;  that is to say, 
it must limit the sum of  its freedom, which might 
cancel  that  impression,  to  the  attainment  of  the 
proposed end of  the cognition, which self-limitation 
is indeed the exclusive criterion of  Reason.  Hence, 
the subject must complete through itself the attain- 
ment of  the end of  the other outside  being; and 
thus the outside rational being must have calcula- 
ted upon this completion of  its purpose through the 
subject, if  it really had  an end in view.  It must, 
therefore, be considered  as a rational being, in so 
far as it has limited its own freedom to the manner 
of the given impression, through this presupposition 
of  the freedom of  the subject. 
But it always remains possible  that the manner 
of  acting on the part of  that outside being was the 
result of  chance or of  necessity.  There is, as yet, 
no ground to assume self-limitation on the part of 
that outside  being,  unless it can be shown that it 
might have acted differently ;  that the fullness of its 
power, if exercised, would  have resulted  in quite a 
different  mode of  acting ; and that that fullness of 
power must, therefore, have been restricted, to have 
resulted in the manner it did. 
It must,  therefore,  be possible  for  that outside 
being to influence or treat the subject also in an 
opposite manner. 
What is this opposite manner?  The character 
of  the first kind of  causality was  such that it de- 
pended  altogether upon  the  freedom  of  my will, 
whether an influence should be exerted upon me or 
not; for  that influence could  not  occur  unless  I 
passively submitted to it and then reproduced it as 
having  occurred.  The character  of  an opposite 
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pended  upon  my freedom, whether I chose to ob- 
serve the influence  or not ; its character implying 
that I must observe it.  How is such an influence 
possible ? 
The first kind of  influence was  dependent upon 
my freedom, because through that mere freedom of 
will  I  could  destroy  the produced  form of  my ar- 
ticulated  body if  I  chose; under  the second kind 
of  influence  this  must,  therefore,  be  impossible. 
The produced  form of  my body must  be  firm,  in- 
destructible-at  least, not destructible through the 
higher organ-my  body must be  tied to this form, 
and  be  utterly checked  in  its movements.  From 
such  a  complete  check  the  reflection  upon  this 
check  would  also  result  necessarily;  not  in  its 
form, as the result of  the check, but in its content, 
as following  and directing itself  upon  the check. 
For a free being finds itself  only as free.  As sure, 
therefore, as it reflects, it imitates, internally, an in- 
fluence produced upon it, under the presupposition 
that it has the power to break off  this influence at 
any moment.  It restricts its own freedom.  But if 
that influence can  no longer  be broken off  by the 
mere  causality of  the will,  then such a self-limita- 
tion  is  also  unnecessary.  Something  is  wanting 
which  belongs  in the reflection of  a free being, as 
such, and thus the compulsion is felt.  Reflection is 
a-lways accompanied  by the feeling of  compulsion ; 
for in the articulated body every thing is connected, 
and each part influences all others, in virtue of  the 
conception of  articulation. 
This checking of  the free movement in my body 
I must necessarily posit as possible ;  and thus my 
body  is further  determined.  As its  condition  I 
must posit outside of  me a tough, compact matter, 
capable of  resisting the free movement of  my body ; 
and thus through the further determination of  my 
body, the sensuous world  has also been further de- 
termined." 
That tough,  compact  matter can  check only a 
part of  my free movements, but not all ; for in  the 
latter case the freedom of  person would be utterly 
annihilated.  Hence, I must be able, through the 
free movement of  the other part of  my body, to re- 
move the check from the limited part, and hence to 
exercise a  causality upon  the tough  matter.  The 
body  must have physical  power  to resist the im- 
pression of  that matter, if  not immediately, through 
the will,  at least  mediately,  through  Art,  that is, 
through application of  the will by means of  the free 
parts of  the body.  But in that case the organ of 
this causality  itself  must  be composed  of  such a 
* A  deduction of  such an empirical determination signifies  as 
follows : The philosopher  shows  a  przori,  that,  if  one  person 
is  to influence  the other,  and  each  one  to know and  treat  the 
other  as rational  being,  then such persons must  have  a common 
sphere of  action,  a  sort of  independent body,  and outside  of  this 
body must be, amongst other powers,  one power  to check its free 
movement.  He  then looks around in the sensuous world, points to 
tough matter, and says, Here we have found what  reason required. 
It  was sure to be found, but I could not tell apaon  what it was ; 
could merely say it must bt-  somewhere and of some character ;  and 
now a postenorc  I can tell you, it is tough matter.-TRANSLATOR'S 
REMARK. 104 
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tough substance ;  and the superiority of  a rational 
being over matter arises only from  the freedom  to 
work  out conceptions.  Matter works only by me- 
chanical laws, and has thus only one mode of  work- 
ing, whereas the free being has many modes. 
If my body consists of  tough,  hard  matter,  and 
has the power to modify all matter of  the sensuous 
world, and to form it after my conception, then the 
body of  the person  outside  of  me consists of  the 
same matter and has the same power.  Now, my 
body itself  being matter, it is, as such, an object of 
the physical influence of  the other person ; a pos- 
sible object, whose  free movements  he can  check 
altogether.  If  he had  considered and  treated  me 
as such mere matter, in the presupposed case, he 
would have treated me thus.  But he has not done 
so ;  hence he has not conceived me to be mere mat- 
ter,  but to be a rational  being,  by the conception 
whereof  he has restricted  his  own  freedom ;  and 
from  this  his  treatment  I  am  now authorized to 
draw the conclusion, that the influence  exercised 
upon me was the influence of  a rational being. 
We have thus established the criterion of  the re- 
ciprocal influence of rational beings upon each other. 
That influence always presupposes, that the object 
of  the ifz$~~e7zce has setzsuousfzess, and  is  not,  like 
mere matter, to be modified by physical power. 
D.  In the described  influence, the organ of  the 
Subject has been actually modified  through an ex- 
ternal person.  This has been done neither through 
the immediate bodily touch of that other person nor 
through some firm matter ; for the latter would not 
involve the conception of  the influence of  a person. 
How then ? 
The organ  is, at all events, something material, 
the whole body being material ;  and the organ must 
therefore have been modified, brought  into and re- 
tained in a certain form, and likewise through some 
external matter.  The mere will of the subject would 
cancel this form ; and he must restrain his will, not 
to destroy it.  The matter through which this form 
has been produced is, therefore, no tough, firm mat- 
ter, the parts whereof could be separated by the mere 
will, but a finer, more subtle matter.  Such a sub- 
tle matter must be necessarily posited as condition 
of  the required influence upon the sensuous world. 
The modification of  the organ for  the influence 
through freedom is not to affect at all the organ for 
the influence through compulsion, but is to leave it 
utterly free.  Hence, the finer matter must influ- 
ence only the former and not  in any way the latter 
organ ; it must  be a matter, the component parts 
whereof  have no connection perceptible to the low- 
er organ, that is, to the organ under compulsion. 
In the described condition I assume the power to 
react upon this subtle matter through the mere will, 
by means of an affection of  the higher through the 
lower organ ; for  it has been expressly stated, that 
I must hold back such a movement of  the lower or- 
gan, in order not  to destroy the determination pro- 
duced in the higher organ ; hence, I must also hold I 06  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  TIfE SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS. 
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back  the power,  to give another determination to 
that more subtle matter.  The subtle matter is there- 
foyefor g~zc nzod$nbde  thyozg-h the were wild. 
To meet in  advance any possible  misapprehen- 
sion, I add a few words.  A double organ has been 
posited ; a higher and a lower organ.  The higher 
organ is that which  is modified through the subtle 
matter ;  the lower organ is that which can be check- 
ed by the tough and hard matter. 
Two cases are possible : 
Either the person  is influenced as a free being. 
In that case the higher organ  is modified  through 
a  certain form of  the more  subtle matter; and if 
the person  is to perceive this influence, he must re- 
strain the movement of  the lower organ in so far as 
it is related  to that part of  the higher organ, but 
must at the same time-only  internally, however- 
imitate the particular  movement  which  he would 
have to make, in order to produce himself that par- 
ticular given modification of the higher organ.  For 
instance, if  you perceive an object in Space through 
Sight, you  internally-but  with  the quickness of 
lightning,  and  hence  imperceptibly-imitate  the 
feeling of  the object,  that is, imitate the pressure 
which  would  be  needed  to  produce  that  object 
through  plastic ; and the impression in the eye is 
retained,  as  the scheme of  this imitation.  This 
explains why uneducated  people,  people who have 
not yet attained facility in executing the functions 
of  mankind, when they wish to look carefully at ail 
elevated  body,  or  even  at a  painting,  engraving, 
book,  etc.,  always  want  to  touch what  they see. 
Again: A person,  who  hears,  can  not  possibly at 
the same time speak ;  for he must, in hearing, imi- 
tate the tones which he hears, through his organ of 
speech, by reproducing  them.  This explains why 
some people often ask you to repeat what you have 
said.  They heard it well  enough, but did  not  be- 
come  conscious of  it,  because  they did  not repro- 
duce your words internally.  Frequently such peo- 
ple  must  repeat  your  words  loudly  to themselves 
before  they can  understand  them.  In this  case, 
therefore,  the body serves as organ,  as sense,  and 
as k&Aer sense. 
Or, the second case, a  modification  is  produced 
in  the higher organ  through  the mere will of  the 
person, accompanied by the will that the lower or- 
gan shall be correspondingly  moved  by  this  will, 
In  that case, if  the lower organ is not checked, the 
intended movement results, and through that move- 
ment  the intended  modification  of  the  subtle  or 
tough matter also results.  Thus, for  instance, you 
form in the eye, as an active organ, the figures you 
intend to sketch or the words  you intend  to write, 
and  throw them  outside  of  you,  long before  the 
hand, which obeys your eye, can draw or write them. 
In this case the body serves as tool. 
If the intended  movement  of  the lower organ 
does not result-the  movement of  the higher organ 
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the lower organ is checked ; and in  that case, the 
sense.  body serves as sense, but as lowe- 
When one rational being affects another rational 
being as mere matter, then the lower sense of  that 
being is also affected, it is true,  and is so affected 
necessarily and altogether independently of the free- 
dom of  that being, (as the lower sense is indeed al- 
ways affected ;)  but it is not to be assumed that this 
affection  was  in  the intention of  the person  who 
produced  it.  His intention was  merely to attain 
his purpose,  to express  his  conception in  matter, 
and he never took into consideration whether that 
matter would  feel it or not.  Hence, the reciprocal 
influence  of  rational  beings  upon  each  other,  as 
such, always occurs by means of  the higher sense ; 
for only the higher sense is one which  can not be 
affected without having been presupposed.  Our cri- 
terion of  this  reciprocal  influence  remains,  there- 
fore, correct. 
E. As  condition of self-consciousness an external 
influence has been posited, and by virtue thereof  a 
certain nature of  the body has been posited, and as 
a result of  this nature of  the body a  certain condi- 
tion of  the sensuous world has been posited.  Our 
argument was : If  consciousness is to be possible, 
then the sensuous world must be constituted in that 
manner  and  must have that relation  to our body 
which has been specified. 
We have also shown up, as condition of  self-con- 
THE  SCZEArCE  OF RIGHTS. 
109 
sciousness,  a  community  of  free individuals,  and 
from this necessary condition we have deduced the 
further determination of  the body, and, by its means, 
of the sensuous world.  The argument here was : 
Because there is to be in the sensuous world a com- 
munity of  free beings, therefore the world must be 
thus or thus constituted.  Rut such a  community 
of free  beings  is  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  posited 
through these beings-on  no account with freedom 
on  their  part,  but  with  absolute  necessity;  and 
whatsoever is thus posited has reality for us. 
F.  I ascribe to myself  a higher and lower organ, 
related to each other as stated above ;  and  in con- 
sequence thereof assume in the sensuous world out- 
side of  me a coarser and a finer  matter, related  to 
my organs as stated above.  Such a positing is, as 
we have shown,  a  necessary condition of  self-con- 
sciousness, and hence is involved in the conception 
of a person.  If I posit, therefore, a person outside 
of me, I must necessarily assume that that person 
posits the same, or, in other words, I must ascribe 
to that person  also, as I did  to myself, the posses- 
sion and use of  two such distinct organs, and must 
assume for  that person  also, as I assumed for  my- 
self, the real existence of  such a determined sensu- 
ous world. 
This transferring my necessary thinking  to an- 
other person, is also involved in the conception of a 
person.  Hence, I must also  assume of  the other 
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what  I assume of  him,  and that he also assumes 
that I assume the same of  him.  In other words, 
the conceptions of  the determined  articulation of 
rational beings and of  the sensuous world  outside 
of  them, are necessarily exchangeable conceptions ; 
conceptions  concerning which  all  rational  beings 
agree beforehand, without any previous understand- 
ing,  and  thus agree  necessarily,  becaz6se  the per- 
sonality of  each involves the same 7nanner of  colztem- 
plating.  Each one can justly assume of  the other 
and claim that that other must have the same con- 
ceptions on these matters, as sure as the other pre- 
tends to be a rational being. 
G.  But a new objection arises, which must be an- 
swered before  the body of  a rational  being can be 
completely determined.  It has been asserted that 
I can not  attain self-consciousness except through 
the influence of  a  rational  being  outside of  me. 
Now, although it depends solely upon my freedom 
whether I choose to surrender myself  to that influ- 
ence or not, and although the manner of  my react- 
ing upon that influence is altogether within my free 
will,  still,  the possibility of  my thus giving  utter- 
ance to my freedom  is conditioned by the occur- 
rence of  the  influence  from without-no  such ex- 
ternal influence, no possibility for  me to manifest 
my freedom.  Hence, so far as actuality is concern- 
ed, I am made a rational being.  True, so far as the 
power  of  freedom  is concerned, I am  free before ; 
but in actuality I can not  become a free or rational 
being unless that external influence is directed upon 
me.  Hence, my rationality depends up011 the arbi- 
trariness or the good-will of  another-upon  chance ; 
and all rationality depends upon chance. 
But this can not be ;  for if  it were, I could not be 
independent as a person ;  I could  only be the acci- 
dence of  another person, who  again  would  be the 
accidence of  a third, and so on ad injnitam. 
This contradiction  can  not  be solved  otherwise 
than by the presupposition that the other has al- 
ready been comjelleed, in that original influence upon 
me,  to treat me as a rational being,  (conzpelleu?,  of 
course, as a rational being, that is to say, he has felt 
himself  consistently bound,) and that he has been 
compelled to treat me thus by me; that, therefore, 
in that first original influence upon me, which made 
me dependent upon  him,  he was  also, at the same 
time, dependent upon me ;  that, therefore, that very 
first and original relation between us was already a 
relation of  reciprocal causality. 
But this seems impossible.  For previous to that 
influence I  am fzot at all I;  have not posited my- 
self; since the positing of  myself  is  possible only 
on  condition  of  that  external  influence  upon  me. 
How then can I have causality upon the other per- 
son before I have  posited  myself?  I am to have 
causality without having it ; to influence the other 
person without being active.  How is  this thinka- 
ble ? 
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have a mere power to influence.  This mere power 
is to influence, is to have causality.  But a power is 
only an ideal conception, and it would be an empty 
thought to ascribe  to such a power  the exclusive 
predicate of  reality,  namely,  causality, without  as. 
suming that power as realized. 
Now, the whole power of  the person is assuredly 
realized in the sensuous world, in the conception of 
his  body, which  body is as sure as the person is, 
and continues as long as the person continues, and 
which  body,  moreover,  is  a  completed  Whole of 
material parts, and has, therefore, a determined ori- 
ginal form. 
It  is, therefore, required that my body should have 
causality, should be active, and yet that I  should not 
be active in that activity. 
2. But my body is vfzy  body only in so far as it is 
placed  in motion  by my will,  and  otherwise  it is 
only a  mass of  matter; my  body  is  active  as my 
body  only  in  so far  as I am  active  through  it. 
Now,  in  the present  case I am not  to be  active, 
am not even to be I.  Hence, my body can not  be 
active. 
It must, therefore, be  thus : Through its  mere 
existence in space, and through its form, my body 
must  exercise an influence of  such a  nature that 
every rational  being will be bound  to consider  me 
as a  being gifted with  reason,  and hence to treat 
me as such. 
3. The first and most difficult question  is, now, 
How can any thing exercise an influence through 
its  mere  existence  in  space,  without  any  mo- 
tion ? 
The influence  is to be exercised upon a rational 
being, as such;  hence, it must occur, not througb 
an immediate touching  and checking of  its lower 
organ, but must be brought to bear upon its higher 
organ, hence by means of  the more subtle matter. 
Now, it is true that, in  our above description, we 
have  assumed  this  subtle  matter  to  be a means 
whereby  rational  beings  influence  each other, in 
modifying it through their higher organ.  This is 
not, however, to be the case here.  In our case, the 
human body is to produce an influence  in its state 
of  repose, without any activity ; and accordingly the 
more subtle matter must be posited  in our case as 
modifiable by the mere form of  the body in its state 
of  repose,  and as modifying  the higher organ  of 
another rational being through this its modification. 
In  so far, moreover,  as the human body is here re- 
garded merely as form, the same must be the case 
in respect to every other form. 
(It has not  been  proved,  that the here deduced 
more ~ubtle  matter,  by means of  which  the mere 
reposing form  in space is to exercise an influence, 
is specifically different from the previously deduced 
more subtle matter, but simply that the more subtle 
matter must have these two predicates.  For if  we 
had wished to prove the former, we should have had 
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ing form  is to exercise an influence, could not be 
possibly placed  in motion by the movement of  the 
higher organ, and  hence must  be specifically dis- 
tinct.  Now, although this proof  is not exactly ne- 
cessary here, I will append it, as follows : 
The form of  the person outside of  me must con- 
tinue to be the same, as we  have shown.  Now, if 
we reciprocally influence each other only by means 
of  a  subtle matter, which can be placed  in motion, 
(Air,)-that  is  to say, only by speaking with  each 
other-then  that  matter,  A,  would  continually 
change, and if  it received  the impression of  our 
forms, would  continually change those forms,  and 
hence those persons.  But as those persons must 
remain the same, it is requisite that the matter in 
which  our forms  are impressed  must  remain  im- 
movable amidst all the motion of  the other matter. 
A must, therefore, be not  modifiable  through our 
organ, and in so far distinct from A.  Let us call it 
B, or Light.  (The appearances in light can, there- 
fore,  be modified  by us  only indirectly,  namely, in 
so far as we can  modify that appearance  itself,  Qr 
the form of  our body.) 
4.  My body must be visible to the person outside 
of  me, must appear and have appeared to that per- 
son through  the medium  of  the light,  as sure as 
that  other ferso~  exercises  an  i~$uence upon  me. 
Thus our first question is answered. 
But now  comes  the second question.  For, ac- 
cording to our necessary  presupposition,  this  ap- 
pearance is to be of  such a nature that it absolutely 
can not be  understood  and comprehended except 
by assuming it to be the appearance  (form)  of  a 
rational being.  My form must be of  such a cha- 
racter that I can say to each other person : As soon 
as you  see this (my) form, you  are necessitated  te 
consider it as the representative of  a rational being 
in the sensuous world, if  you are yourself a rational 
being.  How is this possible ? 
First of  all, what does this signify, to understand 
or comprehend ?  It  signifies to fix, to determine, to 
limit.  I have comprehended  an appearance, when 
I have  received  through it a  perfect  whole  of  a 
knowledge, which,  in all  its parts, is grounded in 
itself ; whereof  each part is explained and ground- 
ed through  all others, and vice versa.  (So long as 
I am still explaining, still floating and undetermined 
in my belief, still driven from one part of  my know- 
ledge to other parts, I have not yet comprehended. 
I have not comprehended A as an accidental until I 
have ascertained  its cause;  and as A  is  a  deter- 
mined accidental, its determined cause.) 
To say, therefore,  I can not  understand  an ap- 
pearance except in a certain manner, signifies :  each 
separate part of  the appearance impels me onward 
to a certain point, and only when I have arrived at 
this point can I place the several parts in order and 
gather them all into a whole of  knowledge. 
To say, therefore, I can not comprehend  the ap- 
pearance of  a  human  body except  by assuming it 
to be  the body of  a  rational  being,  signifies : in 
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until I have arrived at the point which forces me to 
consider it the body of  a thinking being. 
I shall  proceed to the strict genetical proof  of 
this result ; sketching, however, only its chief  fea- 
tures ;  for, as a whole in its completeness, it forms a 
science of  its own, the science of Anthropology. 
I. It must be necessary to think the human body 
as a Whole, and impossible  to think  its parts se- 
parately  as  we  can  think  coarse  matter,  sand 
earth, etc.  What must thus be thought as a Whole, 
in order to be thought at all, is called a72  orgaa;rzized 
prodz~ct  of  nature.  The human body must, there- 
fore, be firstly such an o7~ajzized  product of  nature. 
The distinction  of  such an organized  product  of 
nature from aprodz~ct  of  art, which also can only be 
thought as a Whole, lies in this : In both  products 
each part exists only for the sake of  the others, and 
hence for the sake of  the whole ;  and our judgment 
in considering either product  is forced  to proceed 
from one part to the other, till all have been gath- 
ered together.  But in the product of  nature the 
Whole also  exists for  the sake of  the parts,  and 
has, as a Whole, no other purpose than to produce 
these determined parts ; whereas, in the product of 
art, the Whole  does  not  thus refer  back  to the 
parts, but refers to an external purpose.  The pro- 
duct of  nature exists for its own sake ; the product 
of  art for  the  sake of  a  purpose,  or  as  a  tool. 
Again : In the product of  nature each single part 
produces itself by its inner power ; but in the pro- 
duct of  art, before  even it can become  such,  this 
inner power of  self-development is killed  off; and 
in the composition of  its parts this inner power is 
not at all taken into calculation.  It is composed 
simply according to mechanical  laws ; and hence 
it refers to an external originator, whereas the pro- 
duct of  nature produces and maintains itself. 
11.  An appearance has been completely compre- 
hended by the presupposition  that it is a product 
of  nature, if  all that occurs in it refers back to or- 
ganization and can be completely explained by the 
end and aim of  this determined organization.  For 
instance, the highest and last manifestation of  the 
organizing power in plants is the seed.  Now, this 
seed  is completely explainable from the organiza- 
tion as its end, that is, as the means of  propagating 
the plant ;  and through this seed the power of  or- 
ganization returns into itself  and recommences its 
career.  The act of  organization thus never closes, 
but always rushes along in an endless circle. 
But that an appearance has not been completely 
c~mprehended  by that presupposition, signifies, that 
the highest and final  product of  the power of  or- 
ganization can not be referred  back  as means to 
that power, but rather points to quite another pur- 
pose.  True, you continue the explanation according 
to the laws of organization for some time, (whereas, 
in the product of  art you can not apply this law at 
all,) but after a while you discover that you can no 
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can not be again related to it.  Hence, the circle is 
not closed, and the comprehension not completed ; 
that is to say, nothing has been comprehended, the 
appearance has not been  understood.  (It is true, 
man also  completes the circle of  organization by 
the propagation  of  his  species.  He is a  perfect 
plant, but he is also something more.) 
Now, such a final product of  the power of  organ- 
ization, which can not be referred back again to it, 
is Articulation.  Articulation is both visible  and a 
product of  organization ; but articulation does not 
again  produce  organization, and  rather refers  to 
another end ; that is to say, it can only be gather- 
ed  together  completely  in  another  conception. 
This other  conception  can  be  the conception of 
f..~e moveme?zt, and in so far man is an nlzimad. 
111.  But this presupposition  of  free movement 
21~0  must be insufficient for  the comprehension of 
the human body.  Its articulation, therefore, must 
be incomprehensible in any determined conception. 
It  must not refer to a definite, determined sphere of 
arbitrary motion, as in the case of  the animal, but 
to all infinitely thinkable motions.  There must be, 
not n determinedness of  articulation, but  an infi- 
nite determinability of  articulation ; not develop- 
ment, but developability.  In short, all animals are 
perfect and complete ;  man, however, is merely sug- 
gested.  A  rational  observer of  the human  body 
can unite its parts in no conception, except in the 
conception of  a rational  being like himself, or in 
the conception of  freedom as given to him  In  his 
self-consciousness.  He  must subsume the concep- 
tion of  his  own  Ego to his contemplation of  that 
other human body, because that body expresses no 
conception of  its own,  and can  only  be  explained 
by that conception of  his own Ego.  Every animal 
is what it is ;  man alone is originally nothing at all. 
What man is to be, he must become ;  and as he is 
to be  a  being for  himself,  must  become  through 
himself  Nature  completed  all  her works ; only 
from  man  did  she withdraw her hands,  and pre- 
cisely thereby gave him over  to himself.  Cultiva- 
bility, as such, is the character of  mankind.  The 
impossibility of  subsuming to the human form any 
other  conception  than  that of  his own  Ego, is it, 
which forces every man inwardly to consider every 
other man as his equal. 
COROLLARIA. 
I.  It is a vexatious  question, which,  so far as I 
know, Philosophy has never yet solved :  How do we 
come to transfer  to some object  of  the sensuous 
world the conception of  rationality and not to oth- 
ers ; or what  is  the characteristic  distinction  of 
both classes ? 
KANT  says : "  Act so that the principle of thy will 
can be the principle of a universal legislation."  But 
who shall belong to the empire which  is governed 
by this legislation, and who  shall enjoy its protec- 
tion?  I  am  required  to  treat  certain  beings  in 
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according to the same principle.  But I act every 
day upon animals and lifeless objects without ever 
seriously entertaining that rule.  I  am told : Of 
course, the rule applies only to beings who are ca- 
pable of  being conscious of  laws, hence of  rational 
beings.  But who  is to tell  me what  specific  ob- 
jects  in nature are rational beings ;  whether, per- 
haps,  only the white  European  or also  the black 
negro, whether only the full-grown man or also the 
child, can claim  the protection of  that legislation ; 
or whether, perhaps, the faithful house-dog may not 
likewise claim it  ?  Until this question has been an- 
swered,  KANT'S  rule  has neither  applicability nor 
reality, however excellent it may be. 
Nature has decided this question long ago.  There 
is probably no man who, at the first glimpse of  an- 
other man, will take to flight, as at the view of a wild 
animal, or prepare to kill and eat him like a piece 
of  game; or who would not, on the contrary, en- 
deavor  to enter into mutual  communication with 
him.  This is so, not through habit and education, 
but through nature and reason,  and we  have just 
shown up the law by virtue of  which it is so. 
Let no one believe, however, that man must first 
go through that long and tiresome process of  rea- 
soning, which we have just  gone through, in order 
to arrive at the comprehension that a certain exter- 
nal body is his equal.  That recognition either does 
not take place  at all, or it occurs at once without 
consciousness of  the ground thereof  It is  only 
the  philosopher's business to discover these grounds. 
11.  Every  animal,  a  fcw  hours  after  its  birth 
moves  to  seek nourishment at the breasts  of  its 
mother,  guided  by the mzinzal ilzsti~zct,  or the law 
of certain free motions, which is likewise the ground 
of  the so-called  art-instinct of  animals.  Man  also 
has instinct,  but  not animal instinct in the above 
significance ; he has only plant-instinct.  He  needs 
the free help of  men,  and without  it would  die a 
few hours after his birth.  As soon as he leaves the 
womb of  his mother,  nature withdraws  her hands 
from him and casts him aside, as it were.  PLINIUS 
and others have been very bitter against man's cre- 
ator on that account.  This may be rhetorical, but 
it is not philosophical.  For the very abandonment 
of  man proves  that he is not, and is not to be, the 
pupil of  nature.  If rnan is an animal, then he is a 
very imperfect animal ;  and for  that very reason is 
he no animal.  It has often been  considered, as if 
the free spirit existed  in  man to take care of  the 
animal.  Such is  not  the case.  On the contrary, 
the animal  exists  to bear  the free  spirit into the 
sensuous world, and to connect him with it. 
This  utter  helplessness  throws  mankind  back 
upon itself, maintains and unites  the species.  As 
the  tree  keeps up its species  by casting  off  its 
fruits, so man, by taking care of  and educating the 
helpless new-born child, maintains himself  as spe- 
cies.  Thus reason produces itself, and only thus is 
the progress of  reason  toward  perfection possible. 
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other, and each future one contains the spiritual re- 
sults of  all previous links. 
111.  Man  is  born naked; the animals  are born 
covered.  In creating animals, nature has complet- 
ed her work and impressed upon it the seal of com- 
pletion, by protecting the finer organization, through 
a  coarser  covering,  against  the  influence of  the 
coarser  matter.  But  in man,  the very  first and 
most  important  organ,  that  of  touch,  which  is 
spread  over  his  whole  skin, has been  left  utterly 
exposed to the influence of  the coarser matter, not 
through any neglect on the part of  nature, but be- 
cause of  her respect for  us.  That organ was dcs- 
tined  by  nature to  touch matter  immediately,  in 
order to make it most proper to our purpose ;  but 
nature left  us  perfectly free to determine in what 
particular part of  our body to locate that power of 
moulding  matter,  and what part of  our body  we 
might  choose  to  consider  as  mere  matter.  We 
have located that power  in the tips of  our fingers, 
from a reason which will  soon appear.  It is there 
because we so willed it.  We might have given to 
each part of  our body the same delicate touch,  if 
we had so willed it.  This is proven  by those  men 
who write and sew with their toes, who speak with 
their bellies, etc. 
IV. Each animal has, as we remarked before, in- 
born  powers  of  motion ;  for  example, the beaver, 
the bee, etc.  But man has nothing of  the kind, and 
even the new-born child's  position on the back is 
given to it in order to prepare it for the future walk. 
The question has been asked : Was man intended 
walk upright or on four feet ?  I believe he was not 
intended  to do either.  It  was  left  to man as spe- 
cies, to choose its mode of motion.  A human body 
can run on four feet ; and men grown up amongst 
animals  have so run with incredible  swiftness.  I 
hold that the species has, by its own choice, freely 
lifted  itself  up from  the earth, and thus acquired 
for itself  the power of  looking around in  every di- 
rection and of  surveying one half  of  the universe 
in the skies, whilst  the animal  is,  by its position, 
chained to the soil which  brings forth its nourish- 
ment.  By thus lifting himself  up from the ground, 
man  has won  from  nature two  tools  of  freedom; 
the two arms, which, no longer required to do ani- 
nial functions, now hang down, awaiting merely the 
command of  the will,  and  cultivated  solely with  a 
view  to carry out those commands.  Through his 
daring gait, which  is an everlasting expression of 
his boldness and expertness, man continually keeps 
his free-will and reason in practice, always remains 
a becog~zing,  and expresses this, his character.  This 
gait of  his lifts up his life into the region of  light ; 
by its means he touches the earth with  the least 
possible part of  his body.  Animals use the earth 
as their bed and table ;  man lifts his bed and table 
above the earth. 
V.  What characterizes the cultivated man above 
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all is the spiritual eye and the mouth, which betrays 
the most secret feelings of  the heart in its move- 
ments.  I mention the eye, not because it is movecl 
about by the muscles wherein  it is fixed, and can 
cast  its  glances  hither  and  thither ; a  mobility, 
which  the erect walk  of  man serves to heighten, 
it is  true, but which,  in  itself,  is  mechanical.  I 
speak of  it,  because  the  eye  is  to  the man  not 
merely a dead,  passive  mirror, like the plane of  a 
sheet of  water, or like an artificially prepared look- 
ing-glass,  or like the eye of  an animal, but rather 
a mighty organ, which self-actively sketches and re- 
produces  the forms in  space ; which  self-actively 
creates,  looks  out of  itself,  the figures, which  are 
to be hewn out of  the marble or painted  upon the 
canvas  before  chisel or brush  has been  touched; 
which self-actively creates a picture for the arbitra- 
rily sketched spiritual  conception.  Through  this 
infinite  living  and  moving of  the parts  amongst 
each  other,  that what  they have  of  earthly sub- 
stance in them is, as it were, stripped off, and the 
eye, clearing itself  into light, b~comes  n visible sod. 
Hence, the more spiritual self-activity there is in a 
man, the more spiritual does his eye become ;  and 
the less spiritual activity, the more does the eye re- 
main a dark, fog-covered mirror. 
The mouth, which  nature formed  for the lowest 
and most selfish occupation, nourishment, becomes, 
hrough  self-culture,  the  expression  of  all  social 
entiments, as it is also the organ of  communica- 
on.  As the individual or the race is more animal 
and selfish, does the mouth protrude more ; as the 
race grows nobler,  the mouth recedes  behind  the 
arch of  the thinking forehead. 
All this, the whole expressive face, is nothing, as 
we  come out of  the hands of  nature; is  merely a 
soft, impressible substance, wherein you can, at  the 
utmost, discover what is to become of  it by trans- 
ferring  the picture  of  your  own  culture  upon  it; 
and this very lack of  completion makes  man capa- 
ble of  culture. 
All this-and  not in the separate parts, wherein 
the philosopher represents it, but seized in its sur- 
prising connection as a whole, as which  it appears 
to the senses-is  it, which  forces  every one,  who 
bears a human face, to respect and recognize every 
one who bears  a human face, whether it be merely 
suggested in dim outlines or alreacly elevated to a 
certain degree of  completion.  The human form is 
necessarily sacred to man. 
PROOF THAT,  THROUGH  THE  FOREGOING  SIX  PRO- 
POSITIONS,  THE  APPLICABILITY  OF THE  CONCEP- 
TION  OF RIGIITS  IIAS  BECOME  POSSIBLE. 
A  Persons, as such, are to be absolutely free, and 
dependent only upon their will.  Again :  as sure as 
they are persons  they are to be  reciprocally influ- 
enced  by each other, and hence not  to be depen- 
dent  solely  upon  their will.  How both  these  rc- 
quirements  may  be  possible,  it is the task of  the I 26  TUE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  TiYE  SCIEhTE  OF  RIGHTS. 
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Science of  Rights to determine ; and  its problem 
is, therefore, How may a couzmunity of  free  beings, 
as such, be possible ? 
We have  shown  the external conditions  of  this 
possibility.  We have  explained  how,  under  this 
presupposition,  persons,  who  mutually  influence 
each other, and how  the sphere of  this their reci- 
procal  influence, the sensuous world, must be con- 
stituted.  The proof  of our results rests altogether 
on  the  presupposition  of  such  a  community,  and 
that presupposition is again  based on the possibi- 
lity of  self-consciousness.  Hence, all our previous 
results have been deduced by mediated conclusions 
from  the postulate,  I  am I, and are, therefore,  as 
certain as that postulate  is.  Our systematic pro- 
cedure leads us now to develop the ifzterizal condi- 
tions of  such a reciprocal influence. 
The last point which we reached, and from which 
we now proceed further, was this: All arbitrary re- 
ciprocal causality of  free beings has for its basis or 
ground an original and  necessary reciprocal causa- 
lity of  those beings, which is, that each free being, 
by its mere  presence  in the sensuous world, com- 
pels all other free beings to recognize it as a person. 
It furnishes the fixed appearance ; the other free 
being  furnishes  the  fixed  conception.  Both  are 
necessarily united,  and  there is  not  the  smallest 
play-room  for freedom.  Through this there arises 
a common recognition, but nothing further.  Both 
internally  recognize  each  other,  but  they remain 
isolated as before. 
Each has this  conception of  the other : that the 
other is a free being, and must not be treated as a 
mere thing.  Now,  if  this conception did  in  both 
determine  all  their  other  conceptions, and,  since 
their  will  belongs  to  their  conceptions,  did  de- 
termine also their will, and  through it all their ac- 
tions ; in other words, if  they could  not think and 
will  otherwise than under this  conception, then  it 
would be impossible  for them even to will to influ- 
ence each other arbitrarily, or as things ;  they could 
not ascribe to themselves the power of  influencing 
each other as things, and hence could neither have 
that power. 
This evidently  is  not  the case.  For each  has 
also  posited  the body  of  the other  as  matter,  as 
modifiable matter, and each has ascribed to himself 
the power  to modify matter.  Each can, therefore, 
clearly subsume the body of  the other, in so far as 
that  body is matter, to that general conception of 
modifiable matter ;  can think himself modifying the 
body  of  the  other  through  physical  power ; ancl 
hence-since  his will  can be limited  only through 
his  thinking-can  also  will thus  to  modify  the 
other's body. 
But for  that very same reason, that is, because 
he is free, can every one restrict the exercise of his 
power, can he give a law to that exercise, and hence 
can he give to it the law, never to treat the other's 
body as a  mere thing.  The validity of  that  law 
depends, therefore, upon the fact whether a man is 
consistent  or  not.  But  consistency  in  this  case I 28  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  TIfE SCIENCE  OF RIGIITS  I29 
depends upon  the freedom of  the will ; and  there 
is no more reason why a man should be consistent, 
unless  he is compelled  to be so, than there is why 
he should not be consistent.  The law must, there- 
fore, be applied to this freedom ; and thus we have 
here the boundary-line between  necessity and free- 
dom for the Science of  Rights. 
I3.  We have  said  that no absolute ground  can 
be shown why the rational  being should be consis- 
tent, and hence why it should adopt that law for its 
freedom.  Perhaps, however, an hypothetical ground 
might be discovered. 
It certainly can be  shown  that,  if an absolute 
community  is  to be  established between persons, 
as such,  each  member  thereof  must  assume  the 
above  law ; for  only  by  constantly treating each 
other as free beings can they remain free beings or 
persons.  Moreover,  since  it is  possible  for  each 
member to treat the other as not a free being, but 
as a  mere  thing, it is also  conceivable that  each 
member  may form  the resolve, never  to treat the 
others as mere things, but  always as free  beings ; 
and  since for  such a  resolve  no other ground  is 
discoverable  than  that such a  community of  free 
beings  ottght  to exist,  it is  also  conceivable  that 
each member should have formed that resolve from 
this ground and upon  this presupposition. 
If it could,  therefore,  be moreover  shown  that 
each rational  being  must necessarily desire such a 
community,  then  the necessity  of  the postulated 
consequence would  also  appear, namely, that each 
individual must form that resolve, and must be con- 
sistent.  But that desire can not  be proved  from 
our previous  premises.  True, it has been  shown 
that, if a rational being  is to attain self-conscious- 
ness, and is, therefore, to become a rational  being, 
another rational being must necessarily have affect- 
ed it as a  rational being.  In fact, these  are ex- 
changeable,  identical  conceptions ; no  such affec- 
tion or influence, no rational being. 
But it does not follow that, after self-conscious- 
ness has been posited, rational beings must always 
rationally  influence  each  other ; nor  can  this  be 
deduced from the former without  using the result, 
which is to be proved, as proof. 
The postulate, that a community of  free beings 
is to remain permanent, appears, therefore, to be an 
arbitrary postulate ; or a postulate which each per- 
son  may  adopt  for  himself, if  he so wills.  If he 
adopts it, he  is, of  course,  also  bound  to  submit 
himself to the above law, that is, always to treat all 
other persons as free beings. 
We are here, therefore, as  before  remarked, on 
the boundary-line between  necessity and freedom, 
the line which  separates the Science of  Morality 
from the Science of Rights.  The proposition which 
forms the line is : The rational being is not abso- 
lutely  bound  by  its  character  of  rationality,  to 
desire the freedom of  all other rational beingb. 
The Science of  Morality  shows  that  every  ra- 
tional  being is absolutely bound  to desire the free- 130  THE SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  TRE SCIENCE  OF RIGNTS. 
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dom of  all other rational beings.  The Science of 
Rights does not show this, but says : Each rational 
being has the freedom to desire it or not to  desire 
it ; and then shows the result of  either act. 
C.  Let us suppose that I have resolved with full 
freedom to enter into a community with free beings, 
say with the free  being C.  What is the result of 
this resolve ?  Let us nfzalyze  it. 
I  intend  to enter  into  a  community of  mutual 
rational treatment  with  C.  But a  community in- 
volves matzy.  Hence I add, in thinking, the per- 
son C to my resolve, and assume, in my conception 
of  C, that he has the same resolve;  and since I 
framed that resolve with freedom, I also assume C 
to have  framed his voluntarily.  I  therefore  posit 
necessarily  our  community  as dependent  equally 
upon the free resolve of  C ; hence as accidental, as 
the result of  a ~nutzral  wiZZi~zg. 
I desire nothing further than to be in this com- 
munity of  rational intercourse with C ; we both to 
treat  each other alike ; he me, I him.  Hence, in 
case he  should  not  treat me thus, I have posited 
nothing.  For I have posited in that resolve  only 
that we are mutually to treat each other as free be- 
ings; but have posited nothing for  the case, that 
he may treat me otherwise.  I have neither posited 
that I shall treat him as a rational being, if  he does 
not treat me as such, nor that in such case I shall 
treat him not as a rational being.  In short, I have 
posited  nothing for  such a case.  As soon as his 
treatment no longer corresponds  to my conception 
of  him as a rational being, that conception falls to 
the ground, and the law, which  I formed in conse- 
quence of  that conception, also falls to the ground. 
I am  no longer bound by that law,  and again am 
dependent solely upon my free-will. 
D. Our present result is, therefore, as follows :  It 
is impossible to show an absolute ground why any 
one should make the fundamental principle of  the 
Science of  Rights, "  Limit thy freedom  in such a 
manner that others can also  be  free,"  the law of 
his will and of  his actions.  It  can be shown, how- 
ever, that a  community of  free  beings,  as  such, 
can not exist, unless every member is subjected to 
this law ; and that, therefore, each person who de- 
sires such a community must also desire this law. 
That law has, therefore, only hypothetical validity; 
namely, if  a community of  free beings is to be pos- 
sible, then the principle of  Rights must be valid. 
But even the condition,  the community of  free 
beings,  is  again conditioned  by a  common  desire. 
No one can,  by his own  mere will,  realize  such  a 
community with  another  unless  the other has the 
same will,  and by virtue thereof  subjects himself 
to the principle of law conditioned thereby.  If the 
other one has not this will, as is most  clearly prov- 
ed when he treats the other person contrary to that 
principle of  law,  then the first persoil  is absolved 
by the law itself  from  the law.  For the law  had 
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havior of  the other; and this  condition not being 
given, the law, by its own conception, is not appli- 
cable to the case, and the first person-unless  there 
is another law ; but this the Science of  Rights does 
not  presuppose-is  now  no  longer bound  by  the 
law; he can act toward  the other as he chooses ; 
he has a right against the other. 
The difficulty, which  previous treatments of  the 
Science of  Rights generally have left  unsolved, is 
this : How can a law command  by not command- 
ing, or how can law have causality by utterly ceas- 
ing to exist; or, how can  it comprise a  sphere by 
not comprising  it?  The answer is, it must result 
thus necessarily as soon as the law prescribes  to 
itself a definite sphere and carries with it the quan- 
tity of  its validity.  As soon as it utters the sphere 
whereof  it speaks,  it determines  thereby also  the 
sphere whereof  it does  not  speak,  and confesses 
expressly that it does not  prescribe  for that other 
sphere. 
For instance, the law conlmands that the other 
person shall treat me as a rational being.  He  does 
not  do so ; and the law now absolves  me from all 
obligation to treat him as a rational being.  But by 
that very absolving it makes itself  valid.  For the 
law, in saying that it depends now altogether upon 
my free-will how I desire to treat the other, or that 
I  have  a  compulsory right against him,  says, vir- 
ually, that  the other person  can not prcvent  my 
rompulsion ; that is,  can  not  prcvent  it  through 
the mere pl.ilzc@le  of  law, though he may prevent 
it through physical strength, or through an appeal 
to morality, (may induce me to forego my compel- 
ling him,  or-prevent me from  compelling him  by 
superior strength.) 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS. 
The applicability of  the Conception of  Rights is 
now completely secured,  and  its limits  have  been 
lefinitely fixed. 
A sure criterion has been  established, to which 
of  the sensuous beings  the Conception of  Rights 
applies, and to which it does not apply.  Each be- 
ing, which has human form, is internally compelled 
to recognize every other being which has the same 
form as a rational being, and thus as a possible sub- 
ject  for  the Conception  of  Rights.  But whatso- 
ever has not that form  is to be excluded  from the 
sphere  of  rights,  and  cav  not  be  said  to  have 
rights. 
The possibility of  a  reciprocal  causality  of  free 
and rational  beings,  which  causality  the Concep- 
tion of  Rights must determine, has also been prov- 
ed.  It has been shown that such beings can have 
causality upon each other and still remain free. 
The fundamental principle of  law, as law gcne- 
rally, has been determined.  It has been shown to 
be, not  a  mechanical law of  nature, but a  law  for 
i?cgclorn ;  the ground being this, that it is quite as 
possible for rational beings to treat each other with- 
out mutual respect  for  each other's  freedom,  and I34  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
simply as things of  nature, as it is for them to re 
strict their  freedom  by the conception of  Rights. 
It has  also  been  shown that, if  this fundamental 
principle of  law is to be valid and realized, this can 
only be done if every free being constantly and free- 
ly makes it the law (or rule) of  all its actions. 
The quantity of  the applicability of  this law has 
also been definitely ascertained.  It is valid only on 
condition and in case that a community of  recipro- 
cal  intercourse  between  free  beings,  as such, is 
to be established.  But since the purpose  of  this 
commuility is itself conditioned by the behavior of 
those with whom some one intends to enter into a 
community, its validity  for  each  such some one is 
again  conditioned  by the fact, whether the others 
subject themselves to that law or not ; and if  they 
do not  thus subject  themselves,  then the law ob- 
tains validity  through its very  invalidity,  since it 
authorizes that some one to treat these others, who 
have not subjected themscives to the Conception of 
Rights, as he may choose to treat them. 
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RAL  RIGHTS. 
IF  reason is to be realized in the sensuous world, 
it must be possible for many rational beings to live 
together as such ; and this is permnneyztly  possible 
only if emh free  being- nznkes it its law to Zimzt  its 
own freedom  by the conccptio~z  of the freedom  of  all 
others.  For each  free  being having  the physical 
power to check or destroy the freedom of  other free 
beings, and being dependent in its free actions only 
upon its will ;  it is only when all free beings have 
voluntarily made it their law (rule of  action) never 
so to check the freedom of  all others that a  com- 
munity of  free beings  becomes  possible,  wherein 
such a check never occurs. 
What we  have  here  stated  is  nothing  but  the 
judgment of  the reflecting  philosopher concerning 
the possibility of  a community of  free beings, and 
is to signify nothing more.  If free beings, as such, 
are to exist together, then it can be thought possi- 
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so to exist together, and whether the condition of 
their  living together,  namely, the Law, has really 
been  acknowledged  by each-this  we do not take 
into account. 
At  present we can, at the utmost, say: it is nature 
that desires free beings to live together in the sen- 
suous world, and hence produces a number of bodies 
capable of  reason,  culture, and freedom.  It is not 
to  be  understood  as if  we thus asserted  nature 
to  possess  understanding  and will,  ordesire ; we 
merely say: if  nature is  assumed  to have a will, 
then  her  end  and  purpose  in  the production  of 
many  such  bodies  can  have  been  only  that they 
should live together in the indicated manner.  Un- 
der that assumption, it is nature who wills that the 
freecloin of  each  free  being shall be restricted  by 
the freedom of  the others.  But since in that case 
she likewise  must will  each  rational  being to be 
free  generally,  she  must will  that  they restrict 
their  freedom  voZzwztariZy,  and  that  this  law  of 
restriction shall  not  be  one of  her own  mechani- 
cal  laws,  but  a  law  of  freedom.  What other ar- 
rangements  nature  may have  made  to realize her 
end in  spite of  that freedom,  we  shall see here- 
after. 
The above law is to be a law; that is, it is to be 
impossible that an exception should occur to it;  the 
law  must  command  universally  and  categorically 
after it has once been assumed. 
In consequence of  this law, each one is to limit 
his freedom ; that is,  the sphere of  his voluntarily 
resolved acts and utterances in the sensuous world. 
The conception of  freedom here is, therefore, quan- 
titative and material. 
He  is to limit his freedom thus by the possibility 
of  the  freedom of  all others. 
Here the same word has another meaning, and 
its significance is altogether qualitative andformal. 
Each of  these others is to have  the privilege  of 
freedom, of  being a person ;  but how far the sphere 
of  their possible free acts is to extend, the law does 
not  determine.  In other words,  no one has  the 
right to do an act which would make impossible the 
freedom and personality of  another;  'but all other 
free acts each has a right to commit. 
The first question  would,  therefore, be :  What 
constitutes a  free  person,  or what  is  requisite  to 
make a person free ?  And, since the whole of  this 
requisite is here considered only as condition of the 
possibility of  a living together of  free beings, it is 
in so far termed a Right.  For the same reason we 
shall here demonstrate the conditions of freedom and 
personality only in  so far  as a violation  thereof is 
possible through physical power. 
Now this right, or these rights,  are involved  in 
the mere conception of  the person, as such, and in 
so far  are called Originad (or  inalienable)  Rights. 
The Science of  these  Rights  arises  through  the 
mere analysis of  the conception of  personality,  in 
so far as that which  this  conception involves can 
be violated  by  the free  acts  of  others,  but  must 
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not  be so violated  in virtue of  the conception  of 
Rights. 
The first division of  our Science of  Rights will, 
therefore, treat of  the Ori,.?zal  Rights of  J6e1.z. 
Our established result is hy$otheticaL  If free be- 
ings, as such, are to exist together, then each one 
must subject  himself  to the described  law.  The 
latter part of  the sentence is, therefore, the condi- 
tion  of  the first.  Unless they  so subject them- 
selves to the law, they can not live together ;  and 
hence  the  only ground  why  the  philosopher  as- 
sumes such a law is,  because he presupposes that 
they are to live together. 
Now, we have already shown that, by reason of 
this very conditionedness of  the law, each free be- 
ing can adopt it only as a conditioned law, that is, 
can adopt it only to attain  the end which  condi- 
tions it.  The  end of  the law is to make a common 
intercourse of free beings possible.  But this is pos- 
sible only if the person with whom I thus enter into 
a community has subjected himself  to this law, if 
he has resolved to respect my freedom or my orig- 
inal rights.  The law is not at all  applicable, how- 
ever, to a person who has not subjected himself  to 
it, since the end no longer exists for which I adopt. 
ed that law.  Hence, although I have generally sub- 
jected  myself  to that law, I have not done so in re- 
gard to the particular person, who,  for his person, 
has not adopted it.  In other words, I have adopt- 
ed that law, and have not adopted it ; I have adopt- 
ed it in general, and have not adopted it in this par- 
ticular case.  Because I have adopted it in general, 
and have  placed  myself  under the conception of 
Rights, I act rightfully, and have, therefore, aRight; 
and because I do not adopt it in this particular case, 
I have a right to compel that other individual by at- 
tacking his freedom  and personality.  My right is, 
therefore, a Right of  Compzclsion. 
The law  being conditioned, and adoptable only 
in this  its conditionedness,  each  person  has  the 
right tojudge whether the case of  its applicability 
exists or not.  Each is necessarily his own judge; 
and where the right of  compulsion  exists, the one 
who has the right is, at the same time, the judge of 
the other, against whom  he has this right ;  for the 
right  of  compulsion  is possible  only  through the 
adoption of the Conception of  Rights.  Where this 
condition does not  exist, no one is, or can be, the 
judge of  the other. 
No nght of  conzpukion without n right of  jcdg- 
ment, is the result of  this investigation. 
It is necessary, as we  have shown, that the per- 
son who  is to have  the right of  compulsion  must 
have subjected himself to that law; for otherwise he 
may well  have  the physical  power of  compulsion, 
but  can never obtain  a right to it, since the right 
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Again :  The  right of compulsion results from the 
silence or the non-applicability  of  the law,  but is 
by no means  positively commanded  by  that  law. 
Hence, there is only a  rkht  of  compulsion, not a 
duty to compel. 
From this deduction of  the right of  compulsior., 
it is clear that this right is applicable when one per- 
son violates  the original  rights of  another  persoc. 
The first  division of  the Science of  Rights hav- 
ing, therefore, established the original rights of man, 
the second division, which  treats  of  the Right of 
Compulsio~z,  (Penal  Law,) has only to establish the 
various cases to which  the right of  compulsion ap 
plies. 
I.  The right of  compulsion,  as well  as each of 
its  applications,  has  a  ground ; but  all  that  is 
grounded is necessarily finite, and reaches  no fur- 
ther than its ground.  If, therefore, the limit of  the 
applicability of  the ground can be fixed, the limit 
of  the grounded also can be fixed.  The ground of 
my law of  compulsion is, that the other person did 
not adopt the rule of  law, did  not subject himself 
to the conception of  Rights.  Ry appealing to this 
ground, therefore I assume that I  should  have no 
right of  compulsion,  if  the  other  did  adopt  that 
law,  and-quantitatively  expressed-that  my right 
of  compulsion extends only so far as the other does 
not submit to that law.  The right of  compulsion 
has its limit, and this limit is the voluntary subjec- 
tion of  the other to the law ;  all compulsion beyond 
this limit is unrightful, (illegal.)  As  a general prin- 
ciple, thi~  is immediately clear.  The only question 
in our case-we  teaching a real, and not a  merely 
formal Science of  Rights-is  this, whether and how 
this limit can be discovered  and determined  in its 
application. 
A right of  compulsion  is incurred only when an 
origitzal right has been  violated ; but then it fol- 
lows necessarily ; and hence the general right can 
be  proved  in  each specific  case.  It is  also  clear 
that he, who desires that right to be valid, does not 
desire the violation of  the original rights, or, if  the 
violation has taken place, desires it to be annulled. 
Hence the quantity of  that right seems alsoprova- 
ble  i~z  each specz>c  case;  that is,  in each case the 
limit of  the legal compulsion (punishment) can be 
accurately defined ; it extends to complete satisfac- 
tion and restitution ;  both parties must be placed 
back in the same condition which they occupied be- 
fore such violation took place. 
But-and  this is a circumstance which, in recent 
treatises on Law, seems to have been generallyover- 
looked-the  right of  compulsion  is grounded not 
only upon  the present fact, that a  person  did  not 
respect the law in  this present case, but upon the 
fact that he thereby acknowledges not to have made 
that law his general rule  of  action.  One single 
unlawful  act-even  after a  series of  lawful  acts- 
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rule  of  action,  and that his  previous  lawful acts 
were induced,  not  by respect for the law,  but  by 
other possible motives,  It is this inference which 
warrants the conclusion that no free being can in 
safety live  together with  him,  since safety can be 
grounded  only  upon  a  law.  The person  whose 
original  rights  have  been  violated,  thus becomes 
justified  in completely annihilating the freedom of 
the violator, and in canceling the possibility of  ever 
again coming into contact with him in the sensuous 
world.  The right of  compulsion  in so far is irtfi- 
nite, and has  no limit  at all-a  proposition which 
the writers on Law have partly asserted one-sidedly 
and partly denied  one-sidedly-unless,  indeed, the 
violator  subjects himself  to the law.  As soon as 
he so subjects  himself,  the right  of  compulsion 
ceases,  since  its  continuance was  grounded  only 
upon  the  continuance  of  the  lawlessness  of  the 
other; and all further compulsion is now unlawful. 
In  this respect the limit of con~pulsion  is conditiomd. 
But how shall the cotzdition, the true subjection 
of  the other to the law, be given ? 
Not  through  signs of  repentance,  promises  of 
future better behavior, offers of  damages. etc. ; for 
there is no ground to believe  his  sincerity.  It is 
quite as possible  that he has been  forced  by his 
present weakness into this repentance, and is only 
awaiting a better opportunity to renew  the attack. 
This uncertainty does not warrant the other in lay- 
ing down his arms and thus again exposing all his 
safety.  He  will, therefore, continue to exercise his 
compulsion ;  but since the condition of  the right is 
problematical,  his exercise also will. be problemati- 
cal. 
It is the same with the violator.  If he has offer- 
ed the complete restitution which the law inevitably 
requires,  and it being possible  that he may  now 
have voluntarily subjected  himself  in  all  sincerity 
to the law, it is also likely that he will oppose any 
further restriction of his freedom, (any further com- 
pulsion  by the other,)  but his right  to make this 
opposition is also problematical. 
It  seems, therefore, that the decisive point can not 
be ascertained, since it rests in the ascertainment 
of  inner sincerity, which can not be proved, but is 
a  matter of  conscience for  each.  The ground of 
decision,  indeed,  could  be  given  only,  if  it were 
possible  to ascertain  the whole future life  of  the 
violator. 
If, of the original violator it could be known that, 
after having been liberated from the compulsion, he 
would not, in his whole future life, ever violate the 
law again; and if, on  the other hand, it could  be 
known of  the attacked party that, after having re- 
ceived restitution, he would, in his whole future life, 
refrain from all further exercise of  his right of com- 
pulsion, then it might be believed  that the former 
had sincerely subjected himself to the law, and that 
the latter had asserted his right of  compulsion only 
with a view to assert his original rights.  But such 
a knowledge of  the future is impossible ; because, 
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erate the other from  his compulsion ;  and this we 
have shown he can not do unless he has that know- 
ledge of  the future, since no one can abandon his 
acquired  superiority merely because the other pro- 
tests that he is sincere.  There is  a  circle here. 
The grounded is not possible  without  the ground; 
and vice versa.  Before we see how the synthetical 
method  shall get us  out of  this circle, let us ex- 
amine it a little closer. 
A right of compulsion, as a general conception, has 
been  easily enough deduced from  the Conception 
of  Rights ; but as soon as that right was to be ap- 
plied, we found ourselves wrapped up in an unsolva- 
ble contradiction ;  because the ground of  decision 
of such an application could not be given in the sen- 
suous world,  resting, as it does, in the conscience 
of  each individual.  The right of compulsion, as an 
applicable right, is in evident contradiction with it- 
self,  since it can  never  be  decided whether,  in a 
given case, the compulsion is lawful or not. 
But  the final  decision of  the question  whether 
the  right of  compulsion  can  be  exercised  by the 
offended party himself or not, will  also decide the 
question whether a real  Science of  Rights is pos- 
sible in  so far as such a  science is to designate a 
science of  the legal relation  between  persons out- 
side of  an established state organization and with- 
out positive laws.  As most of  the previous teach- 
ers of  the Science of  Rights were content to philo- 
sophize formaliter about the Conception of  Rights, 
and were satisfied if  their conceptions were think- 
able-little  caring about their  applicability-they 
easily avoided this question. 
We  have here answered the first question in the 
negative, and hence also the second question ;  and 
in order to become  convinced of  our science, it is 
necessary to attain a complete insight into the im- 
possibility, which we  have  here demonstrated,  of 
having the right  of  compulsion  exercised by  the 
offended  party himself.  Hence, this result is im- 
portant for our whole Science of  Rights. 
The circle was this : The possibility of  mutually 
liberating  each  other on  the part of  the offended 
and the offender  is conditioned by the knowledge 
of their whole future ; but this knowledge, again, is 
impossible, unless they mutually liberate each oth- 
er.  The method, which  has  been  prescribed  by 
the Science of  Knowledge, tells us synthetically to 
unite both opposites, and thus to get rid of the con- 
tradiction. 
A synthesis of  this kind would  be,  in our case: 
the mutual liberation of both Yarties atzd the Know- 
ledge of  the whole futzlure  must be  one and the same; 
or, in other words, this mutual liberation must in- 
volve  of  itself  and  guarantee  the whole  future, 
whereof knowledge is desired. 
There is no question that such must be the re- 
sult ; the only problem is, how is it possible ? 
The  whole future experience, and the conviction 
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pressed in the one moment of  liberation, and to be 
so expressed valid  for external conviction, since no 
one can know the inner sentiments of  the other. 
Both parties must, therefore, make it physically im- 
~ossible  for  each other thereafter  to attack  each 
other ;  and each must become externally convinced 
of  this  impossibility.  Such a  security for  the fu- 
ture is called a guarantee. 
Hence, the above synthetical result requires that 
both persons must mutually guarantee their safety; 
otherwise, they can  not  live  together,  and one of 
them must be destroyed. 
How is this guarantee possible ?  We found that 
neither  could put down the arms, because neither 
could trust the other.  They must, therefore, place 
their arms, that is, their whole power, in the hands 
of  a  third party in whom  both  trust.  Both  must 
enjoin this third party immediately to repress that 
one of  them who  may  in  the  future  attack  the 
other.  The third party must have the power to do 
this,  and  must, therefore,  be  the  wore powe~ul. 
This third  party would  thus exercise the right of 
compulsion for both. 
If  he is to exercise this right for both, both must 
transfer to him the right of  deciding not only their 
present  dispute but  all  future disputes  between 
them ; that  is,  they must  confer  upon  the third 
party the power of judging,  or the judicial power. 
They must confer this power upon  the third party 
without reserve ; there must be no appeal from it. 
Both parties must, thergoye, zmconditio7zalb tjpa~zsfcp 
their physical power  and their power  of jzidgnlent, 
that is to say, old  their rights, to thot thirdpn~r'y. 
2. THESIS.  The  freedom of  the person, according 
to the Conception of  Rights, is limited only by the 
possibility that other persons are also to live with 
him as free persons, and hence as also having rights. 
Whatsoever does not violate the rights of  another, 
each  person  has the right to do, and this, indeed, 
constitutes each person's rzght.  Each one, more- 
over,  has  the right  to judge  for himself  what  is, 
and  to  defend,  by  his  own  powers,  what  he  so 
judges  to be, the limit of  his free actions. 
ANTITHESIS.  According to a  correct conclusion 
drawn from  the same Conception of  Rights, each 
person must utterly and unconditionally transfer all 
his power and judgment to a third party, if  a legal 
relation between free persons is to be possible.  By 
this transfer each person  loses altogether the right 
to judge the limits of  his own  right and to defend 
those limits.  He  makes himself completely depen- 
dent upon the knowledge and good-will of the third 
party, to whom he has made the transfer, and ceases 
to be a free being. 
The antithesis contradicts the thesis.  The the- 
sis is the Conception  of  Rights itself;  the anti- 
thesis is a correct result obtained from that concep- 
tion.  The Conception of  Rights is,  therefore,  in- 
volved  in a  self-contradiction.  This contradiction 
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lies here:  Under the Conception of  Rights I can 
surrender only that portion of  my freedom which is 
requisite  for  the coexistence of  other  free beings 
with whom I come in contact in the sensuous world. 
But now I am to transfer all my rights to the arbi- 
trary power of  a  third party.  This is impossible 
and contradictory, unless  in this transfer I never- 
theless  remain  secured  in  the  possession  of  my 
proper  sphere of  freedom.  Rationally, I can not 
transfer all my rights, and no one can demand that 
I should transfer them except upon this condition. 
I must be able,  therefore, to decide  in  my own 
person whether I have that security or not.  My 
transfer is conditioned by the possibility of  my be- 
ing able to decide and of  my deciding upon the suf- 
ficiency of  this guarantee.  When I do not decide 
upon it, my transfer of  all my rights to a third par- 
ty is impossible  and illegal.  When I do  transfer 
my rights thus, it must be done with my own per- 
fect free-will. 
After I have once transferred  my rights, I have, 
as has been clearly shown, no further right to de- 
cide upon the sphere of  my freedom.  My express- 
ed decision on the sufficiency of the guarantee must, 
therefore, be possible, and be given before I make 
the transfer. 
In this decision, that the guarantee is sufficient 
for  me,  I  virtually  say: "I am  sure that, after I 
have thus transferred all my rights and made my- 
self  subject to a third party, my lawful freedom will 
not  be  in the least  abrogated;  I am  sure that I 
shall never have to sacrifice any more of  it than I 
should have been compelled to do in my own judg- 
ment by the mere Conception of  Rights."  In  mak- 
ing this  decision,  I  must overlook,  therefore,  the 
whole future  experience of  my state of  subjection 
to a third party, and then judge whether the gua- 
rantee of  my perfect security within the limits  of 
Law will be sufficient. 
What is it which  is  to  be  guaranteed to me? 
Perfect  security of  all  my rights, as well  against 
the  third  party  to whom  I  have  transferred  my 
rights,  as  also  through  it against  all  individuals 
with  whom  I  may  come  in  contact.  I must  be 
convinced  that  all  possible  future law  decisions, 
which  may be pronounced  in  affairs of  mine, wilI 
always be precisely as I should myself  be compel- 
led  to pronounce  them  under  the Conception of 
Rights.  Rules of  these future law decisions must, 
therefore, be submitted to my examination, accord- 
ing to which  rules the Conception of  Rights is to 
be applied  to all possible  future cases which  may 
occur.  Such rules are calledpositive laws. 
All positive laws are, in a greater or less degree, 
deduced from the Conception of  Rights.  There is 
and can be no arbitrariness in them.  They must 
be such as every rational  being would  necessarily 
make them. 
In these positive  laws the rule of  Rights is ap- 
plied  to the specific  objects which  the rule  com- 
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the Conception of  Rights and the Decision of Law 
In  positive law, the rule of  Rights is applied to par- 
ticular objects ;  in the decisions of  law, the positive 
law is applied to particular persons.  The civil judge 
has to decide only what has occurred, and then to 
state the law which applies to the occurrence.  If 
the law is clear and complete, the decision  or sen- 
tence should already be contained in it. 
The contradiction has been in part canceled.  If 
I subject  myself  to a law which I have examined 
and approved,  (such approval being the exclusive 
condition of  a lawful possibility of  my subjection,) 
then I have not  subjected myself  to the arbitrary 
will of  a  man, but to an unchangeable, determined 
will, in fact, to the will of  Reason in general, or to 
my own will, as that will must be, if  determined by 
the Conception of  Rights; and unless  my will  is 
so determined, I have no rights at all, as has been 
shown.  Hence, far from losing my rights by such 
subjection,  I  rather first  obtain  them  through  it, 
since only by  this  subjection  have I fulfilled  the 
conditioh under which  alone  man  obtains  rights. 
Although  I  am  subject, I am  subject only to my 
ow~z  will.  I have once really exercised my right of 
judgment,  and that once was for my whole life and 
for all possible cases.  All that has been taken from 
me is the care to carry out my own  law decisions 
by physical force. 
RESULT. 
Man can transfer his physical power and right of 
judgment only to the necessary and unchangeable 
will of  the Law, but  not to the free and arbitrary 
will of  a  man.  The former  alone  is required  by 
the Conception of  Rights, is alone the condition of 
all rights.  The latter is not precisely against the 
Conception of  Rights-simply  because  a  right  is 
not  a  duty,  and  because  any one  may  therefore 
abandon a right if  he chooses  to do  so-but  nei- 
ther is it a result of  that conception. 
3.  But the contradiction has been solved only in 
part.  The law is to give me the guarantee that, 
after I transfer my rights to it I shall still be pro- 
tected in all my rights for the future.  But what is 
the law?  A  mere conception.  How,  then, can 
this mere conception be realized  in the sensuous 
world ? 
Again: I  am  to  become  convinced  before  the 
transfer  of  my  rights of  the  utter  in~possibility 
that my rights can ever be violated hereafter.  How 
can I become  thus convinced ?  or, in other words, 
even after the mere will of  the law pronounces that 
impossibility, who will guarantee me that the will 
of  the law, and only of  the law, will always rule? 
I ain to be secured against the law itself; hence 
it must be made impossible to turn the power of 
the law against me, except in the cases provided by 
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ers; hence the law  must  always  act where  it is 
intended  to act.  It must never sleep where it is 
called upon to act. 
In short, the law must be apower.  The Concep- 
tion of  Law, which we obtained from the last part 
of  our investigation,  and the conception  of a  su- 
preme power, which  we had  obtained  previously, 
must be synthetically united.  The law itself  must 
be the supreme power, and the supreme power must 
be the law.  Both must be one and the same ;  and 
in subjecting myself  to the law, I  must  convince 
myself  that it is so ;  that it is completely impossi- 
ble that any power except that of  the law can ever 
be turned against me. 
The question is, therefore, How does the law be- 
come a power?  The power we  seek is not a force 
of  nature,  is not  a  mechanical  force, as we have 
already shown ; and  hence  men  have the  physi- 
cal  power  of  inflicting  wrongs  upon  each  other. 
The required power must, therefore, be a power de- 
pendent upon a will.  This will, however, must not 
be free, but unalterably and necessarily determined 
through the law.  Such a will can not exist, there- 
fore, as the will of  an individual.  We are in search 
of a will which shall have power only where the law 
wills, and which shall have no power whatever where 
the law does not will ; a wild, in short, which is an 
infallible power,  bgt  on& when  ilt  confomzily  with 
the will of  the law. 
Superior power over a free being can only be real- 
ized by the union of many free beings, since the  sen- 
suous world holds nothing so powerful as a free be- 
ing-for  the very reason that it is free and can dl- 
rect  i&  forces  with  matured  consideration-and 
nothing more powerful than a single free being, ex- 
cept many.  Their strength would, therefore, con- 
sist only in their union.  In the present case, their 
power  is to depend upon  the fact  whether or  not 
they will the will of the law.  Their zttzion, therefore, 
as the basis of their power, must depend upon that 
fact;  the only  bond  of  their union must  be that 
fact.  The moment their will should differ from the 
will  of  the law, their  union  also, and  hence  their 
whole power, must come to an end. 
Now, this fact, that the desire to commit injustice 
necessarily destroys their union, is the case in every 
community of free beings.  A number of  free be- 
ings unite themselves, signifies : they desire to live 
together.  But this they can not  do,  unless  each 
restricts  his freedom by the freedom of  all  others. 
If  a million of  men live together, it is very possible 
for each to desire as much freedom as possible.  But 
if  you unite the  will of all of them in one conception, 
as one will, then that one will divides the amount of 
possible freedom in equal parts amongst all ;  desires 
all to be free, and hence desires the freedom of each 
to be restricted by the freedom of  all others.  The 
only possible point of  union for their will is, there- 
fore, the Law, and, ir, our case-where  a fixed num- 
ber of  men of  various inclinations and occupations 
live together-the  Law, in its application to them, or 
their Positive Law.  As sure as they are united, 
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they niust will  the law.  If  but one of  them  is 
wrongly  treated,  this  one  certainly  protests,  and 
they are no longer united. 
That, wherein they agree, we  have stated to be 
their positive  law,  which  fixes  the rights of  free- 
dom of  each.  It is not  expressly  necessary that 
they should  all  give utterance to  it,  or,  perhaps, 
vote upon it.  Each rational being who has a know- 
ledge of  their  number,  occupation,  etc.,  can  tell 
them wherein  they all  agree.  Their positive  law 
has  been  given  to  them  by  the  Conception  of 
Rights and by  their  physical  status, just  as two 
factors give  the product.  The content of  the law, 
therefore, does not depend at all upon arbitrariness ; 
indeed,  the least  influence  thereof  upon  the  law 
would  involve  the seed  of  dissension and  future 
dissolution. 
But the fom~  of  the law, its obligatory power, it 
only receives from the consent of  the several  indi- 
viduals who unite thus into a commonwealth. 
Concerning  justice  and  law,  therefore,  all  are 
agreed ;  and all who  are agreed  necessarily desire 
law and justice.  There can not be a community, 
whereof  one  member  has  another  will  than  the 
other member.  But as soon as two individuals are 
no longer  united  in their will,  at least one of  the 
two is also at variance with all the others ;  his will 
is an individual, and hence an unjust will.  If the 
will of the other, with whom he is in conflict, agrees 
with the will  of  all  the others, then this other is 
necessarily in the right. 
There is no question as to the fact that, in such 
a commonwealth, the just  will, if  rallying into ac- 
tion, will  be always able to overpower  the unjust 
will, since the latter will  is only  that of  an indivi- 
dual, whereas the former is that of  all others. 
The  only question is, How can it be arranged that 
this will  of  all  the others will  be active and effec- 
tive,  wherever  an  individual  will  is  to  be  re- 
pressed ; how, therefore, the physical powers of the 
individuals  may  be  united  with  the power  of  the 
commonwealth into one, just  as the wills of  these 
individuals were united into one conception ? There 
must be a necessary and strict rule, whereby this 
union of  all individual forces into one will result in- 
fallibly; for each one who subjects himself  to the 
law is to have a convincing guarantee that it will 
be impossible throughout the whole future for  any 
other force  than the power of  the law to be active 
against him ;  and that his security does not depend 
upon chance or the good-will of  his neighbors, but 
is absolutely  secured  by  the  organization  of  the 
whole. 
The strictest and only sufficient guarantee which 
each individual can justly demand is this, that the 
existence of  the commonwealth  itself be  made to 
depend upon the effectiveness of  the law. 
(True, as a general thing this is already so.  If 
injustice  should  become  universal,  society  would 
necessarily dissolve itself, and thus perish.  Often, 
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again, remains inactive ;  but these isolated cases do 
not necessarily dissolve the connection in actuality. 
For the individual there is, of  course, little guaran- 
tee in the reflection that the whole commonwealth 
can  not well  perish  unless  each  member thereof 
suffers injustice, and that he or other persons may 
well suffer violence at times without the protection 
of  the law.) 
The relation between each member and the com- 
monwealth must, therefore, be thus, that, from each 
however apparently petty an injustice  against  the 
individual, there also  results, necessarily, injustice 
against all.  How is this to be attained ?  The law 
is to be, necessarily, Deed. -  Now, the law can not 
fail to be deed  if, on the other hand, the deed is al- 
ways law; that is to say, if  each act which is once 
permitted  by the law does, by that one permission, 
become lawful,* and may be done by all others ;  in 
other words,  if  each act of  each  individual results 
in a universally valid law.  If this has been recog- 
nized, then each injustice necessarily falls upon all ; 
each offense  is a public  misfortune ; what was al- 
lowable  against me  is  now also allowable  against 
every member of  the commonwealth ; and if a sin- 
gle one of  them is to be secure, it is the first inter- 
est of  al4 first to protect me, and to secure me my 
right, and to punish the unlawful deed.  It  is clear 
that this guarantee is sufficient, and that, if this rule 
is established,  the  law  must  always  be  effectual, 
though it can also never transgress its limit, because, 
if it did, transgression would  become lawful for all. 
It  is clear that the individual who enters such an 
agreement  receives  his freedom,  although  he re- 
nounces it, and receives it because he renounces it ; 
it is  clear,  that  through  it all  contradictions are 
solved,  and  through  its realization  the  supreme 
rule of  law can  be secured ;  it is clear, that every 
one who  desires  the supremacy of  the law  must 
necessarily desire such a commonwealth ; and that 
through  the conception thereof, our  investigation 
has  therefore been  brought to a close.  The ana- 
lysis of  this conception will  lead us from the First 
Part of  the Science of  Rights, as the Science of 
Natural Rights, to its Second Part, or to the Sci- 
e7zzce  of  Rights in a CommonweaZth. 
CONCERNING  THE ORIGINAL  RIGHTS  OF MEN. 
Rights can be spoken of  only on the condition 
that a person is thought as a person, that is, as an 
individual, or, in other words, as occupying a rela- 
tion  to other individuals, between whom  and  him 
a community, though not actually posited, perhaps, 
1s  at least  fictitiously assumed.  For those things 
which, through  speculative philosophy, we discov- 
ered to be conditions of  personality, become rights 
only  if  other persons  are added  in  thought, who 
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not, however, be thought  as coexisting  at all, un- 
less their rights reciprocally  limit each other, that 
is, unless the sphere of their on5tzal  rights changes 
into the sphere of  nghts in a commonwealth.  It 
would  seem, therefore,  impossible  to reflect  upon 
rights as original rights, that is, without regard  to 
their necessary  limitations  through  the  rights  of 
others.  Nevertheless, such a reflection must occur 
and furnish the ground for an investigation of rights 
in a commonwealth.  All limitations must, therefore, 
be abstracted from, and this is, indeed,  so easy a 
matter for speculation, that it rather makes this ab- 
straction involuntary, and needs only be reminded 
of having made it.  The possibility of  the abstrac- 
tion offers no difficulty. 
But  it must  be well  remembered  at all  times, 
THAT the abstraction  has been made, and that the 
conception produced by it, though it have ideal pos- 
sibility, (for thinking,) has no real significance.  If 
this is forgotten, a purely formal Science of  Rights 
will be the result. 
There is no status of  original  rights  for  Man. 
Man attains rights only in a community with oth- 
ers as indeed  he only becomes  man-whereof  we 
5ave  shown the grounds heretofore-through  in- 
tercourse with  others.  Man,  indeed,  can  not be 
thought  as one  individual.  Original  Rights  are, 
therefore, a purefiction,  but a  fiction necessary for 
the purpose  of  Science.  It must also be always 
remembered,  that  the  conditions  of  personality 
should be  thought  as rights only in so far ds they 
appear in  the sensuous world, and as they can be 
checked or disturbed by other free beings.  It  is pro- 
per, therefore, to speak, for instance, of  a  right of 
sensuous self-preservation, that is, of preserving my 
body as  such;  but  it is improper  to speak of  a 
right  to freely  th/tilzk. or  will.  I have  a  right  of 
compulsion against the man who attacks my body, 
but not against the man who, perhaps, disturbs me 
in my peaceful convictions,  or who  annoys  me by 
his immoral behavior. 
The fundamental  principle  of  all  rules of  law 
we have found to be this: Let each one restrict his 
freedom or the sphere of  his free acts through the 
conception of  the freedom of  the other, (that is, so 
that the other may also exist as generally free.) 
The  conception of freedom as applied here to the 
other, namely, in its merely formal significance, fur- 
nishes the conception of  the Original Rights, that 
is, those rights which absolutely belong to a person 
as such.  Let us analyze that conception. 
It  is, in regard to its quality, the conception of a 
power to be absolute first cause.  In regard to its 
quantity, it is the conception of an unlimited or infi- 
nite power, since it merely states that the person is 
to be free, but not how far he is to be free.  Hence, 
the Conception of  Quantityis opposed to the Con- 
ception of  Original Rights as here expressed in its 
formal significance.  In regard  to its relation, this 
conception  speaks of  the freedom  of  the person 
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others is to be limited  by it, because those others 
might make the required  formal  freedom  impossi- 
ble.  Through its relation, therefore, the quantity 
is determined ; namely, the conception  refers only 
to causalzty in the sensuous world, since in it alone 
can freedom be limited by freedom.  In regard  to 
its modality, finally, this conception has apodictical 
certainty.  Each person is to be absolutely free. 
The Original Right of  a person is, therefore, his 
absolute right to be only cause (never effect) in the 
sensuous world. 
The conception of  a  cause and here of  an abso- 
lute cause, involves, first, that the quality and quan- 
tity of  the act shall  be  completely determined by 
the cause itself; and, secondly, that, as soon as the 
quality and quantity of  the act is determined, the 
quality and quantity of  the effect  in the object of 
the act is  also  immediately given.  You  can  pro- 
ceed from the one to the other, you  can determine 
immediately the one through the other ; as soon as 
you know one, you necessarily know both. 
In so far as the person  is the absolute  and final 
ground of  the conception of  his causality, or of  his 
purpose,  the freedom  manifested  therein does not 
come within  the limits of  this investigation, since 
it never enters the sensuous world, and can, there- 
fore, not be checked in it.  The will of  the person 
enters the sensuous world only in so far as it is ex- 
pressed in the determination of  the body.  011  this 
sphere of  the sensuous world  the body itself of  a 
free being is, therefore, to be regarded as itself the 
final ground of  its own determination ; and the free 
being, as appearance is here identical with its body. 
The body is the representative of  the Ego in the 
sensuous world, and where the sensuous world alone 
enters into consideration, the body itself is the Ego. 
Hence, we  use  every day such phrases as, " I  was 
not there," ii He  has seen me,"  "  Ne  is born, he died, 
he was buried,"  etc. 
The body, therefore, considered as a person, must 
be absolute and final cause of its determining itself 
to have  causality.  In what limits and under what 
laws  the  body  is placed  by its own  organization, 
does not  concern us here.  Whatsoever the body 
is not  originally, does not appertain to it, or,  that 
the body is not; and hence that is not taken into 
account here.  Only that which  is physically pos- 
sible for  the body,  must also be possible of  being 
actualized  in  the  body,  whenever  the person  so 
wills, and only when the person  so wills.  An ex- 
ternal cause must neither induce the body's motion, 
nor check its motion ;  in fact, no external influence 
must immediately affect it. 
Again:  From this movement  of  the body,  the 
effect  made possible  by it must infallibly result  in 
the sensuous world.  Not  exactly  the  result  in- 
tended; for  if  the person  did  not  know well  the 
nature of  the things he operated  upon, or did  not 
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sistance, then the fault was his own, and he has no 
right to complain of  the sensuous world.  But the 
sensuous world  must not  be determined  by a for- 
eign free power outside of  it, in opposition to that 
person's  will ; for  if  it is so determined, then he 
ceases to be free cause. 
But the intentional determination of the body for 
the purpose of  producing a certain effect upon the 
object, follows  upon  and from  a  preceding  know- 
ledge of  the object  to be effected;  and hence the 
free being is, after all, dependent. 
In a general way, we have already acknowledged 
this,  and excluded it from  our present  investiga- 
tion.  Causality  and definite  knowledge  mutually 
condition each other, and fill up the same sphere, as 
has been shown and explained  before.  A person 
can not wild  to have causality previous  to and be- 
yond the given, factical existence of the objects ; for 
to have such a will would  be self-contradictory ;  it 
is only within the sphere of  the factical  existence 
of  the objects that the person is free.  Within that 
sphere the person is free to leave things as they are 
or to change them in accordance with his purpose. 
He is free to reciprocally relate the various mani- 
folds given to him, to determine them through each 
other, and  to unite them  into a whole as may best 
suit his purpose.  If he is not free to do either of 
these,  he is no longer dependent  solely upon  his 
will. 
It  is, therefore, required  that every thing should 
remain  precisely  as  it  has  once  been  gathered 
into  the  conception  of  the  rational  being, whe- 
ther it be already modified  through it or not.  In- 
deed, that which  is  not so modified in nature, be- 
comes-by  the very thinking of it, as not modified, 
and by joining it in thought to the modified-modi- 
fied itself  The  person has not modified it because 
it suited better to the modified things in its natural 
shape ; and the person would have modified it if  it 
had so suited better.  In refraining from a specific 
activity, he was, therefore, also active, and modified 
-if  not the specific  thing, at least-the  whole, to 
which this specific thing was to be conformed. 
Now, nature, obeying her mechanical  laws, can 
not really  change.  All  change in  nature contra- 
dicts  the conception  of  nature.  That which ap- 
pears  to us self-alteration of  nature, occurs in vir- 
tue of  those mechanical laws, and could not appear 
to us as a change, but would appear  to us as a per- 
manent, if we sufficiently knew those laws.  Hence, 
if those laws work any change in the world which we 
have proposed  to form to our conception, it is our 
own fault ;  for either those laws are too powerful for 
us, and then we should have considered that before- 
hand,  or  they are not too  powerful,  and then we 
should have controlled them through art and inven- 
tive  ability.  It is only through other free beings 
that unforeseen and unpreventable changes can be 
produced  in our world-that  is,  in  the system of 
that  which  we  have received  into our knowledge 
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sality can, therefore, be disturbed.  Now, a  person 
has the right to demand that, in the whole sphere 
of  this,  his  known world,  every thing  should  re- 
main as he has known it from the first, because in 
exercising his causality upon this his known world, 
he is regulated  by that knowledge of  it,  and will 
be led astray, will find his causality checked, or will 
obtain  other  results  than  those he has desired, if 
his  knowledge should  turn out meanwhile to have 
been incorrect because a change had taken place in 
his world. 
Here lies the ground of all right of properly.  That 
part of  the sensuous world which is known to me, 
and  has  been  subjected  by  me,  though  only  in 
thought, to my purposes,  is original& my proper- 
ty, (originally,  I  say,  not in a community.)  And 
being thus my property, no other person can have 
causality upon it without checking  the freedom of 
my causality. 
The old dispute, whether the right of  property to 
a  thing is obtained only through  my forming  it- 
modifying  it  in  some way-or  also  through  my 
mere will  to take possession of  it,  is thus settled. 
It  is settled by the synthetical union of  both  these 
determinations, as could not be expected otherwise 
in a strictly synthetical system, or by showing that 
the mere subjection of  a thing to my will is equally 
a  positive modification of  that thing, since it pre- 
supposes my free resolve to abstain from a possible 
activity for a certain end or purpose ; and by show- 
ing, moreover, as will appear directly, that the modi- 
fication of  a  thing  gives a  right of  property to it 
only in so far as something is and remalns thereby 
subjected to our  end.  The final  ground  of  the 
right  of  property  is,  therefore,  the  subjection  of 
that property to our purposes or ends. 
A person  desires  his  activity in  the  sensuous 
world to be cause, signifies, therefore : a person de- 
sires a perception to result from it, which percep- 
tion shall correspond to his conception of  the end 
and purpose of  his activity. 
It has already been remarked that, if  this is to be 
possible  at all, the object of  his  act~vity  must not 
be disturbed by other influences ;  and that the per- 
son, in willing  his  activity to be cause,  must also 
necessarily will the latter. 
But it is equally clear,  that the person who de- 
sires  that  future  perception  to  result,  must  also 
necessarily will  the continuance  of  his  own  body 
and of  its present relation  to himself  as a willing 
and knowing being ; or, more definitely expressed, 
the person  must  also will  a  future state to exist, 
which  shall  have  resulted  from  the present  state, 
in consequence of  the rule which he followed when 
he resolved upon his act of  causality. 
Through the will, therefore, and only through the 
will, is the future embraced in the present ;  though 
the will  alone  is the conception  of  the future,  as 
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but also determines the future.  It is to be such a 
future, and in order that the future can be such a 
one, I must be such a one ; and if  I am to be such 
a one, I must have existence in general. 
The argument is here that, from the willing of  a 
determined  mode of  existence  in  the  future, the 
willing of  a  future in general and the wish of  our 
continued existence is the result.  The assertion is, 
here, that we have the will to continue to exist, not 
for the continuance in itself, but for  the sake of  a 
determined state in the future ; the continued ex- 
istence is not absolute end itself  at all, but mere- 
ly the means for some specific  end.  This experi- 
ence,  indeed,  fully  confirms.  All men  desire  to 
live, the nobler men to do  something more, the less 
noble, at least to enjoy something more. 
The person  wills  what we  have just  shown  as 
sure as he wills at all, no matter what it is he wills. 
This determined willing is, therefore, the condition 
of  all willing, and its realization,  namely,  the pre- 
servation of  our body, which, in Natural Law, is as 
much as se~~reservation,  is a condition of  all other 
acting and of  all manifestation of  freedom. 
If we unite all our results into one, the person, 
in demanding his original rights, demands a contifz- 
zled  reciprocal causality betweefz his body and the sen- 
suous  world,  determined  and  determinable  solely 
through his free& formed  conception of  that worZd 
The conception of  an absolute  causality in  the 
sensuous world, or, since this conception was found 
to be equivalent to that of Original Rights, the con- 
ception of  Original Rights itself, is thus completely 
exhausted. 
The Original  Rights are, therefore, an absolute 
and  closed Whole ; each  partial violation  whereof 
affects the Whole and influences the Whole.  If  it 
is desirable to make divisions  in the conception of 
Original Rights, that division  can be only the one 
which  the conception  of  causality itself  involves, 
and which we have already developed.  This would 
give, as the Original Rights of  Men : 
1st.  The right to the continuance of the absolute 
freedom and inviolability of  the body. 
2d.  The right to the continuance of  our free in- 
fluence upon the whole sensuous world." 
*Our  Declaration of  Independence, wherein  the original  rights 
of  men,  which  have  here been  philosophically  deduced,  are ex- 
pressed in their results, or simply asserted, specifies the right to the 
continuance of the absolute freedom of the body as the RiglrttoLiJe; 
the right to the inviolability of  the body as the Right to Freedom; 
and the right to the continuance  of  our free influence  upon the 
whole  sensuous world,  as the Rkht to the Pursuit of  Happi7zess. 
The latter right is also often  called the Right to Property.  Our 
Declaration of  Independence, therefore,  completely exhausts the 
conception  of  original  rights.  By proceeding  "and  in order  to 
have these rights,"  etc., the Declaration of  Independence further 
asserts, by inferring the right of compulsion, that original rights can 
only be secured as rights by the establishment of  a  commonwealth. 
In that one immortal sentence from the Declaration of  Indepen- 
dence, therefore, the whole  Science of  Rights is involved, and can 
be deduced from it in its application  to the least of  possible law- 
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There is no particular right of  self-preservation ; 
for  that the use  of  the body as a  tool,  or of  the 
things as means, should have, in a certain case, the 
immediate purpose of  preserving our body, as such, 
is  accidental.  Even if  we have a  lesser  purpose, 
our freedom must not be disturbed ;  for it must not 
be disturbed at all. 
But it is well  to be remarked, that our Original 
Rights are valid  not only for present purposes, but 
extend as far  into the future as we can  embrace 
the future in our minds or plans ; and that, hence, 
they immediately and naturally involve the right to 
secure those rights for all  future. 
The Original Rights return in themselves, justify 
themselves,  and  constitute  themselves  as  Right ; 
that is to say, they become an absolute Right ;  and 
this proves  that the circle of  our investigation, as 
far  as  these  rights  are  concerned, is  completely 
closed,  since a  complete synthesis  has now  been 
established.  I have the right to will the exercise 
of  my rights throughout all the future, so far as I 
posit myself,  simply because  I  have these rights ; 
and I have these rights because I have the right to 
will them.  The right to be free cause, and the con- 
ception of  an absolute will are the same.  He  who 
denies the freedom of  the will must also necessari- 
ly deny the reality of  the Conception of  Rights, as 
Spi~zoza  indeed does, whose  right  signifies merely 
the power of  the determined individual, limited  by 
the All. 
CONCERNING  THE  RIGHT  OF COMPULSION. 
PRELIMINARY.-The  right of  compulsion, accord- 
ing to the above, is to have its ground in a viola- 
tion of  the original rights,  that is, when  one free 
being extends the sphere of  its free actions so far 
as to violate thereby the rights of  another free be- 
ing.  But that first free being, being free, has as- 
suredly also  its original rights, which are infinite, 
as we  have shown.  How then  can it, by the free 
exercise of  those rights,  violate  the rights of  an- 
other?  It seems as if  the original  rights  must, 
after all, have a  determined quantity, fixed  by the 
law, if, by their exercise, the violation of  a right is 
to be possible.  The answer to the question,  In 
what  case is a right violated and does the law of 
compulsion  therefore  apply ?  depends,  therefore, 
upon the answer to another question, namely: what 
quantity of  freedom does the Conception of  Rights 
determine for each free being ? 
In other words, if  any exercise of  freedom  is  to 
be illegal, and may thus authorize compulsion, then 
the legal use  of  freedom,  that is,  of  the original 
rights, must be limited by definite boundaries ;  and 
the illegal  use  can  not  be determined unless the 
legal  use  is  known; both  are  determinable  only 
through opposition.  If  these limits can  be ascer- 
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tained, and if  each person keeps within them, then 
a  right  of  compulsion  does not arise  at all;  an 
~p~ilibrium  of  rights is the result,  which  it must 
now be our task to determine, for only where this 
equilibrium of  rights  is disturbed, may the law of 
compulsion become applicable.  After we have de- 
termined this equilibrium of  rights, we can proceed 
to a consideration of  the right of  compulsion, but 
not before. 
DEDUCTION  OF AN EQUILIBRIUM  OF  RIGHTS. 
-All  law  relations  are determined by this  prin- 
ciple:  each  one must restrict his  freedom by the 
possibility of  the freedom of  the other.  We have 
shown what the conception of freedom, or of  origi- 
nal  rights,  involves.  Such  an  infinite  freedom 
would,  however,  cancel  the  freedom  of  all but  a 
single person ; nay, would even cancel the physical 
existence of  freedom ; and the conception of rights 
would therefore contradict  itself  But this contra- 
diction  solves  itself  as soon  as it  is remembered 
that the law applies not to a single one free being, 
but is valid for all free beings.  If A is to limit his 
freedom so that B can also be free,  B,  on the other 
hand, must also limit his freedom so that A can be 
free, etc., etc.  Nay, A can not even  self-limit his 
own freedom by the possibility of  B's freedom, un- 
less B also limits his own freedom by the possibility 
of  A's, the principle of  law being not applicable at 
all  unless both take place.  Unless both  self-limit 
their freedom, neither does.  This has indeed been 
shown already sufficiently.  The only question is, 
how does this as yet empty conception become ap- 
plicable ?  If one person says to the other, "  Leave 
that alone, it limits my freedom !"  why should not 
the other reply,  "But it limits my freedom to leave 
it alone ?" 
The question  therefore  is,  how far shall each 
one limit  the quantum  of  his free actions by the 
possibility of the other's freedom ; how far does the 
freedom extend which each may retain for himself, 
and  only  by respecting  which the other can show 
himself  also  entitled  to rights ; and how  far  does 
the freedom  extend which  he  must resign  to the 
others in his conception of  their freedom, and only 
by respecting which  he can show himself  entitled 
to his own  freedom ? 
The law-relation  is  determined  solely  by  the 
established  principle  of  law.  Our  question  can 
therefore be determined only by that law principle. 
But  this we  have discovered  to be  purely formal, 
and not at all  determining any quantity.  It fixes 
merely the that, not the  in how far.  The whole 
principle of law is, therefore, either not at all appli- 
cable, and results  merely in a  play  of  empty con- 
ceptions, or  the i~z  how far must result  from  the 
that, and by determining the latter the former must 
also be determined.  In other words, the mere con- 
ception of  the freedom  of  another being must also 
determine the quantity of  limitation which I have 
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Let us see what this  synthesis may involve, and 
what it may therefore signify.  It  involves 
A. The actual self-limitation  of  a  free being is 
conditioned by the cognition of another free being. 
Whosoever has no such cognition can not self-limit 
his freedom ;  and  the possible  free  beings whom 
he  does not  know,  do not  bind  him  to  llmit  his 
freedom. 
(In the deduction  of  original rights  a person is 
thought isolated in the sensuous world.  Not know- 
ing, therefore, any other person, he may extend his 
freedom  as far as he chooses, and take possession 
of the whole world.  His right is really-if  original 
rights ever  could  be  wal rights-infinite,  for  the 
condition which would  limit it does not exist.) 
B.  The self-limitation of  a free being is not only 
posited  by the cognition of  another free being, but 
also, at the same moment, completely determz~zed. 
That it is so posited we have already shown.  But it 
must  also be determined ; that is, the mere cogni- 
tion  of  the other  must determine the limit which 
the person has to put upon his own freedom. 
C.  My freedom is limited by the freedom  of  the 
other only on condition that he limits  his freedom 
by the conception of mlne.  Otherwise he is lawless. 
Hence, if  a  law-relation  is  to result from my cog- 
nition of  the other, the cognition and the consequent 
limitation of  freedom must have been mutual.  All 
law-relation  between  persons  is,  therefore, condi- 
tzoned by their mutual cognition of  each other, and 
is, at the same tme, completely determined thereby. 
We now  proceed  to apply our synthesis to the 
several  cases determined  by it ; and  firstly to the 
right of the continuing freedom of the body. 
I. We have  shown  that a rational  being, when 
perceiving a body articulated for the representation 
of  reason  in  the sensuous world,  must posit  that 
same as the body of  a rational being.  By positing 
that body, it determines it also as a certain quantity 
of matter in space, which fills this space and is im- 
penetrable in ~t. 
Now, the body of  a rational being is necessarily 
free and  inviolable in virtue of  its original rights. 
Hence, the other person who takes  a cognition of 
that body must, by virtue of  this his cognition, be 
forced  to  restrict  his freedom  to causality in  the 
sensuous world,  by  that  body  and  by  the  space 
which it occupies.  He can not posit that body as a 
thing to be influenced  by him arbitrarily and sub- 
jected  to  his  purposes, but  solely as  something 
whereby  the  sphere  of  his  causality  is  limited. 
That causality may  extend  everywhere  except to 
the space occupied by this  body.  As soon  as  I 
have seen the body and recognized it as that which 
it is, I have also recognized something which limits 
my causality in the sensuous world.  My causality 
is excluded  from  the space occupied  by that body 
at any time. 
But since this self-limitation depends upon  the 
fact that the other has also  seen and recognized 
me in the same manner, and limited his freedom as 
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other to it is, after all, onlyproblenzaticaZ;  and it is 
impossible to decide whether  it  has occurred or 
not. 
2.  By positing  the body of  that other being as 
absolutely free  in  its  self-determination  to  have 
causality,  and  by  positing  the being  represented 
by it, as a free cause in the sensuous world, I must 
necessarily posit  that  this  being desires  to have 
some effect in the sensuous world to correspond to 
its conception, and hence that it has subsumed cer- 
tain objects of  the sensuous world  to its ends, ac- 
cording to the conception of  original rights.  The 
other being must assume the same of  me. 
These objects, subjected by each to his particu- 
lar purposes,  must be mutually inviolable to both 
of  us, if  we know them.  But since this subjection 
remains within the consciousness of each, and does 
not manifest  itself  in the sensuous world, the ob- 
jects of  this right and limitation remain also pro- 
blematical. 
3.  The objects of  this  right  are problematical, 
and not only they, but the right itself is problema- 
tical, is uncertain, and depends upon the unknown 
condition, whether both parties have mutually rights 
upon each other.  I am  bound  to respect the ob- 
jects which the other has subordinated to his ends 
only in so far as the other respects those which I 
have subordinated to my ends.  But he can not re- 
spect them until he knows them ;  nor can I respect 
his until I know  them.  This mutual  ignorance 
cancels even the possibility to approve each other 
as beings who have rights.  And since this  igno- 
rance  extends  even  to the fact whether  each  in- 
tends to respect the freedom  and inviolability of 
the other's body, the result is, that no law-relation 
at all is possible between them ;  every thing is and 
remains problematical. 
In our deduction of  the right of  compulsion, we 
discovered already that, as soon as that right is to 
be applied, men can not live  together without  an 
agreement.  We ngw  find  that this  impossibility 
exists even before  the right of  compulsion  is ap- 
plied, and enters, indeed, as soon as mutual rights 
are tried to be established. 
That problematical state and uncertainty can not 
remain permanent if  a living together of  individu- 
als under the conception of rights is to be possible ; 
for if  it does, no one can subject objects to his ends 
without  fearing that the other may already have 
subjected them to his own  purposes,  and without 
fearing,  therefore,  to  trespass  upon  the  other's 
rights.  Nay, neither can be secure of  his previous 
possessions,  since  it is  always  possible  that  the 
other  may take  possession  of  it under  the  pre- 
sumption that it has as yet no owner, and since in 
that case it would be impossible  for  the previous 
owner  to prove his  title; which title again might 
also  be  illegad, however  honest&  supposed  to  be 
legal, since the other may previously have subject- 
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be  decided?  It is  quite possible  that neither of 
the parties  know which of  them  has the previous 
title ; or,  if  they could  know it,  their ground of 
decision would  always remain a matter of  internal 
conscience, and could, therefore, not attain external 
right.  A law-dispute  arises  between  them, which 
can not be decided, and a dispute of  physical pow- 
ers, which can only end with the physical annihila- 
tion of  one of  them.  Only by pure chance, name- 
ly, if  it should happen that neither has a desire for 
what the other has, could they posslbly live togeth- 
er in peace.  But they can not possibly  allow all 
their  right  and  security  to  depend  upon  pure 
chance. 
Unless this  uncertainty is removed, a legal rela- 
tion between both is impossible. 
If it is problematical, moreover, what the objects 
of the rights of  both parties and of their mutual ob- 
ligation are, it is also problematical whether a con- 
dition of  rights and whether obligation do at all ex- 
ist.  He  who desires the conception of  rights to be 
realized, desires this problematical condition to cease, 
This condition must be removed ; and the Concep- 
tion of  Rights  itself  desiring  that  removal,  there 
must  be  a  right  to remove it.  The person, who 
does not desire to remove that condition of  uncer- 
tainty, testifies  by that very fact  that  he does not 
desire Law to rule.  He becomes,  therefore, law- 
less, and justifies,  on the part of  the other, an in- 
finite compulsion. 
But how shall their ignorance be removed?  It 
has  been  shown, that  the  conception of  a person 
involves the assumption that he has subjected some- 
thing in the sensuous world  to his  purposes.  It 
would thus seem necessary that each person, when 
obtaining cognizance of  the existence  of  another 
perscn, must limit his possession of  the sensuous 
world  to some It;fzite quantwz; for  otherwise, the 
other person  could not exist as a free being ; but 
what  particular  finite  quantum  each  person  so 
chooses as his own, must depend altogether upon his 
freedom.  Again :  This choice remains a matter of 
the person's own consciousness, and does not mani- 
fest itself in the sensuous world.  Each must, there- 
fore, state to the other what he has thus appropria- 
ted  as his own, since such is  the only way to re- 
move  the uncertainty which  threatened  to cancel 
the Conception of  Rights.  Each is legally bound 
to determzlze himsey internal(y as to  what he de- 
sires to appropriate for his exclusive use ;  and each 
has the right to compel an undetermined person to 
thus determine himself, since the establishment of 
Right  requires that the determination of  each in 
this respect should be made known.  Each is, there- 
fore, moreover, legally bound  to express hi~lzsey  ex- 
ternal& concerning this his self-determination,  and 
the other has a right to compel him to this expres- 
sion, that is, to compel him  to make a declaration 
of  his possessio?zs. 
All lawful relation between  persons is thus con- 
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desires exclusively to possess, and becomes possible 
only through such a declaration. 
These declarations of  several parties may agree 
or may conflict with  each other; agree,  if  no one 
declares  a  wish  to possess  what the others  have 
appropriated, and conflict if  both  claim  the same 
object.  In the first case they are already united ; 
but in the latter case their dispute can not be set- 
tled by grounds of  law at all.  For as to the claim 
of  previous possession, this nelther of  the parties 
can  prove externally,  and  hence  neither  can  fur- 
nish a legal proof.  For since the law declares the 
expression of  the will to possess something to be 
the ground of  all property, and since both parties 
express that will at the same time, both parties have 
an equal right before the law. 
Two solutions of  this difficulty are possible. 
Firstly.  Both  parties  may mutually compromise 
as to their respective claims, and may thus enter 
the required condition of  harmony.  It  must be re. 
membered, however,  that neither  has the right to 
compel the other to compromise ;  for the other's re- 
fusal to cede part of  his claims does not prove his 
unwillingness  to  recognize  law  in general.  He 
has chosen a particular  possession  and thus  has 
fulfilled the requirement  of  the law.  He  is, more- 
over, willing  to subject himself to the rule of  the 
law  hereafter,  provided  his  claim  to  his  choice 
possession  be granted.  But he has no notion of 
of  ceding that  claim  merely in  obedience  to  my 
will, and because I also desired that same piece of 
possessions.  He holds my will to be a particular, 
Individual  will,  and  not  the  common  wlll  of  the 
law,  which  we  both  ought  to  acknowledge,  but 
which  does  not decide  in  this  case as to whose 
claim is the right one. 
Or, secondly, if  they can not agree, a quarrel or 
war will ensue, which  can end only with the com- 
plete extermination of  one of  the parties.  Now, 
since such a war-as,  indeed, all war-is  against 
the law, or is absolutely unlawful, they are bound, in 
order to prevent the war, to transfer  the decision 
of  their  dispute  to  a  third  party,  and  hence  to 
transfer their whole  right of  deciding questions at 
law and their physical power to enforce such decb 
sion to this third party.  Or, as we expressed it be- 
fore,  they must  both join  a  commonwealth ; and 
each has the right  to compel  the other to join  a 
commonwealth with him, since only thus the main- 
tenance of  law and a  legal relation between  men 
is made possible. 
How the rights of  property are settled, if the par- 
ties thus enter a commonwealth, we shall see here- 
after, when we come to speak of the Conception of 
Rights as applied in a commonwealth.  At present 
the only question which concerns us is this : Sup- 
posing, therefore, all parties to be agreed from the 
start, or to have agreed by a con~promise  as to their 
exclusive possessions, and supposing each one to 
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been  ceded  to him  by the general declaration  of 
property, upon what ground is his right of  property 
to the particzdar a?zd$xed  objects based, which the 
general division has assigned to him ? 
Evidently,  altogether upon  the  fact  that  their 
wills were agreed  and not in conflict, or that the 
one has ceded what  the other claimed.  Each one, 
by saying, "  This only shall be my possession,"  says, 
at the same time, "  Every thing else may be thine," 
and vice versa.  Their right of property, that is, the 
right of  exclusive possession, is  therefore complet- 
ed and conditioned by mutual recog?zition, and does 
not exist without  it.  All property is based  upon 
the union  of  many wills  into  one will.  Through 
this  mutual  recognition,  indeed,  does a possession 
change into property. 
I am excluded from the possession of a determin- 
ed  object,  not  through  the will  of  the other,  but 
only through my own free-will.  If  I  had  not  ex- 
cluded  myself,  I  should  not be  excluded.  But I 
must  exclude myself from  something in virtue of 
the Conception of  Rights. 
Another result could, indeed, not have been ex- 
pected.  If each person is to have original right of 
property to the whole  sensuous world,  but not  to 
retain that right in actuality, and yet is to be and 
remain absolutely free, this is the only possible  so- 
Iution. 
My right of  property to a particular object  (not 
the right of  property in general) is, therefore, valid 
only for  those  who  have  recognized  this  right of 
property amongst each other, and no further.  It 
always remains possible, that all  the rest of  man- 
kind  will  come and dispute  my right of  property 
to something recognized  as mine by the few with 
whom  I have entered into a legal relation.  There 
is, hence, no sure and absolute title to property ex- 
cept a  title recognized  by the whole  human race. 
To obtain  this recognition seems an infinite task, 
and yet it is easy of  solution, and has, indeed, been 
solved  long ago by men.  To wit,  each citizen of 
a commonwealth guarantees to each other citizen 
thereof  his  right  of  property to his  selected pos- 
session.  Now,  the adjoining  commonwealths  ac- 
knowledge and guarantee the right of  property of 
this commonwealth, and hence of each citizen there- 
of.  The commonwealths adjoining those again ac- 
knowledge their property,  etc.,  etc.  Even the re- 
mote  commonwealths,  therefore,  which  have  not 
directly recognized  my  right  of  property  in  my 
commonwealth, have done so implicitly, since they 
have recognized  the right of  property in adjoining 
states, and can therefore not trespass upon the pro- 
perty of  those states, which adjoining states again 
have  acknowledged  the same rights  in the states 
next to them, etc., etc.  As our earth is  an abso- 
lutely closed  and  connected  whole,  each piece  of 
property is,  therefore,  mediately recognized  by all 
mankind,  through  the immediate  mutual  recogni- 
tion of  adjoining commonwealths.  True, in a state 
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all the states at war becomes insecure ;  but a state 
of  war is not a lawful condition. 
When this  general declaration  of  property oc- 
curs, if some objects of  the sensuous world  should 
remain  unappropriated,  these  unappropriated  ob- 
jects are property of none, (yes ?zeutrizls.)  It  needs 
no special declaration to fix these objects, since all 
objects not expressly declared to be appropriated 
are unappropriated.  Now,  in regard  to these un- 
appropriated  objects the same difficulty may arise, 
which we met at the first start, when attempting to 
fix  the right  of  property  in  general.  After  this 
general declaration, two persons may desire to pos- 
sess  themselves  also  of  this  unappropriated  pro- 
perty, and, as each one has the same right to it, a 
state of uncertainty will again result, which can not 
be allowed to remain if the Conception of Rights is 
to rule.  That uncertainty must  be removed.  In 
the first general  establishment of  a  state of  law, 
therefore, a rule regarding this future appropriation 
of unappropriated possessions must be fixed.  It is 
not only advisable to do so, but such a rule must be 
fixed  and  agreed upon, or a  complete  and  secure 
state of law is impossible.  Each person has, there- 
fore, the right to compel the other to agree to some 
rule,  generally  valid,  for  those  future appropria- 
tions. 
What sort of  a rule may  this be?  The declara- 
tion of  property  determines the object  taken  pos- 
session of ;  the reco~~zitiotz  secures to the proprietor 
the guarantee and consent necessary to make it his 
property.  Now, this recognition may  precede the 
declaration; that  is,  at the  moment  of  the  first 
agreement, a rule of recognition may be fixed for all 
future time ;  but the declaration can not precede the 
recognition, if it is to refer to  fz~ture  appropriations. 
To make such a rule possible, therefore, it would be 
necessary to  mutually agree, that each will hereafter 
recognize  each declared  possession of  the other in 
the region of  the unappropriated objects to be that 
other's  property the moment such a  declaration is 
made. 
In virtue  of  such an agreement,  the one who 
would  first  make  public  his  declaration  would 
thereby  secure  a  complete  right  of  property and 
title to it, since all others would  have agreed in ad- 
vance to respect such a title.  Hence, there arises 
here for the first time, and solely in consequence of 
a  voluntary  but  legally  necessary  agreement,  a 
mb  of  law  from  priority of  time;  and the law for- 
mula : Qui prior  temzpore,  fotior jz~rc,  which  had 
hitherto no legal validity for  an external court of 
law, has now been grounded.  Another law formula, 
lies nullius cedit pm'nzo occupanti, is at  the same time 
more  particularly determined  and limited.  There 
are no absolutely Yes  nullius in the  eye of external 
law.  Things are ownerless only through a mutual 
declaration and exclusion from them, (yes neutrizts.) 
The possibility of an endless law dispute has not 
been  removed,  and  the  proper  law  relation 
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so  arranged  that  the  declaration  follows  imme- 
diately the  taking  possession  of  an object.  For 
unless  I  do immediately declare  my  possessions, 
another person  may  come  to  declare  his  posses- 
sion of the same object, (not having known of mine,) 
and the law dispute will again be interminable. 
Possession  and  declaration  must  therefore  be 
synthetically united, or the occupied object must, at 
the  occupation,  be  so  determined  that the other 
can not perceive the object without perceiving that 
it has been taken possession of  The object  itself 
must  express the declaration ; hence, both  parties 
must have agreed upon certain signs of occupation ; 
and since it is necessary to have these signs in or- 
der to make possible the rule of law, there is a right 
to  compel  the  other  to  make  and  respect  these 
signs.  These signs are signs only in so far as they 
have  been  agreed  upon.  Hence, they may  be of 
any  possible  nature.  The signs  used  in  landed 
property  are  usually  fences  or  ditches.  Animals 
are thereby prevented from entering such property, 
and rational beings are thereby reminded that they 
sre not to make use of  their power to enter it. 
Concerning the abandonment of  property, (dere- 
lictzo  domilzii,)  in  regard  to  which  law  disputes 
might also  be possible, it is at once clear, that the 
first  property which was acquired  through mutual 
declaration and recognition, can be abandoned only 
by the express declaration of  the possessor, that he 
no longer  desires to possess it.  For the grounded 
reaches as far as the ground.  Now, the declaration 
is the sole  ground of  this kind of  property, hence 
the property can not be deemed abandoned until the 
declaration is annulled.  When it is annulled, the 
property  becomes  ownerless, and  belongs  to  the 
class of ownerless objects already alluded to. 
As  far  as  the  afterward  acquired  property 
(dominiurn  crcqz~isitunz)  is concerned,  the title to 
which  is obtained  through  the sign  of  occupation, 
it can, of course, be abandoned only by the removal 
of  the  sign; and, by  the removal  of  the sign the 
title to  this property is abandoned in virtue of  the 
same rule; the grounded  extends no further  than 
the ground.  It might be maintained, that the sign 
having  once  been  fixed  upon  the property, every 
body  now  ought  to know  that it has been  taken 
possession of, and  that  the removal or destruction 
of  the sign ought  not to invalidate  the title.  But 
you  never  can  prove  that others  have  seen  the 
sign.  They may never have seen the property, or 
if  they  have seen  it, may never  have noticed  the 
sign.  Hence the sign is not superfluous, but is the 
necessary  and  continuing  ground  of  right  to the 
property ;  and if  the owner takes it away or allows 
it to be  destroyed, he  is  to be  considered  as one 
who has abandoned his property. 
By making this fixed agreement concerning their 
property, the persons who make it reciprocally prove 
to each other that they have  subjected  themselves 
to the law, and hence, that they are beings who have 
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rights.  By means of this property covenant, there- 
fore,  do  the  freedom  and  inviolability  of  their 
bodies, which  before  remained  problematical,  also 
receive  sanction,  and  now  become  a  categorical 
right.  Of course, to secure it in a particular agree- 
ment is not necessary, since the i?z how far of that 
freedom is not at all disputable, but is given in the 
mere  cognition.  The that  of  those  rights of  the 
body,  however,  is  decided  by  the  property cove- 
nant. 
Our investigation has thus returned  into itself. 
What was first  problematical,  has  become  in  its 
simple self-development categorical ;  and our inves- 
tigation is, therefore, completely exhausted. 
The free beings have now been completely deter- 
mined in regard  to  the limits of  their  free  acts in 
relation  to each  other.  Each has its determined 
stand-point in the sensuous world, and they can not 
get at all into  a  law dispute, if  they keep  on that 
stand-point.  An equilibrium  of  rights  has  been 
established between them. 
The' synthetical  proposition,  that  the  in  itself 
for~vznd principle  of  law  does  also  determine the 
material extent of  the rights of each person, has ap- 
proved  itself as true by its universal  applicability. 
Through the mere cognition of a free being my law 
relation  to  it is  immediately  determined  for  me, 
that is, is posited as necessarily to be determined. 
Either I  must  determine it myself  freely,  or  the 
state determines it for me. 
We  have  thus  answered  the  most  important 
question  of  the Science  of  Rights :  How call a 
purely  formal rule of  law be applied  to determined 
objects ? 
111. 
THE  PRINCIPLE  OF ALL LAWS  OF COMPULSION  OR 
OF  PENAL  LAW. 
Our whole argumentation in the deduction of  an 
equilibrium of  rights turns around in a circle ; and 
if we  reflect upon  this circle, the lawful  condition, 
which  was  to be made possible through  the estab- 
lishment of an equilibrium of rights, again becomes 
impossible, and the Conception of  Rights appears 
still empty and without an applicability. 
The rational beings, which we posited as recipro- 
cally  recognizing  each other as such, were  all un- 
certain  whether  the one  could  depend  upon  its 
rights  being  secured  against  the  attacks  of  the 
other; and hence whether the other one had any 
rights at all, or ought not rather to be driven away 
by  physical  force from  the sphere of  causality  of 
the first one.  This uncertainty we claimed to have 
removed in causing both to mutually recognize and 
determine  the  sphere of  their  rights,  since  this 
recognition and determining was evidence that both 
had  subjected  themselves  to  the  Conception  of 
Rights. 
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based  upon their  agreement  to live  together in a 
lawful condition, that it rather is based  altogether 
upon the fact, whether in all their future acts they 
will conform to this agreement.  Hence, the agree- 
ment  presupposes mutual confidence  of the one in 
the other,  that  he will  make  that agreement his 
irrevocable rule of action.  But the adoption of such 
a rule presupposes in each party the will  to estab- 
lish and maintain a lawful condition between them ; 
presupposes, therefore, their subjection to the Con- 
ception of  Rights ;  and thus that which was to prove 
the honesty and  lawfulness of  each party, namely, 
his  subjection  to  the law, proves  it  only  if  that 
which  is to be proved  is presupposed, and has no 
validity or significance unless  such presupposition 
is made. 
Our whole subsequent investigation depends upon 
the correct  and strict comprehension of  this point. 
The security of  both parties is to depend, not upon 
chance, but upon a necessity, equal to a mechanical 
necessity,  and one from which there is no excep- 
tion possible.  Now, such a security is possible only 
if the Conception of Rights has been made the irre- 
vocable  rule  of  action  of  each party ; and unless 
both  are convinced that each has thus adopted it, 
the agreement to respect each other's property and 
personal liberty affords  no security at all,  since it 
rests upon this very subjection to the Conception of 
Rights and has no effect otherwise.  Thereare  many 
reasons  which  might  induce  either party to enter 
an agreement without  having the slightest  inten- 
tion to keep up to it.  Or they may have made the 
agreement with sincere intention to keep it and to 
live  together  in a  legal  state,  and  yet  may  have 
since changed their minds.  The moment one par- 
ty can suppose this possible of  the other, he has no 
security any longer, but  must always  be  prepared 
for disturbance and war, and thus can lead the oth- 
er party, who may still be honest and sincere in his 
submission  to  the law, to entertain the same dis- 
trust.  Each party thus obtains the right to annul 
the agreement and to  get rid of  the other party, 
since the possibility of  both parties living together 
as free beings has been canceled.  Their agreement 
is annulled, because that upon which it was based, 
mutual confidence, has been annulled. 
Result : Thepossibility of  a legal relatiolz between 
persons  is conditioned by  7nwzutzial fidelity  nrzd  coefi- 
hzce.  But mutual fidelity and confidence are not 
dependent upon the Conception of  Rights, and can 
not be  compelled  by law,  nor is there a  right  to 
compel  confidence  and  fidelity,  since  confidence 
and fidelity can not be externally manifested,  and 
hence do not appertain to the sphere of  the Con- 
ception of  Rights.  Nor  can  I even compel any 
body not to manifest his distrust in me ;  for if I had 
that  right  of  compulsion,  it would  force  him  to 
abandon all care for  his own security, and hence all 
care for his freedom  and his rights.  Such a right 
on  my part would  make  him  subject  to  my  arbi- 
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words, would enslave him, and no one has the right 
to enslave another. 
Whenever fidelity and confidence  between  per- 
sons living together have  been  lost, mutual securi- 
ty and legal  relation  between  them have become 
impossible, as we have seen.  The parties can not 
become  convinced  of  the groundlessness  of  their 
distrust, simply because  such a  conviction  can be 
based only upon a fixed, unchangeable good will-a 
will which each person  can scarcely presuppose in 
himself,  much  less in others.  Fidelity and confi- 
dence, therefore,  when  once  lost,  can  not be re- 
stored ; either the distrust continues and spreads, 
or a war finally breaks out,  which  is an unlawful 
state, and, moreover, can not restore confidence. 
Now, none of the parties care about the good will 
of  the other in itself, in its form ;  for, as far as the 
good will is concerned, each is accountable only to 
his conscience.  It  is the results, or the matevial of 
the will, which  they care for.  Each wills  and has 
the right to will that the other party's  acts shall al- 
ways be such as would result if  he had a good will. 
Whether  this good will  really is the incentive  of 
those acts or not, is all the same to him.  Each has 
claim  only to the Legality of  the other, not to his 
Morality. 
Nevertheless, the provision  to be made to re- 
press  acts which  ought  not to  occur,  must  not 
operate  through  means  of  a  mechanical  power 
of  nature ; firstly,  because  this can not be  done, 
man  being  free,  and  hence  able  to  resist  and 
overcome any power of  nature ;  and secondly, be- 
cause  such  a  procedure  would  be  unlawf~ll; for 
man would  thus be changed into a  mere machine 
in his  legal  state, and would  not  be  supposed to 
have any freedom of  will,  to secure which,  alone, 
the whole legal relation is established.  Hence, the 
arrangement to be established must be of  such a 
character as to relate to ths will itseK as to induce 
and compel  the will  to  determine itself  never  to 
will any thing inconsistent with lawful freedom. 
It is easy to see, that such must be the solution 
of  the problem ; but it is far more difficult to deter- 
mine what  this solution  may really signify and in- 
volve. 
The free being with absolute freedom  proposes 
to itself certain ends.  It  wills because it wills, and 
the willing of  an object is itself the last ground of 
such willing.  Thus we have previously determined 
a free being, and any other determination would de- 
stroy the conception of  an Ego, or of  a free being. 
Now, if  it could  be so arranged that the wilZing 
of  an unlnwfz~l  end would necessari.+itt  virtue of 
an always efective law-resalt  in the very reverse of 
that end,  THEN  THE  UNLAWFUL  WILL  WOULD  AL- 
WAYS  ANNIHILATE  ITSELF.  A  PerSon  could  not 
will that end for  the very reason  because he did 
will it ;  his unlawful will would become the ground 
of  its own annihilation, as the will is indeed always 
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It  was necessary to establish this principle in all 
its synthetic fullness, since upon it all laws of  com- 
pulsion  (the whole Penal Law) are grounded.  We 
shall now proceed to analyze it. 
The free being proposes  to itself an end.  Let 
this end be called A.  Now, it is very possible that 
this A may be related to other ends as a means, and 
that these other ends are again so related  to still 
others,  etc.  But  no matter how  far this  relation 
extends, at the end there must be an absolute end 
which is willed simply because it is willed.  All pos- 
sible mediating ends are related to this absolute and 
total end as its parts, and in so far are also to be re- 
garded  as absolute end.  I will A, signifies, I de- 
mand that something corresponding to the concep- 
tion of A be given in perception as existing.  Hence, 
the conception of the real existence of A, or the will 
that A shall exist, is the real motive power of  the 
will A.  As sure as I desire A and its real exist- 
ence, I must detest its opposite as the greatest evil 
possible to me. 
Hence, if I can foresee that an act which I under- 
take to realize A must necessarily result in the op- 
posite  of  A, I  can not  wish  to realize A, for  the 
very reason that I do desire it and do not desire its 
opposite ; I  can not will A because I will  it.  Our 
problem is therefore solved.  The lawless will anni- 
hilates itself and keeps itself in its own limits. 
Hence, if  a contrivance could  be secured  which 
would  operate with  mechanical  necessity so as to 
cause each lawless act to result in the very opposite 
~t was intended to produce, then such a contrivance 
would  compel  the will  to desire  only what  is law- 
ful ; and would restore the security which must  be 
restored,  after  fidelity  and confidence  have  been 
lost.  The good will would be rendered superfluous 
for the external realization  of  right, since  the bad 
will would  be forced  by its very badness  to  effect 
the same end.  A contrivance of this kind is called 
a Law of  Compulsio~z. 
There exists a  general right  to establish such a 
contrivance,  since  reciprocal  legal  freedom  and 
security can  only exist, as we have  discovered, by 
means of  it.  Hence, the problem to establish it is 
involved in the Conception of  Rights. 
The freedom of the lawful will remains unviolated 
by this contrivance, and retains all its dignity.  So 
long as a person  desires  that which  is lawful only 
for the sake of  lawfulness, he experiences no long- 
ing for the unlawful ;  and since the law of compul- 
sion  operates  only  where  this  longing  exists,  it 
never effects the just person at all.  His own good 
will  places  him  above  all  external  law, and he is 
utterly freed from it. 
But  a  person may trespass  upon  another  per- 
son's  right without  being thereunto  impelled by a 
bad  will.  It may  be  done  through  carelessness. 
The law of  compulsion, however, is operative only 
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means the rights of  persons are not yet sufficiently 
protected.  Let us examine this. 
All carelessness can be reduced to this, that the 
careless person has ~zo  will at all in cases when he 
ought to have a will and when he must be assumed 
to have had one as sure as he claims  to be  a free 
and  rational  being.  If in a  certain case he  has 
acted without a clear conception of  his acting, if he 
has acted  mechanically, obedient to chance impul- 
ses, it  is  impossible  to  live  together with  him  in 
security  as  a  rational being.  He ceases to be a 
rational  being, and  becomes  a  product of  nature, 
which  ought to  be compelled  to  inactivity.  But 
this can not be done, both because he has, after all, 
a free-will,  and because his general  freedom  must 
be respected. 
The following  rule applies  to such cases : Each 
person  must take as much  care not  to violate the 
rights of  others as he takes  care that his own are 
not violated.  The proof of the validity of  this rule 
is as follows : the final  end required of  me by  law 
is, mzrknl seczirity.  This involves the end, that the 
rights of the other shall not be violated by me, in the 
same degree as the end, that mine shall not be vio- 
lated by him.  Both these ends, the inviolability of 
mine as well as that of  the other's  rights, must be 
equally ends of  my will, and until they are so, my 
will is not a lawful will. 
The question is : How  is it  to  be so  contrived 
that a  person will  have a  will  when  he  ought  to 
have  it, or, as we  have  just  now  determined  the 
proposition, that  he will  take as much care not to 
violate  the right of  the other, as he takes  care to 
protect his own right against the other ? 
Let us first  examine the rule as we  determined 
it at the outset, because it is the most difficult, and 
hence  makes  the  investigation  most  interesting. 
How then  is it  to be  contrived  to produce  a will 
where it ought to be ? 
That which  has  no will at all  is not a free or a 
rational  being.  The free persons, whom  we  have 
posited  here, have a will ;  the direction of  that wilI 
is also known, for they have announced the objects 
which they have subjected to their ends, (their pro- 
perty.)  This will,  which  is known  to exist,  must 
be so worked upon  by the contrivance postulated, 
as to produce of itself the will which is lacking, and 
which, nevertheless, is necessary for mutual security ; 
that is to say, the  gratification of  the will, which 
they have, must be conditioned by their having the 
other will, which they  ought  to have but perhaps 
have not. 
To  illustrate : I  am  known  to have  the end A. 
Now the law relation I have entered into with other 
free beings, demands that I also must have the end 
B ;  but it is not known whether I will always enter- 
tain the end B.  The way to  force me to entertain 
B at all times, is to make it the condition of A.  For 
in that  case I  am  compelled  to will  B,  since A is 
not possible without it.  A is the end to assert my 
own  right, B  the end  not  to violate  those of  the 
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trived, which with  mechanical  necessity will  make 
the violation  of  the rights of  the other (I violation 
of  my own  rights,  then  I  will  certainly  take  as 
much care to protect his as to protect my own.  In 
short, each loss which the other suffers through my 
carelessness, must become my own loss. 
The  distinction between the former and the latter 
application of the law of compulsion is clear : In  the 
first case, my will  went  beyond  its limits, and at- 
tacked the exclusive rights of  the other, with a view 
to use  them  for  my own  advantage.  The law of 
compulsion addressed itself to this going beyond of 
my will, in  order to drive it back within its limits. 
But  in  the second  case, my will did not  go  far 
enough ; for it did not notice at all the rights of the 
other,  as  it  should  have  done.  Here,  therefore, 
the law addressed  itself  to the care I  take of  my 
own  rights,  in  order  to  impel  my will  to  go far 
enough.  Regard for  my  own  security has, there- 
fore,  under  the  law  of  compulsion,  the contrary 
effect  intended by my own will, namely, to induce 
regard for  the  other's  security.  Thus the equili- 
brium of  rights is fully secured, and the conception 
of  a law  of  compulsion,  which  is  to secure those 
rights, has been completely exhausted. 
IV. 
The law of compulsion is to work in such a man- 
ner that every violation  of  the rights of  the other 
is to result for the violator in the same violation of 
his own rights.  The question is, How can such an 
order of things be established ? 
A compulsory power is evidently required which 
shall  irresistibly punish  the violator.  Who is  to 
establish such a power ? 
This power is posited as a means to realize recip- 
rocal  security,  whenever  fidelity  and  confidence 
have been lost ;  and is posited  in no other respect. 
Hence, it can be desired only by a person who has 
that object in view ; such a  person, however, must 
necessarily  desire its establishment.  The persons 
posited  by us as making the agreement, have that 
object in view ; hence they, and they alone, can de- 
sire-the means to realize it.  Their will is united in 
the object in view, and hence must  also be united 
in the only means  to realize it ; that is, they must 
will  to make an agreement concerning  the estab- 
lishment of a law of compulsion and of a compulsory 
power. 
What sort of a power is this to be ?  As  a power 
operative under a  conception,  and under a concep- 
tion  of  absolute  freedom-namely,  of  the limits 
posited by the contracting parties to their causality 
in the sensuous world-this  power  can  not  be  a 200  TZE SCIENCE  OF RIGIfTS.  TKE:  SCIENCE OF RIGE-ITS.  201 
mechanical power, but must be a free power.  Such 
a power, however, is not posited  beyond their own 
common  power.  Their agreement  to  establish a 
law  of  compulsion  will  thus  have  to contain  the 
provision : that both parties agree to treat, zoith umi- 
ted strength, that one of  them who shall  violate the 
rights of  the other, ifz  accorda~zce  wit/t theprovisio~zs 
of  the law of  compz~lsio~z. 
But if the law of compulsion becomes applicable, 
one of  these parties must be the violator, and it is 
contradictory  that this  one should  lend  his  own 
strength to repel his own attack.  He  can, therefore, 
only promise that he will not resist the compulsion 
of the other, but will voluntarily submit to the pun- 
ishment of the other.  This, however, is also contra- 
dictory, since his original violation presupposes that 
he intended to deprive the other person of his rights, 
and if he did, he will not now voluntarily give them 
UP. 
Nevertheless,  it must be so.  For how else can 
a  superior power  of  right  be realized?  since we 
must ascribe to both parties equal physical strength. 
Thus it seems that the same party whom I could 
not  trust to refrain  from violating  my rights, and 
who, moreover, has since shown that this my dis- 
trust was  justified,  must  now  be  trusted  by  me 
voluntarily to submit to the punishment  provided 
by the law of compulsion.  But this same difficulty 
remains  if  that party does so submit.  For if  the 
aggrieved  party  himself  inflicts  the  punishment 
provided  by the law of  compulsion, who is to gua- 
rantee to the aggressor that the aggrieved  party 
will not purposely step beyond the provisions of the 
law of  compulsion, or that he has not made a mis- 
take in  applying  it ?  The aggressor  also  must, 
therefore,  have  an  impossible  confidence  in  the 
justice and wisdom  of  the other, after first  having 
lost that confidence ; all of  which is contradictory. 
An agreement such as we have found necessary 
is, therefore, contradictory, and can not be realized. 
It could  be realized  only if  the aggrieved  party 
had  always  superior  power,  extending, however, 
only to the limit provided by the law of compulsion, 
and if  he lost  all  that  power  as soon  as he had 
reached  that limit ;  in other words,  zy  each  party 
had precise&  as much power as rkht. 
This condition is, as we have seen before, possible 
only in a commonwealth.  Hence, an application of 
the law of  compulsion  is  not possible  except in a 
commonwealth; outside  of  a  commonwealth  com- 
pulsion  is only problematically lawful, and for that 
very reason is always unlawful if really applied. 
Hence, Natz~~tal  Law, or a legal relation between 
men, is not possible at all except in a commonwealth 
and under positive laws. 
Either general  morality, and  universal  faith  in 
this  morality, prevails-and  even  in  that case  it 
would be the most marvellous of all chances if men 
could  agree upon  their claims ; and if  morality so 
rules, law does not exist at all ; for  that which  law 
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that which  it prohibits  is never done.  For a race 
of perfect  moral  beings  there is  no  law.  That 
mankind can not be this race is clear from the sim- 
ple  fact  that man must first be educated, or must 
$rst  educate hiwself, to become a moral being. 
Or there is no such general morality, or, at least, 
no  universal  confidence  in  it.  In that case, the 
external  rule  of  law  certainly becomes  ap~licable 
but  it  can  be  applied  only  in  a  commonwealth. 
Natural law, therefore, becomes inoperative. 
But what we  thus lose on  the one hand, we get 
back with profit on the other hand ;  for the common- 
wealth now becomes the natural condition of  man, 
and its laws  will,  after all, 3e  only Natural  Law 
realized. 
SECOND  PART  OF  THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
CONCERNING  STATE  ORGANIZATION. THE  problem which we were unable to solve, and 
which we hoped to solve through the conception of 
a comn~onwealth,  was this :  to realize a power which 
might  enforce the Conception  of  Rights  (or that 
which all persons necessarily will) amongst persons 
who live together in a community. 
The object of their common will is commotz secu- 
rity; but since only  self-love, and  not morality, is 
supposed to exist-the  willing of the security of the 
other emanates from the willing of  the security of 
himself in each person.  The  former is subordinated 
to the latter.  No one is supposed  to care that the 
rights of  the other are secure against  his attacks, 
except in so far as his own security is conditioned by 
this  security of  the others.  We may express this 
in the following  formula :  each one  szr6ordinate.s the  - 
common end to his private end. 
The law  of  compulsion  is intended  to produce 
this reciprocity or this necessary connection of both 
ends in  the will of  each, by combining  the welfare 
of  each  with  the security  and the  welfare  of  all 
other*. 
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law of compulsion can not be of this character ;  for 
the subordination  of  the  private  to the  common 
will being produced only by this power, which must 
be superior to all other power, that subordination 
could  be produced in the supreme power  only by 
its own  power, which  is  a  contradiction.  Hence, 
that  subordination and  harmony  of  private  and 
public will must not wait to be produced, but must 
exist from the very beginning  in the power which 
is  to carry  out  the law  of  compulsion;  in  other 
words, the private will  of that power and the corn- 
mon will of all  persons must  be one and the same 
will ; the common will  itself,  and none other, must 
be the private will  of  this power,  and the power 
must have no other particular will of its own at all. 
11.  The problem  of  the Science  of  Rights  is, 
therefore, to discover a will, which can  not possibLy 
be other thalz the common will. 
Or, to use our  previous formula, which is  better 
suited for our investigation, to discover a will, wherc- 
in  private atzd common will are synthetical& united. 
Let this will, which is to be discovered, be called X 
A. Each will has itself (in the future) for its own 
object.  The  ultimate end of each willing person is 
his own preservation.  This applies to X also ;  and 
hence this is the private will of  X.  This private 
will is  in X  to be the same  as  the common  will. 
The common will  is  the security of  the rights  of 
all.  Hence X, as much as it wills itself, must will 
the security of the rights of all. 
B.  The security of the rights of all is willed only 
through the harmonious will  of all.  Only in thzs 
are the wills  of  all harmonious ; for  in all  other 
matters  their willing  is  particular and  has  indivi- 
dual purposes.  No individual singly has  this for 
his object, but only all in common will it. 
C.  X is therefore itself this agreement (harmony) 
of all.  As sure as this harmony wills itself, it must 
will the security of  all, since it is itself  this very 
security of all. 
111.  But  a harmony like this is  a mere  concep- 
tion.  Such it is not to remain ; but to be realized 
in the sensuous world, that is, to be established  in 
a determined utterance and to have effect as a phy- 
sical power. 
All willing beings in the sensuous world are men 
to us.  Hence, that conception must be realized by 
men.  This requires : 
A. The  will of a certai?z number of  men in some 
particular time-moment must become really harmo- 
nious, and must declare itself as thus harmonious. 
It is important here, to show  that this required 
harmony  does not  occur of  itself, but is grounded 
ilt  arz  express act  in the sensuozis world percejtible at 
aq  time nlzd possibb  on&  throztgh free  sey-deter- 
m+i~zntion.  The proof of  this act  has already  been 
given, when  it was shown that the applicability of 
the Conception of Rights is not possible, unless each 
person  has made  an express declaration of  the ex- 
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suous world  to his  end, or to which he has  taken 
possession of them. 
The  further development of this act is undertaken 
in our first book : CONCERNING  STATE  ORGANIZA- 
TION. 
B.  This common  will  must  be  clothed with  a 
power, and with  a  supreme  power, so that it may 
maintain  itself  and  its  decisions  by  compulsion. 
This power  involves both  the right  to decide law 
disputes  and to execute these  decisions : Judicial 
and Executive power. 
The manner of  its establishment is developed in 
our second book :  CONCERNING  THE STATE  CONSTI- 
TUTION. 
C.  This common will must be established as the 
unchangeable and permanent will of all, which each 
agrees to recognize  so long as he remains  in  the 
commonwealth ;  a fact which must always be borne 
in mind.  The whole  future will of  each individual 
is concentrated  into the one moment when he de- 
clares his willingness to participate in the common- 
wealth ;  and this extending  the present  will  so as 
to embrace the whole future, changes the expressed 
common will  into LAW.  In so far  as the common 
will  determines how  far  the rights of  each person 
shall extend, the law  is called Civil Law ;  and in 
so far as it determines the punishment which shall 
follow  a violation  of  the law, it  is called Peaad  or 
Cyiwzi~zad  Law. 
The further development of  these conceptions is 
undertaken in our third book :  CONCERNING  MUXI- 
CIPAL  LAW. 
CONCERNING  STATE  ORGANIZATION. 
PRELIMINARY.-Let  US analyze more thoroughly 
than we have done heretofore  the conception of 
the fundamental agreement upon which a common- 
wealth is established. 
An agreement presupposes two persons who are 
posited as each desiring the same object to be his 
exclusive property.  The object  upon which  they 
are to agree must, therefore,  first,  be of  a  nature 
which  will  allow  it  to become exclusive  property, 
that is, which will  allow the object  to remain  the 
same as conceived by either person when subjected 
to his end ; and, second, of  a  nature which will al- 
low it to be subjected to an end only as exclusive 
property.  (See the deduction of  the right of  pro- 
perty in the paragraph on Original Rights.)  If the 
former is not the case, then no agreement is possi- 
ble ; if  the latter is not the case, no agreement is 
necessary.  Hence a certain amount of  light or of 
air is not a legitimate object of  an agreement. 
Again :  Both parties must have the same right to 
the object, otherwise there exists no law dispute be- 
tween them to be settled by an agreement.  This 
is, indeed, the case as far as all objects and all  free 
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Previous  to the agreement, the only legal  ground 
which a person can make valid for  the possession 
of  a disputed object is his freedom and rationality ; 
but all free beings can make the same ground valid. 
A dispute concerning the possession of their bodies 
is not possible amongst persons, since the natural 
end of  each body, to be moved through free-will, is 
physically impossible  to all  but one.  But  to the 
rest of  the  sensuous  world,  all persons  have  the 
same claim. 
It is not  necessary, however,  that both  parties 
need  claim  the same property at the present  mo- 
ment ; the fear that such a claim  may be raised  in 
the  fz~tzlre  is sufficient to make an agreement neces- 
sary.  But unless either case occurs, an agreement 
is altogether unnecessary, since then the sphere of 
freedom for  both parties is so separated that a col- 
lision of  wills  is  considered  impossible.  So long, 
for instance, as their possessions are separated by 
a river, which  both parties consider impassable, it 
is useless for them to promise each other that they 
will not cross the river and attack each other's pro- 
perty.  Nature has made the river the limit of  our 
physical power.  It is only when the river becomes 
fordable, or when we invent ships, that it becomes 
necessary to fix  the river  as the limit of  our pos- 
sessions by agreement. 
This will  of  each party,  to have exclusive pos- 
session of this or that piece of  property, is the pri- 
vate will of  each party.  Hence, in the agreement 
there are, firstly,  two private wills, which  may be 
called material wills, since they are directed upon 
an object. 
The possibility of  an agreement requires, more- 
over, that both parties have the will to come to an 
agreement concerning their disputed claims, or to 
relinquish each a part of his claim until both claims 
can coexist together.  If one or both of  the parties 
have not this will, an agreement  becomes impossi- 
ble,  and  war  is  the  result.  The Conception  of 
Rights requires  each rational  being  to  have  this 
will, and there is a law of  compulsion to force each 
person to enter an agreement, (which, it is true, has 
no applicability, since it is impossible to determine 
to what extent a person should relinquish his claim,) 
all of  which has already been proved. 
This will of both parties to compron~ise  their law 
dispute peaceably, we shall call, since it refers to the 
form of  the agreement, their  for~zal  co~nmo7t  will. 
Their will to restrict their two private wills so far 
that they may no longer conflict with  each  other, 
and hence to relinquish  each  a part of  his  claims 
for now and ever, we shall call their wzaterial com- 
lnolz wzll. 
By  this agreement of  both  contracting parties, 
the will of  each now extends also to the property 
of  the other, which, perhaps, it did  not previously, 
since the other party may not even have known it ; 
but it does  so only ~zegativeb. The will of  each 
party extends beyond its own private end, but mere- 
ly as a negative will.  Each one does tzot will what 
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wills the possessions of the other, is to each a mat- 
ter of  indifference.  The material will of  both par- 
ties, in so far as it is a common will, is purely nega- 
tive. 
The conception of  an agreement requires, more- 
over, that this common will be established as a per- 
manent will, determining all future free acts of  both 
parties, as the ~ule  of  law which  fixes  their whole 
future legal relation to each other.  As soon as one 
of  the parties transcends the limits of  this  agree- 
ment  in  the  least, the agreement and the whole 
legal relation established by it is annulled. 
It might be supposed that, in case of  such a vio- 
lation  of  the agreement,  the aggrieved  party had 
only a  claim  to  demand  damages, and that a  res- 
titution would  place  all things back  in their origi- 
nal position.  This is true, if  the aggrieved party 
is satisfied with the restitution and is willing to re- 
new the agreement with the other party.  But it is 
very important,  for  the sake of  our future results, 
that it should clearly appear, that the offended party 
is not  legally bound  to be satisfiecl with damages ; 
the one violation  of  the agreement strictly annul- 
ling the whole legal relation between them. 
For this reason : Previous to the agreement each 
of  the parties had the most perfect title to the pos- 
sessions demanded by the other party and ceded to 
that other party in the agreement.  Though the first 
party may not even have had knowledge of  the exis- 
tence of those possessions, he might have obtained 
that knowledge at some future time.  His right to 
those  possessions  he lost only by  the agreement, 
by his voluntary cession.  The agreement, however, 
exists  only in so far as it is always maintained ; its 
violation  annuls it.  When the ground is annulled, 
the grounded  is also annulled ; and since the con- 
tract was  the only ground  of  the cession of  those 
possessions  to  the  other, with  the contract  that 
cession also  is abrogated.  Both parties are again 
in the same relation to each other which they occu- 
pied before the agreement. 
No legal  relation  is possible without  a  positive 
determination of the limit  to which the freedom of 
each individual is to extend ; or, which is the same, 
without defining their property in the widest sense 
of  that word, namely, in  so far  as it  signifies not 
only the possession of  real estate, but the r&hts to 
free  acts ilt  the sensz~ous  world general&. 
In the organization of  a state or commonwealth, 
therefore,  if  that  organization  is  to  establish a 
general  legal  relation  between  individuals,  each 
individual 7fzust  agree with all others co~zcemzi~zg  the 
property,  yights,  and  lzberties which he  is to  have, 
arzd  which he  is to cede to the others."  Each must 
* "  The Declarahon of firdependence was a soczal compact by  whtch 
the whole people  covenartled wtth  EACH czhzeit of  the  Unzted States, 
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make  this  agreement with all the others itz ?person. 
Each, is the one party, and all the others, as indivi- 
duals-for  only as individual  free beings  does he 
agree with  them-are  the other party.  Each one 
has said to all : I wish to possess this, and demand 
that  you  shall release  all  your  legal claims  to it. 
All have  responded  to each:  We do  release  our 
claims to it, provided you release your claims to our 
possessions. 
All the requirements  of  an agreement are con- 
tained in this one.  Firstly, the private will of each 
individual to possess  something as exclusive  pro- 
perty, for otherwise he would  not have entered the 
agreement.  Each citizen of  a state has, therefore, 
necessarily  a  property ; for  if  the  other had  not 
guaranteed him his property, he would not have gua- 
ranteed theirs.  Secondly, the formal will  to make 
the agreement.  Thirdly, it is necessary that each 
shall  have  agreed  with  the other  concerning the 
matter  of  his  possessions ; otherwise  the agree- 
ment  could  not  have  been  effected.  Fourthly, 
the will  of  each is positive  only  in  so far as his 
own  possessions  are  concerned, and  negative  in 
regard  to the possessions  of  all  others.  Again, 
and of right ought to be, free and independent States."  (John Quin- 
cy Adams,  July  Oratzorz, 1831.) But they covenanted more.  Each 
citizen also covenanted with  the whole people, and the whole peo- 
ple with each citizen, that all men are endowed with  the rights of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of  happiness.  Ttlese rights they gua- 
ranteed  to each other in that compact ;  and hence the Declaration 
of  Independence is the Property Compact of the citizens of the Uni- 
ted S~~:~S.-TRANSLATOR. 
the  possessions  of  each  are  recognized  by  the 
others  only  so  long  as  the  former  recognizes 
their possessions.  The least violation cancels the 
whole agreement, and justifies  the offended  party, 
if  he has the power, to take away from the aggres- 
sor all  his possessions.  Each, there$ore,  pledges all 
hispropeyty as securig that he will not violate  the 
property of  all  others. 
I call  this first part of  a  state organization  the 
Propeyty Contpact of the citizens. 
Each individual  has  at one  time  actually thus 
declared his  possessions,  whether  by  word  or by 
deed,  in choosing publicly a  profession, which  all 
the others, at least  tacitly, have consented to, and 
thus guaranteed. 
We have assumed  that in a  commonwealth  all 
make  the  agreement with  all.  Some one  might 
object that this  is not  necessary,  and that,  since 
men do business  necessarily in a  limited sphere, it 
would be sufficient if  each individual made such an 
agreement with three or four of  his next adjoining 
neighbors.  According to our presupposition, how- 
ever, this would not be  sufficient.  Our presuppo- 
sition must  therefore assume  that each person can 
come in conflict with each other ;  that hence, each 
is not limited  to  his  chosen  sphere in space, but 
has the right to traverse the whole  sphere of  the 
commonwealth.*  It will appear, hereafter, that this 
*  TRANSLATOR'S  RFMARK.  -  Fichte  does  not  touch  the  real 
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is really the case.  At  present we only wish to show 
from this requirement that, in a commonwealth, the 
agreement should be one of  all  with all, and that, 
volves this question :  Why may not each two or three persons on 
the earth make such an agreement ?  why must the state be a  large 
commonwealth?  The solution suggested is the true one, though it 
is not expressed clearly and not at all deduced ;  namely, the possi- 
bility is to remain I'  that each person may come in conflict with each 
other" on the @re  of  the wholeglobe, or rather, witlr each  individual 
mem6er of  the wholehunran mce.  I say, Fichte has merely suggested 
this solution, and has not at all attempted its deduction.  Of course, 
as a principle of law, it must be involved in the conception of rights 
that each person  shall rest&  his freedmt  by the conception of the  free- 
dom of  all others;  and the deduction may be thus sketched in its 
leading features : 
It  has been shown that the consent of all human individuals must 
be obtained in order to render the title to any property (or rights in 
general) perfect.  It  has also been empirically stated by Fichte that 
this universal  consent  exists in the  treaties  of  adjoining  states, 
recognizing  each  other's  possessions.  This is not  correct as an 
empirical statement; if  it were, we should have  no wars.  As a 
matter of fact, not a single state (our Republic excepted, for reasons 
which will  clearly appear) recognizes the possessions of the other, 
but only awaits an opportunity to appropriate them ;  and the ground 
of this is, that a legal  relation is possible only between individuals, 
but not between  states, when  such states assume to be absolute 
bodies.  From this universal uncertainty of property in all countries, 
which  uncertainty  increases  with  the  number  of  small  absolute 
states, (and hence was  never  greater than in Germany during the 
feudal  times,) arises the unlawfulness of  all states which  do not 
embrace the possibility of  annexing  the whole globe, or of  uniting 
the whole  human  race  under  one form  of  government.  A small 
state of two  or three persons, therefore, would be in contradiction 
to the conception of rights.  There is not perfect security-and  per- 
fect security that conception demands-possible  in it.  Nor is such 
security possible in any al~solutely  limited state.  A commonwealth 
which is to afford perfect security must embrace the whole globe, 
although the possessions of all on the surface of the 
earth may be in part, that is, in a certain respect, 
divided  amongst  the  individuals,  still  in  another 
respect, which the agreement must also determine, 
there must  be a sphere of  action for all ;  the mer- 
chant, for instance, retaining the privilege to travel 
and to sell his goods, the cattle-raiser to drive his 
cattle over  the high-roads, the fisher to walk upon 
the property  of  the agriculturist along the rivers, 
etc., etc. 
Now, since the Conception of  Rights can not be 
realized except through a universal commonwealth 
of  all mankind, the right to realize  it must always 
remain a  right of  each  individual ;  and it  is  this 
or at least, in order to be conformable  to the conce~tion  of rights, 
must contain thepossibili@ of uniting all mankind.  We  shall show 
in another place, that the only commonwealth which  contains  this 
possibility is that of  the United  States, and that hence the United 
States, with its form of government of a Confederate Republic, is 
the only lawful  commonwealth on the face of  the globe. 
For only a  Confederate  Republic  furnishes  really  those  states 
which Fichte wrongly asserted empirically to exist, namely,  states 
which guarantee each other's possessions.  None of  its states being 
absolute, there is no cause for a mar between them ;  only riots (our 
late war was merely an organized  gigantic riot)*  are possible in a 
confederation.  No state would be bettered by  being enlarged, nor 
even lose by being made smaller. 
Tlle distinction between war and  riot may be  held to be e~ther  quantitative or 
qualitative.  If held to be  only  quantitative, our late  war, of course, was  a war, 
and every large riot must then be called a war.  But if we wish to make a qualita- 
tive distinction, a  war can  only be waged  between  separate  absolute states, with 
a view  to conquer  each other's possessions,  directly or  indirectly;  and  a riot or 
insurrection is a revolt against the  law within a certain commonwealth.  A riot is 
opposition to law;  a war has no  reference to law at all, but ifinores it 2 I 8  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS. 
right to realize a true lawful relation between man- 
kind, which is the legal ground, why each individ- 
ual, besides  his particular  limited sphere in  space 
selected as his exclusive possession, has  a  right to 
claim all the rest of  the world as sphere of causali-' 
ty.  Only, this latter right is neither exclusive nor 
absolute.  It is defined  in  the separate common- 
wealths, but a universal determination of  this right 
is not possible until the object contemplated by it, 
the establishment of  a  Universal Confederacy,  has 
been realized. 
But the object of  state organization is, to protect 
the rights guaranteed to each in the property-com- 
pact against all attacks whatever, and so to protect 
them by compulsion or physical force, if  necessary. 
Such a protecting power has not been established 
if  the will of  each party remains  only negative  so 
far as regards the property of  the other.  The pro- 
perty-compact  must,  therefore,  embrace  another 
compact,  in which  each  individual  shall  likewise 
covenant with all the other individuals of  the com- 
monwealths that he will protect their specified pro- 
perty (or rights) to the extent of  his physical pow- 
er,  provided  they will  protect  his  property in the 
same manner. 
This agreement we will  call  the Protection-Corn- 
pact. 
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This second compact is in its matter conditioned 
by the first.  Each can only agree to protect what 
he has recognized  as the right of  the other, whe- 
ther it consist of present possessions or in the per- 
mission  to  obtain  future possessions under a  cer- 
tain rule.  But he can  not promise  to assist  the 
other if  the other should  involve  himself  in quar- 
rels not provided for in the agreement. 
This second  compact  is distinguished  from  the 
first in this, that the negative will in respect to the 
other's property now becomes positive.  Each pro- 
mises not only to abstain from attacking the pro- 
perty of  the other, but, moreover, to assist in de- 
fending it against the attacks of  any possible  third 
party. 
Like every agreement, the protection-compact  is 
conditioned.  Each promises  to  the other protec- 
tion  on condition that the other will  also protect 
him.  The agreement is annulled if  any party does 
not fulfill its conditions. 
The protection-compact is distinguished from the 
property-compact  remarkably  in  this,  that in the 
former both parties  agree merely not to do certain 
things, whereas  in the latter both  parties agree to 
do certain things.  It can, therefore,  be known  at 
all times whether the property-compact has been 
complied with,  since  it only requires  knowledge 
that certain things have not been done by the oth- 
er party ; but it can not always be known whether 
the  protection-compact  has  been  complied  with, 
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since it requires  that the other party shall do cer 
tain things which  he can not  do at all  times, and 
which he really is never obliged to do. 
Let us examine this important point more close- 
ly. 
The protection-compact  is a  conditioned agree- 
ment concerning positive duties, and as such it can, 
in strict law, have no effect whatever, but is null 
and void. 
The formula of  such an agreement would  be as 
follows:  On condition  that you  protect my rights, 
I will protect your rights.  How, then, does some 
party obtain the right to claim the protection of the 
other ?  Evidently, by actual& protectitzg  the rights 
of  the other. 
But if  this is so, no party will ever obtain a strict- 
ly legal claim to the protection of  the other. 
It  is important for our whole future investigation 
that this be clearly comprehended, and this  com- 
prehension depends upon a  thorough  insight into 
the nature of  this compact.  I am legally bound to 
protect  you  only on condition that you protect  me. 
Let it be clearly noted what this last clause sig- 
nifies.  It does not mean, merely, "that you  have 
the good will to protect me."  For good  intentions 
can not be proved  before  a court of  external law, 
and, moreover, might change at any moment.  In- 
deed, it is the right of  each party, never to be com- 
pelled to depend on the good intentions of the other 
party.  Nor is that clause equivalent to saying, "  On 
condition that you have protected  me at some past 
occasion."  For the past  is past, and is of  no mo- 
ment to me at present.  Morality,  gratitude,  and 
other  internal  or  moral  qualities  may,  it is  true, 
induce me to recompense past  services,  but  in a 
Science of  Right we  must  not  take morality into 
account  at all.  On the field  of  law  there is no 
means to unite men except through  this insight : 
whatever  you  do to the other  party,  whether of 
good or of evil, you do not unto him, but unto your- 
self. 
Applying this to the present  cases, it would be 
necessary to become convinced, that in protecting 
the other party I simply protect  myself, either ac- 
tually in the present or prospectively in the future, 
namely, if  protection of  my rights in the future is 
the necessary result of  my affording protection  to 
him now.  The former is not possible ; for in pro- 
tecting the other, I do not need and do not receive 
present protection.  The second is equally impossi- 
ble ; for I can not have absolute certainty that the 
other will protect me again in the future. 
Our above exposition is the most stringent, but 
the matter may be viewed from various sides.  For 
instance,  either  both  parties  are attacked at the 
same time, and in that case neither can afford pro- 
tection to the other, or they are attacked at differ- 
ent times.  In the latter case, the party called upon 
to protect  the other, might say, Our agreement is 
a conditioned one ; only by affording protection to 
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since you have not actually fulfilled the condition, 
the conditioned, of course, is null and void.  In the 
same manner the other party will argue, and thus 
the conditioned will never become realized, because 
the condition can  never  be realized.  They may 
come  into  a  relation  of  moral  obligation,  if  one 
party assists the other, but never into a relation of 
legal obligation. 
Let us compare this i11 itself  null and void com- 
pact with the right  based  upon  the property-com- 
pact.  In the latter compact, the condition is only 
negative on either side, namely, that neither party 
shall attack the rights of  the other ;  and hence it 
can always be proved  before external law, that its 
conditions  have  been  complied with,  and  that a 
legal obligation exists.  The condition in the pro- 
perty-compact is not a  something, but a  nothing ; 
not an affirmation,  but a  mere negation, continu- 
ously possible  at all times ;  and hence  the condi- 
tioned  is also  possible  at all times.  I am always 
obliged to refrain  from  attacking the rights of  the 
other, because thereby, and only thereby, do I legal- 
ly restrain him from attacking my rights. 
But if  the protection-compact is null and void, 
then the security of  the property-compact  is also 
canceled, and the Conception of  Rights can not be 
realized. 
The difficulty must be removed, and the solution 
of this problem completes the fundamental compact 
of  every state organization. 
The chief  difficulty was,  that it always remains 
problematical whether  the obligation  required  by 
the protection-compact  has been  met or not,  and 
hence, whether the other party has obligations or 
not.  If this uncertainty can be removed, the diffi- 
culty is solved.  It  is removed, if  the mere entrance 
into the agreement, the mere becoming a member 
of  a  state organization,  carries  along with  it the 
fulfillment of  the obligation demanded  by the pro- 
tection-compact ;'  in  other words,  if promise  and 
fulfillment are synthetically united, if word anddeed 
become one and the same. 
What we  have just  stated  concerning the pro- 
tection-compact,  applies to all compacts involving 
positive obligations, since it has been deduced from 
the general character of  such compacts.  In estab- 
lishing, therefore, the form whereby the protection- 
compact may become valid, that is, by making word 
and deed  one,  we  have  established  the universal 
form of  all such compacts. 
The  protection-compact is to contain, at the same 
time, the fulfillment of  its obligations.  Ilow is this 
to be realized?  Evidently in the following manner : 
*The protection-compact, therefore, forms part of the Constitu- 
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The  compact, which is to establish the state organ- 
ization, must at the same time provide for a protec- 
tive power, to which each member of  the organiza- 
tion must furnish his contribution.  This contribu- 
tion would at once be the fulfillment of  his promise 
to protect  the rights  of  all  other members, and 
there could  be  no  further  uncertainty as to his 
affording that protection to the others upon which 
his own claim to protection is grounded. 
But how  is this protective power  to  be estab- 
lished,  and what  is actually established  in  estab- 
lishing it  ? 
To  make clear the important conception we shall 
thus obtain, let us  again  place  ourselves  on  the 
standpoint from which we saw the one person  en- 
tering into an agreement with all the others.  He 
is the one of  the contracting parties.  A contribu- 
tion is demanded of  him as the condition bf  his en- 
tering the state.  By whom is this contribution de- 
manded ?  Who is the second party to this agree- 
ment ? 
This second party demands a protective power- 
for what particular individual ?  For absolutely no 
particular individual, and yet for all ;  for each one 
who may be attacked in his rights.  This each one 
may or may not be every single one of  them.  The 
conception  of  the  individual  to be  protected  is, 
therefore,  an undetermined  conception ;  and thus 
arises  the  conception  of  a  Whole,  which  is  not 
merely  imaginery,  (created  by our thinking,) but 
which is actual;  a Whole not merely of  all indivi- 
duals, but of  a totality. 
Let us describe this totality more at length.  A 
mere abstract conception is created solely through 
the free act of  the mind.  Such was  the concep- 
tion of  all  persons together, which we  established 
above.  Hut the conception which we have now ob- 
tained  is not  created  by an arbitrary act, but  by 
something actual;  which,  however,  is as yet  un- 
known, and can  be determined  only in the future 
through the apprehended  attack.  No one knows 
upon whom this attack will be made, but it may be 
made  upon  all.  Each can, therefore, believe  that 
the whole contrivance has  been established solely 
for his particuIar benefit, and hence will  cheerfully 
furnish his contribution.  Rut the attack may also 
be made upon another.  The  contribution, however, 
has already become part of  the Whole ancl can not 
be withdrawn.  This undeterminedness, this uncer- 
tainty as to which individual is to be attacked first, 
this suspension of  the power of  imagination, there- 
fore, constitutes the real tie of  union.  It is it,  by 
means of  which all flow together into one, and are 
now united  no longer in an abstract conception, as 
a co~izpositz~rtz,  bbt in fact,  as a tot~~m.  Thus nature 
in the state unites again what she separated in the 
production  of  many  individuals.  Reason  is only 
one, and its representation in the sensuous world is 
also only one ;  mankind  is a  single organized and 
organizing Whole  of  Reason.  Reason was  sepa- 
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the natural institution of  the commonwealth  can- 
cels  this  independence  provisionally  and  unites 
separate numbers into a whole, until finally morali- 
ty recreates the whole race into one. 
The conception  thus attained  can  be  properly 
illustrated by the conception of  an organized pro- 
duct of  nature ;  for instance, of a tree.  If you give 
each separate part of  the tree consciousness and a 
will, then each part, as it desires its own pre.serva- 
tion, must also desire the preservation of  the whole 
tree, because its own preservation is possible only 
on that condition.  Now, what,  then,  is the tree? 
The tree in general is nothing but a  conception, 
and a  conception  can  not  be violated.  But  the 
part wills that ?tot a single part of all the parts shall 
be violated, because that violation would inevitably 
be felt by it too.  It is different with a mound of 
sand, where  each  part  exists  separately, and can, 
therefore,  be  careless as to what  other  parts  are 
separated, trodden down, or scattered away. 
The thus established totality  is, therefore,  that 
which  is to be protected, and is the required se- 
cond party to the compact. 
The  point of union of this totality has been shown. 
But how and through what  determined  act of  the 
will has this whole become a Whole ? 
We remain  on  our  previous  standpoint,  from 
which we saw a single person enter the agreement ; 
and our question will soon be answered. 
That single person expresses his will  to protect, 
of  course,  the Whole.  He, therefore,  becomes  a 
part  of  the  Whole,  and joins  together  with  it; 
whether he become, as can not be foreseen, the pro- 
tector or  the protected.  In this manner, through 
covenants of  single persons with  other single per- 
sons,  the Whole  has  arisen ; and when  all  single  - 
persons have covenanted with all other single per- 
sons, the Whole is completed. 
We call this compact, which secures and protects 
the two previous compacts, and in union with them 
forms  the fundamental  compact of  state organiza- 
tion, the U~zion-Compact,* 
*Our Constztution, (or  State constitutio~~s.)  Those who do not 
like to have  the  Declaration of Independence  considered as the 
fundamental property-compact of  our Constitution will, perhaps, 
be better pleased if  we call the Bill of  Rights (the amendments) of 
our Constitution the property-compact ;  the sections, which consti- 
tute the government and provide  for  its efficacy, the protection- 
compact ; and the preamble the union-eompact. 
Our forefathers originally intended to keep the property-compact 
separate from the Constitution.  They held that the Declaration of 
Independence specified the original and inalienable rights of  men 
in sufficiently comprehensive terms, and that it would only be pro- 
ductive of harm to specify them in greater detail in the Constitu- 
tion,  since such specification must  necessarily  be  imperfect  and 
would leave room open to the interpretation, that rights not speci- 
fied could be taken away by act of  Congress.  The Patrick Henry 
partn however, insisted on having this specification,  and hence the 
original amendments to the Constitution, which are nothing more 
than an imperfect  specification of the three fundamental  origin& 
rights asserted  in the Declaration  of  Independence.-T~~~5~- 
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By virtue of this union-compact,  each single per- 
son becomes part of  an organized whole and melts 
into one with it.  Is he swallowed up into it in all 
his being and essence, or does he remain free and 
independent in a certain other respect ? 
Each gives to the protecting body his cofztribu- 
tion; he gives his  vote  to the election of  magis- 
trates and to the constitution, and his fixed contri- 
bution of  forces, services, natural  praducts, or  all 
of  these changed into the common representative 
of  value-money.  But he does  not  give himself 
and what belongs  to him  altogether.  If  he did, 
what  would  remain  his  for  the whole  to protect? 
The compact would be a contradiction, established 
on the pretext of  protection, and yet with nothing 
to protect."  Its fundamental principle would be : 
all  promise to protect,  although  all  promise  that 
they will have nothing to protect.  Hence, the pro- 
tecting body  consists  only of  parts of  that which 
belongs  to the single individuals.  The  whole em- 
braces  them all, but each of  all only in part.  But 
in so far as they are thus embraced  in it, they con- 
stitute the state and form the true sovereign.  Only 
in giving his contribution does each belong to the 
*On such a contradiction  the "right "  of  conscliption  is based. 
The citizens of  the United  States have  formed their  constitution 
and government solely to guarantee to each other "life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of  happiness."  By ordering conscription, government 
takes away your freeclom, in order to make you free ;  takes away 
your l:fe,  in order to secure it.-TRANSLA~OR'S  REMARK. 
sovereign.  In a  free state the pa~wze?tt  of  taxes is 
an exercise ox sovere&?zl'y. 
But that which is to beprotected embraces alZ that 
each one possesses. 
The totality thus established can not undertake 
to protect any  thing  which it has not recognized.  By 
undertaking- to protect all thepossessio~zs  of  each citi- 
ze72,  it recognizes his title to  those possessions;  and 
thus the property-compact-which  it  at first  ap- 
peared was only concluded between all as single in- 
dividuals-is  confirmed by the actual totality of the 
commonwealth. 
In so far as the Whole must regard all violation 
of  any of  the possessions or rights  of  the single 
citizens as inyi'ictea? @on  itseg the Whole is pro- 
prietor of all ; but in so far as it wishes to have free 
use of  any t/zin,a;  only that which each citizen  con- 
tributes toward the Whole is property of  the state. 
That which the individual does not contribute to 
the Whole is his own, and in respect to it he re- 
mains individual, a free,  independent person ;  and 
it is this very freedom which the state has secured 
to him, and to secure which he became member of 
a state.  Man separates himself from his citizenship 
in order to elevate himself with absolute freedom to 
morality;  but in order  to be able to do so, he be- 
comes a citizen. 
In so far as the individual  is limited by the law, 
he is a su@ct,  subject to the protective power with- 
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entered into with him only on condition of  his fur- 
nishing his contribution, and hence the contract is 
canceled when he does not furnish it.  Each one, 
therefore, guarantees with all his property that he 
will  so contribute, and  he loses  his right  to his 
property  if  he does  not contribute.  The Whole 
likewise, since he voluntarily resigns all participa- 
tion  in the decision of  cases,  becomes  his judge, 
and he is in so far subject to it with all his proper- 
ty.  If there is a penal law providing for such cases, 
as is to be supposed, he may buy off  his  fault  by 
paying  a penalty, and may thus save  his property 
by losing only part of  it. 
Thus our investigation returns into itself, and the 
synthesis is closed. 
The state-compact is, therefore, a compact which 
each single citizen enters into with the actual Whole, 
which Whole results from  the agreements of  the 
single individuals with each other, and whereby he 
becomes One with this Whole in regard  to a  cer- 
tain part of his rights, receiving in return the rights 
of  sovereignty. 
The two parties of  the contract are: the indivi- 
dual and the state as a  whole.  The compact  is 
conditioned by the free, formal will of  both  parties 
to enter  into  an agreement.  The material wiil, 
about which  the parties  must agree, is, on the one 
side, fixed property ; on the other side, relinquish- 
ment of  title to all other property, and a fixed con- 
tribution  to the protective power.  Through  this 
sdmpact the citizen of  the one party receives a se- 
cured property ;  and the state of  the other party re- 
ceives both a quit-claim to all other property in the 
state, which is necessary to perfect the title of  all 
the other citizens of the state, and a fixed contribu- 
tion to the protecting power. 
This compact guarantees itself, it contains in it- 
self  the sufficient ground that it will be kept, as in- 
deed all organized  bodies  have in themselves  the 
sufficient  ground  of  their existence.  Either  this 
compact does not at all  exist for a person, or, if  it 
does, it completely binds him.  But the person who 
does not belong to this compact stands, indeed, in 
no  legal  relation  to other persons  at all,  and  is 
rightfully  excluded  from  a  reciprocity with  other 
beings of  his kind in the sensuous world. 
COROLLARIUM. 
So  far as I know, the conception of  the state as 
a whole has heretofore been established only by an 
ideal gathering together of  the individuals, and thus 
the true insight into the nature of  this relation has 
been lost.  By such a gathering together, all possi- 
ble  things may  be collected into a  whole.  The 
uniting tie is always merely our thinking, and all 
the parts remain isolated as before, the moment we 
think differently. 
A true union has not been comprehended until 
the uniting tie  has been  shown up outside of  tAe 
conception-as  we say, from the empirical standpoint 232  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  THE  SC(ENCE  OF RIGHTS.  233 
-or  until that which compels us i~z  thirzki?z,g  to make 
this union, as we say, from the transcendental stand- 
point, has been shown up.  We  have shown up this 
uniting tie of  the state as a  whole  in the concep- 
tion of  the individual who is to be protected.  That 
individual being necessarily undetermined, because 
any one of  all individuals may need the protection, 
this very  undeterminedness  unites  all  individuals 
into one. 
The most proper illustration of  this conception 
is an organized product of  nature.  Precisely as in 
it, each part can be what it is only in its connection, 
and out of  it would  not be this ; nay, out of  all or- 
ganic connection, would be absolutely nothing, since 
without the reciprocal action of organic forces, hold- 
ing each  other  reciprocally  in  equilibrium,  there 
would  be no permanent form at all, but merely an 
unthinkable eternal war between being and not be- 
ing:  so,  also,  does man  receive only in the state 
organization a determined position in the series of 
things, a point of  rest in nature ;  and each receives 
this determined position toward others and toward 
nature  only by living  in this determined organiza- 
tion.  Through the union of all organic power does 
nature constitute herself;  through  the  union  of 
the arbitrariness of  all men does mankind  consti- 
tute itself. 
It is the character of  inorganic matter, which is 
thinkable only in conjunction with and as a part of 
the organized world, that in it no part can be found, 
which has not  the ground of  its determinedness in 
itself, which is not completely explainable in itself; 
whereas, in organized products no part can be found 
which has the ground of  its determinedness in it- 
self, and which does not refer to and presuppose a 
being outside of  itself 
The same relation  exists  between  the  isolated 
man  and  the citizen.  The former acts purely to 
satisfy his wants, and none of  his wants are satis- 
fied  except through  his own  acts ; whatever  he is 
exteriorly  he is  only  through  himself  The citi- 
zen, on the contrary, has much to do and to leave 
undone, not for his own  sake, but  for the sake of 
the other ;  and, on  the  other  hand,  his  highest 
wants are satisfied not by his own acts, but by the 
acts of others.  In the organic body each part con- 
tinually  preserves the whole, and in preserving it 
preserves itself; so also is the citizen related to the 
state.  It is not necessary to have this  preserva- 
tion of the whole particularly in view; each citizen, 
in preseming hi~nself  in his  position  as part of  the 
whole, preserves the whole ; and again, the whole, 
by preserving each in his position, preserves itself, 
and returns into itself." 
* The deduction here undertaken lacks comprehensiveness itt its 
application. 
Firstly :  An organized product of nature is not a completed whole. 
Not only do its parts point to an outside end, but the whole itself 
expresses this insufficiently, chiefly through the distinction of  sex. 
A tree, as a whole, is not a complete organization.  There is only 
one whole, one true, organized product of nature ;  and that is the 
whole of  nature itself. 
Secondly:  If within  the whole of  nature we  draw a distinction 
between  organized  products  of  nature and  inorganic  matter, the 
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is only one compIete organization, embracing all nature, then every 
part of nature, as part of  that organization, must also refer  to it, 
and thus the distinction between organic and inorganic matter falls 
aiFay.  (That distinction  has indeed been swept away long ago by 
LEIBNITZ,  whose  monad-theory  is  this very statement.)  Every 
grain of  sand is as much an organized product  as the tree or the 
animal ;  and its reference to the totality of  nature is quite as clear, 
if we  get to the inside of  it.  (Each monad, says LEIBNITZ,  from 
this very character of referring to another, must  express the whole 
aniverse.) 
Thirdly : It is, therefore, possible to say both :  all parts of  mat- 
ter are organic, or all parts of  matter are inorganic.  They are or- 
ganic, if you consider that each atom must still be part of  an orga- 
nization, and as such express it ;  it is  inorganic, if you  consider 
that even the most perfect  animal does not describe a complete re- 
turn into itself, and  is no more perfect (qualitatively) a product of 
nature than a grain of  sand or a  piece of rock.  Both  statements 
are true, or neither is true ;  for both are true only in their synthe- 
sis, under thc l~ighcr  conception of the whole of nature as the com- 
plete organization. 
Fourthly:  Hence, that which was  to be illustrated by the con- 
ception of  a  product  of nature, and which  is  equally taken  from 
eapirical observation, must be modified.  The state, as an organi- 
zation, is either the totality of  mankind, or every two individuals 
may form a state.  There is no ground why a state should be lim- 
ited by another number than the totality oirational beings on earth, 
just as we found no ground why the conception of  organized pro- 
ducts of nature should be limited by only quantitative lines.  I have 
already shown that FICHTE  never  touches  this difficulty.  But  it 
follows  from his speculative  ascertainments  clearly enough.  If 
every fraction of individuals can form a state organization, then the 
smallness of  the fraction can not be determined, and it is purely a 
matter of  chance how states will shape themselves.  Every two in- 
dividuals have the right to form  a  different state.  I have shown 
why no limited  number of individuals  has this right, namely, be- 
eause they are not perfectly secure until they have agreed with all 
members of the human race.  The only legitimate form of  govern- 
ment is, therefore, one which embraces, or proposes ultimately to 
CONCERNING  THE  STATE  CONSTITUTION. 
embrace, all mankind ;  and a true state organization must embrace 
all members of  the human race.  Only then is it a Whole, a TO- 
 TRANSLATOR. THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF A  GOVERNMENT. 
THROUGH  the  state  organization  the  common 
will  has manifested  itself, and become the law of 
all.  But it has not yet been established  actually, 
nor has the power to protect all the individuals of 
the state been, as yet, conferred upon it.  The  com- 
mon  will  is realized  in the  state organization  as 
mere will ;  but not as power to maintain itself, not 
as a gover?zmeizt. 
This is our present problem. 
The individuals of  the commonwealth, as physi- 
cal persons in the sensuous world, necessarily are 
themselves  possessed  of  power.  Until some one 
transgresses the law, his will  must be assumed  to 
be in harmony with  the common will, and hence 
his  power  is  part  of  the common  power.  Thus 
each one, even if  he has  the desire to transgress 
the law, must always  fear the power  of  all others, 
and all others must constantly fear his power ;  sim- 
ply because neither party can have a ltnowledge of 
the other's  intentions.  In short, the power of  all 
keeps the power of each single individual in check ; 
and the most complete equilibrium of rights is thus 
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But as soon  as the law  has been  transgressed, 
the matter changes.  The transgressor is now ex- 
cluded from the law, and his power from its power. 
His will is no longer in harmony with the common 
will, but is a private will. 
So also is the offended party excluded from the 
execution of the common will ;  for the very fact that 
he is the offended  party makes his will j  that the 
transgressor shall be  punished,  a  private will and 
not  the common  will.  His private will, we  have 
shown, is kept in check only by the power of  the 
common will.  If this  power  were  intrusted  into 
his  hands  for  the purpose  of  executing what is 
clearly  his private  will,  his private will would  no 
longer  be kept in  check by the common  power. 
Hence, only a  thirdparty can  be judge,  of  which 
third party it is to be assumed  that the whole dis- 
pute  concerns him only in so far  as the common 
security is endangered thereby, since he can have 
no private advantage in deciding in favor of  this or 
the other party ; and of which party it is, therefore, 
to be assumed that his will is the common will, ut- 
terly uninfluenced by his private will. 
Nevertheless,  the possibility  remains  that  the 
third party, from some unexplainable preference in 
favor of  one of  the parties, or because he may be 
interested after all, or because he is liable to error, 
will pronounce an unjust decision and combine with 
the offender  to carry it 3ut.  Both  parties would 
thus be united in favor of  injustice, and the supreme 
power would no longer be on the side of  the law. 
How is such a combination  in favor of  injustice 
to be made impossible ? 
The will of  the common end or the rule of  the 
law is, as we have shown, conditioned by the will of 
the private end of each ; his desire of  public secur- 
ity is conditioned by his desire of  his own security. 
Hence, it would be necessary to effect a contrivance 
which would  make it impossible for individuals to 
combine  together  against  the security of  others 
without infallibly losing their own security. 
It  is certainly true, that if  such a combination has 
once been formed in a state, it thereby becomes pos- 
sible a second and a third time, and hence that each 
member of  the first  combination  must apprehend 
that the rule of  his own conduct will at some future 
time be turned against him.  But still it is possible 
that each  one will  think, It won't  hit  me ; I shall 
be smart enough to be always on the winning side. 
The possibility of  such a thought must be utter- 
ly taken away.  Each one must become convinced 
that the subjection and unlawful  treatment of  om 
member of  the state will infallibly result in his own 
subjection and unlawful treatment. 
Such a conviction can be produced only by a law. 
The unjust  violence  against  an  individual  must, 
therefore, become legalized by its having occurred 
in one case.  Because something has been allowed 
to occur  once,  each  citizen  must  thereafter  have 
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previously-used formula : Each deed must necessa- 
rily become law ; if  it does, then every law is sure 
to become a deed.  (This proposition  is, indeed, a 
matter of  course ;  for  the law is the same for  all 
men, and hence what the law allows to one it must 
allow to all.) 
But  this  proposition  can  not be realized;  for 
through it right and  justice  are annulled  for  all 
time.  The Conception of  Rights can not involve 
such a self-contradiction ;  hence, it can only signify 
that no single case of  a violation of  law must ever 
be allowed to occur, since its occurrence would an- 
nul law for all time to come.  How this is to be ac- 
tualized will appear directly, when we shall examine 
more closely the established conception of  a power 
of  the law. 
We have said that the protective power must be 
one, the self-preservation whereof  is conditioned by 
its continuous effectiveness, which  will,  therefore, 
be annihilated for ever if  it remains inactive in one 
single case ; the ,aerteraZ existence of  which, indeed, 
depends upon  its ~nanifsti~zg  itsey i7z every single 
case; and since this order of  things is not sure to 
be established  of  itself,  it must  be  provided  for 
through a fundamental law of  the constitution. 
It is established when the following provision  is 
made :  That a law shall have no validity for future 
cases until all previous cases have been decided ac- 
cording to it.  In other words, no one must be al- 
lowed the benefits of a law until all previous persons 
who have claims under the same law have had their 
claims settled ;  and no one must be punished under 
a certain law until all previous violations of this law 
have been discovered and punished.  And since all 
laws are really only One Law, the provision  must 
be :  that the one general law can not be applied in 
any particular case until  all  previous  cases  have 
been decided according to it.  A law, which in this 
manner prescribes a law to itself,  such an in itself 
returning law, is called a Co~zstitlltiorzal  Law, or the 
Constitzition. 
If this order of  things is made secure by a power 
of  compulsion, then the security of  all and the un- 
interrupted  rule  of  law  seems firmly established. 
But how is it to be thus secured ? 
If, as is always presupposed here, the whole com- 
monwealth  holds  the power  of  compulsion  in its 
hands, what other power is there to force the com- 
monwealth to see that the required order of  things 
is always upheld?  Or, supposing that all members 
of  the state should for a while observe their funda- 
mental compact and the required constitution, but 
should in a  certain case be unwilling or unable to 
redress at the moment the grievances of some party 
or another.  In that case, the operations of the law 
would come to a stand-still, and the disorders arising 
therefrom would soon be so great as to compel the 
people to violate their constitutional provision  and 
-leaving  old offenses unpunished-to  try and stop 
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For such a stand-still of  the law would be the pun- 
ishment of  their laziness, negligence, or partiality ; 
and why should the people inflict upon  themselves 
a violence of  this kind ? 
In other  words, the people would  be their  own 
judge of  the administration of  the law.  Now,  so 
long as insecurity had not become general, the peo- 
ple would probably allow many violations of the law 
to pass unpunished.  Suddenly, when matters would 
grow intolerable, the people, in order to remedy past 
neglect, would  pounce with  unjust and passionate 
severity upon  the criminals, whom  previous laxity 
had rendered bolder, and who  had  been led to ex- 
pect  the same laxity in their own cases, but whose 
misfortune  had brought them into the clutches of 
the law at the very epoch of the awaking of the peo- 
ple.  This state of  things would continue until ter- 
ror had become general.  Then the fury of the peo- 
ple would die out, the people and the administration 
of  the law would fall asleep again, and the old state 
of  things would return. 
Such a form of government, the democratic* form 
of government, in the real signification of the word, 
is the unsafest which is possible, since each citizen 
has constantly to fear not only the attacks of other 
citizens, but also the blind rage of a maddened mob, 
which will  carry out  injustice under the name of 
law. 
* Democracy, as it was understood in Greece, namely, the direct 
rule of  the people without a ~ov~~~~~~~.-TRANSLATOL 
Our problem, therefore, has not been solved ;  and 
the condition  of  men  is  as unsafe  as ever.  The 
true ground of  this unsafety is, that the people can 
not be at the same time both judge and aparty in 
the administration of  the law. 
This discovers to us the solution of our problem. 
In the administration of  the law, judge  and party 
must be divided, and the people  of  the common- 
wealth can not be both together. 
The people can  not  be  a  party in  this matter. 
For the people  must remain  the  supreme power, 
and hence no judge,  if  the  people  were  a  party, 
could carry out his  sentence against them, unless 
they should voluntarily submit, which  is not to be 
supposed ; for  if  they did, they would respect  the 
law  above  every thing, and  no  law-dispute  could 
possibly arise. 
In short, there  must  be  a  law,*  according  to 
which it can  be decided whether the power of  the 
state has been properly applied or not ;  and in this 
law-dispute the same person can not be both judge 
and a party to the case.  Now, as the people must 
be one or the other in the law-dispute, and as they 
can not beparty, from the reason stated above, the 
people can not  retain the supreme power in their 
own hands. 
It is, above all, important to be convinced of  the 
* There must be,  besides  the power of government, which  en- 
forces the laws, another power, which makes it impossible  for the 
power of  government to violate  the laws.  This other  power  is, 
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strictness of  this  argument, since it furnishes the 
a priori  deduction, which,  to my knowledge,  has 
never before been  given, of  the absolute necessity 
of  R~presnztatiorz  in  a  comn~onwealth.  It shows 
that a representative government is not only useful 
and wise, but is absolutely required by the Concep- 
tion of Rights, and that a Democracy, in the above- 
mentioned  sense of  the word, is not only an impo- 
litic, but  an absolutely  unlawful  form  of  govern- 
ment.  Perhaps the statement, that the people can 
not be both judge and party to a case at the same 
time, will meet less objection than the other state- 
ment, that a check upon  the administration of  the 
supreme power is absolutely necessary.  Neverthe- 
less, it is the certain  result of  all we have said  be- 
fore.  Each  member  of  the  state must  be  con- 
vinced of the impossibility that  his rights will ever 
be violated.  But this impossibility does not exist 
so long as the administrators of the supreme power 
are not held accountable. 
The people of  a commonwealth must, therefore, 
relinquish the administration of the supreme power 
to one or more persons, who remain responsible for 
the proper  application of  that power.  A form of 
government which does not provide for this respon- 
sibility of  the administration is a despotis~rz. 
Hence, it is a fundamental law of every rational 
and legal  form  of  government, that  the executive 
power, which  embraces the executive  and judicial, 
should be separated  from the power zvhich co~ztrols 
and Jecks the ndmi~zzistratiorz  of that exec%tive  arzd 
judicial power. 
I shall call the latter power the Ep/lo?zte.  It  must 
remain with the entire people, whilst the executive 
power must not remain with the entire people.  A 
form of  government,  therefore,  must  be  neither 
despotic nor democratic. 
Much  has  been said  concerning the division of 
powers, that is, of  dividing the one common power 
of  government  into many.  It has been said  that 
the legislative  power  must be separated  from the 
executive ;  but this proposition  seems to be some- 
what indefinite. 
For, after  the people of  a  commonwealth  have 
once agreed upon living together in a legal relation, 
all  specific  laws  are only applications  of  the one 
filndamental  law,  to  which  they  have  subjected 
themselves.  It is, therefore, all the same if the men 
who  are intrusted with  the executive  power,  also 
frame new specific laws ;  for in doing so they only 
execute the one fundamental law, which they were 
elected  to carry out.  If their  specific  provisions 
are unjust,  or unlawful,  the Ep/lorak  holds  them 
responsible." 
Utterly useless  and  only seemingly  possible  is 
the separation of  the  judicial  from  the executive 
* Here FICIITE  does not  perceive that such a separation is one 
of  the very best means of  checking the abuses on the part of  the 
supreme power.  The conception of  an Ephorate is precisely real- 
ized  by  this separation of  the  form of  government  into  several 
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power,  using  the latter word  in  its more limited 
sense.  For if  the executive  power  has no  veto 
upon  the judicial  power,  then  it is the unlimited 
power  of  the  judiciary  itself,  separated  into two 
persons ;" but of  which two  persons  only one has 
a  will,  the other  being  merely  a  physical  power 
directed  by  another  will.  13ut  if  the  executive 
power has a veto, then it is itself the highest judi- 
cial power, and both  powers are again one and the 
same.  According to our doctrine, only the execu- 
tive power  and the Ephorate, or checking power, 
are to be separated. 
The executive power of a commonwealth may be 
intrusted  either  to  one person-as  is  done in  a 
Monarchy-or  to an organized  body established in 
the constitution, as is done in a Republic.  But since 
even in a monarchy one person does not really ex- 
ecute all the power, intrusting it rather  to subor- 
dinates,  the real  distinction between  a  monarchy 
and a republic is this, that in a monarchy the final 
decision of  all questions rests with one permanent 
* It  is very true that all separation of  power is only a separation 
of one power amongst different persons, but this separation amongst 
different  persons is one of  the  best safeguards  against  abuses of 
power.  There is  really but  one  executive  power-and  only the 
checking power is opposed to it ;  and this one power is divided out 
amongst a number of  persons, some  of  whom  exercise the legisla- 
tive,  others the  judicial,  others  the  strictly executive  functions. 
The whole machinery of government is established merely to carry 
out, to execute, the fundamental  law;  and none of  the wheels  of 
this  machinery  are  independent  of  each other ;  yet  is  each of 
the wheels also independent enough  to check the other.-TRANS- 
LATOR'S  RE~~ARIL 
president, (the monarch ;)  whereas in a republic  it 
rests  with  the majority  of  votes-the  ballot-box. 
Hence, in a republic, the permanent  monarch is a 
mythical and often  changeable person, since  it is 
composed  of  all  those  who  decide  by their votes 
the question at issue. 
Again : The  administrators  of  the  executive 
power  may be  either elective  or not; and in the 
former case all or  only some of  them may be elec- 
tive.  They are elective in a proper democracy, that 
is to say, in a  democracy which  recognizes  repre- 
sentation.  If  all the public  officials are directly 
elected  by  the whole  people,  the democracy is a 
pure democracy ;  if only some, it is a mixed demo- 
cracy.  The public officials may also fill vacancies 
themselves ; this  is the case in a pure aristocracy. 
But if  only  some of  the magistrates  are thus re- 
placed  by the public officers, and if  the others are 
again directly elected by the people, then the form 
of  government is that of  a democratic aristocracy. 
A  permanent  president  (monarchj  may  also  be 
elected to exercise the executive power during his 
lifetime. 
In all these cases, either all citizens of  the com- 
monwealth,  or only  some of  them, are eligible to 
office.  Eligibility may,  therefore,  be  limited  or 
unlimited.  It  can be effectivelylimited only through 
birth ;  for  if  every citizen is eligible to any office 
in  the state, and the limitation  is merely that he 
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he has filled lower ones, then his eligibility is not 
absolutely but only relatively limited.  If  eligibility 
is  absolutely  limited,  and  hence  grounded upon 
birth, the form of  government is that of  an Acrcdi- 
taty aristocracy;  and this  leads us  to the second 
supposition, that the administrators of  the execu- 
tive powers are not elective. 
They are not  elective  in  a form of  government 
which recognizes born representatives, persons who 
are representatives either immediately through their 
birth, as hereditary princes in every hereditary mon- 
archy, or who, at least, are, through their birth, the 
only eligible  representatives, as the nobility in all 
monarchies, and the patricians in hereditary-aristo- 
cratic republics. 
All  these  forms  of  government  become  legal 
through the law ; that is, through the original will 
of  the  people,  expressed in the adoption of  their 
constitution.  They are all lawful, provided  that a 
checking  power is  established effective  enough to 
prevent any abuse of  power.* 
+ This  provided annuls all the foregoing, which, indeed, as based 
upon facts taken from experience, is a purely subjective judgment.  It 
is. for instance, apriori clear that no checking power can be eacient 
if  a monarch remains thepemrarzetzi executive ;  or if there is not a 
power to punish his unlawful actions, by depriving him of  his exe- 
cutive office.  It  is equally clear that an hereditary aristocracy does 
not  permit of  an efficient checking system, and that hence it is an 
unlawful  form of  government ;  for there is no power  sufficient to 
prevent their abuse of  power ;  or, if there is, then the aristocracy 
is not hereditary and exclusive possessor of  certain rights. 
It is certainly not the province of the Science of  Rights to deter- 
mine which is the better form of government, but it is equally truly 
its province to determine the conditions of a lawful  government. 
The  question, Which is the better form of govern- 
ment for any particular state  ?  is not a question for 
We  have already shown that one of these conditions is universal 
applicability  to the whole  human  race,  and hence  the form  of a 
Confederate Republic.  Another condition is, as FICHTE  has clear- 
ly shown, an effective checking power.  How this  is to be estab- 
lished is certainly a problem for the art of  politics;  and it is also 
clear  that this art can constantly be improved upon.  No one will 
deny that, however  excellent, our system of  checks and balances, 
both in our general form of governments and in our state govern- 
ments, can be vastly improved.  Our state governments particularly 
seem much in need of  such improvements. 
All we desire to assert in this note is, that the conditions of  the 
effectiveness of  such a system of  checks can be much closer  deter- 
mined than FICHTE  has done here.  The reason why he found this 
subject so difficult to manage was probably because  he could not 
see that the Ephorate, of the necessity of  which institution he was 
absolutely convinced, would be realized in those very separations of 
powers and systems of checks which he attacked ;  and this he could 
not see because he did not see this, their true character.  A priori 
he was  convinced that a checking power must be established ;  but 
how to establish it was a question to which history alone could sug- 
gest  answers, ancl neither  the history of  the ancient  republ~cs  nor 
the recent  experiments  of  France furnished  the  proper  answer. 
American history was little known at FICIITE'S  time.  Thus it puz- 
zled  him  continually;  and hence, also, no chapter  of  his  Science 
of  Rights was  looked upon with more wonder  by the publ~c  than 
this one upon the Ephorate.  Unable to suggest a solution, FICHTE, 
some ten years later, withdrew his proposed establishment of  such 
an Ephorate, but took, at the same time, occasion  to reassert  his 
firm conviction in the correctness of the idcn.  He  added that, after 
all, such an Ephorate did already exist in every civilized common- 
wealth, ifz the jorre ofpublic opinion, which kept a  continual check 
upon the executive power.  We append that retraction at the end 
of this  book, so that the reader  may fully see how a philosopher 
may be absolutely certain of  the correctness of a principle, and yet 
find it impossible to give it reality in  the world as it is.-TRANS- 
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the Science of  Rights to solve, but for the art of 
politics ;  and the solution of that problem depends 
upon  the investigation, under  which  form of  gov- 
ernment the checking  power can be made to work 
in the most effective manner. 
The persons  who  have  been  intrusted  by  the 
people  with  the administration  of  the  executive 
power, must have accepted it, and made themselves 
responsible for its administration. 
Of course, this acceptance can  only be volunta- 
rily ;  and both parties must come to an understand- 
ing  about  it.  For although  the  Conception  of 
Rights requires that a public power, and expressly 
appointed  administrators  thereof,  shall  be  estab- 
lished, it does not say to what  particular  persons 
that power is to be intrusted. 
It is clear enough that, since the Conception of 
Rights requires such an establishment of a govern- 
ment, each  person can be compelled to vote for or 
against the establishment of  it ; and likewise, that, 
if  he happen to be elected as one of  that govern- 
ment, he must declare whether he will  accept  the 
office or not. 
It is also clear that the vote  on the constitution, 
as the instrument which  establishes the form  of 
government, must be a  una~zitnous  vote.  For al- 
though there exists a right of  compulsion, to com- 
pel every person to become member of  a common- 
wealth, there is no such right to compel him to be- 
come member of any particular commonwealth.  If 
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the vote is not unanimous, the majority will proba- 
bly  remain  in  the  country,  afid  constitute  them- 
selves  a  commonwealth under  that constitution ; 
whilst  those in the  minority, as  they can  not  be 
tolerated in the commonwealth unless they become 
members of  it, have  no other choice than either to 
make the vote  unanimous by accepting the consti- 
tution, or to make  the vote  unanimous  by leaving 
the commonwealth. 
Those who  have  once accepted an office under 
the constitution, can not again resign it without the 
consent of the people, since such resignation would 
perhaps  interrupt the rule of  the law, or make  it 
impossible  for a while, if  no one could be found to 
take their place.  On the other hand, the people can 
not take the office away from them; for their office 
is now their vocation, their possession in the state, 
and they have no other property.  The other citi- 
zens received  their  property, and  these  got their 
offices as their property ;  hence their legal relation 
with  the other  citizens  would  be  annulled, if  the 
offices were taken away from them one-sidedly.  Of 
course, if  both  parties agree, no objection can  be 
raised. 
Again : Since those  who  are to  administer the 
public  power  made themselves  responsible for the 
maintenance  of  justice  and  security,  they  must 
necessarily insist on being provided with the means, 
and the free use of them, requisite for that purpose. 
They must have the privilege of  determining what 
each  citizen  shall furnish  as  his  share of  those 
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means, and of  using them according to their  best 
knowledge and conviction.  (How far this power 
is, nevertheless, to be limited, we  shall  soon  see.) 
They must, therefore, be intrusted  with  unlimited 
control of the public power. 
This public  government  must, in  each  specific 
case, protect the rights of citizens and punish vio- 
lations of these rights.  It is held responsible  for 
this, and hence must have the power  and the right 
to watch the conduct of the citizens ;  in other words 
it must  have a police  pozwer"  and a police  legisla- 
tion. 
It needs  scarcely  be  added,  that  this  public 
administration  is  also  a  judge from  whom  there 
is no appeal, since all citizens have agreed in  their 
original  compact  to submit their  law disputes  to 
the  common  power, which  has  now, through the 
constitution, been  established  as an administrative 
power. 
* Our  Grand  Juries  are  such  an  institution.-T~~h-s~~~o~'S 
REMARK. 
THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF A  CHECK  UPON THE  GOV- 
ERNMENT. 
WE now proceed  to the second problem  in the 
establishment of  a constitution : How can this su- 
preme power of  the commonwealth, which has been 
constituted its government, be prevented from ever 
executing what  is not lawful ; and likewise from 
ever neglecting to execute what the law requires ? 
We  have already suggested in general how this is 
to be accom~lished. Their private end, the end of 
their own  security and welfare, must  be  the same 
as the common  end, and must be attainable only 
through  the common  end.  It must be made im- 
possible  that they should  have  any other object 
than to promote the general object. 
The  law is merely formal;  hence there must be 
no  matevial interests  possible  for  their law  deci- 
sions.  The only interest possible  for  them  must 
be to watch, that their decisions are conformable to 
the law. 
They must, first of  all, be placed in a position of 
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far as their private needs are concerned.  They must 
have a sure and sufficient income, so that no private 
person can offer them any benefits, and that all in- 
ducements which may possibly be offered to them 
can have no value in their eyes. 
They must also have as few friendships, personal 
connections, attachments, etc., as possible, in order 
to be indisposed to show partiality. 
It was stated before as a principle, necessary to 
~bompel  equal legislation  for  each person, that the 
law must judge  cases in time-succession,  and that 
no future case must be decided until all past cases 
have  been  decided.  This principle  falls  away  as 
soon as a  regular judicial  power  has been  estab- 
lished  through the constitution, which  is held  re- 
sponsible  for  the pure  administration of  the law ; 
for it may be more expedient to first decide cases 
which require little time ; and the great object is, 
after all, to lose as little time as possible ; but nev- 
ertheless, it is absolutely necessary that the judicial 
power  should  always  be able to show that it has 
taken cognizance of  all cases brought before it, and 
likewise that a certain time should be fixed within 
which  cases-according  to their nature-must  be 
finally decided upon.  If such a time is not fixed, 
it is impossible to ascertain whether each  citizen 
has obtained his rights, and impossible to prove a 
neglect  on the part of  the judicial  power, since it 
can always refer the complainants to the future. 
But the following is a sure criterion whether the 
law  is administered  as it should  be: The admin- 
istration  of  the law  must  never  contradict itself 
Each public act of  the public government must be- 
come established rule for all the future.  This will 
bind government to the law.  The government offi- 
cials now can not proceed unjustly, since that would 
involve continued injustice for all the future, which 
again would lead to their own unsafety.  Or  if they 
should  ignore again  the unjust  rule once adopted. 
they would thereby confess their unjust  procedure 
in the previous case. 
To make such a criterion possible, all acts of the 
administration, with their connected circumstances 
and grounds of  decision, must receive  the greatest 
publicity,  at least  after their final  settlement.  It 
might often  be necessary,  for  the sake of  public 
security,  to keep  these  proceedings  secret whilst 
still pending ;  but after the final decision, secrecy 
is no longer necessary. 
If the state officials administer their power in ac- 
cordance with  these principles, right, justice,  and 
security are fully guaranteed to each citizen of  the 
con~monwealth.  But how-since  confidence  and 
fidelity  are qualities never  to  be  presupposed  in 
legal  relations-can  the officials  be  compelled  to 
proceed according to these principles ?  This is the 
final problem for a rational state constitution. 
The executive power  has final jurisdiction in all 
cases ; there is no  appeal  from  it.  Such appeal 
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legal status that no appeal shall be made from the 
executive power-nor  is it possible, since the exe- 
cutive power wields supreme power.  The  presump- 
tive law, which  has been  constituted the infallible 
law of  the commonwealth, speaks through the per- 
son of  the judges,  elected as infallible, from whom 
there is no appeal.  The decisions of  that power 
must, therefore,  be carried  out  in  the  sensuous 
world. 
A clear proof that the constitutional law has been 
violated by the executive power, can be furnished 
only when it is shown, either that the law has not 
been executed within the time fixed  in the consti- 
tution, or when it is shown that the state officials 
contradict themselves, or commit evident injustice 
in order to avoid the appearance of  self-contradic- 
tion. 
It has further been shown, that only the people 
can judge  the administrators of  the public power. 
But the difficulty  is this :  where and what is  the 
people?  Is it any thing more  than a  mere  con- 
ception, and if  any thing more, how is it to be re- 
alized ? 
Before the tribunal of  the public power  or state 
government, all the members of  the state are only 
private persons and not a people ;  each person is al- 
ways subject to the government.  Each will is con- 
sidered by the government as only a private will, 
and the government considers  itself  the sole ex- 
pression  of  the  common  will.  The people,  as a 
community,  have  no separate will;  and  hence a 
people as a body to sit in judgment upon  the gov- 
ernment, can not at all be realized until the people 
have withdrawn their declaration that the will of the 
government is their own will. 
But how can this be done?  No private person 
has the right to get up and say : "  Let the people 
of  our state come together in a convention to sit in 
judgment upon the government !"  For if  the will 
of  such a person does no:  agree with the will of the 
government which continues to represent the com- 
mon will, then the will of  that person is a private will 
rising in opposition  to the government, and hence 
a rebellious will, punishable  as such ;  and  his will 
certainly will never agree with that of  the govern- 
ment.  For either that government is conscious of 
its just administration, and in that case such a pro- 
position for a convention would  be utterly opposed 
to the common desire that no unnecessary disturb- 
ance of  private business and of  the administration 
of  the law shall  be tolerated,  or it is  conscious 
of  its injustice ; in which case it is not to be pre- 
sumed  that  it  will  give  up  the power  which  it 
still  holds  in  its  hands,  and  will  itself  call  to- 
gether  its  judge.  Hence,  the  government offi- 
cials always remain their own judges, because  the 
realizing of a judicial  power to judge them depends 
upon themselves ;  and thus the form of government 
remains, after all, a despotism. 
In short, since the people, as one body, can call it- 
self  together in convention only through itself, and 
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been thus called together, its calling together is im- 
possible.* 
How can  this  contradiction be  solved ?  It is 
solved ; When the co7zstitution is made to provide  in 
nabance  that  the peopb  shall, in n  certain case, be 
called together in convention. 
Such a constitutional law might provide, for in- 
stance, that the people should assemble together in 
convention at  certain times, in order to consider the 
administration of  the government officials.  This 
arrangement is possible in small states, where the 
people do not live far apart, and can be called to- 
gether without much loss of  time, and  where  the 
administration of a government, moreover, can be 
easily  surveyed.  Yet  even  in  such  states this 
great law-ceremony would  lose  its dignity by  too 
frequent  a  recurrence ; and what  is worse, a  fore- 
knowledge of  its occurrence would  enable parties, 
to a great extent, to control such conventions, and 
thus make them rather the representatives of  their 
own  than  of  the common  will.  In larger  states, 
however, such an arrangement would be altogether 
impossible.  It may, therefore, be stated as a prin- 
ciple of  such a provision : That the peopleshall fzever 
be called together without absolzrte ~recessity  ;  but as 
soon as it is necessary, they shall be called together at 
once, and shall have the power to judge. 
*As would be the case in a state under a constitution  providing 
no mode for calling together a constitutional convention, and aswas 
the case in the State of  Missouri in 1861.-TRANSLATOR 
There is no necessity for such an assembly, nor 
will the people desire it, unless law and justice have 
utterlyceased to be effective ;  but when this neces- 
sity arises, the convention must be called. 
In a properly organized state, law and justice in 
general are dependent  upon  the  maintenance  of 
the  rights of  each single  individual ; and  hence 
the whole law  is  overthrown  if  a  single  case  of 
injustice occurs. 
But who shall ascertain whether this case has oc- 
curred ?  Tbe  people can not, for they are not as- 
sembled ;  nor can the government, for that would 
be making it judge its own case.  Nor can the par- 
ty  which complains of injustice, for it also is inter- 
ested  in the case.  Hence, there 11zust be  a @eciaZ 
pozuer  established by  the co~zstitution  to take cogniz- 
ance of such cases. 
This power must be intrusted with continual su- 
pervision over the conduct of  the government, and 
hence we may call it the Epkorate. 
The executive power is responsible only to the 
people assembled in convention ;  hence tlic Epho- 
rate can not sit in judgment upon the government ; 
it must, however, be intrusted  with  the  power  to 
constantly watch  the conduct of  the government, 
and hence, also, to obtain information concerning it. 
The  Ephorate must not have the power to stop the 
decisions of the executive officials, since from them 
there is no appeal ; nor must it have the right  to 
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only magistrate  in  the state.  The Ephorate has, 
therefore, no executive power at all." 
But the Ephorate has an a6soZz~teprolZibitory  pow- 
er-pourer  to prohibit, not the execution of  this or 
that particular decision of  the government, for then 
it would be a judge, and the executive power would 
not be supreme, but to utterly suspend the admin- 
istration of  the law and  the government in all its 
branches.  I  will  call  this  suspension  of  all  law 
power  the  state  interdict,  (in  analogy with  the 
church interdict.  The church  has  long since in- 
vented this infallible means to enforce the obedience 
of  those who need her.) 
It  is, therefore, fundamental principle of a ration- 
al and proper government, that the absolzdte positive 
power should be complemented by an absolute tzega- 
tive power. 
But since the Ephorate is to have no power at all 
in its hands, and since the executive government is 
the  supreme power,  it might  be asked  how  the 
Ephorate  can  enforce  its declared suspension of 
the government.  But this enforcement will  come 
of  itself.  For by the publicly announced  suspen- 
sion of  all law, all the subsequent  acts of  govern- 
ment become  illegal  and  null  and void.  Every 
body will,  therefore,  refuse  to submit to the deci- 
sions of  government if  the decision is against him ; 
*In this the power of the Ephorate, deduced from pure reason, is 
utterly distinct from the Ejhoresof the Spartans, from the state in. 
quisit~on  of Venice, etc.  The tribunes of  the people in the Roman 
republic had somewhat of  the character required here. 
and no one can rely on its decision if it is in his 
favor. 
By the announced suspension of  the government, 
the state officials are declared to be mere private 
persons, and all their orders to use executive pow- 
er are declared  null and void.  From the moment 
of  this announced suspension, every act of  the gov- 
ernment, whereby it exercises  executive power,  is 
resistance to the common will of the people, as ex- 
pressed  through the Ephorate, and hence is a re- 
bellion, and is to be punished as such.  But since 
by such a resistance a government would in advance 
subject itself to the highest  punishment, whereas 
by quietly awaiting  a  trial  before  the people,  it 
might, perhaps, successfully refute  the charges of 
the Ephorate, a resistance of  this kind is scarcely 
to be apprehended. 
The  announcement of  the suspension of  the gov- 
ernment is at the same time a call for a convention 
of  the  people.  The greatest  misfortune  which 
could possibly happen to them, has forced the peo- 
ple to come together in convention.  The Ephorate 
is, of  course, the sccusing party, and has to prefer 
its charges. 
It  is, of  course,  not  necessary, and would  be in 
most cases impossible, to call all the people togeth- 
er; it is  sufficient if  all of  them  take part in the 
convention.  How this is to be accomplished, or 
how  the result of  the will  of  the people is to be 
clearly ascertained, is a question for  the art of po- 
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reason we shall shortly develop, that at  various places 
large gatherings of  the people come together. 
The  resolves of  this convention of  the people be- 
come constitutional law." 
It will  be,  therefore,  necessary, first of  all,  that 
the convention  declare the suspension of  the gov- 
ernment, and hence its own existence, to be in ac- 
cordance with  the constitution, and that the deci- 
sion  of  the  convention,  no  matter  which  way  it 
may turn,  be  declared  to  be  supreme  law of  the 
land. 
Again :  So  far as the decision itself  is concerned, 
it will necessarily be just, that is, in accordance with 
the original common will of  the people.  For if the 
convention should absolve the government from the 
charge preferred by the Ephorate, that the govern- 
ment has  allowed  a  crime to remain  unpunished, 
(the  fact,  as such, must not admit of  a doubt;  this 
the Ephorate will  have to take care of;) then the 
convention would thereby resolve  that the unpun- 
ished  crime  should  be  considered  a  lawful  act, 
which every citizen of  the state might commit.  Or 
if  the government is charged with contradicting it- 
self, or with an evident injustice, and the conven- 
tion should absolve the government, then the con- 
vention would  thereby make that contradictory or 
unjust principle a fundamental law of  the state, ap- 
*The state of things  in Missouri, from 1861  to 1864, affords an 
exact analogy to the condition of  things here described; and our 
practical American solution of  the dificulty was precisely in accord- 
ance with the principles here established.-T~~~s~~~o~'s  REMARK. 
plicable to each citizen.  The convention will cer- 
tainly be very careful to avoid a wrong decision. 
The  losing party, whether it be the government 
or the Ephorate, must  be declared guilty of  high 
treason.  The Ephorate, because it has suspended 
the administration of  the law without just  cause ; 
the government, because it has abused  the power 
intrusted to it to suppress the law. 
Few persons will hold it too hard that the govern- 
ment,if declared guilty, should be pronounced guilty 
of  high  treason ; but some may consider this too 
severe a punishment for the Ephorate.  It may be 
said that its members were  positively  convinced 
that the commonwealth was  in  danger, that  they 
have acted  conscientiously  and  have  only  erred. 
But the same may be said of the government, and 
the only answer to this is : Error in such  matters 
is quite as dangerous as a bad intention ;  and the 
law should be quite as careful to prevent the former 
as to suppress the latter.  The wisest of the people 
should be elected to the offices of the government, 
and none but old and experienced men should be 
elected as Ephores. 
Moreover, it is quite probable that, previous  to 
suspending the government, the Ephorate will con- 
sult with the government officials and induce them, 
if  possible,  voluntarily to remedy its fault or neg- 
lect.  By doing this the Ephorate will, at  the same 
time, obtain a thorough knowledge of  the merits of 
the case. 
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power.  The  judgment pronounced under the rules, 
which the convention has disapproved, are annulled, 
and the parties who have suffered under these judg- 
ments are reinstated in their previous position with- 
out detriment, however, to their  opponents, since 
these have acted only in accordance with the law, 
althougli the law has now shown itself to be an in- 
valid law.  The  damages devolve upon the judges 
who have pronounced  the unjust judgments. 
The ground of this retroactive force is this :  the 
party who lost under the unjust judgment was pro- 
hibitedfrom appealing from it,since thepresumption 
was, that the will of  the judge who pronounced  it 
was  in  accordance  with  the common will  of  the 
people.  At  present  the  contrary  appears,  and 
when  the  ground  falls  away,  so  also  does  the 
grounded.  That judgment, therefore, is annulled. 
The positive and negative powers-the  govern- 
ment and the ephorate-must  be heard before the 
convention of the people.  They  can not be parties 
in their own cause, and hence do not belong to the 
people.  The truth  is,  all  government  officials. 
though  before  their  election  they belong  to the 
people, cease to belong to it the moment they be- 
come officials.  If  they are born such officials, as 
is  the  case  with  hereditary  princes,  they  have 
never  belonged  to the  people.  Born  aristocrats 
and noblemen belong to the people, but  not after 
they are elected into the government.  Before elec- 
tion, they are not government officials,although they 
are exclusively  eligible.  The  constitution  must 
make provision  that  their votes,  in view of  their 
pbable  partiality for the executive power, shall not 
have an injurious influence upon the actions of the 
common will.  HOW  to make  such provisioll  is a 
problem for the art of  politics. 
As soon as the candidates for offices are elected, 
they cease to belong  to  the people,  even  though 
they have  not yet accepted the election.  Making 
themselves, as they do,  responsible  for  the public 
safety and the administration of  justice with their 
own  person and freedom, it is necessary that they 
should have a veto in the legislation ; that is to say, 
they must  have the privilege  of  stating: We will 
not govern under such laws.  But the people then 
must  also  have  the privilege  of  replying: If you 
will  not govern under laws which  appear god  to 
us, we will elect others. 
As soon as the government has been established, 
the people, as a unity, cease to exist ;  the people are 
no  longer a  people, a Whole, but an aggregate of 
individuals subject to the government, which is now 
not a part of  the people. 
It appears, that the safety of  the whole common- 
wealth depends upon the absolute freedom and per- 
sonal security of  the Ephores.  It is they who are 
to keep the supreme power of  the government  in 
proper  check.  It must  be impossible,  therefore, 
that they  can  ever  become  dependent  upon  the 
government so far as their personal welfare is con- 
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paid.  Moreover, they are exposed to the persecu- 
tions and threats of  the government, and have nu 
other defense than the people. 
Their persons, must, therefore, be made secure by 
the law ; that is, they must be declared inviolable, 
The least  violence  or  threat of  violence  against 
them  is  hzgh  treason, that i9,  is an immediate at- 
tack upon the commonwealth.  The mere  threat 
of  violence  against  them on  the part of  the gov- 
ernment  is, indeed, in itself  a declaration that  all 
law is suspended ; for by such a threat the execu- 
tive power clearly separates its will from the com- 
mon will. 
Again, the pozuer  of the peopk wurst surpass by faf 
the power  of  the gove~nment.  For if  the power of 
the government were but in any ways equal to that 
of  the people, the governrrlent might resolve to 1e- 
sist the  people, and  a  war would be  possible  be- 
tween the people and the government;  but such a 
war must be rendered impossible  by the constitu- 
tion.  If the executive power of  the government 
were  superior  to that of  the people, or  could be- 
come superior-in a war, the government might  at 
any time undertake to subjugate the people and to 
reduce them to perfect slavery. 
It is, therefore, a  condition of  the lawfulness of 
every civil government, that under no circumstan- 
ces must the power of the government be able to- 
oppose the least resistance to the power of the peo- 
ple as a whole.  Every end must  be sacrificed  to 
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this highest of all ends, which is equivalent to that 
of maintaining the rule of law itself. 
For this reason it is also one of the chief aims of 
a rational constitution to provide that when the peo- 
ple are called together in convention by the Epho- 
rate, larger masses of  people  shall  congregate  in 
different places, ready to quench  any possible re- 
sistance on the part of the government. 
The following important question might still be 
asked:  How shall the people decide?  By a major- 
ity of votes or by unanimity ? 
We have shown that, in the original compact of 
the people amongst themselves, unanimity is neces- 
sary.  Each individual must declare that he is de- 
sirous of  tritering with  all  the others into a com- 
monwealth for the maintenance of the law. 
In electing magistrates, the matter already as- 
sumes a different shape.  True, the minority is not 
compelled to submit to the majority ;  but being the 
weaker party, the minority may be  compelled  to 
leave the country within  the  limits of which  the 
majority conclude to realize their constitution.  If 
the minority does not choose to do so-as  is most 
likely-it  will  have  to  indorse  the action of  the 
majority. 
We said : being the weaker party, the minority 
may be compelled to leave.  The  reason is, evident- 
ly, because  they are  not  strong  enough to resist. 
The proof  seems  to consider,  therefore,  already, 
that  the  majority  is a  very  decided  one,  strong 
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enough to make all resistance hopeless and a war- 
always an unlawful  condition-utterly  impossible. 
Until the minority is so strong, it must simply sub- 
mit to the majority." 
In considering  the  justice  or  injustice  of  the 
charges preferred by the Ephorate against the gov- 
ernment, little or no difference of  opinion can pos- 
sibly arise.  The  facts of  the case must be appar- 
ent to all.  The only question  remains, therefore : 
is the charged  conduct of  the government just  or 
not, and shall  it be  law  for  us  in  all  future time 
or not?  Only two answers are possible.  Yes or no. 
If the citizens have but ordinary power of  judg- 
ment, the question is very easy to decide ; and, in- 
deed, it is so intimately connected with the welfare 
of  each citizen, that the answer to it must be, from 
the nature of  the case, almost unanimous, and that 
an opinion adverse to that of  the overwhelming ma- 
*  This is a very ticklish question.  It is clear, that the original 
constitution of  a state must be adopted by an absolute majority, or 
unanimity ;  and such was the case with the United States Constitu- 
tion.  That original constitution, in order to settle all disputes as 
to the kind of  majorities  needed,  before  such disputes can arise, 
must specify them ;  as our general constitution, indeed, does.  For 
all the cases provided for by the constitution, a dispute is, therefore, 
Imuful(y impossibie.  If, however,  an  unforeseen  question  should 
come up, of vast  importance for  the whole people, for which  the 
constitution  contained  no provision,  it is difficult to see how any 
other than an absolute  majority could decide it.  It  will not do to 
say that the minonity must submit.  The minority have their rights 
under the original  agreement,  to take away the least of which in- 
volves an utter overthrow of  all law ;  no matter how large the ma- 
jority by which it is  TRANSLATOR'S ~IEMARK. 
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jority may be safely put down as that of either in- 
competent or partial persons.  The more rational 
citizens, if the first is the case, will try to convince 
them ;  and if they can not be convinced, th'ey will 
make themselves very suspect of being partial.  But 
if the minority can not at all agree with the vote of 
the majority, then they are certainly not obliged to 
make their safety dependent upon a law which they 
do  not recogiize as  just ;  but neither will they desire 
to live among men who have adopted such a law, 
and hence the only course open to them is to emi- 
grate from the state.  As this is not always plea- 
sant, it is to  be expected that no one will insist on 
it ;  unless, indeed, he is convinced  that the passage 
of the law will destroy all safety.  He  will, on the 
contrary, rather indorse the vote of  the majority, 
and thus make it unanimous. 
It  will be seen, that my theory of Rights always 
assumes the legal validity, not of a majority vote, 
but of a unanimous vote ; although it is admitted 
that those who refuse to submit to a very decided 
majority, (which may be fixed at  seven eighths, per- 
haps, or still higher,) do thereby cease to be citizens 
of the state, and thus make unanimity possible. 
Under the described constitution, Law must ne- 
cessarily and infallibly rule at  all times ; unless, in- 
deed, the Ephorate should unite with the executive 
power  to suppress  the  people."  This final  and 
* The excellent arrangement of  our checking power makes  such 
u  union next to impossible.  Even in our mere general form of gov- 370  THE:  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  27 f 
greatest obstacle to a just government must also be 
removed. 
The Ephorate must not  be dependent upon the 
executive power, nor be in a position to receive fa- 
vors from the government.  It must have no friend- 
ly or social  relations  with  the government.  The 
people will look to this, and the Ephorate will take 
care not  to lose the confidence  of  the people  by 
such conduct. 
Moreover  it is advisable, nay, almost necessary. 
to make the tenure of  government offices for life- 
time,  because  the officials  lose  their  other posi- 
tions  in  life ; but it is  equally advisable to make 
the tenure of  the Ephores only for a specific time, 
since they  need  not  give up their ordinary voca- 
tions.  When retiring from office, the Ephores must 
give an account of  what  has occurred during their 
tcrnl  of  office ; and if  any injustice  has  occurred. 
which  still continues, the new Ephores must sus- 
pend the government and call  together the people 
to sit in  judgment  upon  the retiring  Ephores as 
kvell as upon the government.  It is clear, that the 
guilty Ephores must be punished as guilty of  high 
treason.  To have honorably administered the du- 
ties of  the Ephorate ought to entitle to life-long dis- 
tinction. 
The Ephorate must be elected by the people, not 
rrnment, a coml)mat~on  of  President, Congress, and the Supreme 
Court IS out of  the question.  How, then, could the governments of 
all the states comblne to suppress the whole  people !-TRANSLA. 
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by the government ; nor can the Ephores fill vacan- 
cies  amongst  themselves, the new  ones being the 
judges  of  the old.  The mcde of  their  election 
should  be specified  in  the constitution.  No  one 
should be allowed to apply for the Ephorate.  The 
people themselves should select them ; and in this 
manner the people will learn to pay more attention 
to their wise and great men. 
If all these provisions are observed, it is not well 
possible  that the Ephorate will ever combine with 
the government against the liberties of  the people. 
Unless  every one of  the first men of  the country 
who may be successively elected into the Ephoratc 
has been bribed when  entering upon the duties of 
that office; and  moreover,  unless each of  them is 
so sure of  a  corruptible  successor that he can ai- 
ford to stake his whole security upon it, such a col- 
lusion is not well  possible.  A state of  things like 
this is, however, impossible;  or,  if  it is possible, a 
people  corrupt  enough  to  make  it  possible  may 
be  said  to deserve  no  better  fate.  Nevertheless, 
as a strict science should take cognizance even of 
the greatest improbabilities,  the following must be 
added : 
Each private person who calls together the pee- 
ple  at large  agaitet  the  will of  the government, 
which  government represents the will of  the peo- 
ple until the people are assembled in convention- 
it will always be against that will, since the govern- 
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gether-is  a rebel, since his will is in opposition ta 
the presumptive common will. 
But the people,  rn a whole, never can be  a rebel; 
and the expression rebellion, applied to the people 
at  large, is the greatest absurdity ever uttered.  Fof 
the people are, in fact and in law, the highest power 
and the source of  all power;  responsible  only  ta 
God.  By the convening of  the people, the govern- 
ment loses its power, both in fact and in law. 
Two cases are possible.  Firstly, the people may 
rise up unanimously of their own accord and sit in 
judgment upon both Ephorate and government; for 
instance, when acts of  injustice are too horribly ap- 
parent.  In this case, the uprising is lawful both in 
form and in substance ;  for until insecurity and mal- 
administration of the law oppress every citizen, each 
one takes dare only of himself, and tries to get along 
as best  he may.  No people have ever uprise nor 
ever will uprise as one man, until injustice has bed 
come too intolerable. 
Or, seco~ldly  : one or more private persons may 
call upon the whole  people  to come  together  in 
canvention.  In this case, these persons  are cer- 
tainly presumptive rebels, and until the people has 
so assembled, they will undoubtedly be so treated, 
in accordance with the presumptive common will, by 
the government, if that government can get hold of 
them.  But an unjust power is always weak, because 
it is illogical ;  and because it has common opinion- 
often even the opinions of  those whom it  uses  as 
tools-against  itself.  The more  unjust  it is. the 
more impotent and weak ;  and the more probabili- 
ty, therefore,  that those  persons  who  have called 
the people together will escape the clutches of gov- 
ernment. 
The people may obey this call or may disregard 
it.  If they assemble in convention, the executive 
power vanishes into nothingness, and the people sit 
in judgment upon it and upon those who have call- 
ed the people together.  If the people indorse the 
charges of  the latter, they thereby declare their will 
to have been the true common will ; and its  sub- 
stance being acknowledged as the true law, its want 
of  legal form is now supplied  by the indorsement 
of the people.  If, on the contrary, the people pro- 
nourice their charges  unfounded,  then  these  per- 
sons become rebels, and are condemned as such by 
the people. 
If the people disregard their call, this disregard- 
ing proves either that oppression and  public inse- 
curity have not yet become general enough, or that 
they do not exist ;  or secondly, that the people have 
not yet awakened to a desire to maintain their free- 
dom and to a knowledge of  their rights ;  that they 
are not yet fit to decide upon the great law dispute 
brought before them, and hence  that  they  ought 
not to have  been  called  together.  The persons 
who issued the call are, therefore, punished-with 
perfect  external  justice,  as rebels ; although, ac- 
cording to internal justice, or in  their  conscience, 
they may be martyrs  of  true justice.  They are 
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are punished as guilty.  They ought to have had 
a better knowledge of the people.  For if a people 
unfit to maintain its freedom had come together, it 
would have resulted in a general annihilation of all 
law. 
All these provisions concerning the election  of 
executive officers,  and  concerning  the  establish- 
ment of a checking power, are provisions concern- 
ing the administration of  the law ;  and  all  these 
provisions together are called the Constitutioiolz. 
A lawful and rational constitution is unchangea- 
ble, valid for ali time ; and is necessarily established 
as such in its preamble. 
For each single individual  in the commonwealth 
must agree to it ;  and hence it is guaranteed through 
the original common will.  Each individual has be- 
come a member of  the state only under the guaran- 
tee of  this particular constitzrtion.  He can  not be 
compelled  to approve another  one.  If,  therefore, 
such another one contradictory of  the original con- 
stitution  should, nevertheless, be carried through, 
he would  be  compelled  to  leave  the state if  he 
could not approve of  it.  But since he can not be 
required to do this under the original agreement, it 
follows that it is absolutely unlawful to change the 
constitution, even if  only one person is opposed to 
it.  To effect  a change of  this kind in  the consti- 
tution, therefore, absolzlte unanimity is required. 
The distinction between  the absolute unanimity 
requisite for this change of  the constitution and the 
~bove  feiative unanimity is this, that the latter per- 
mits the exclusion of  several persons from the state, 
while the former does not.  In the former, the right 
to remain a citizen of  the state is absolute ; in the 
latter, it is conditioned by his joining the majority. 
We have said :  A constitution which  is a  lawful 
one, that is, which provides for a responsible execu- 
tive power, and for a checking power, is unchangea- 
ble ;  that is to say, within its general scope.  Infi- 
nite modifications are, of  course, possible ; and  in 
60 far even the best constitution is subject to amend- 
ment. 
If  the constitution, however, is not a lawful one 
then it may be changed into a lawful one ; and no 
one has the right to say : I do not wish  to give up 
the previous constitution.  For  the toleration of the 
previous  illegal constitution was excusable only on 
the ground of  previous ignorance or insensibility to 
the Conception of  Rights ; but as soon as that con- 
ception is clearly apprehended, and the people have 
become capable of  realizing it, each one is bound to 
accept it ; for right shaZZ  yule. 
It is different with  the amendments to the civil 
legislation.  These will make themselves.  At iirst, 
the state consists of  a certain fixed number of men, 
carrying on these or those professions, etc. ;  and the 
civil law is made accordingly.  But as the people in- 
crease and new branches of  business are created- 
of course, none must  be  created without the COR- 
sent of  the state-the  laws  also must change and 
be made to conform to the changed people. 276  TIIE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS.  71ZE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS.  277 
The  whole described mechanism  is requisite for 
the realization of  a lawful relation  between  men ; 
but it is not at all necessary that all these springs 
and wheels are always externally and visibly work- 
ing.  On the contrary, the better a state is orgar;- 
ized the less it will be perceived, because its inter- 
nal weight and quiet power cancel  in advance all 
rlecessity for its exercise.  The state prevents  it- 
self from being necessary. 
The  first object of the state is to decide the dis- 
putes of its citizens concerning their property.  The 
more simple, clear, and comprehensive  the law is, 
and the more infallible its execution, the less will 
be the number of  these disputes, uecause every one 
may know with tolerable certainty what belongs to 
him or not, and will not be likely, therefore, to make 
the-presumptively  abortive-attempt  to secure the 
property of  another.  If  the few  disputes  which 
may at first  arise through  error, are decided  cor- 
rectly in the conviction  of  both parties,  there will 
be no crime.  For where else is the source of crime 
concealed  but in  greediness and passions  excited 
thereby, or  in poverty and want, which  are impos- 
sible if  the law caref~~lly  watches over the property 
of each ?  And how can crimes arise if their sources 
are stopped ?  A good civil law and a strict execu- 
tion  thereof  utterly cancel the application  of  the 
criminal law.  Moreover, who will  dare to commit 
a crime if  he knows surely that he will be detected 
and punished?  A half  a  century of  such a  state 
of  things, and the conceptions of crimes will have 
vanished from the conscio~~sness  of  the happy peo. 
who are governed according to such laws. 
If the executive power  has less to do, the possi- 
bility of  its being unjust is lessened in an equal de- 
gree.  The  rare manifestation of  the power of  gov- 
ernment will  become  an  act which will  excite the 
veneration  of  the people  and of  themselves ; all 
eyes will  be turned  upon  the government, and the 
necessary reverence  of  the people  will  make  thc 
government reverence  itself, if  it should  not do so 
otherwise. 
The power of  the Ephorate also will  find  no oc- 
casion  for  its application,  because  the  executive 
power  will  always  be  just,  and  neither  interdict 
nor  conventions of  the  people  will  ever  be  re- 
quired. 
If, therefore, any one should possibly allow him- 
self to be frightened by theseconceptions, and should 
imagine heaven knows what horrors when he reads 
of  conventions of  the people  to sit  in  judgment 
upon  governments, he has  two  good  reasons  to 
quiet himself.  Firstly, it is only the lawless mob 
which commits outrages, and not a legally assem- 
bled people,consulting in an established form of pro- 
ceeding.  (The  fov?tz is, by the by, one of the great- 
est benefits for mankind.  By forcing man to pay 
attention to certain things, his attention generally 
is concentrated.  That man has not the interest of 
mankind at heart who wishes to take away  from 
them all forms.) 
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not in  order to be used, but  in order to make the 
occurrence of cases, which might require their use, 
impossible.  Precisely, in the states wherein  they 
are established, they  are superfluous ; and  where 
they are not established, they are sadly needed. 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS. 
The science which considers a particular empiri- 
cally determined state, and proceeds to develop how 
the Science of  Rights may be properly realized in 
such a state, is called the Science of Politics.  All 
the problems of  such a science have no connection 
with our science, which is purely a jriori, and must 
be carefully separated from it. 
To  this class of  problems  beiong  all  questions 
which may be raised concerning the particular de- 
termination of the one and only lawful constitution. 
For  our  established conception of  a  constitution 
solves only the problem of pure reason : How can 
the Conception of  Rights be realized in  the sensu- 
ous world ?  If that constitution is, therefore, to be 
further determined, this can be done only by empi- 
rical  facts.  We  now  proceed,  in  conclusion, to 
specify the possible questions which may  arise in 
this connection, and shall show that their solution 
depends upon the accidental position of the states 
to which the constitution is to be applied. 
Our first a priori established rule in considering 
the constitution was this : That the power of a com- 
monwealth must be transferred, and can not remain 
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in the hands  of  the people.  The question  here 
arises:  Shall it be transferred to one or to many ; 
or shall the state, in regard to the persons who con- 
stitute its government, be a monocracy or an aris- 
tocracy ?  For a pure democracy is not a legal form 
of government. 
The reply is : Both forms of government are law- 
ful ;  it is a question of exfedierzey  which to choose. 
The  ground from which to decide this question I will 
state in a few words:  Of  many, who modify each 
other's opinions more wisdom is to  be expected ;  but 
on the other hand, they are slower, more inclined to 
throw responsibility the one upon the other.  Nor 
will the power of  the Ephorate be  likely  to have 
the proper influence upon them, since they will feel 
themselves more secure in the great number of  the 
guilty.  A  perpetual  president  may, perhaps, be 
more liable to err ;  but power in his hands is more 
effective, and he is more responsible to the Epho- 
rate.  Hence, in states which need chiefly a strong 
government,  partly because  the people  have  not 
yet been used  to strict  obedience  to  the  law, or 
partly by reason of  their  loose relations  to  other 
nations, a monocracy probably has the preference ; 
but in states  which  have  already been  for  some 
time  under  such  an  orderly  government  and  in 
which the law works  by  its mere  internal  power, 
the republican form of government has the prefer- 
ence.  It  is clear, that all subordinate officials must 
be appointed by the highest regent, whether one or 
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mands.  For only the highest government (the re- 
gent) is responsible to the nation, and responsible 
only for the administration of law and justice.  But 
to be so responsible, the regent must have complete 
control over the selection of those persons through 
whom justice  is administered. 
Another question is, whether it is better that the 
people should directly elect their highest represen- 
tatives, (as is the case in  a proper and  lawful  de- 
mocracy,) or through mediate representatives ;  or 
whether, perhaps, it is better to introduce heredi- 
tary descent of office ? 
In regard to the Ephorate, this question has al- 
ready been decided.  They must be directly elect- 
ed by the people.  In  regard to the executive pow- 
er of the government, the decision can only be sup- 
plied by empirical facts, particularly by the degree 
of  culture which a people possesses, and which  is 
attainable only through a previous  wise  and  just 
legislation.  A people  which  is to elect  its  own 
rulers must be very far advanced in culture, for the 
election must be unanimous in order  to be  valid. 
But since this unanimity need only be relative, the 
fear always remains that a part of  the minority will 
have to submit to rulers whom  they do  not like, or 
be compelled to emigrate.  The  constitution ought, 
however, to remove all occasions for disputes and 
party divisions among its citizens.  Now, until the 
people have attained this high degree of culture, it 
is  better  that  they  should,  in  their constitution, 
delegate their  right  of  election  (of  franchise)- 
which, of course, they can thus delegate away only 
by absolute unanimity-and  thus introduce a fixed 
succession of rulers.  In a republic, the rulers may 
be allowed to fill vacancies in their own body ;  for 
if  the Ephorate is  strong  enough, they  will  take 
pod  care to make the best  selections.  In a mo- 
nocracy, only the people, it would seen], could elect 
their ruler ;  but since the people are not allowed to 
elect, they can only constitute  their  ruler  heredi- 
tary.  This hereditary descent has, moreover, other 
advantages,which render advisable its introduction; 
for instance, the monarch is utterIy cut off from the 
people ; is born and dies without any private rela- 
tion to the people. 
Questions might arise concerning the conditions 
of  the contract between the people and their rulers, 
their  personal  rights, privileges, incomes, and the 
sources of  these incomes.  But all these questions 
must  be decided empirically  The sources of  in- 
come, or theprinc@Ze  of  $nances,  we shall speak of 
hereafter.  Each one must contribute according to 
the ratio in which he needs protection, and the pro- 
tective power mus;  correspond  to the  protection 
needed.  This furnishes us at once with  a stand- 
ard of taxation.  Tlle rate of  taxation is changea- 
ble as the requirement of  protection  is changeable. 
The ruler or rulers can, of  course, be held accounta- 
ble for the administration of the finances, through 
the Ephorate ;  for it is one of the rights of the citi- 
zens not to pay taxes for any but public purposes. 
A  question might  be raised concerning the na- 232  TZfE SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  THE SCIE-VCE  OF RIGHTS.  283 
ture of the judiciary.  It has been proved, that the 
executive power  must also be the highest judicial 
power, from which there is  no appeal.  It is also 
clear that subordinate courts and judges will be ap- 
p~inted,  from whom appeal can be taken.  So far as 
the  fomn  of  the judicial investigation or the trial is 
concerned, it is  clear  that judicial  proofs  are fur- 
nished like any other proofs, and hence the proced- 
ure of  courts is based chiefly upon logic and sound 
common sense.  The sufficiency or insufficiency of 
the proof  is decided by the judge.  One important 
point is, however, to be remembered concerning the 
proof  by  00th.  There are two ways of  considering 
the  oath.  It may be viewed  simply  as a  solemn 
assurance,  the  external  formalities  accompany- 
lng  it having  no  other end in  view  than  to  red 
move  recklessness  and  to  induce  witnesses  to 
consider the importance of  such an assurance; in 
which  case  the  presupposition  is,  that he who  id 
capable of  publicly asserting a  falsehood will  also 
swear  a  false  oath.  Or an oath is  regarded  as 
something more than such  a solemn assurance, in 
which case the presupposition is, that a person who 
will not  hesitate  to publicly assert a falsehood will 
hesitate to swear a false oath.  Under the first sup- 
position,  it may  be  asked: Why should  the state 
or the opposite party in a trial be compelled to ac- 
cept such a statement on oath as absolute fact, and 
why should the judge be compelled to base his de- 
cision upon it, when the whole government is based, 
not upon trust, but upon distrust  ? 
Under the second  presupposition,  there arises 
this  same  question, and,  moreover,  the following 
higher question :  What is there supposed to be in 
an oath calculated to restrain a man, who will pub- 
licly assert a falsehood, from making a  false  asser- 
tion under oath ?  Since he does not fear the guilt 
of  falsehood, it follows that he believes  the calling 
upon God as a witness in the oath to be some sort 
of  a  supernatural,  incomprehensible, and magical 
means of incurring God's  anger by swearing false- 
ly.  This is, without doubt, in the true nature of a 
superstition,  and is utterly at variance with  moral 
religion.  The state, therefore, in prescribing oaths, 
calculates upon the continuance of  immorality, and 
must do all  in its  power  to promote  immorality, 
since it has staked its own existence upon a view 
of  the oath, which is immoral.  But this is absurd. 
Hence,  the oath  can  only be viewed  as a solemn 
assurance, and should not be administered except in 
private cases, where one party is willing  to accept 
the sworn statement of  the other as decisive.  Yo- 
Zenti nonfit injurin.  On a public occasion the oath 
should never be administered ;  nor will there be any 
need of  oaths, if  the state is properly organized. 
Finally, a question  might be raised  concerning 
the manner of  convening the people  for the elec- 
tion of  the Ephorate, or concerning the voting in 
convention, when the people are called together by 
the Ephorate to sit in judgment upon the executive 
power.  As for the election of the Ephores-whose 
number is a problem of  expediency and  to be de- 
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cided by the number of the population and the cul- 
ture of the people-a  higher degree of  culture re- 
quiring  fewer  Ephores-it  will  be  immediately 
apparent that it should  be conducted  by  the old 
Ephores, but in a manner which will pre"ent  them 
from controlling the election, since the new  Epho- 
res are to be  their judges.  When  passing  judg- 
ment upon  the  executive  power, the voting  will 
have to be under the superintendence of  men espe- 
cially appointed for the purpose, the Ephores being 
themselves an interested party in the case.' 
*  We append  FICHTE'S  later declaration on the subject  of the 
Ephorate, which is taken from his  Science  of  Rights of  the year 
n81z  : "  Many years ago I made a proposition  to establish a  very 
complicated  checking  power-the  Epholate.  The principles  of 
law which led me to do so are perfectly correct.  It is  a  very  true 
principle, that the government officials should  be made responsible 
to each citizen, and it would  be well  if  such  a  responsibility could 
be realized  in the sensuous world.  It is  also  clear,  that  no man 
ought to be a member of  the government  whose  understanding of 
the law is considered insufficient by the Ephorate or by  the people 
themselves.  But so far as the  practicabil~ty  of  such  a  checking 
power is concerned, I must now, after mature consideration, decide 
against it.  For, who shall again check  the Ephorate, that it may 
not commence  a ievolution for  some  reason  or  another, although 
the government has not  violated  the law ?  Again :  Will  not the 
government,  having  all power  in  its  hands,  try to  suppress  the 
Ephorate at the very start?  The Roman  patricians  will  bear  wit- 
ness ;  for they killed the tribunes of  the people.  The Ephores once 
killed, government  would find arguments and false charges enough 
to justify its conduct.  Moreover, it has certainly been  proved, that 
the decision of the people  is always jort7raliter  law, because  there 
is no higher judge.  But  how  f~zaterinlitw? Is not  more  confi- 
dence to be placed in  a  number of  the wisest  of  the  people  than 
*. 
in  a majority which  has  been gathered together,  God only knows 
how? 
86  his considerationdid  not escape me at  the time.  I admitted all 
this,  but added, that a people whose Ephores,  being selected  from 
the very best of the people,  could be corrupt enough for such con- 
duct, did not  deserve a better  government, and were  not  fit  for a 
better one.  This is, after all,  the truth  of the case.  The realiza- 
tion of a checking power as a part of the constitution  is not practi- 
cable,  because mankind at large is too  bad as yet ;  but until men 
grow better,  they will have to get along with a  government  which 
needs no really established Ephoratr. 
One circumstance, however, seems to  have escaped all, who have 
expressed surprise at this idea of  an Ephorate; namely,  that this 
idea is,  in point of fact, realized wherever a civilized people is to be 
found.  As soon  as thinking  is  developed  among  the people,  a 
power which observes and checks the action  of  the government  is 
aiso developed.  This power has two purposes  to fulfil :  To warn 
the government; and secondly, if that is of no avail, to call the peo- 
ple together.  The first  purpose  it generally  accomplishes,  unless 
free speech is forbidden, (which is a dangerous undertaking on the 
part of  the government,)  and government usually  listens to those 
warnings and  obeys them.  For no  government  dares to remain 
behind the people.  But if government does not listen to them, the 
people are called together.  As a sure proof that this is practicable, 
I need only say that it has been done in this age and under our very 
eyes, and that it has resulted  in the overthrow of  the government. 
[Alluding  to the French Revolution.-T~~~s~~~o~.]  It has also, 
however,  as far as can be judged  at present, resulted  disastrously 
for the people;  not by  accident, but in  obedience to a  necessary 
law.  For so long as there are more good  than bad people, it may 
be safely assumed that the propositions of the bad, and not those of 
the good and wise, will be adopted.  Hence, the expedient of  call- 
ing the people  together  through the  Ephorate, or  of  revolutions, 
will be only a substitution of one evil for another and greater one, 
until a complete change has  been  effected  in the human race.  A 
greater evil :  for the principles of government, which are always con- 
formable to the character of  the age, will not change,  and the regent 
of apeople which has revolutionized  will try all the more to root his 
power  firmer, in  order to prevent the recurrence  of  a  revolution. 
The only thing from which we can expect improvement is the pro- 
gress of culture and morality,  and a consequent  steadily  increasing 
influence of  the Ephorate in this progress!' CONCERNING  MUNICIPAL  LAW CIVIL LAW. 
TIIE  first compact of  persons entering with each 
other into a legal relation, and which we have called 
the property-compact, is the true original basis of 
that relation, and hence is equally the basis of what 
is usually called civil law.  To exhaust our present 
investigation, therefore, all we need to do is to ana- 
lyze that compact thoroughly. 
The conception of  original rights we have shown 
to be that of  a continuous reciprocal  causality be- 
tween  the person  and the sensuous world,  which 
causality is dependent  solely upon  the will of  the 
person.  In the property-compact each person  has 
assigned to him a determined  sphere of  the sensu- 
ous world, as the exclusive sphere of  his reciprocal 
causality;  but with  these two  conditions,  to wit, 
that he will  not disturb the freedom of  all  others 
in their sphere, and that he will protect them by 
his contribution against the attacks of  any third 
party. 
Firstly: A sphere is assigned to him for his free- 
dom ;  nothing more.  This sphere contains certain 
objects, determined by the freedom assigned to him. 
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fore,  as far as the frpedom  assiped  to him extends, 
and no further.  He receives them only for a spe- 
cial use, and he has only the right to exclude every 
one else from this special use and from what might 
be injurious to this specid use.  The object of  the 
property-compact  is a  determined  activity.  (This 
appears,  indeed,  already,  from what we  have said 
previously.  For  the  fundamental  ground  of  all 
property  is,  that  I  have  subjected  something to 
my end.  But what end ?  This question each one 
has to answer when entering the property-con~pact, 
which compact must be throughout determined and 
determining.  It is only this  declared  and recog- 
nized  end and purpose  in the objects which  that 
compact guarantees ;  and the property of the object 
extends no further than to the attainment of  this 
end.) 
But these ends may be very different  in the use 
of one and the same object, and hence also in the 
use of  different objects.  The question is, whether 
all possible ends of  a citizen may not be subordina- 
ted to a single one ? 
The person,  in acting,  always  presupposes  his 
own future existence ;  the object of  his present act- 
ing always lies in the future ; and he is a  cause in 
the sensuous world  only in so far  as he proceeds 
from the present to the future moment.  Freedom 
and continued existence are essentially united, and 
he who guarantees the one necessarily guarantees 
the other.  Present activity itzcludes the f utzcre. 
Nature has destined man, who alone concerns us 
bere, for freedom, that is, activity.  Nature attains 
all her ends, and hence must also  have made ar- 
rangements  to  attain  this  one.  What arrange- 
ments could she contrive to incite man to activity ? 
If we  presuppose  that each man  has wishes in 
the future,  then nature  could  attain  that end  by 
making the  possibility of  a  future for  him  depe~t- 
deyzt upon his present activity. The  wish for a future, 
on the other hand, would  involve the necessity of 
present activity.  The future would be conditioned 
by  present  activity ; in  the  present  activity  the 
future would necessarily be contained. 
But since it is possible that there may be men who 
have no wishes  in the future, and since, moreover, 
the desire for a future is grounded  only in present 
activity,  which present activity is itself again ground- 
ed in the  desire  of  a  future; and since  the  con- 
trivance  of  nature  would,  therefore,  be  a  faulty 
circle, it is necessary that she should unite both in 
a third  present  moment,  and this  is Pain.  The 
present  pain, threatening  continued  existence, in- 
volves  both present  activity and the wish  for and 
the possibility of a continued existence.  This pain 
is hunger and thirst; and we thus discover that the 
need of nourishment is alone the original incentive, 
as its satisfaction is the final end of  the state, and 
of all man's life and doing ; of course, only so long 
as man remains under the guidance of  nature, and 
does not arise through  freedom to a  higher exist- 
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highest  synthesis, which  unites  all  contradictions. 
The highest and universal  end of  all  free activity 
is, therefore,  that men  may  live.  This end each 
one has,  and the guarantee  of  freedom  involves 
this guarantee.  Unless he attains it, freedom and 
the continued  existence of  his person will be im- 
possible. 
We thus obtain a more special determination of 
the  exclusive  sphere  of  freedom,  guaranteed  to 
each in the property-compact.  To  be able to live 
is the absolute, inalienable property of  all men.  A 
certain sphere of  objects is guaranteed to a person 
exclusively for a certain use ;  but the ultimate end 
of  that use  is, that  he shall be able to live.  The 
spirit of  the property-compact  is the guarantee of 
this end, or of life.  It is the fundamental principle 
of  every  rational  form  of  government,  that  each 
person shall  be able to live  from the results of  his 
labor. 
Each individual  has  made this agreement with 
all others, and all have made it with each.  Hence, 
all  have  promised  to all that their labor  shall  be 
the means to attain this end, and in the state orga- 
nization provision must be made to realize this pur- 
pose. 
Again :  all  right  of property is based upon  the 
agreement of  all with  all : that each will  acknow- 
ledge  the possessions  of  the other,  provided  the 
other will  acknowledge  his.  But as soon as any 
one can no longer live from the results of his labor, 
that which  belongs to him  is no  longer his ;  the 
agreement  with him  is,  therefore, completely an- 
nulled, and he is no longer legally bound to respect 
the property of any one else.  Since this insecurity 
of property is to be avoided, all  must in  law and 
by agreement give  him  of  their possessions  suffi- 
cient to live from.  From the moment that any one 
suffers  distress, that part of  the property of  each 
citizen, which is necessary to remove that distress, 
no  longer  belongs to them, but in  law and justice 
belongs  to the suffering individual.  The original 
compact  should  make provision  for  such a repar- 
tition  of  property  among the  sufferers,  and  this 
contribution to the distressed is as much condition 
of  all  civil  rights  as the contribution  for  common 
protection.  Each  one retains  possession  of  his 
property only in so far, and on the condition that 
all other citizens can sustain their lives from their 
property ;  and if  they can  no longer  sustain their 
lives  therefrom,  his  becomes  their  property :  of 
course, in such proportions as  the state government 
may  determine.  The government  is  responsible 
for  this  as well  as for all  other  branches of  state 
administration ;  the poor  citizen  has  an absolute 
claim to support. 
The principle  established was  this : Each one 
must  be able  to live from  the results of his lobor. 
Labor is, therefore, the condition of  being  able to 
live, and when this condition has not  been fulfilled 
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sible for the support of  all who can  not live  from 
their labor, they necessarily also  have the right to 
watch that each labors sufficiently ;  and this right 
of  supervision  they  transfer  to  the  government. 
No one has a  legal  claim  to the support of  the 
state until he has shown that he has done within his 
sphere all that was possible  for him  to do in order 
to make his living ;  and that, nevertheless, he was 
unable to do it.  But since, even in the latter case, 
the state could  not  permit  him  to die, and would 
be, moreover, liable to the reproach that it had not 
compelled  him  to work, the state necessarily must 
be intrusted with the right of  supervising the man- 
ner in which  each  citizen  administers his proper- 
ty.  Precisely as there must  be  no poor  man  in 
a rational  state, so also must there be no idler.  A 
legal exception to the latter result will appear here- 
after. 
The property-compact  comprises,  therefore, the 
following acts : 
I. ~ll  state to all what they intend to live from, 
This holds good without  exceptions.  He  who can 
not state this can not be a citizen of  the common- 
wealth, since he can  not be forced  to respect the 
rights of  property of  the others. 
2.  All permit to each this occupation, exclusively, 
in  a  certain  respect.  Each  one  must  expressly 
state his occupation ;  and hence no one becomes a 
citizen in general, but  becomes, at the same time, 
entitled to a  certain  occupation.  There must be 
no undeterminedness whatever in a state organiza- 
tion.  Each, of  course,  has possession  of  objects 
only so far as the ends of his occupation require it. 
3. The end of  all this labor is, to be able to live. 
All guarantee  to each  that his  labor will  achieve 
this  end,  and guarantee  this  end with  all  their 
means.  These means belong to the rights of each, 
which the state must protect.  The agreement in 
this respect is as follows : Each promises to do all 
that is in his power to do, in order to make his liv- 
ing  from what has been ceded to him as his property 
and rights ; and in consideration of  this promise, 
all  others,  or the state, promise  to cede more to 
him, if  he should not be able to make his  living 
therefrom,  guaranteeing this  promise by  obliging 
themselves to furnish contributions.  Hence, pre- 
cisely as the original compact provides for the erec- 
tion of  a protective power of  government, so must 
it also provide for a  supporting power.  In other 
words, the state government must not only protect 
the citizens, but must also support the poor. 
The arrangement contrived by nature to compel 
US to free activity is as follows : 
Our body is an organized product of  nature, and 
the progress  of  organization  goes on in the body 
uninterruptedly.  Nature  proceeds  herein  in  two 
modes :  Either the body takes  in  organic  matter, 
and nature first organizes that matter in the body ; 
or the body receives matter already organized, and 
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Moreover,  nature  may  either  bring  herself  the 
matter to be organized within  the sphere of  caus- 
ality of  the body, or may arrange the body so as to 
betake itself  by free activity to the materials need- 
ed  by it.  The latter condition  occurs in  beings 
that are articulated for free movement ;  and, since 
nature would seem to rise to greater perfection in 
these latter bodies, it seems not unlikely that both 
conditions should go together ; that is, that articu- 
lated bodies should be able to supply their organiza- 
tion only from organized matter.  Without investi- 
gating here why and by virtue of  what laws this is 
so,  we  content ourselves  with  stating the simple 
fact that it is so.  The plants are formed  from  in- 
organic matter ; at least, matter which appears in- 
organic to us ;  whilst animals feed from the organ- 
ized products.  What seems to be an exception  to 
this rule  is  none.  When animals  swallow  earth, 
stones,  or sand,  etc.,  it is  not  to derive  nourish- 
ment therefrom, for these materials are not digest- 
ed, but  to  expel  injurious  ingredients  from  the 
body. 
It may also be possible, that articulated creatures 
again, on their part, supply their organization from 
other articulated creatures, or eat meat.  It seems, 
indeed, as if  these meat-eating creatures occupied, 
likewise,  a  higher  stand-point  of  organization." 
"Quite  the contrary doctrine to that of  the vegetarians, yet un. 
cloubtedly more plausible.  Such improper generalizations are, how- 
ever, all faulty.  Since all matter is organic, all cleaturcs are meat- 
eating ;  and whether we eat  only snlall animals, in vegetable food, or 
b:g ones, in animal food, is all the same.-T~~ss~~ron's  REMARK. 
Man  is evidently made to supply his nourishment 
from both spheres of  organized nature. 
It is a condition of the continued existence of the 
state, that a sufficient amount of  food should be on 
hand ; for  otherwise  men would  be forced to emi- 
grate. 
All organization proceeds according to laws of na- 
ture, which man can learn and direct or apply, but 
which he has not the power to change.  Man may 
place nature in the known conditions of  the appli- 
cation of  her laws, sure that she will not fail  then 
to apply them ; and by doing so, man exercises the 
power  of  promoting  and  increasing  organization. 
It seems  likely that nature will  need  such assist- 
ance from  man  in places  where  men  congregate 
through freedom, which  freedom nature could  not 
have taken into consideration  in arranging herself. 
If  this is a fact, then the promotion of organization 
is  the  fundamental basis of  the state, since it is 
the exclusive condition on which  men can live to- 
gether. 
Man will find it requisite, first of  all, to promot2 
the organization of  plants, in order to feed himself 
and  the animals.  Plants are fixed  to the ground 
so long as their organization lasts.  It seems, there- 
fore,  probable  that  many  men will  devote  them- 
selves exclusively to the cultivation of  plants ; and 
such a right must be admitted, since the existence 
of  the state depends upon its exercise. 
All organization  progresses  according to certain 
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gress.  In each cultivated part of  the plant king- 
dom, therefore, every thing must remain precisely 
as the cultivator has designed it to be ;  and hence 
the ground, which  he  needs  for  this  cultivation, 
must be  exclusively granted to him  for that spe- 
cific purpose. 
PROPERTY  IN LAND. 
Land is the common support of  mankind  in the 
sensuous world, the condition of  man's  existence in 
space,  and hence of  man's  whole  sensuous  exist- 
ence.  The earth  in  particular,  considered  as a 
mass, is not at all a possible object of  property ;  for 
it can  not, as substance, be submitted  to any pos- 
sible exclusive end of  a person ;  and it is not law- 
ful for any one, according to our above results, to 
exclude all others from  the use of  a thing without 
assigning himself  a  use for it.  Even if  some one 
should say :  the earth is useful to build houses upon, 
he already  ceases to speak  of  it as a substance, 
modifies  it, and uses it as an accidence.  Hence, 
the right  of  the agriculturist  to a  fixed  piece  of 
ground is solely the right, exclusively to raise pro- 
ducts upon it and to exclude all others from doing 
the same, or from using it for  any purpose which 
would conflict with that use. 
The agriculturist, therefore, has not the right to 
prevent  another use  of  his  property,  provided  it 
does not  conflict  with  his  own.  He has not the 
right, for instance, to prevent others from using his 
lands after harvest for pasturage, unless he has ob- 
tained also the right of  cattle-raising ; nor to pre- 
vent  the state from  mining  on  his  lands,  unless, 
indeed, his lands should thereby receive  damages, 
in which case the state must reimburse him. 
The lands of  the commonwealth are chosen by 
the individuals, and guaranteed by the state to each. 
Their limits are  designated by fences or other marks, 
so that they may always be known.  To wantonly 
remove such marks is a crime, because  it leads  to 
endless law disputes. 
Each agriculturist, who  is nothing  but  agricul- 
turist, must be able to live from  the cultivation of 
his lands.  If he can not do so, an additional piece 
of  land must be given to him, since he is only agri- 
culturist.  Whether he has worked  sufficiently in 
the cultivation of  his lands, the state decides. 
As citizen  of  the state, the agriculturist  must 
contribute toward  the needs of  the state.  So far 
as we can see now, he will have to make these con- 
tributions from the products of  his field.  Until he 
makes this  contribution,  he has  no property,  be- 
cause  he  has  not  fulfilled  the  agreement which 
makes it his  property.  Whatsoever  remains after 
this contribution is his own; the state has, so far 
as appears now, no  claim  on it, and must protect 
h~m  in  the  possession  of  it  against  all  attacks. 
Only the  products of  his lands are, therefore, the ab- 
solute property of  the agriculturist.  They belong 
to him, substance and all ;  whereas, of  the lands, 
he owns only an accidence. 
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Mrhatsoever grows wild on cultivated lands must 
be assumed to have been subjected by the proprie- 
tor to his ends ; hence it rightfully belongs to him. 
Moreover, if  a stranger should interfere with such 
wild products, he would interfere with the proprie- 
tor's right to dispose of  his lands as may seem best 
to him. 
Uncultivated  lands  are property of  the whole 
commonwealth,  for  they were  assigned  to no  one 
when  the lands were  distributed.  Of  course,  the 
state  distinguishes  between  the  substance,  the 
ground itself,  and its accidences, that which grows 
upon  it.  These accidences will  most  properly be 
taken  by  the state for  public  purposes,  (forests.) 
But if  they shall be so taken by the state, then the 
state must expressly declare them to be state pro- 
perty ;  and what is not so declared thereby becomes 
the property of  the first one who chooses to appro- 
priate it, (wild fruits, berries, etc.) 
Whenever a  citizen  wishes  to  cultivate  any of 
these  uncultivated  lands,  they  must  be  divided. 
Whoever obtains  such lands  as his property must 
cultivate them.  The  state will thus be indemnified 
for  the loss  of  the accidences on these lands  by 
receiving contributions (taxes) from  their new cul- 
tivators. 
MINERAL  LANDS. 
Minerals are the transition of  nature from inor- 
ganic matter  to  organic products.  The laws  by 
which  nature  produces them are either not at all 
discoverable,  or,  at least,  are not  yet discovered. 
Metals can, therefore, not be arbitrarily reproduced 
by art and cultivation like fruits.  They are found 
as nature made them. 
It  seems as if  each one ought to have the right 
to say:  I intend to hunt for minerals ; just as each 
has the right to say: I intend to cultivate fruits ; 
and hence as if  the interior of  the earth could  be 
divided  among the miners precisely as the upper 
crust is divided  among the farmers.  The metals 
found would thus belong to the miner, as the fruits 
cultivated belong to the farmer.  Nevertheless, there 
is a difference ; partly because mining is risky, and 
can not be surely known to support the miners, and 
partly  because  the land  once investigated  by the 
miner  can  not  be  reinvestigated.  Mining must, 
therefore, be assigned to a  permanent corporation, 
which can afford to wait for success ; and no cor- 
poration is better adapted to do this than the state, 
which,  moreover,  has  still another  reason  for  ob- 
taining  possession of  the metals,  as we  shall soon 
show.  Hence,  the interior of  the earth remains 
the common  property of  the  commonwealth,  and 
the miners become the regularly employed laborers 
of  the state,  receiving  their wages  whether they 
find any metals or not. 
The same principle applies to all similar products 
uf  nature ;  precious stones, quarries, sand, etc.  The 
state has the right to make these objects its own de- 
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lxopriating or using them.  If it does so, it must, 
of course, guarantee to furnish  these  products  in 
sufficient  quantities to all who may desire to use 
them.  If the state does not choose so to do,  it 
may extend the privilege of  working them for cer- 
tain districts to such individuals  as may apply for 
the privilege ; or may tacitly agree to let any one 
take possession of  them who chooses to do so.  The 
principle which rules is always that unless the state 
expressly declares these objects to be  its property, 
they may be taken possession of  by the first comer. 
PROPERTY IN  ANIMALS. 
There are also animals upon the earth who  may 
be useful to men in their accidences, or whose sub- 
stances may be useful  to  men ; their meat to eat, 
their skin for various purposes, etc.  If any citizen 
intends to subject only the accidences of  such ani- 
mal to his ends, he must first make the animal sub- 
servient to him.  Moreover, since the animals are 
fed  and kept alive  only by organized  matter, and 
since it is not to be expected that nature will  take 
care of  them after they have  once been made art- 
products, he must replace nature in becoming their 
nourisher.  This, again,  is conditioned  by the ex- 
clwivepossessio~z  of  the animal ; only /  must  feed 
and attend the animal always, and only I, therefore, 
inust  be allowed  to enjoy  the advantages  it may 
confer. 
There is no reason why each one should not have 
the same right  to take  possession  of  an animal 
Hence, exclusive  property  in animals  can  be  ob- 
tained only through the original  property-compact 
in a state. 
There is, however, this difference between  pro- 
perty in land and property in animals, that the land 
can always  be  designated  by  the place  in  space 
which  it  occupies,  whereas  the  animal  has  free 
motion and can not be so specified.  How then is 
it to be made known what particular animal belongs 
to a certain person and to no one else ? 
If it should, firstly, be the case that only certain 
kinds of  animals are ever made exclusive property 
of  persons, it would be, above all, necessary to spe- 
cify to what kinds of  animals the right of  property 
can extend.  This would enable every one to know 
at once whether an animal, coming within his reach, 
is the property of  any body or not.  For instance, 
if  I have a right to hunt, I may shoot the deer, be- 
cause it is a deer ; but I may not shoot the horse, 
although I do not know who  owns  it.  Why not? 
Simply because I know that horses have been de- 
clared property by the state, and that, hence, some 
one  is surely the owner  of  the horse,  although  I 
do not know  who.  If  some one should  tame a 
deer, it doubtless  becomes  his  property.  But if 
the deer runs away and I shoot it, am I, therefore, 
responsible  for  it as for  the horse?  Clearly not, 
since the state has not declared  that the right of 
property extends to deers.  The right of  the origi- 
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ma1 may run away from him, because in the origi- 
nal compact it has been agreed upon in what kinds 
of  animals the right of property may rest.  Such 
animals are called lame animals.  The ground why 
~recisely  these kinds of animals have been declared 
property in a  state and none others, lies in their 
fitness for serving the needs of  men in their acci- 
dences, in the possibility of  taming them, and in the 
necessity of  taking care of  them. 
But let no one believe that this taming and feed- 
ing of  the animals is the true legal ground of  the 
right of  property in them.  That legal ground is to 
be found only in the property-compact.  Hence, if 
any one should introduce a new kind of  tamed ani- 
mals, for instance, buffaloes or kangaroos, the state 
would first have to declare them animals  to which 
the right of property should extend, since otherwise 
they would  be  properly  treated  like wild  animals. 
If they were  kept locked up in such a one's house 
or yard, they would, of  course, thereby become part 
of  his house property.  It is also clear,  from  the 
foregoing, that the state has a perfect right to pro- 
hibit the keeping of certain animals, for instance, of 
lions, bears, monkeys, and unnecessary dogs. 
But the next question is : To whom does this or 
that  animal which  in its kind  has been  declared 
property,  belong ?  These animals  may either re- 
main under the immediate supervision of  their pro- 
prietor, so that he can at any moment prove them 
to be his-unless,  indeed, they be unlawfully in his 
possession-or  they may be feeding in a  common 
pasture with the animals of other proprietors.  How, 
in the latter case, can ownership be proved ?  Hap- 
pily, animal instinct has supplied the neglect of the 
lawgiver.  Tame animals accustom  themselves to 
their stables, and the judge  decides according to 
the instinct of  the animal as to who  is its owner. 
Yet, would  it not be proper to have all tame ani- 
mals marked in some way, the marks to be as in- 
violable as those which designate the several pieces 
of  landed  property, and thus to place them under 
the direct protection of  the law?  (In the armies 
the horses  are, indeed,  so marked.)  Each bill of 
sale of  an animal ought to be accompanied  by a 
specification of  the mark upon the animal, so as to 
guarantee perfect safety to the purchaser. 
In reference  to some animals, the right of  pro- 
perty is determined by the space  they occupy,  to 
wit,  when  they  are of  a  kind  which  can  be con- 
fined to a certain locality, and must be so confined 
to serve their end.  In such cases the owner is pro- 
prietor of  the animals, because he is proprietor of 
the  locality  wherein  they exist,  (fish-lakes,  bird- 
houses, etc.)  When the fish is out of  the lake, or 
the bird out of  the cage, they have no owner. 
The right of  property is always granted with re- 
erence to the end to be  accomplished  by it; so, 
likewise,  the right of  property in animals.  Now, 
most animals are useful, not only in their acciden- 
ces,  (as milk,  eggs,  and their  labor,)  but also  in 
their substance ;  we  eat their meat,  make use of 
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It may,  perhaps,  be deemed  expedient  to limit 
this  right of  property in the su6stance of  the ani- 
mals, and to specify this limit  in the original pro- 
perty-compact.  Such a limitation would not invali- 
date the right of  property in the animals, so far as 
it has reference to their accidences, but it would re- 
strict the right to do with the substance of  the ani- 
mals as might please the owner.  The state, for in- 
stance, might provide that a certain number of cat- 
tle shall always be kept in the state, and that, there- 
fore, only a limited number may be slaughtered.  If 
such a law is passed in a state, another law must be 
passed, of  course, providing that, at all times, a cer- 
tain amount of  food for cattle shall be raised  and 
set aside,  since  otherwise  the  former  legislation 
would cancel itself. 
Animals propagate themselves, and their young 
ones are their accidences.  The ownership of  the 
old animals involves  the ownership of  their whole 
future breed, precisely as the ownership of  a grain 
of  wheat involves that of  all the future wheat which 
may grow out of  it.  It may be lawful, however, to 
limit the number of cattle which shall be kept in a 
commonwealth. 
The animals have free movement and feed  from 
the products of  the field.  Hence, when an animal 
trespasses upon the fields of  a farmer, there arises 
this dispute between  the agriculturist and the cat- 
tle-raiser : 
The former says : "I  have the right to cultivate 
land in this state, and the products of  the field are 
mine."  The latter replies:  "I have  the right  to 
raise  cattle in the same state, and the state knows 
well  that animals are determined by their 
nature to hunt food." 
This dispute the state has to settle by establish- 
ing laws, based  on  the original  property-compact, 
whereby either the one party alone is compelled to 
keep  his cattle in  a  closed  pasture, or,  which  is 
more fair, the other party is also compelled to fence 
in his fields.  Whosoever neglects to do his duty in 
this respect, must not only repay damages, but also 
makes himself  liable to an additional fine.  If ac- 
cidents  happen  in  spite of  all  precautions,  they 
are to be considered  as misfortunes for which nei- 
ther party is liable, and which the state has to re- 
pair. 
Wild animals are animals the accidences whereof 
can not be subjected to the use of  men.  Their sub- 
stance, however, may be useful, and since they can 
not  be tamed, it becomes useful  only through  the 
death  of  such animals.  In so far  they belong  to 
the whole state, or are undivided property.  They 
become  the property of  individuals  only by being 
caught or killed. 
There is, however, one great distinction between 
these animals.  Some of  them  are inclosed in an 
element which is not subject to men, at least in so 
far as these animals live b  and of  it, namely, the 
fishes in rivers and seas.  Hence, they do no harm 
to men.  It is the same with  some other animals, 
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as men, the earth, yet do so little damage to it, that 
they are not materially injurious ;  namely, the birds, 
The harm which they do to the crops, etc., is amply 
repaid by their killing off  injurious insects. 
It  is quite different with another class of  wild ani- 
mals, which are injurious to men and destroy man's 
labors.  All kinds  of  game  belong  to this class. 
Now, since the state guarantees to each person his 
property,  it must protect  that of  the agriculturist 
against  the devastation of  these animals.  Every- 
where wilderness must give way to culture, and the 
irregular modes of  living, which  can not be surely 
known  to suffice  for  man's  subsistence, must give 
way to regular pursuits. 
Hence, the state must make fishing a lawful pur- 
suit, which  is best  accomplished-with  a  view  to 
make it an oyderly business-by  assigning specific 
districts of  rivers and lakes to fishermen, who thus 
become the proprietors  of  these districts  in  the 
manner  of  agriculturists, of  course  only in regard 
to the use of  these districts.  They  would not have 
the right, for instance, to prevent navigation within 
their  districts, since that would  not  interfere with 
their pursuits in the same localities. 
But all wild animals of  the second class must be 
regarded by the state as absolutely injurious ; not 
as a source of emolument, but as a class of enemies. 
The  first object of hunting is not, therefore, to possess 
the game, but to protect the farmer; and the state 
must undertake  this protection precisely as it un- 
dertakes to protect property against thieves and in- 
cendiaries, namely,  by appointing men  especially 
intrusted with this duty.  Of course,  the agricul- 
turist retains the right to shoot any piece of  game 
or wild  animal which  may stray within  his fence, 
and does not  need  to wait  for  the  official  game- 
keeper's  arrival,  precisely  as each  citizen  retains 
the right to quench the flames, if  his house should 
be put on fire, without waiting for the arrival of the 
official firemen. 
Now, since the chase affords considerable profits, 
it is not to be assumed that the people ought to pay 
taxes for  sustaining it ;  rather, it ought to pay it- 
self  For this reason it will be most advantageous 
to grant to a certain class of persons, game-keepers, 
the right of chase in specified districts-as  in the case 
of  the fishermen-which  right thus becomes  their 
property.  Let it be well understood, that the right 
of  property is not vested in the animals,  as such, 
but only in the killing of this class of animals within 
the specified district.  Nevertheless, since it is the 
chief  object of  the chase to protect the agricultu- 
rist, the game-keeper can receive this right only on 
the express condition  that the game is truly kept 
harmless by him, and that he holds himself respon- 
sible for  all  the damages farmers may receive  by 
reason of  such game. 
No one but the gamekeeper can possibly have 
the intention to take care of  or protect the game, 
and this end is granted to him only in so far as the 
game is not injurious to the purposes of culture ;  or 
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ever kills them there, trespasses upon the property 
of the gamekeeper ;  whereas, he who kills them upon 
his  fields  is perfectly justified.  For the life of  the 
game is  not guaranteed  by the state; indeed, the 
game has no end for the state ;  on the contrary, their 
death is the end which the state has in view.  The 
killed  game belongs to the gamekeeper of  the dis- 
trict ;  the damage they have inflicted whilst at large 
must be paid by him, whether the animals be worth 
much or nothing at all. 
The first end of  the chase is to protect culture ; 
all other ends are accidental.  Hence, it is proper- 
ly made the duty of  the gamekeeper to exterminate, 
likewise, wild  animals, from  which  he himself  de- 
rives no benefit, and which may not be  immediate- 
ly  injurious  to himself;  as,  for  instance, eagles, 
hawks, sparrows, nay,  even caterpillars  and other 
injurious insects.  Other animals, which are imme- 
diately injurious  to himself,  because  they destroy 
his game, such as foxes, wolves, etc., he will exter- 
minate of  his own accord. 
If the chase were a  burden without  profit, gov- 
ernment would  have to undertake it.  But since it 
is combined  with  considerable advantages,  which 
generally increase in value  the  less attention the 
gamekeeper  pays  to  his  proper  business-and 
herein  lies  the root  of  the chief  difficulty-and 
since, therefore, complaints will often be preferred 
against  the gamekeepers,  it is expedient  to keep 
them under  the close  supervision  of  the govern- 
ment.  The right of  keeping game, being combin- 
ed with emoluments, can not remain,  therefore, in 
the hands of  the government.  Government would 
always  be an interested party as the possessor of 
the game, and the agriculturist would  have no im- 
partial judge. 
PROPERTY  IN PRODUCTS  OF INDUSTRY  AND  ART. 
All rights of  property, heretofore considered, are 
vested in products of  nature, as such, whether na- 
ture has heen assisted in producing them, as is the 
case in agriculture and  cattle-raising,  or whether 
her products are merely hunted up, as is the case 
in  mining, hunting,  fishing, and cutting down of 
timber.  We will  call  all  the  citizens,  who  have 
rights of  this kind, Prodzdcers. 
Now, it is very probable that these raw products 
of  nature need a particular preparation through art 
to render them useful for the purposes of  men, and 
in  our present  wholly  empirical  investigation  we 
will assume, without further apriori deduction, that 
such is the case.  It is, therefore, to be expected 
that  another  class of  citizens will  devote  them- 
selves  wholly  to  this  art-preparation  of  the  raw 
material.  I shall call this class of  citizens Artists, 
in the widest significance of  the word. 
The distinction is sharply defined, and the desig- 
nation  in itself perfectly correct.  For the former 
class of  citizens leave nature to herself, do not pre- 
scribe to nature,  but merely  place her under  the 
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of  that class who  merely hunt up products do not 
even so much.  As soon  as nature  has  achieved 
her work,  the labor  of  the producers  is finished ; 
the product  is ripe,  or the raw product  has been 
found. 
But the second class of  persons wlio  now enter 
on the scene, do not calculate at all upon the assist- 
ance of  nature, since the organizing power of  the 
product has already been deadened by its ripeness, 
or else must be deadened by them to become  use- 
ful for their purposes. 
They compose these parts according to their own 
conception  altogether;  the  moving power  lies in 
t/ze~vt,  not in nature.  Every thing composed in this 
manner is called a product of art.  Each thread of 
the spinner is a work of  art.  It is true, the word 
Artist  has  been  applied  to  particular  classes  of 
these laborers ;  but this use of  language need  not 
interfere with  ours,  which  is  based  on  a  correct 
apriori division, and which we do not desire at all 
to make universal. 
A number of  persons  must have  the  exclusive 
right to thus artistically prepare certain objects in 
a certain manner.  If  they have no exclusive right, 
they have no property ; for  in that case they have 
recognized the labor-vocations of all others, whereas 
their own has not been recognized  by these others 
in return.  Their property-compact, in that case, is 
one-sided,  merely obligatory, not  granting  rights, 
and hence is xiull and void. 
A class of  citizens exclusively entitled to prepare 
certain objects in a certain manner is called a pro- 
fession.  To leave all professions open at all times 
to all citizens, renders a property-compact  impossi- 
ble. 
The artist must be  able to live from his work. 
Two classes  of  artists  are to  be  distinguished; 
such  as merely  furnish  their  labor  and  do  not 
own  the  materials  of  it,  and such  as own  the 
material.  To enable  them  to  make  their  living, 
the state must guarantee to the former class labor, 
and to the second class sale of  their wares. 
The substance of the agreement which all others 
make with the artists  is as follows:  You promise 
us to furnish this sort of  work in sufficient quanti- 
ty and of  excellent quality ; we, on the other hand, 
agree to purchase it only from you.  If  the profes- 
sions do not furnish excellent work, they lose the 
exclusive  right  granted  to  them  in  the compact. 
Hence, the examination of  candidates for a profes- 
sion is a matter of  common interest.  The govern- 
ment, or each profession  in  the name of  the gov- 
ernment, must calculate how many persons can live 
from each profession, and how many are necessary 
in each to satisfy the needs of  the public. 
If all can not make their living, government has 
made  a  miscalculation,  and must  bear  the conse- 
quences.  Those who  can  not sustain themselves 
from  the  profession  must  be  assigned  to  other 
branches of  business. 
But the artist can not live from  his works.  He 
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therefore,  necessary  that there  should  be  in  the 
state at all  times products enough to supply both 
the needs of  the producers themselves  and of  the 
artists.  These products  the producers  supply to 
the artists, and receive in return the works of  the 
artists ;  and vice versa.  Thus an exchange takes 
place, which government should regulate in the fol- 
lowing manner: Each piece of  work  must be ex- 
changed for as many products  as the artist needed 
during  the  time of  making  that  work;  and  vice 
versa.  Each product of  the producers must be ex- 
changed for works of  the artist in the same ratio. 
Ir short, there must be a complete equilibrium be- 
tween raw products and manufactured wares. 
There must not  be any more artists in a  coun- 
try than can be supplied by its products.  An un- 
fruitful soil does not admit of  luxury.  The people 
must retrench their needs.  Of course, this princi- 
ple is limited by the results of  external commerce, 
which we do not consider here, since we speak of 
each state as a whole in itself  But since such ex- 
ternal  commerce  renders  states  dependent,  each 
state should try to arrange itself  so as to be able to 
do without it. 
Every person  must have his requirements sup- 
plied  as soon  as possible.  To facilitate  this ex- 
change, therefore, it  is well  that a  class  of  men 
should devote themselves entirely to it-merchants. 
The  right to be a merchant is conferred exclusively 
upon  a  certain  number of  citizens, which  number 
the government must determine by calculation, as 
their  property in the state.  Of  course,  they also 
must be able to live from its results. 
All contracts of exchange, whether concluded be- 
tween the producers and artists directly or by means 
of  the merchants,  are guaranteed  by the govern- 
ment, and government must look to see that they 
are fulfilled, since without them a legal relation be- 
tween persons is impossible.  But since the state  can 
not guarantee that whereof  it has no cognizance, it 
must establish by law what contracts are to be valid 
and what contracts not.  A contract concluded  i?z 
violation of  the laws of  the state has no validity ; 
if  concluded  withoz~t  legal  form,  it  has  no  legal 
validity,  and  becomes  a  matter  of  private  honor 
and  morality.  The validity of  all  contracts is de- 
rived,  immediately or mediately by means of  posi- 
tive law, from the supreme principle of  law, accord- 
ing to the rule :  that, without which a legal relation 
between persons would be impossible, is absolutely 
valid in law. 
In this  exchange of  products for  manufactured 
wares  and  labor,  the  advantage is, of  course, de- 
cidedly  in  favor  of  the  producer.  He can  get 
along, at least to a great extent, without the works 
of  the artist; but  the artist can  not  live without 
the  products  of  the producer.  But  it  has  been 
agreed  in  the  property-compact  that  the  artist 
shall be able to live from  the results of  his labor, 
that is, that he shall always be able to obtain the 
proper  amounts of  products  for  his works, accord- 
ing to the standard already established.  The pro- 
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ducer is, therefore, bound by the property-compact 
to sell.  But these products  are, as we  have seen, 
his absolute property, and hence he ought to be at 
liberty to sell them  at as high a price as possible. 
It  now appears that this liberty can not be extended 
to him.  It will,  therefore,  be  necessary  to  fix  a 
highestprice for all articles of  food and for the most 
necessary articles  for  manufacture.  If the produ- 
cer  is not willing  to sell  at this  price,  and if  the 
state has not the power  to force him  to sell, the 
state may, at least, induce him to sell.  This it can 
best  accomplish  by  storing away  all  the  articles 
which it receives from the producers as their con- 
tribution  toward  the support of  the government, 
and selling them at the highest price at which the 
producer declines to sell.  The artist is never in a 
position to oppress the producer to any extent ; for 
he is always in  need of  articles of  food  (I speak 
here, of  course, of  a state organization such as has 
been  described,  and not  of  the existing state, in 
which  the farmer  has to pay his taxes in  money, 
and may, therefore, be compelled  to sell by those 
who hold the money.) 
A distinction must be  established, however, be- 
tween  those  manufactured wares which  are indis- 
pensable to the producer and those which are not 
so.  The former  class  comprises  all  tools of  agri- 
culture,  clothes,  houses,  etc.  Of  these  articles, 
likewise, the highest  price must be established, so 
that if  the artists should refuse to work or sell their 
wares  at that' price,  the state may do it.  Hence, 
government will also have to store away such tools, 
clothes, etc. ;  and will  also have to engage masons 
and carpenters,  who  may  build  houses  on  its ac- 
count  if  necessary.  The needs of  luxury  are not 
guaranteed  by the state,  and hence  need  not  be 
kept on hand.  The state ought to take care, like- 
wise,  that those articles which  are dispensable- 
particularly those which can only be imported from 
other countries, and the import whereof may, there- 
fore, become interrupted-shall  not become  indis- 
pensable.  This can  best  be attained by Ievying 
high  taxes  on  such articles.  The object of  these 
taxes must not be to make the income from the tax 
large, but to stop it altogether ;  and the tax should 
be increased-until the importation stops.  This, how- 
ever, must be done at the very commencement, and 
not after the state has encouraged the enjoyment 
of  such articles by its neglect, and has thus tacitly 
guaranteed their enjoyment. 
MONEY. 
It seems that we  have involved  ourselves  in a 
contradiction. 
T~~srs.-The  state guarantees to each citizen, 
who contributes toward the protection of  the state 
and to the support of  the poor, the absolute  and 
unlimited property of  the remainder of  his posses- 
sion.  Each must have the right to waste, destroy, 
or throw away what belongs  to him,  provided  he 
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ANTITHESIS.-The  State continually  takes  pas- 
session  of all the remainder-of  the  products  of 
the producers, and of  the wares  and  labor of  the 
artist-in  order thereby to make possible the neces- 
sary exchange, without which each can not be sure 
that he can sustain himself  froin the results of  his 
labor. 
To solve this contradiction we  must discover its 
ground. 
The state takes possession of  the remainder, not 
in respect to its  form, as remainder and as property, 
but in respect to its substance, as something which 
is necessary to sustain life. 
In order  to solve  the contradiction  thoroughly, 
fame and substance must, therefore,  be separated. 
The state must have the power of  taking the sub- 
stance without touching the  fom. 
Without exhibiting here unnecessary profundity, 
I  shall  solve the problem at once.  We must dis- 
cover a mere  form of  property,  a  mere sign of  it, 
which  is a sign of  whatever  is useful  in the state, 
without having in itself  the least use ;  for if it were 
useful in itself, the state would possess the right to 
claim  it, like the other  products,  for  public  pur- 
poses.  Such a mere fomz  of  property is called mo- 
ney.  The use of  money must be introduced  in a 
state necessarily ;  and this solves our problem.  The 
producer has not the right to keep his  products; 
he must sell them.  Nevertheless, they are his ab- 
solute property,  guaranteed  to  him  by  the state. 
True, he is not to give them away for  nothing, but 
in exchange for wares.  But he needs no wares at 
present, at least not those which are offered to him. 
Hence, he receives  money.  The same  applies to 
the artist. 
The state is obliged to furnish  to the producer 
wares for his products, and to the artist products 
for his wares.  They have received money for their 
respective  property,  not  wishing  to  exchange for 
wares or products at present.  Hence, as soon as 
they desire to make this  exchange, they must be 
able to effect it by means of  that money, which they 
hold  as the sign of  the value of  those articles.  In 
other words :  by  the issuing of  money  the  state 
guarantees  that  it will  furnish to  the  holder  of 
money  at any time,  for  his money,  those articles 
whereof the state has guaranteed the enjoyment to 
every one ; for  each piece of  money in the hands 
of  a private person is a sign of  an indebtedness on 
the-part of  the state. 
The amount of  money current  in a state repre- 
sents all that is purchasable  on the surface of  the 
state.  If the quantity of  purchasable  articles in- 
creases while  the quantity of  money  remains  the 
same, the value of the money increases in the same 
ratio ; if  the quantity of money increases while the 
quantity of  purchasable  articles remains the same, 
the value  of  money  decreases in  the  same ratio. 
Hence,  if  a  state is  considered  as isolated,  it is 
all the same whether there is much or little money 
in  it ; the increase  or decrease  is  merely  seem- 
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money always  represents the total of  all purchasa- 
ble  articles  in the state, and since, therefore, any 
part of it can always purchase a corresponding part 
of  that total. 
The conception  of  money  involves, as we  have 
seen, that its material must have no utility for men ; 
its value  must depend altogether upon  agreement 
and common opinion.  Each must merely know that 
every other one will  recognize  it as the equivalent 
of  a particular part of  all purchasable articles  in a 
state.  GoM is, therefore, excellent money ;  for its 
true value, its utility, is as nothing in comparison 
with its imaginary value as a sign.  Silver is not so 
good for money, for it is intrinsically very useful in 
itself  These two  substances have become money 
for all the world, both by reason of  their rarity, and 
because states can not arbitrarily increase them. 
Pajey or leather money is the best  money for  an 
isolated  state, if  counterfeiting  can be prevented, 
because its intrinsic value is as nothing  compared 
with its artificial value  as money.  The  objection, 
that a state may easily over-issue it, is  of  no force, 
since it is all the same whether the amount of  the 
circulation is large or small ; its value  rising and 
falling,  as we  have  shown,  in  proportion  to its 
amount. 
But since all  civilized  states of  the present age 
carry on foreign commerce, and since foreigners are 
not  generally inclined to receive a currency which 
can  be contracted  or expanded  ad  libitum,  these 
paper issues  must  be at a considerable  discount 
against  gold and silver.  The discount will  be the 
greater the more such a state imports from abroad, 
and the less it has to export in return. 
Coining money is the privilege of  the state alone ; 
for the state alone can guarantee its value to all citi- 
zens.  Hence,  mines  are a  necessary property of 
government. 
Citizens pay their  taxes  with  their products  or 
manufactures ; if  they choose,  however, they may 
also pay in money, since that is the state's author- 
ized representative of  all things.  But the citizens 
must have the privilege of  paying in those articles ; 
and the amount of  taxes must also be calculated by 
products and manufactures, for the reason that the 
value of  money is constantly fluctuating. 
Whatsoever  remains  to  the  citizens after they 
have paid  their taxes, is their property ; but since 
the state has the power to compel the exchange of 
such articles for others, each citizen receives money 
for that remainder.  This money is absolately pure 
property, over which the state has 120 Zofzgey ayy coolt- 
trod. 
Each piece of  money which I possess is, at the 
same time, a sign that I have fulfilled all  my civll 
obligations.  The state has no supervision over it. 
Taxation on money is absurd. 
Whatsoever citizens have bought with money for 
their private use-not  for trade, which is under the 
supervision of the state-all  furniture, clothing, jew- 
elry, etc., etc., is, for the same reason, absolute pro- 
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THE  HOUSE. 
The state is obliged  to protect all absolute pro- 
perty, as specified  above, and to guarantee to each 
citizen its secure possession.  But all these things, 
and particularly money, can not in any way be desig- 
nated as belonging  to such and no other persons. 
In the case of  land, corner-stones or wooden posts 
designate  property,  which  can,  therefore,  be  de- 
scribed on the record-books of  the governments as 
belonging  to such or  such  an individual ; but  all 
dollar-pieces look alike, and must look  alike, since 
they are intended to change owners ; how then can 
property in them be specified ? 
Again, the state can not take notice at all of  how 
much money each citizen possesses ; and even if  it 
were possible for the state to do so, the citizen need 
not suffer it.  But how can the state protect that 
whereof  it does not know, and which, in its nature, 
is wholly undeterminable?  If  the state is  bound 
to afford this protection  to the undetermined, that 
undeterminable property must be inseparably con- 
nected  with  something  else which  is  determined 
and which is expressly posited  as the symbol of  ald 
nbsolz~tejroje~ty,  thereby being removed altogether 
from the supervision of the state.  This determined 
something must be visible, known and determinable 
through the person of  the owner. 
This determined something, with which  the un- 
determinable  property is to be connected, may be 
of two  natures,  as will  appear immediately.  The 
state has guaranteed  to each citizen who  has paid 
his contributions the full use of all his manufactured, 
built,  or  bought possessions.  By this guaranteed 
use the state has characterized or determined pro- 
perty.  It  is, therefore, to be presupposed, until the 
contrary is proved, that that which a person imme- 
diately uses is his ;  for in a well-administered state 
it is not  to be assumed  that a  person  should  be 
making use of  any thing against the will  of  the 
law.  Immediate  use,  however,  connects  articles 
with  the body.  Hence, whatsoever  a  person car- 
ries in his hands or on or upon his body, belongs 
to such a  person.  Money,  which  I  carry in  my 
hands or in my clothes, is mine,  as the clothes are 
mine to which the money is attached.  (The Lazza- 
roni  always  carry all  their  absolute  property  on 
their body.) 
Not only that which I use immediately, however, 
but also that which I intend  for future use, is my 
absolute property.  Now it is not to be assumed, 
nor can it be required, that I shall always carry it 
all on my body.  Hence, there must be a surrogate 
of  the body, whereby that which is connected with 
this  surrogate may be designated as my property 
absolutely by reason of  thus being connected with 
it.  Such a  surrogate we call  the house, using the 
word in its widest significance as designating equal- 
ly the room which  a person  has rented, the trunk 
of  the servant, etc.  My house is immediately un- 
der the protection and guarantee of  the state, and 
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guarantees me against all violent enhance into my 
house.  But the state knows  not and has no right 
to know what is in the house,  Hence, the single 
objects in it, as such, are under my own protection 
and under my own  absolute control.  In like man- 
ner all my actions in the house are under my own 
absolute control, provided  their effect does not  ex- 
tend  beyond  the house.  The supervision of  the 
state extends to the lock upon the door, and there 
begins mine own.  The lock is  the boundary line 
between the power of  the government and my own 
private power.  It is the intention of  locks to make 
possible self-protection.  In  my own house my per- 
son is sacred and inviolable even to the government. 
In civil cases government has no right to attack me 
in my house, but must wait  till I am  upon  public 
ground.  In our investigation of  Crzwzz?zal Law, we 
shall see how this sacred house-right may be lost. 
The house designates and determines  my abso- 
lute property.  Something is my absolute property, 
because it has got into the house-of  course with 
the knowledge  and  consent  of  the government. 
The fact of  my having a house and  something in 
it is  the best proof, in a state such as we are de- 
scribing, that I have completed my obligations to- 
ward the state, for the state first appropriates what 
I owe to it. 
If I  am  absolute  master  and  protector  in my 
house,  using  the word  as described  above,  then 
every thing that enters my house stands under my 
authority and my protection. 
No one has the right to enter my house against 
my will.  Even the state can not compel me to ex- 
tend this permission, since even the state can not 
enter against  my will.  In the  house we  are  no 
longer under the supervision and guarantee of  the 
government, but under  our  own  supervision  and 
protection, and hence we enter each other's houses, 
so far  as our  personal  security is  concerned,  on 
trust and faith in each other.  Whatsoever occurs 
in the house  is a  private  affair,  and  may  be for- 
given by the injured party ;  but whatsoever occurs 
publicly is  a  public  crime, and can not  be so for- 
given.  In the house a tacit agreement of  mutual 
personal security is presupposed.  Whosoever vio- 
lates this agreement becomes infamous,  that is, un- 
trustworthy for all future time. 
(Thus, indeed, has a deep-rooted moral sentiment 
decided long ago among all nations.  Everywhere 
it is considered infamous, if  a landlord  insults his 
guest, or  a  guest his landlord  in his own  house. 
Everywhere  secret  theft  has been  held  to be in- 
famous to a  degree which  never was  attached to 
open  and  bold  robbery.  Perhaps  the  latter  is 
quite as dangerous as the former ; and hence this 
general opinion  is  not inspired  by  egotism.  But 
robbery is bold, and opposes, confessedly, force to 
another  force,  which  is  not  deceived;  whereas 
theft is cowardly, using the confidence of  the other 
with a view to violating it.) 
Whatever  is  in  the house-cash,  furniture, vict- 
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yond  the supervision  of  the state, and hence the 
right of  property to such articles is not immediate- 
ly guaranteed by  the government.  If I lend  my 
money to the other on his word, and he denies the 
loan, I  have no redress from  the state, since our 
contract was not concluded under the guarantee of 
the  state,  and  since I can  not,  therefore,  legally 
prove the debt.  But if  I  take  his note-the  state 
having announced such a note to be a legal  proof 
of the debt-then  the state owes me protection and 
redress against him.  Contracts concluded upon mere 
trust and faith admit of  no legal redress ; their vio- 
lation is punished solely by loss of  character. 
GOOD NAME. 
The honor or character of a citizen is constituted 
by the  opinion  of  his  fellow-citizens,  that  he is 
faithful  and trustworthy in all cases which  are be- 
yond  the reach of  the state ; for  where  the state 
extends its power of compulsion, trust and faith are 
not taken at all into consideration. 
The government  has neither the right  nor  the 
power to command that the citizens shall trust each 
other ; for  the state is the very result of  distrust ; 
nay, it is even the object of distrust, as shown in the 
constitution. 
But  neither  has  the  government  the  right  to 
prohibit trust and confidence.  True, it has a per- 
fect right  to  decree  that  none  of  its  own  affairs 
shall be transacted on the basis of  trust and confi- 
dence, and to annul  the legal  results of  all enact- 
ments thus made.  For instance:  the state has a 
perfect right to pass a law, that land or houses shall 
not be sold otherwise than in the prescribed  legal 
form ;  for the government must always know the 
legal  owner thereof.  But  since the state has no 
supervision over the whole  region of  absolute pro- 
perty, nay, has not the right to take  any notice of 
it whatever,  it follows  that each  citizen  must be 
permitted  to  do with his  absolute  property what- 
ever he pleases to do with it.  He may  throw it 
away or destroy it, and hence  he may also loan it 
upon  trust.  Money,  or  any articles  of  personal, 
absolute property, may, therefore, be  loaned with- 
out the authority of  the law. 
Nevertheless, the state must protect the absolute 
property of  each  citizen.  How, then,  can  it pro- 
tect him against infamous  characters ?  Simply by 
warning all citizens against all mnz  Known  to  be 
infnnzous. 
The property-compact  involves  both  the  right 
and duty to  do  this ; for  the  state must  protect 
against all dangers, and infamy is a  great danger. 
Hence, the state ought to make that danger impos- 
sible as much as it may.  This it can do by inflict- 
ing upon the acts hereinbefore specified the punish- 
ment of  infamy. 
No one has the right to demand that other citi- 
zens should trust him, or that the state should com- 
pel them to trust him.  Confidence is required and 
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demand that he shall not be proclaimed  infamous 
without  legal  conviction.  The confidence of  his 
fellow-citizens  is  worth  a  great  deal  to him,  and 
perhaps  he may require it hereafter.  Hence, no 
one has a right to deprive him  of  this  possibility 
by falsely charging him with infamy. 
The right to  a good name  is, therefore, simply 
the right not to be falsely proclaimed infamous.  It 
is a mere negative right.  The  state has guaranteed 
it by agreeing  not to interfere with public opinion, 
and the natural order of  things in this respect. 
THE  RIGHT  OF PERSONAL  SECURITY. 
The freedom  and  absolute  inviolability  of  the 
body of  each citizen is not expressly guaranteed in 
the  municipal  compact,  but  is  rather  constantly 
presupposed  together with the personality of  each 
citizen.  The very possibility of  the compact, and 
of  all  its contents, is grounded upon  it.  No one 
may beat, push, or hold a citizen without infringing 
upon the use of  his  freedom, and diminishing  his 
activity  and well-being.  Blows  or wounds  inflict 
pain ;  and  each  one  has  the  right  to  be  as well 
as nature permits  him  to  be ; and  another  free 
being has not  the right to infringe  upon  it.  An 
attack upon the body of a citizen is an attack upon 
all the rights which a citizen has in a state, and is, 
therefore, indeed, a crime in the state. 
Hence, whenever I am  on Public dominion, that 
is,  outside of  my  house,  I  am  always  ander the 
protection  and guarantee of  the state.  Each  at- 
tack  on  my-person  in  such  places  is  a  public 
crime, which the state is obliged to investigate and 
punish, and which the parties interested must  not 
be  allowed  to  settle  among  themselves.  But 
whilst I am in my house, I am  not  under the pro- 
tection  nor  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state, 
although the house itself  stands under  that juris- 
diction.  Hence,  a  forcible  entrance,  whether  by 
day or by night, is a public crime, and must be pun- 
ished  as  such.  But  persons who  enter  quietly, 
withoz~t  havizg- broken  ojerz  the loch-and  for  this 
reason the custom of  knocking at a door has  been 
introduced,  and  should  always  be  upheld ; the 
"  Come  in !"  giving the necessary legal authority 
to enter-have  entered with  my consent, and stay 
with  me as a matter of  mutual  faith and trust  in 
each other.  I  have not presupposed that they will 
attack  me or my  property,  or  else  I  should  not 
have admitted them. 
But supposing that, nevertheless, they should at- 
tack me, my body or my property, or both, if I de- 
fend  my  property  with  my  body,  is  the state in 
such a case bound to protect me or not ? 
The state does  not  know what happens  in my 
house, has not the right publicly to know it, nor to 
act as if  it knew it.  If the state is to take cogni- 
zance of  it, it must be because I myself have legal- 
ly made  it known  to the state, that is, by having 
preferred complaint. 
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judge,  applies  only to the  cases  which  happen 
within private  dominion ; but  on  no  account  to 
occurrences  upon  public  dominion.  Bar-rooms, 
coffee-houses, in short, all  places  which  one may 
enter who proposes to spend money, are under pub- 
lic jurisdiction ; and  all violations  of  law  happen- 
ing in such places must be investigated and pun- 
ished  by  the state, whether  complaint  has  been 
preferred or not. 
But is the state really obliged to take cognizance 
of my complaint concerning occurrences in my own 
house,  and  if  so, why?  The reason  is this : the 
state is obliged to protect  me and  all my property 
in my house ; not  immediately, however, but only 
mediately.  The immediate protection of  the state 
would violate  my  right  because its condition, the 
taking  cognizance of  it by the state, would violate 
my right.  If  I resign this right by voluntarily giv- 
ing the state notice of  the facts, I submit immedi- 
ately to the state what previously was  only medi- 
ately under the state's jurisdiction.  Of course, this 
must  be specified  in  the penal  law, so that every 
citizen may act accordingly. 
But by this arrangement we get into a great dif- 
ficulty.  For if  a citizen is killed in his own house, 
he can not  prefer complaint.  Perhaps he also has 
no relatives, who may do it for him ;  or his relatives 
may  have been  implicated in his murder.  Since 
the state  has no jurisdiction over the house, it would 
seem that there is no legal protection against such 
murder; nay, more, that the law  expressly invites 
thieves and  robbers to add murder to their crimes, 
so  that  no  complaint  can  be  preferred  against 
them. 
This can  not be the case.  There must be some 
rational  solution  of  this  difficulty.  Let us  look 
for it. 
If  the murdered man were alive, he might prefer 
complaint or might pardon.  He  has been unjustly 
killed ; he ought still to live, and the state does not 
know of hinl yet except as living, since he has been 
killed  beyond  the jurisdiction  of  the  state.  The 
state has still the right  to ask him  what  he has 
resolved  to  do  concerning that  occurrence,  and 
hence his will is to be assumed, with perfect exter- 
nal  right, as still continuing to exist  for the state. 
The murdered  man has not determined this will of 
his ;  but it is determined, declared, and guaranteed 
by the general will of  all the  citizen.^ of  the state, 
regarded as separate indi?~idtLals  ;  not  by the com- 
mon will of the state as a body, for the state judges, 
decides, and grants, but does not demand and sue in 
the present case.  (We shall speak of  this general 
will  of the iltdividztals of  a  state again, when  we 
come to speak  of  Wills ; for  this general will  is 
manifested always when it is the interest of  all the 
individuals of a state that a deceased citizen should 
have had  a will,  and that his will  should be still 
valid ; because they all wish that, in a like case, the 
same should be assumed of  them.)  How, then, is 
the will of  the  murdered  man  determined  by  the 
general will of  all  citizens ?  They all  say, his will 
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would have been to prefer complaint.  Hence, there 
should  be  a  representative  of  the general will  in 
regard  to this last will of  the deceased-a  sort of 
public  prosecutor ; for the state can not prefer the 
complaint,  since the state does  not  and can not 
know of  the murder; and each  private citizen has 
the right to see that this public prosecutor does his 
duty.  Each one has the right to notify him of such 
occurrences, and to prefer complaint against him if 
he neglects to prefer  complaint against  the mur- 
derer. 
Each  private  citizen  must  not  only  have  the 
right, but must be obliged to give public  notice of 
what he knows of  such occurrences, and must be- 
come  liable to punishment if  he neglects  to do so. 
Nay, even the government  takes, to some extent, 
notice of  the occurrence, since it must take notice 
of  the death and the manner of  death of  all  citi- 
zens-for  to die is a public  act.  All doctors must 
be  under  the  supervision  of  the  government. 
Hence, it  is  rather in  the interest of  the offender 
to spare the life of the attacked party ; for so long 
as that party lives,  he may forgive ; but when he 
dies, his  cause  devolves  upon  the people  and the 
public prosecutor ; and the people can not pardon, 
for the sake of  their own security. 
No one has the right to defend with his own body 
property which is  ~narked  by  the state,  and thus to 
jeopardize his own life and the life of  his opponent ; 
for so far as such property is concerned,  title can 
always be  proved, even if  it should be taken  pos- 
session of  by the other party, and the true owner 
can be reinstated and have his aggressor punished 
by the state. 
But property which is not thus marked, the title 
to which  can only be proved  by its actual posses- 
sion, either upon one's body or in one's house, each 
person  has the right to defend- even at the risk of 
the  life  of  the assailant.  The question, What is 
money worth compared to life ? can not be properly 
asked in such cases.  For that question rests upon 
moral, not legal, considerations.  Each person  has 
the absolute  right  to prevent any one from taking 
things away from him by force, and to prevent it at 
all hazards.  A violent attack upon my property, if 
I protect it by my own person, thus becomes an at- 
tack upon my body, and I have the same right of 
self-defense.  The ground of  this right is, that the 
assistance of  the state is not immediately on hand, 
and that the defense-since  the property to be de- 
fended can ~zot  be r@Zaced--must  be immediate. 
We have thus obtained,  at the same time,  the 
*The limitations of  this right, as here exposed, deserve  particu- 
lar notice in our republic, where no right is more shamefully abus- 
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limit of  the right of  self-defense.  I have this right 
only in so far as the state can not defend me ;  hence, 
it must not be my fault that the state can not do so, 
and I am legally bound  to do my best  to make it 
possible for the state to do so.  I am bound to call 
upon the state for help, and this is done by calZz7zr 
for he@.  It  is absolutely necessary to do this, and 
it is the exclusive condition of  the right of  self-de- 
fense.  The code of  laws should specify it, and citi- 
zens should be taught it from  their earliest youth, 
so that they may accustom  themselves to it.  For 
how, if  I  murder some one, and say: He assailed 
me, and I  could  save my life  only by taking his ? 
The murdered man can not expose my lie.  But if 
I call for help, I can  prove  that I was  the attack- 
ed party; or,  at least,  if  the contrary can  not  be 
proved  against  me,  the  presumption  remains  in 
favor of  my innocence. 
(The laws of the twelve tables justified the killing 
of  a  thief who defended himself, and very correct- 
ly, if  he had stolen unmarked property ;  for no one 
can be required to let things be taken from him to 
which he can not afterward prove his right of  pro- 
perty.  He was justified  in reclaiming  the articles 
by force.  If the thief  defended himself, the attack 
upon the property became an attack upon the per- 
son of  the injured party, and hence he was justified 
in defending himself  at the risk of  killing the thief. 
But the law  required  him,  as a  condition  of  that 
right of defense, to cry out for help ;  and again very 
correctly,  for  only by thus crying out for help did 
he place himself  in a position  to get the public to 
witness his innocence, or to obtain assistance which 
might secure the thief  and obviate the necessity of 
killing him ) 
Such an attack upon unmarked property may oc- 
cur either upon public territory or in my house.  In 
the first case, the application of the above principles 
is clear enough.  In the latter case, no private per- 
son, not even government, has the right- to enter my 
Rouse.  It is only by crying out for help that I jus- 
tify government and every private  person to enter 
my house.  My crying out for help  is a  complaint 
preferred, and hence a voluntary abandoning of my 
house-right. 
Each person who hears another one cry for help 
is lawfully bound by the state-compact to hasten to 
his  assistance.  For  all i?zdividuals have promised 
to all itzzdzvviduals to protect  them ;  and the cry for 
he@ is the annoutzcement that a danger exists, which 
the representative of the protecting power, the govern- 
ment, can not immediate@  remove.  Hence, the cry 
for help confers upon each individual again not only 
the right but also the obligation to render immedi- 
ate protection.  If it can be proved  that a citizen 
heard the cry for help and did  not hurry to assist- 
ance, he is liable to punishment ;  for he has violated 
the original municipal compact, and the law should 
provide  punishment for  such cases.  Such assist- 
ance in need  is not only moml and religious duty, 
but is the absolute duty of  citzzensh+. 
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duty than to part the combatants, but on no accoun 
have they a right to decide their dispute.  For the 
grounded extends no further than the ground.  The 
immediate right of  protection is grounded upon the 
prese~zt  danger; and that danger has been removed 
by the interference of  the others.  The  judicial de- 
cision  and investigation  on  the part  of  the state 
can now be safely awaited for.  It is, for instance, 
an unlawful  barbarism  which  should  be  severely 
punished, when  mobs  punish  criminals  after  they 
have been caught.  As soon as the immediate dan- 
ger has been removed, by the capture of  such crimi- 
nals, government again becomes sole protector and 
judge. 
There is still another case of  self-defense, based 
upon  a  pretended  right  of  ~zecessity, the  theory 
whereof we  shall also consider in this connection. 
This right is said to come into play when two free 
beings are brought by mere natural casualty-and 
on no account  by any action of  their own-into  a 
position wherein the one person  can save himself 
only by the death of  the other, wherein  both must 
die unless one of  them is sacrificed.  This category 
of  supposed cases includes that wonderful problem 
of  the  law  colleges,  which  assumes  a  board,  to 
which  two  shipwrecked  persons  cling,  the board 
being  only large enough  for  one ; and which  pro- 
blem has recently been changed for the more ac- 
commodating illustration of a boat of the same quali- 
ties as the board.  But having clearly determined 
this whole class of  cases, we may well refrain from 
examples. 
Much pains have  been  taken to soIve this law- 
problem, and various solutions have been proposed, 
simply because the legal principle involved has not 
been clearly thought. 
The  problem of the Science of Rights is, How may 
many free beings, as such, exist together?  In thus 
inquiring after the manner of  such a  coexistence, 
the possibility of  such coexistence is evidentlypre- 
supposed ;  and hence, when this possibility does not 
exist, the inquiry after the manner of  its existence 
is clearly inadmissible.  Such is the case in the as- 
sumed  instance.  Hence,  there  exists no  positive 
right to sacrifice another individual  to the preser- 
vation of  my existence ; but  neither  is it against 
the conception of  rights, that is, it is not  in  con- 
flict with any positive right of  the other to sacrifice 
his  life  to the preservation  of  my own.  In short, 
the question of  right and not right does not enter 
here at all.  Nature has canceled her permission 
for both of  us to live ; and the decision is a matter 
which physical strength or free will may settle.  It 
may be, however, that this free will, which is not de- 
termined by the conception of rights in the present 
instance, stands under a higher legislation-the  mo- 
ral law.  Such, indeed, is the case.  Morality tells 
each of  the two : Do nothing at all, but leave the 
matter to God, who can certainly save you, if  it is 
his will, and to whom  you must surrender your life 
if  it is his will.  This consideration, however, does 
not properly belong to a Science of  Rights. 
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cised,  whether  upon  provocation  or by accident, 
the person who  has exercised it is obliged  to sur- 
render himself  to the government for justification, 
and to prove  that he went beyond the pale of  the 
laws of  the state only because a case had arisen  in 
which those laws could not be applied.  The person 
who does not voluntarily thus give notice of  the fact, 
renders himself  liable to suspicion. 
The last will of  the person killed is, presumptive- 
ly, that the deed shall be investigated.  It  is, there- 
fore, the duty of  the public prosecutor to prefer the 
complaint.  The defendant is not obliged to furnish 
the positive  proof  that he did act in  self-defense; 
for in the fewest cases, however just  the provoca- 
tion, could such a  proof  be procured.  Provided it 
can not be proved  against him  that he acted with- 
out  sufficient  cause,  judicial  proceedings  against 
him  must  be suspended.  A complete exoneration 
can not be pronounced unless he can furnish posi- 
tive proof.  Concerning  this mere suspension  of 
judicial  proceedings,  we  shall  have  more  to  say 
hereafter, when speaking of  Criminal Law. 
The property and honor of citizens is thus clear- 
ly defined  and secured as perfectly  as their life ; 
nor does it appear  likely  that greater  security  is 
obtainable. 
ACQUISITION  AND  DERELICTION  OF FROPERTY. 
We speak hcre of acquisition of property only in 
the strictest  meaning of  the  word,  as signifying 
really  the  acquisition  of  a new kind  of  property, 
and not as signifying a mere exchange or trade of 
similar property. 
All property is of  a  double nature ; it is either 
absolute, and hence not under the jurisdiction of 
the state, as money and valuables, etc., or relative, 
and immediately under the jurisdiction of the state, 
as real estate, houses, licenses, etc. 
When  both kinds  of  property  are exchanged, 
that is, when a sale takes place, each party acquires 
a new kind of property, and hence the supposed ac- 
quisition takes place.  It is clear enough that the 
deed of  sale must be concluded  under the supervi- 
sion of  the state, that is, according to the forms of 
law, and must be guaranteed by the state.  For the 
state has all  this  property under its jurisdiction, 
protects it and assigns it to the proper person ; the 
state must, therefore, know the owner.  No one is 
the legal owner of  such a piece of property, except 
through  the  recognition  of  the state.  The only 
question  can, therefore,  be,  whether  the state is 
obliged to give its consent to all such sales or con- 
tracts  between  private  persons ; or  whether the 
state may interfere, and to what extent. 
The legal  end of  the state in  all  the property 
conveyed to citizens  is, that this property shall be 
properly  used  for  the  necessities  of  the  state. 
Hence,  the  purchaser  must  agree to use  it,  and 
must be  in a  position to be able to use it; for in- 
stance, if  he purchases  lands, he must be able  to 
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Whether houses  may be purchased  for the pur- 
pose of  pulling them down depends upon the spe- 
cial provisions of  the law, which  always shapes it- 
self according to circumstances. 
Again :  since the seller retires from the jurisdic- 
tion of the state, so far as the money he receives in 
consideration is concerned, which is absolute pro- 
perty, and since, nevertheless, the state guarantees 
him a living, the sale must  be of  such a character 
that the sustenance of  the seller is perfectly secur- 
ed, and may never  devolve upon  the state.  This 
can  be done either when the seller  retains a claim 
upon  his  property  in  the  shape  of  a  mortgage, 
etc., or when  he  loans  out  the  purchase-money 
under the supervision of  the state.  I-Ie  is not ab- 
solute proprietor of  his  money so long as it is his 
only sustenance, he being responsible  to the state 
for his ability to make his living. 
A  second mode of acquiring and ceding property 
is, where the party who deeds it away receives  no 
equivalent for it-bequests  am! last wills. 
Property thus bequeathed may be either absolute 
or relative.  Absolute property may, of  course, be 
given  away without  form of  law, the state having 
no jurisdiction  over  it.  Relative  property,  how- 
ever, can be bequeathed only in the form prescribed 
by law.  The same condition  applies  here which 
applies to sales: the bequeather  must  retain suffi- 
cient  to  sustain his  life.  A bequest  conveys full 
title, and can not be repealed. 
A will conveys  property after the death of  the 
grantor.  The important  question  is  here :  How 
can  the will of  a  dead  person  be  obligatory upon 
the living ?  The conception of  rights applies only 
to persons  who  stand, or may stand in  reciprocal 
influence  with  each  other  in  the  sensuous world. 
Dead persons have, therefore, at first view, no rights, 
and their property reverts to the state, which is the 
first claimant, since no individual can take posses- 
sion without the state's permission.  But it is very 
possible that a man  may cherish in  his  life wishes 
for others after his death ;  and the firm belief  that 
those wishes will be carried out after such death as 
well,  is frequently  a  real  present  advantage-for 
instance :  better attendance, care, and love of  those 
who are the presumptive heirs, are an actual bene- 
fit of  life.  In short, the conviction  that wills  are 
valid  is an enjoyment of  life, to which  it may well 
be possible  to acquire a  right.  This is the only 
proper  point of  view  from  which  to consider  this 
matter.  The question is not one concerning the 
rights of  the dead-the  dead  have  no rights-but 
of  the living. 
Whenever  the  necessity  of  such  a  conviction 
arises among men, provisions will  be  made  for  it 
in the property-compact ;  that is, all will guarantee 
that conviction to all. 
But it should be constantly  kept in mind  that 
this agreement is arbitrary ; that is to say, a legal 
relation  among men  is possible  without  such an 
arrangement.  It is not  necessary that a  law dis- 
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dead, since the state is ready to claim them.  I call 
this agreement regarding the validity of  wills arbi- 
trary, therefore, merely because it is not necessary 
for the realization of  the conception of  rights. 
The conviction that wills will be considered valid 
after  death can  be  realized  only by establishing a 
law that all wills, without  exception, shall be thus 
considered.  Each one,  then,  guarantees  for  his 
own sake to all others the validity of their will, and 
in doing so guarantees his own will.  The  right of 
the dying is thus made to connect with the rights 
of  all  surviving citizens.  It is not the dying per- 
son's own will which the state respects, but the will 
of  all surviving individuals. 
It  is the business of  the public administrator, as 
the representative of  the will of  all individuals of a 
state, to watch over the wills, and see that they are 
properly executed.  He must not be a member  of 
the government, since the government  is an inter- 
ested party in the matter, but simply a representa- 
tive of  the people, as individuals, precisely like the 
public prosecutor. 
Hence, likewise, every private person must have 
the right to prefer complaint against him. 
Wills  should  be  executed  in  presence  of  this 
administrator  and of  witnesses who  represent the 
public. 
Since  the  legal  validity  of  wills  is arbitrarily 
established, it follows that the law may also provide 
how far the right  shall extend to inherit at all.  It 
is the duty of the legislator, with due regard to the 
peculiar  circumstances and conditions of  his state, 
to  establish  such  provisions.  There  is  only one 
npriori limitation to this right of  willing away pro- 
perty, namely, that the heirs of  the deceased must 
be  provided  for sufficiently, that is, that they may 
not become a burden to the state. 
PENAI.  LAW. 
THESIS.-Whosoever  violates the municipal com- 
pact in any manner, whether from neglect or inten- 
tionally, loses, strictly speaking, all  his  rights as a 
citizen and as a man, and becomes an outlaw. 
PROOF.-A  person  has rights  only on condition 
that he proves himself  fit for a community of  free 
beings,  that  is,  that  he makes  the  fundamental 
principle of  law his constant rule of  action ;  and is 
also able to actually determine  his free acts by the 
representation of that principle.  He  who willingly 
violates  the law  has not  made  that  principle  his 
rule of  action ;  and he who violates it through care- 
lessness is not able to determine  his  acts by that 
principle.  In either  case, therefore, the condition 
of a person's having rights does not exist, and hence 
with  the condition  the conditioned  also vanishes. 
In either case the person  has no rights, and is an 
outlaw. 
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a  state government is to secure  to  each  the full 
possession of  his rights ; and the state has only to 
discover  and  apply  the  means  which  will  secure 
this  object.  Hence, if  that object can be attained 
without  the absolute  outlawing  of  transgressors, 
the state is not necessarily obliged to affix this pun- 
ishment to violations of  the law.  It may do so or 
not as it pleases.  If,  moreover,  it should appear 
that the interest of  the state requires the preserva- 
tion of its citizens, and that each citizen is likewise 
interested  in not  having  each little offense of  the 
laws  punished  by  outlawing  the  transgressor,  a 
compact of  the following  character would  become 
necessary :  All  citizens promise to all citizens that 
they shall  not  be outlawed and  expelled  from the 
state by reason of  their offenses, provided  such be 
compatible with  public  security.  Let us  call this 
compact the compact of  expiation. 
Such a compact is equally useful  for all (for the 
whole state) and for each single person.  For the 
whole state has thus the prospect of  retaining citi- 
zens whose  usefulness  far exceeds  the injury they 
may do, and obliges itself merely to accept the ex- 
piation.  The single individual, on the other hand, 
has thus the perfect  nght  to ask that his expiation 
shall  be  received  in place of  the greater punish- 
ment which  he has deserved.  It is a  very useful 
and important  right, this right of  citizens to expi- 
ate offenses. 
This compact becoming a law, the government is 
bound to act according to it. 
Of course, the right of  expiation extends no fur- 
ther than is compatible with public security.  If it 
is made to extend further, it is irrational ;  and a state 
in which it extends beyond this limit, is not a legal 
state at all ; that is, does not sufficiently guarantee 
public security, and has no claim to toleration. 
Punishment is not an absolute end.  In fact, the 
proposition  that punishment. is an end for itself, as 
is,  for  instance,  involved  in  the expression, "  He 
who has killed must die," is positively meaningless. 
Punishment  is merely a means for  the end of  the 
state "to maintain  public  security ;"  and the only 
intention in providing punishment is to prevent by 
threats transgressions of  the law.  The end of  all 
penal laws is, that they may not be  applied.  The 
threatened  punishment is intended to suppress all 
evil purposes  and to promote  a  good disposition, 
so  that  the  punishment  may  never  be  applied. 
Hence,  in  order  to  attain  this  end, each  citizen 
must know that the threat of  the law will invaria- 
bly become reality if  he should commit any offense. 
It  is, therefore, to some extent true, that punish- 
ment serves as an example, namely, to convince all 
of  the infallible execution of  the law.  But the ori- 
ginal intention of  punishment  was  solely to deter 
the criminal from  the crime.  Now, since this end 
could not be attained, he having committed a crime, 
his punishment  has another aim  in view, namely, 
to deter other citizens from  committing the same 
offense.  The execution of  the penal  law is, there- 
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an offense, must  also learn that it has been  pun- 
ished.  It would be an evident injustice toward all 
those who  might, in  future, be tempted  to violate 
the same law, if  the actual punishment of previous 
violations  of  that  law  had  been  concealed  from 
them;  for  such concealment  would  lead  them to 
hope for escape from punishment. 
The  material principle of  positive punishments in 
a state has already been  suggested.  Each indivi- 
dual must stake precisely that portion of  his rights 
and  privileges (his  property, in the widest  signifi- 
cance of  the word) which  he is tempted to violate 
in the others, whether wilfully or through neglect. 
In other words, the punishment  must be equal to 
the crime: pens talionis.  Each one must know, 
that the injury he may intend  to do to the other 
will be done to himself. 
The essence of  this principle is, as we have also 
seen, that a sufficient counterpoise must be estab- 
lished for the evil intention or the neglect. 
Whenever this principle becomes applicable, the 
compact of  expiation can become valid ;  and hence 
the legal extent of  the validity of  that compact de- 
pends upon the answer to the question: How far is 
such a counterpoise possible ? 
This counterpoise becomes  possible  or impossi- 
ble,  first,  either from  the nature of  the case,  or, 
second, from  the peculiar  position  of  the subject 
for whom the punishment is intended. 
PUNISHMENT  BY FINES. 
I. a. Such a  sufficient counterpoise, or a punish- 
ment which may be perfectly equal to the crirne com- 
mitted, is  practicable  from  the nature of the case 
where a wrong has been  committed through care- 
lessness, and where the will of  the criminal was  a 
materialiter evilwill, having selfish ends in view, and 
longing for the possession of another man's property. 
There is, however, this distinction : In the case of 
carelessness, a fine equal to the amount of damage 
done is equal to the injury committed; but in the 
case of  a crime, the criminal must not only restore 
what is  taken, but must,  moreover,  pay  an equal 
amount from his own property, in order to have the 
punishment made equal to the offense.  For if you 
take away from him merely that which he has taken, 
he will always be tempted to commit the same crime, 
having nothing to lose and every thing to gain.  By 
establishing the theory of  a sufficient counterpoise, 
however,  and hencp  by making him  pay precisely 
the same amount which  he has stolen, there is no 
inducement for him to steal.  In case of  discovery, 
he will  lose precisely the amount he would gain if 
not discovered.  Hence, the only incentive to rob 
would be the consideration that the chances of dis- 
covery were in his favor.  But such a probability is 
not likely to happen in a well-regulated state. 
6.  The principle of a counterpoise is not applica- 
ble  from  the nature of  the case when  the will of 
the transgressor is formaliter evil ;  that is, when the 
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violation of  the law is done, not for the sake of get- 
ting possession of another person's goods, but mere- 
ly for  the sake of  injuring the other.  For such a 
forffzaliter evil will is not deterred by the punish- 
ment of  an equal  loss ; nay, an envious,  malicious 
person may gladly submit to such loss, provided his 
enemyis also injured.  Unless we find some other 
means of  protecting citizens against such a forfza- 
liter evil  will,  the only punishment  adequate to it 
must be outlawing, or exclusion from the state.  Let 
us consider this subject. 
Firstly, it is to be remarked that we have here a 
case where the sentiments and intentions which in- 
spired the crime must be taken notice of  Never- 
theless, it should  not  be  held  that this is a  case 
wherein the morality of  the act is considered.  No 
man can and no man should be the judge of another's 
morality.  The  only object of civil punishment, and 
the only measure of  its degree is the possibility of 
public security.  Violations of the law, prompted by 
malicious intentions, are to be punished more severe- 
ly than violations  inspired by selfish motives ; not 
because  they  are  more  irn7?zoraZ*-morality,  in- 
deed, has no degrees ; and there is only one morali- 
ty-but  because the fear of  a milder punishment, a 
punishment simply of  equal loss, would  not afford 
adequate security. 
Hence, the question arises : How can it be known 
*Moreover, who woulcl assert that the man whose malicious act 
evinces, zt lea- , .~urage  and energy, is more dead to morality than 
the man who is prompted only by egotism? 
and proved for external law what motives  inspired 
the crime ; and what punishment  shall be applied 
to crimes prompted by malicious motives ? 
He  who can prove that he stood in need of  what 
he has appropriated  from  the other, and for what 
purposes he needed it, etc., is to be considered as 
having appropriated it for  the sake of  selfish gain. 
He  who can not  prove this, who, perhaps, did  not 
even take or intend  to  take the property  of  the 
other,  but merely destroyed it, has made himself lia- 
ble to another doubt : Did he injure it intentionally 
and maliciously, or inadvertently ? 
We have  two  criterions for  malicious  motives ; 
one external and one internal criterion.  We  have 
an external criterion when previous free acts of the 
same person  can be proved,  which  can  be  inter- 
preted  only as means for the final end to effect a 
malicious injury. 
On the other hand, the person who pretends that 
he has injured the other's property unintentionally, 
must  be able to fz~rtzis/t positive proof  that those 
other acts which are connected with the injury had 
quite a dzferent  end in view.  Unless  he can fur- 
nish this proof, he is to be held  as convicted of  a 
malicious act. 
And  yet remarkable connections of circumstances 
are possible which will  give to an accidental crime 
all the appearance of  premeditated maliciousness, 
without any true ground.  Hence, regard must also 
be paid  to the i~tzternad  criterion of  maliciousness, 
namely, whether the two  persons  have  previously 3  so  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  35I 
been enemies, and whether the accused has exhibi- 
ted signs of malicious intent in his previous life. 
But how if  all this circumstantial evidence nei- 
ther proves the suspicion nor removes it complete- 
ly, as is very possible ?  A great number of  jurists 
recommend in such cases a mild sentence ;  but such 
mildness exhibited toward a guilty person is a great 
injury to the commonwealth.  By thinking the case 
clearly, the solution of this problem will show itself. 
The  investigation is not yet closed, and can not be 
closed by the proofs  furnished as yet ; hence, the 
accused is not pronounced either guilty or not guil- 
ty.  He has,  however, been  convicted, at least, of 
carelessness, and this punishment he has to suffer 
for the present.  As far as his malicious  intent is 
concerned, the state says nothing, but allows  him 
to show, by his future life, proofs  for or against it. 
Moreover, additional circumstances may be discov- 
ered in the future concerning  the motives  of  the 
crime, and those additional circumstances, together 
with  his  behavior,  will  determine within  a  speci- 
fied time whether he ought to be convicted or com- 
pletely  cleared.  This suspension  of  judicial  pro- 
ceedings we  have  already had  occasion  to recom- 
mend  in cases wherein  the right of  self-defense is 
exercised, and is, indeed, to be recommended in all 
cases of  unproved  suspicion.  In a well-regulated 
state, no one should be punished  innocently;  but 
neither should any offense pass unpunished. 
As a matter of  course, the state will have to pro- 
vide  by law  more  severe punishment  for  offenses 
committed  with  n~alicious  intent  than  for  those 
committed  for  selfish  motives  of  gain.  For each 
one must know beforehand by what law he will  be 
punished ;  otherwise, the punishment would involve 
an injustice ;  and the intent of the law, to deter men 
from committing offenses, can  be achieved only by 
publishing the law.  It  is also clear, that the state 
must expressly provide by law what shall be held to 
constitute criminal neglect, and hence must specify 
the care which each citizen is required to observe in 
particular cases.  Whosoever observes the care thus 
required by law, is to be released ; and if  any dam- 
age happens in spite of  such care, it is to be  con- 
sidered as a  misfortune, which  must  be borne by 
the sufferer ; or it must be paid for by the state, if 
it was  occasioned  by  a  want of  proper  law  or  of 
proper police regulations. 
The plea of  anger or of  drunkenness-as  having 
placed the criminal for the moment beyond the con- 
trol of  his reason-relieves  him from the charge of 
premeditated  and malicious  intent ; but a  rational 
legislation  will  rather  provide  more  severe  than 
milder  punishment  for  such cases,  particularly if 
such a state of  mind  is habitual with the accused ; 
for  a  single unlawful  act  may  well  constitute an 
exception from an otherwise blameless life.  But a 
person who pleads, " I habitually get so angry or so 
drunk  as not to be  any longer master of  my sen- 
ses !"  confesses  thereby that  he  changes  himself 
into a  beast  on  a  fixed  principle,  and that  he is, 
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must either be content to lose his freedom until his 
recovery is sure, or else be excluded from the state 
forever.  Our laws  treat far too leniently pleas of 
drunkenness.  True, if  a nation  or a class of  men 
in a nation can not renounce this vice, the laws can 
not prevent  them from  shutting themselves up in 
their  houses  with any one who  chooses  to  keep 
them company, and  there to drown their reason, 
provided  they remain so shut up until they again 
become  rational;  but the state may well  lock  up 
every  person  found  intoxicated  on  public  terri- 
tory. 
11.  a.  The counterpoise  becomes  impossible  of 
application from the peculiar position of the subject 
for  whom  the punishment  is intended, when  that 
subject has nothing to lose but his body.  Let no 
one complain of  injustice  in this  respect, because 
the wealthier man, who has no need to rob, and in 
robbing only risks his property, is allowed to expi- 
ate his offense ;  whereas, the poor man, who needed 
what he took for his absolute requirements, can not 
expiate it, and hence must be completely outlawed, 
simply because he has nothing.  For such an objec- 
tion would falsely assume that the state is the mo- 
ral judge of  men, and must  make the punishment 
equal to the moral depravity.  But the state has no 
such inoral end in view.  The state merely wishes 
to secure property.  Now the threat,  "What  you 
steal from  another citizen  I shall take from  your 
possession,"  has little terror for a person who owns 
nothing.  Hence, the state must use another threat 
for such persons.  Whether this threat must neces- 
sarily be  exclusion  from  the state, or whether an- 
other punishment  can  be  contrived  for the poor, 
we shall see hereafter. 
b.  It  is impossible to contrive a punishment as a 
counterpoise against the will, to arise in immediate 
hostility  to the law  and  its power.  The utmost 
that can be done and must be done, is that the law 
be made to maintain  its authority ; and hence the 
law  can not, as an equal  punishment  for  the  at- 
tempt  to overthrow it, provide double  severity for 
all  its subjects.  This would  be to punish all citi- 
zens for the crime of  one individual.  The punish- 
ment of  an equal loss  is,  therefore,  not allowable 
here ; and  there is  no manner  of  expiating  the 
original punishment  for  all  crimes-to  outlaw the 
criminal. 
Two modes of  committing this crime against the 
state are possible ; it may be committed mediately 
against the state in the person of its citizens, name- 
ly, by violating in them the compact to which  the 
state, as such, is one party ; or it may be committed 
di~ectly  against the state, in which case the offense 
is rebellion or high treason. 
I. We shall first explain the former.  The  original 
municipal compact contains two distlnct compacts. 
Firstly, a compact of  each citizen, as an individual, 
with all others, as individuals, concerning their pro- 
perty.  This property-compact the i~zdzvzdzinZs  con- 
clude, (not the state, as such, that is, not as the or- 354  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  THE SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  355 
ganized whole of  all individuals, for  the state only 
guarantees this compact.)  In  other words, the gov- 
ernment is not a party to the original property-com- 
pact, but is merely a created organization  to gua- 
rantee it. 
But the original municipal compact contains, se- 
condly, this very agreement of  all citizens, as indi- 
viduals, with  themselves, as an organized whole, or 
as a state, in which  agreement the state promises 
each citizen, when he has fulfilled all the duties of 
a citizen, to protect his absolute property, his body, 
and his Zge.  The state has, of  itself, renounced all 
claim to the absolute property ;  it has no right upon 
it, only duties concerning  it.  The state is, there- 
fore, party of  the citizen,  to whom  it has guaran- 
teed  protection of  this property  against all viola- 
tion.  Hence, if  some individual should break this 
compact of  the state by robbery or by violent  as- 
saults upon  a  citizen's  life  or  body,  he would  be- 
come guilty of an immediate attack upon the state ; 
for he would have broken the compact of the state, 
and have done his best to make the state faithless, 
and thus to destroy the compact existing between 
the state and the citizen.  For  the  state having 
guaranteed the protection of  that property, life, or 
body, the criminal directly offends against the state, 
and for this attack upon the state he should be de- 
clared outlawed according to the above. 
2. To  attack the state immediately is to be guilty 
either of  rebellion  or high treasotz.  REBELLION  is 
to attempt to raise, or actually to raise, a power in 
hostility  to the power  of  the state, and to resist 
therewith that power of  the state.  TREASON  is to 
use a power which has been conferred by the state, 
to destroy or annihilate the ends of  the state; or 
not  to execute the ends of  the state ; hence,  to 
take advantage of  the confidence of  the nation  to 
render  nugatory  its  purposes.  Not  to  exercise 
the power of  government  is often  as injurious  to 
public security as to abuse it ;  and hence should be 
equally punished.  It  is all the same to the citizens 
whether government officials abuse their power for 
positive  aggressions  of  their own, or whether,  by 
neglecting  to exercise  it, they permit  the aggres- 
sions of  others.  In either case, the citizens  are 
oppressed.  After an individual has  signified  his 
willingness to accept an office, the nation properly 
calculates that the duties of  that office will be exe- 
cuted, and hence takes no other precautions to have 
them executed.  If he had no intention to execute 
the duties of  his office, he should have  refused  to 
accept it. 
Only private persons can be rebels ;  only govern- 
ment officials can become guilty of  high treason. 
PUNISHMENT  BY  CONFINEMENT. 
All these classes of  offenses condition outlawing 
or complete exclusion  from the state, because the 
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so terrible as expulsion from the state ;  and it is not 
to be expected that any one will choose it in prefer- 
ence over the established expiation, or that the pros- 
pect of  having the privilege to choose it, if  discov- 
ered, will quiet him when about to commit a crime. 
(This same privilege of  accepting the expiation 
established by law, or of  submitting to the exclu- 
sion from the state, must, of course, be allowed also 
where the punishment is one of  fines ;  although it 
is not to be supposed that any one would ever pre- 
fer to be expelled from the state, and thus to lose 
all his property, rather than pay the fine.) 
By means of  this compact, a reform is to be made 
possible  in the criminal.  Not a moraZ reform, not 
a reform of  inner sentiments ;  for no man is a judge 
of  another's morals ; but merely a politicaZ reform, 
a  reform of  obedience to the law  and of  rules of 
action.  Moral sentiment is a love of  duty for the 
sake of  duty; but  political  sentiment  is love  of 
one's  self for the sake of one's self and care for the 
protection of one's own body and one's own proper- 
ty.  This all-transcending  love  of  one's  self  be- 
comes  the very  means  in  the hands of  the penal 
legislator by which to force each citizen not to vio- 
Igte the rights of  the other ; for  in the Penal Law 
it is established that every evil act you do unto an- 
other you do unto yourself.  It  is this care for one's 
own security which originally impelled man to build 
up a state, and he who has no such care has no rea- 
son to remain  citizen  of  a  state.  It is this  care 
alone by means of  which each citizen gives to the 
state a  sufficient guarantee,  and is controlled  by 
the state.  The law has no hold  upon a man who 
has  not  this  self-love.  There  are two  ways  of 
escaping from it.  Firstly, by pure morality, when 
each one forgets his empirical self in the ultimate 
end of  all  reason;  in which  case the Penal Law 
does not determine his acts, since duty itself causes 
him to obey the laws ; and, secondly, by barbarism, 
when a man does not care for his own welfare ;  in 
which case he becomes unfit to live with other free 
beings, since the Penal Law can not apply to him. 
Political  reform  is a return to a care for one's  own 
security and welfare. 
He  who  has inflicted  injury for the sake of  the 
injury, has exhibited not only internal malice, which 
the state does not judge, but also barbarous man- 
ners and an unusual carelessness for his own wel- 
fare.  If those barbarous manners are replaced  by 
milder traits, and if  the criminal learns to care for 
his  own  security, he  may again  be  tolerated  in 
society.  Long  confinement  and  its  many  evils 
are very apt to teach  him  this.  The same holds 
good  in  regard  to  those who  have  attacked  the 
body or property of  other citizens.  They are wild 
and untamed natures, and in the latter case, more- 
over, lusting after another's possessions.  Let them 
first learn to live and take care of  their own.  It  is 
only the reckless  squanderer of  money  who  is a 
thief or robber.  Rebels may often be good-natured, 
but erring visionaries.  Let them  have their con- 
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of  a civil government, particularly of  that in their 
own state, and they may grow to be excellent citi- 
zens.  It is  only the  traitor  who  has acted both 
faithless and  infamous ; hence, he can never again 
be trusted with a public office.  Used to power and 
to command, he will,  however,  not  find  it easy to 
stay content with  modest  retirement  and a  small 
private business.  The only question is, whether he 
can  not  be tamed  down?  It may  be a  difficult 
matter, but who would assert the absolute impossi- 
bility  of  it  ?  (Dionysius became  scl~oolmaster  in 
Corinth.)  The chief  rule  is,  that we  should  not: 
despair of  their reform, nor make them despair of 
themselves ; and secondly, that they should always 
be made to retain some degree of  satisfaction with 
their condition, and  some hope of  a  future better 
fate.  To some extent this is accomplished by al- 
lowing them the privilege of  choosing between ex- 
pulsion and expiation.  They will trust themselves 
when they perceive that the state trusts them. 
The institutions of  correction for these offenders 
must be practically  arranged.  They must  be  re- 
moved  from  society, and the state must  be  made 
heavily responsible for any injury which may be in- 
flicted upon society by persons who have been sen- 
tenced to these institutions.  Hence, the freedom 
of  such persons  must  be  completely taken away 
from them.  But he who is to reform his manners 
must be free ; and he must be free, moreover, in 
order to render possible  a judgment  as to his re- 
form.  Hence, it is a chief  maxim, that these nlen 
must be free within necessary restrictions, and must 
live socially together. 
Nothing for them without labor.  It  would be the 
greatest mistake  if  these institutions were  so ar- 
ranged that the prisoners  received their food whe- 
ther they worked  or not,  or if  laziness were  pun- 
ished  by the most degrading treatment-blows- 
instead  of  by its natural  sequence-lack  of  food. 
Again : All the production of  their labor, after de- 
duction of  their board, must remain their own.  In 
the same manner, their property in the state must 
be kept for them under the supervision of  the gov- 
ernment.  The object of  their confinement is,  to 
awaken in them love of  order, of  labor, and of pro- 
perty.  But how could this love arise, if  order and 
labor were to them  of  no advantage, and  if  they 
could not acquire property ?  They must be under 
the supervision of  the state, and yet they must also 
be free ;  in other words, so long as they act proper- 
ly they must seem to be perfectly free ; but when 
they act wrongly, punishment must follow immedi- 
ately. 
It  will be well to use remote countries, uninhab- 
ited islands and deserts for  such institutions.  To 
urge the expense would be criminal.  For what are 
the revenues of  the state for, unless  for  such pur- 
poses ?  The expense,  moreover, will  not be very 
great, if  such colonies  are properly arranged, and 
if  each person is employed  in the occupation with 
which he is familiar. 
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to expiate their offences is their reform.  Unless, 
therefore,  they really  do reform,  the conditioned, 
that is, the patience of  the state, ceases.  It  would 
be very  practicable  if  each criminal  could  be re- 
quired to prescribe a fixed term for his own reform, 
which term he might, perhaps, be allowed to extend 
a little if  it sh~uld  be considered advisable.  But a 
certain general term must be peremptorily fixed for 
all.  We have  already  said,  that  the object  in- 
tended is not moral, but political reform ; and acts 
alone can decide whether it has taken place or not. 
Hence, if the discipline of government is relaxed 
as each prisoner gives evidence of  improvement, it 
will  not be difficult  to determine  soon whether a 
reform is taking place.  It will be necessary to ap- 
point sensible and conscientious men for these offi- 
ces, who will make themselves  responsible for  the 
future good conduct of  all persons whom they pro- 
nounce reformed. 
Tlle reformed criminals return into the common- 
wealth and are reinstated in their previous condi- 
tion.  They have  been  completely reconciled  with 
society by their punishment and subsequent reform. 
Nor will  there be entertained any more distrust- 
but rather confidence-in  these reformed criminals, 
when men have once resolved  to consider such in- 
stitutions as really means of  reform, and not merely 
as means of  punishment ; and when only those are 
allowed to return into society who have reformed, 
but not, as is done at present, all who have been de- 
tained  for  a  fixed  term,  and who  have  only been 
made worse by irrational treatment. 
All prisoners who  have not reformed within the 
prescribed term, are excluded from the state as in- 
corrigible. 
These institutions are to  be not only places of 
conversion,  but  also  of  punishment;  and  hence 
they must be of  a  nature  to deter citizens  from 
committing  crimes.  Loss  of  freedom,  exclusion 
from society, and strict discipline-all  this  is  ter- 
rible enough for men accustomed  to freedom ;  but 
there is no reason  why  the fate  of  the  prisoner 
should not be generally considered to be still more 
severe than it really is, or why distinctions  should 
not be made in their treatment which  terrify oth- 
ers without being in themselves an evil ; as, for in- 
stance, a peculiar dress, or a chain which does not 
pain  much.  The prisoner  gets used  to it, and on 
the outsider it makes the proper impression. 
MURDER. 
The only crime  which  does not allow of  an at- 
tempt  to reform  the  criminal,  and  which  must, 
therefore, be punished immediately by absolute ex- 
clusion from the state, is intentional and$renzedita- 
ted murder.  (Not a murder which is merely the ac- 
cidental  result of  another violence.)  The ground 
is this : Of  him who has committed murder, it is to 
be apprehended  that  he may  murder  again;  and 
since the state has no right to compel any one to 
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expose his life, no one can be compelled to under- 
take the supervision  over  the murderer, who must 
be allowed some degree of  freedom, if  he is  to  re- 
form ; nor can the other criminals be compelled to 
tolerate  a  murderer  in  their midst.  True, if  any 
one is willing  voluntarily to risk  his life in behalf 
of  the murderer, he may do so.  Hence, societies 
might be permitted to establish institutions for the 
purpose of attempting the reform of such criminals ; 
but such societies must guarantee to the state the 
safe-keeping of  the murderer. 
THE PUNISHMENT  OF OUTLAWING. 
But what shall be done with those who are abso- 
lutely excluded from  the state, either without pre- 
liminary attempts to reform them, or because they 
did  not reform within the prescribed  term, or be- 
cause they refused to expiate ?  This is by far the 
most important investigation in the theory of  pun- 
ishments.  We  hope by its means to put an end to 
a number  of  confused  notions ; and we  shall not 
merely, as is usual, assert, but prove. 
I.  The declaration  that a citizen is an outlaw is 
the highest punishment which the state can inflict 
upon any rational being.  For the state exists for 
the individual  as state only through the compact. 
The  utmost the state can do, therefore, is to declare 
this compact annulled.  Both the state and the in- 
dividual do not now exist for  each other any more. 
The compact, the legal relation between them, and 
indeed all relation between them, has been  utterly 
canceled.  The state has now no right  upon  the 
individual by virtue of the compact ;  and since there 
is no other positive, determined, and determinable 
right than through  the compact, the state has no 
right whatever upon the individual thus outlawed. 
2. But what, then, are the results of this cleclara- 
tion ?  The perfectly arbitrary treatment of the out- 
lawed.  Not as if you hnda  right to treat him thus ; 
but there is neithcra  right  agailzst  it.  The  outlawed 
person is, therefore, declared to be a thing-an  ani- 
mal.  For, in regard to  animals and their relation 
to us,  the question is never  one of  right,  but of 
physical  force.  I  can  not  say, I  have  a  right to 
kill this animal ; but neither can I say, I have not 
a right  to  kill  it.  It is  so with  the outlaw.  No 
reason  can  be  shown -from  positive  law -  why 
the first citizen  who  meets him  should  not kill or 
torture him ; but neither can any reason be shown 
why he should do so. 
3.  Supposing some citizens should thus treat the 
outlaw, what would follow ?  No proceeding against 
them on the part of  the state, for the outlaw has no 
rights ;  but certainly the contempt of all men, or in- 
famy.  He  who  tortures an animal for  mere plea- 
sure,  without  having  any  positive  advantage  in 
view,  is justly held  in  abhorrence as an inhuman 
barbarian ; how  much  more he who would  torture 
or  kill,  for  mere  pleasure,  a  being  which  at the 
worst has, at least, a human countenance !  It will 
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any rights, but from motives of  self-respect and of 
the esteem of  other men.  (The moral view of  the 
act we  do not take into consideration  here;  but 
merely its civil aspects.) 
4.  How, then, is the state situated  in regard  to 
this outlaw?  We have already shown, that by the 
breaking of  the compact the state ceases to exist as 
a state for the outlaw.  Hence, if  the state should 
kill  him,  it does not kill  him as state, but as the 
stronger physical farce,  as  a  mere  natural  force. 
But the state has the same reasons for  not killing 
or torturing him which we discovered  to influence 
the private individual, namely, respect for itseli, for 
its citizens, and for other states. 
Nevertheless, there is a possible ground why the 
state should kill  the outlaw, to wit: Because  it is 
the only manner  in which  the  state can  protect 
itself against him.  Since there is no reason why it 
should not kill him, this consideration is, therefore, 
decisive in such a case.  The outlaw is considered 
simply as a wild beast, which must be shot ;  or as an 
overflowing river, which must be stopped ;  in short, 
as a force of  nature, which  the state must render 
harmless  by an opposing  force  of  nature.  The 
death of  the outlaw is not a means of  punishment, 
but merely of security ; and this consideration gives 
us the whole theory of  capital punishment. 
THE PUNISHMENT  OF DEATH. 
The death of  the outlaw  is  not decreed  by the 
state as a judge.  The state, as judge,  has merely 
pronounced  the  sentence of  exclusion  from  the 
state, and this  is the only public act of  the state 
If, after such sentence, the state, nevertheless, kills 
him, it does not kill him through the judicial power, 
but through the police power.  The  condemned has 
been placed  beyond  the pale  of  the judiciary;  he 
belongs to the police.  The killing is not done by 
virtue of  a positive right, but from sheer necessity. 
Such  matters,  however,  are  not  honorable,  and 
hence, like all that is dishonorable and yet neces- 
sary, must be done secretly and shan~efully. Let 
the criminal  be  throttled  or  beheaded  in  prison. 
His civil  death has been  pronounced  publicly by 
the sentence of  expulsion, and  that sentence  has 
killed him in the memory of  all citizens.  The citi- 
zens do not care what  is  done with  the physical 
man after that sentence. 
(What a disgrace to reason  that so much pomp 
should  accompany  executions ; or that  the  dead 
bodies  of  the  criminals  should  be  hung  up  for 
public  show, tied  to  the wheel,  etc., just  as  the 
Indians hang up the scalps of  their enemies around 
the walls of  their wigwams !) 
The death of  the criminal is something acciden- 
tal, and hence can not be officially announced ;  but 
the exclusion from  the state must be officially an- 
nounced. 
To increase the death-penalty by torture is bar- 
barous.  It changes the state into a wild, malicious, 
revengeful enemy, who  loves  to torture his enemy 
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It  is often necessary to strengthen the proofs of 
reason  by  facts  of  experience.  Here is one well 
known:  In the Roman  Republic, those who were 
condemned  to death were  allowed  the choice of 
exile.  It  was  only when  danger was  to be appro 
hended of  them,  as in  the case of  Catilina's  con- 
spirators, that the Romans permitted  their death. 
But they killed  them secretly, in prison ; not pub- 
licly.  The consul Cicero was  sent into exile, and 
very justly, in so far, not because of that execution 
itself,  but because  the trial  of  those  conspirators 
had been decided in the senate, and not before the 
people, as the law required. 
One other circumstance is to be considered in the 
execution of  criminals, which we  can not well pass 
by here, although it is not of  a legal nature.  For 
the moral law explicitly prohibits  in each  case the 
intentional killing of  another.  Each man must be 
regarded as a means to promote  the object of  rea- 
son ; and no one can renounce the belief  that the 
other, however  corrupt he  may  now  be,  may  re- 
form  his  moral  character, without renouncing  his 
own end, as necessarily established for him through 
reason.  The strict proof  of  this assertion is to be 
furnished in a  Science of  Morality.  Hence, a pri- 
vate person has never  a  right to  kill,  but rather 
than kill should endanger his own life.  It is differ- 
ent in the case of  the state, which, as police power, 
is not a moral, but simply a legal body.  Govern- 
ment officials may be often morally obliged to ex- 
pose their own lives to danger rather  than kill  the 
life of another; but they have not the right to ex- 
pose the life of others, still less the life of the state-- 
that is, the life, security, and legal relation of all-by 
allowing a dangerous outlaw to remain alive. 
Hence,  the execution of incorrigible  rascals al- 
ways remains an evil, though a necessary one, and 
it is the problem of  the state to render it unneces- 
sary.  But what  is  to be  done with  them, if  they 
must  not  be killed?  Imprisonment  for  life  is  a 
burden for  the state; and  how, indeed, could  the 
Ltate require its citizens to pay taxes for something 
which  will  realize  none of the ends of  the state, 
since there is no hope for reform ?  The only re- 
maining punishment  is  banishment  for  life ; not 
deportation, for deportation is, as we have shown, a 
means of  conversion, and is carried  on  under the 
superintendence of  the state.  If there is any fear 
that the criminal may return, let him  be branded* 
in a manner as little painful as possible, for the state 
must not appear as a torturer.  The  branding, also, 
is not punishment, but a means of public safety, and 
devolves upon the police. 
What shall be done with the criminals who have 
thus been  branded  and  expelled  from  the state? 
This is a question put, not by the citize~zs,  but by 
meyt.  Let the branded criminal go into the wilder- 
ness and live among animals.  This has accidental- 
ly happened to many who were not criminals ;  and 
*  The custom in Nebraska, Kansas, and all border states of civil- 
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the criminals, branded under laws  as we have de- 
scribed, are incorrigible. 
Against the theory of punishments as established 
here by us, there is usually opposed another theory, 
which establishes an absolute right of  punishment, 
and looks upon judicial punishment not as a means, 
but as an end in  itself.  Since this latter theory 
claims  to rest upon  an unprovable assertion,  and 
hence  manages very cleverly to escape  furnishing 
proof,  it is  easy  for  its advocates  to sneer at all 
those  who  think differently,  to  charge  them with 
sentimentality, aflected humanity,  etc.,  and to  call 
them sophists and legal quibblers ;  quite in violation 
of  the  much-praised  and  justly-to-be-demanded 
equality (of reaso7zs) and freedom (of  opinions, sup- 
ported  by reasons) on the field of  philosophy.  The 
only prominent side of  this system, by which it ex- 
poses  itself  to attacks, seems to me to be this : It 
has often been remarked, that no person condemned 
to death for murder has ever been known to com- 
plain  that he was  being punished  too  severely or 
unjustly ; and if  any one  should  so complain,  all 
sensible men would laugh in his face.  Now, apart 
from  the laughing in his face, this is so very true 
that a murderer could not say he were suffering too 
much or unjustly, even though he should have been 
sentenced  to the gallows by a government which 
was  entirely ignorant of  his  crime of  murder, and 
which was hanging him altogether unjustly.  There 
is nothing more true than that we are forced to con- 
fess : In a moral world, governed by an all-knowing 
judge,  and according to moral laws, no one who is 
treated according to the same law which he himself 
established  suffers  unjustly ; and this  confession, 
which forces itself  upon  all  men, is based  upon  a 
categorical imperative.  Hence, the question is not 
at all whether tke rnzlrde~ey  suffers  unjustly, when 
he also loses his life in a violent manner ; but the 
question is : Whence does any other mortal derive 
the right to personify this  moral  rule of  the world, 
and to punish the criminal according to his deserts  ? 
A  system  which  asserts the supreme ruler  of  a 
state to have this right  is undoubtedly compelled 
to say that the title  to it is beyond demonstration, 
and hence to call it a right given by God.  Such a 
system is, therefore, bound to consider the monarch 
as the visible  representative of  God  in this world, 
and to consider all government as a theocracy.  In 
the Jewish  theocracy, the doctrine was,  therefore, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and very properly. 
PILLORY,  DAMAGES,  ETC. 
He  who  maliciously defames another citizen, na- 
turally defames himself, for he renders himself unfit 
for the confidence of  others.  But since the state 
owes retribution to the one who has been innocently 
slandered, it must make public  the defamation  of 
the slanderer. 
Pillories are a means to calI the attention of  the 
public to this defamation, and to symbolize infamy. 
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a punishment in themselves ;  hence they must not 
be connected with  other  punishments, unless, in- 
deed, when  a crime has been committed which in- 
volves the infamy of  the criminal, as, for  instance, 
burglary.  For the common  criminal does not be- 
come infamous when there are hopes of his reform ; 
and if  there  are none, if  he is  an outlaw, it would 
be no punishment to put him on a pillory. 
The one who has been injured must receive dam- 
ages  in  all  cases.  He holds  the  state directly 
responsible for his damages, since the state guar- 
anteed him protection against all injuries ; and the 
state holds  the criminal  responsible.  It is  clear 
that the injured party must not be made to pay the 
costs  of  the proceedings.  What does he  pay his 
taxes for?  The state must hold  the  criminal  re- 
sponsible.  When the criminal is outlawed, all his 
property is, of course, confiscated by the state. 
There are two distinct kinds of  punishment, as 
we  have  seen, such  as  are based  upon  a  com- 
pact,  and  such  as  are based  upon  the  absolute 
nullity of  the compact.  It is clear that the citizen 
is obliged to submit to the first class without com- 
pulsion, since they are in  a  certain  other  respect 
also  his rights, and that he  may very properly be 
compelled to submit to them voluntarily, since there 
are worse punishments  possible, and since the re- 
mainder of  his property is still to the state a gua- 
rantee  of  his  submission to the law.  He must, 
therefore, voluntarily appear at the investigation of 
his crime, and can be punished  if he does not ap- 
pear.  Hence,  there is  no reason why his  body 
should be taken possession of by law." 
But the guilty person can give no proper guaran- 
tee when  his  crime  involves  punishments  of  the 
second class ;  that is to say, when it involves either 
exclusion  from  society or  deportation  to  institu- 
tions  of  reform.  The reason  is, that in  the first 
case he has lost all  his rights categorically, and in 
the second case problematically, that is, unless he 
reforms.  Hence, the  state must  take possession 
of the bodies of such offenders.  The right of com- 
pulsion which  the  state has commences  with  the 
relative property of citizens ;  if that is not sufficient, 
the state takes hold of their absolute property ; and 
if the guilty person refuses to pay,  the state enters 
his house by force ; and, in the extreme case, the 
state takes possession of their persons. 
*  In other words : for all such crimes each citizen has an absolute 
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POLICE  LAW. 
WHAT  is the Police ?  This we can best  answer 
by a deduction of the conception of the police power 
of  the state.  The state, as such, has entered into 
a common compact with its citizens by which each 
party assumes  certain  duties  and  receives  certain 
rights.  We have shown the means  of  connection 
between the state and the citizens in  all  cases in 
which the  citizen can and undoubtedly will prefer 
con~plaint.  But we have also shown up a number 
of  matters  regarding  which  no complaint will  be 
preferred, because  the state is  officially oblked to 
watch over them.  Hence, there must be a pecu- 
liar  means  of  connection  for  these cases between 
the citizens  and the government ;  and  this means 
of  connection  is  the police  power  of  the govern- 
ment.  By  its means the reciprocal influence be- 
tween government and  citizens first becomes pos- 
sible.  Hence, it is  one of  the  necessary require- 
ments of  a state. 
The state has a twofold relation to its subjects : 
it has duties  to perform, namely, to protect  their 
rights ; and  it has rights, namely, to require their 
obedience to the  laws  and the  fulfillment of  their 
duties as citizens.  In either case the police power 
is the mediator between state and citizens.  As the 
judicial power is related to positive law in its appli- 
cation to the citizen, so the  police power is related 
to positive law in its application to the government. 
The police furnishes the case of  the application of 
the law. 
It is, as we  have  said, the duty of  the state to 
protect the rights  of  its citizens,  and the  police 
power  is  the executive  power  of  this  protection. 
Some persons  might  object  that citizens are very 
apt to remind  the state themselves when the pro- 
tection  stipulated  in the constitution  is required. 
But very often a damage received can not be made 
good ; and it is far more the object of  the state to 
prevent attacks upon the rights of  its citizens, than 
to punish attacks after they have  been committed. 
Hence, the arrangements necessary for  protecting 
and  securing  the rights  of  citizens  are the  first 
branch of  the police power. 
Each citizen must  be  able to travel throughout 
the whole  state free and  safe  from  all  accidents, 
whether he does so by virtue of  his  right  to culti- 
vate the ground,  or to  purchase  products,  or to 
carry on trade, or to enjoy his capital.  The greater 
the number of  men  is  who  are gathered  at one 
place, the more effective must be the arrangements 
for protecting them.  Hence, armed police-squads 
are necessary in the streets, and on the roads where 
roads are unsafe.  These subordinate officials have 
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rarily  arrest  suspicious  persons.  They are to bc 
held heavily responsible  for  all  crimes  committed 
within their precinct. 
This protection of the safety of  life and property 
involves  also a  superintendence of  roads.  Each 
citizen has the right to demand good roads or streets, 
for  the state has guaranteed  to him  the speediest 
and most comfortable mode of carrying on business, 
or most agreeably enjoying his justly acquired gains. 
Hence, signs must  be  put up at all unsafe  places. 
Persons who  are injured at places  which  have  no 
such signs  are entitled to redress from the state, 
for the state has guaranteed to them securiz'y  i7z aZZ 
acts notprohibited by law.  Persons who are injured 
where  such signs have  been  put up  have no  re- 
dress ; but  neither  must  they become  liable to a 
fine, for each person is master of his own body. 
This protective power of the police involves, like- 
wise, superintendence of  doctors and apothecaries. 
The examination  of  physicians  is best left to the 
medical colleges, who in this examination are, there- 
fore, considered as government officials.  Quackery, 
etc., must be prohibited, that is, for thosc who carry 
it 072 ;  but  not  for those who make  use of  it ; for 
each person is master of  his own life. 
The police  must also  afford  protection  against 
robbery,  against fire, and against  the overflowing 
of rivers, etc., etc.  All this is the absolute duty of 
the state, and is not merely to be regarded as a be- 
nefit conferred. 
But  besides  this direct protection  by means of 
the police, the state has also the right, for the same 
purpose  of  protecting the rights of  its citizens, to 
pass certain laws tending to facilitate the police su- 
perintendence, the discovery of  guilty persons, and 
the  general  security of  citizens.  These laws  are 
called  Policc Laws,  to distinguish  them  from  the 
real Civil Laws.  For, whereas the latter laws pro- 
hibit merely the actzial violation of the fundamental 
compact, the police laws  are made  to prevent the 
possibilig  of  such violation.  Thus, the civil laws 
prohibit acts which directly interfere with the rights 
of  others, as,  for  instance, theft,  robbery,  assault, 
etc., and hence these laws are not likely to be con- 
sidered unjust by any one.  The police laws, how- 
ever, prohibit  acts which  may appear perfectly in- 
different, and which in themselves harm no one, but 
which  are calculated to facilitate  the wronging of 
others, and to render difficult the protection of  the 
rights of  citizens by the state.  Hence, these laws, 
the violation whereof  is not  injurious in itself, are 
often considered unfair by people who do not com- 
prehend  their peculiar  nature, and the right of  a 
state to pass  them has often  been  doubted.  But 
the right and the duty of the state to pass such laws 
appear  clearly from  the police power  of  the state. 
Let me illustrate the matter by an example: If  a 
citizen carries arms,  he thereby does  not directly 
violate the rights  of  any other  citizen ; for what 
can it matter to the other citizen what I choose to 
carry about  my person?  But my  carrying  arms 
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the state has, in my opinion, a perfect right to pro- 
hibit the carrying of arms.  Nay, it would have the 
right to prohibit the harboring of arms in my house, 
if  the state could only be sure that I would never 
require to use them in self-defence.  (In the Roman 
Republic it was  prohibited to appear armed in the 
city ; and the general who awaited the honor of his 
triumph was required to remain outside of  the city 
until the day of his solemn entrance, or, if he chose 
to enter before, the law required  him  to lay aside 
his arms and renounce  the expected  honor.)  At 
any rate, the state has the undoubted  right to pro- 
hibit the possession of certain weapons, such as air- 
guns, which seem especially made for assassination, 
and are not necessary for self-defence. 
Another instance:  It would  be a  very proper 
police  law  to prohibit  citizens  from  walking  the 
streets at night without a light.  The object of this 
law is that each citizen may be easily recognized by 
the policeman.  True, by walking without a light, 
the rights  of  no citizen are injured;  but in the 
darkness it is much easier to injure a citizen, and 
this possibility is to be removed by the police law. 
He  who violates a police  law must  suffer all the 
disagreeable  consequences  which  may  result  to 
him, and is, moreover, liable to a fine. 
The chief  principle of  a well-regulated police is 
this:  That each  citizen  shall be  at all tinzes  and 
places, when  it may be  Izecessary, recognized as this 
or  that particztlar persoitz.  No  one  must  remain 
unknown to the police.  This can be attained with 
certainty only in the following  manner : Each one 
must  always carry a pass with  him, signed by his 
immediate government official, in which his person 
is accurately described.  There must be no excep- 
tion  to this  rule.  In the  case of  important per- 
sons, who can afford to pay for it, it may be well to 
use  their  portrait  (photograph)  in  the  place  of 
word-descriptions, which  are always  more  or less 
insufficient.  No person should be received at any 
place who  can not  thus make  known  by his pass 
his last place of  residence  and  his name.  But in 
order not to interfere with the innocent enjoyment 
which  may arise from  temporary i?zcog~zito,  police- 
men  should  be  strictly prohibited  from  ever de- 
manding the exhibition of  such passes  from mere 
curiosity.  It  is only to be required when necessary 
to identify the person. 
The state  does  not know  what  passes  in  the 
house, but it does take cognizance of what happens 
in  the streets, which,  after  all,  we  must  pass  in 
order to get into the house.  Hence, the citizens 
can not assemble in a house without the knowledge 
of  the police ; and  the police have thus not  only 
the power, but  also the right to prevent  such  as- 
semblages-since  the streets are under their super- 
intendence-if  they excite  suspicion.  If enough 
men gather together  to possibly endanger  public 
safety, which  is always the case when the number 
is  large  enough  to  resist  effectually  the  armed 
power of the government at such a place, the police 
has the right to ask of  them their  intentions, and 
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to watch that these intentions alone are carried out. 
The house-right  ceases  in  such  cases ; or, if  the 
owner  of  a  house does  not  wish  to give  up  that 
right, he can assemble the masses in a public house, 
where  house-right does  not  exist.  Gatherings of 
the people in the streets, market-places, etc., belong 
to the same class, and  may likewise  be   re vented 
by the police, or at least watched.  The state may 
properly arrange this matter by providing that, when 
a certain  number of  people  gather together, they 
must notify the police of their intention, so that the 
police may act understandingly. 
In regard to the security of  absolute property, 
two  more  questions are to be  answered : firstly, 
how is the counterfeiting of drafts to be prevented ? 
and secondly, how the counterfeiting of  gold  and 
silver?  I  am the more  inclined to reply to these 
questions, since I can thus illustrate how that which 
is deemed  impossible  is  easy  enough for  a  well- 
regulated police. 
Firstly, concerning forged  drafts.  I  refer  here 
only  to those which  are transferable  by  indorse- 
ments.  In large cities, such drafts  often  change 
owners many times in a day.  Perhaps the persons 
through whose  hands the draft passes  know each 
other  not at all  or only slightly.  Now, it is very 
true that merchants  do not  usually  take  a  draft 
unless they know the maker or makers, and his or 
their signature  to the draft.  But  signatures can 
be forged ;  and the simple fact is, that forged drafts 
are passed, and  that hence it must be possible to 
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cheat  by  means  of  them.  The forgery is  finally 
discovered.  But how is it now possible to find out 
the man who is  guilty of  the forgery, and to get 
hold of him ?  There is no difficulty about the mat- 
ter under such police laws as we have described. 
The names  of  those  through  whose  hands  the 
draft has passed  are written on  its back.  Under 
present  circumstances, however, people  can easily 
adopt  false  names, and it is  impossible, therefore, 
to trace them.  According to our proposition, each 
person  who  indorses  the draft must  show by his 
pass that he is this particular person, and where he 
resides.  The one who  receives the draft  makes a 
note of  this by writing  on  the back  of  the draft 
over the name, "  Pass from -,"  naming the gov- 
ernment official who  has issued the pass.  These 
few  additional words  are all  that is  necessary  to 
make  known the true name and residence of  the 
indorser. 
But how can the indorser be found again, if  the 
draft, after the lapse of  some time, should turn out 
to have been  forged  by him ?  Under our  police 
laws, no one can  leave one place without announc- 
ing his  next place  of  residence,  which  must  be 
marked  on the  pass  and  recorded  in  the  books. 
No other place receives  him  except the one men- 
tioned  in  his pass, and when  he leaves that place 
again the same rule holds good. 
But how if  he is a foreigner or travels  abroad ? 
All police-states,  particularly  those  who  are also 
commercial, must come to an agreement about this 3B2  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
matter, so that the forger may be  arrested  in any 
country.  The  pass of a state which has not entered 
into  this agreement must not  be recognized, and 
hence people who present passes from such a state 
can not have their drafts cashed.  Such an under- 
standing would force all commercial states to adopt 
this agreement. 
But how if  some one should  also  forge  such a 
pass ?  The forging  of  passes  ought  to be made 
impossible ; to accomplish which  there are doubt- 
less  ample  means.  For instance, by  a  paper  or 
parchment prepared  exclusively  for  this  purpose, 
as was  used  for the  French assignats, the secret 
of  making which  must  be known only to the gov- 
ernment.  But can not this paper be forged, as was 
doce in that same case of  the French assignats? 
It  was done in that case, because  a  great interest, 
as well of  pecuniary gain as of  political  animosity, 
was to be satisfied ; and  because the forged  paper 
could  be used  hundred-fold.  But when  only  one 
pass  is to be forged, will  any one go to  all  that 
trouble ?  Not likely, unless a forged draft of a very 
large  amount is to be  passed.  But the  dangers 
which would accompany such an undertaking would 
in all  probability deter from the costs and trouble 
of  it. 
As regards the second point, the counterfeiting 
of money, there is this to be considered : The state 
guarantees  the value  of  the money, and whoever 
accepts a piece of  money accepts it on the faith of 
the  state,  the seal  whereof  is  stamped  upon  it. 
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Hence, the state must guarantee to each citizen the 
genuineness of  the money, and whoever is cheated, 
without any  fault of  his OWE, by counterfeited  mo- 
ney, should be justly indemnified by the state, and 
have his false money exchanged for genuine money. 
But when is a citizen  cheated without alzy fault 
of  his own?  Under what conditions is it to be be- 
lieved that he could not distinguish the false money 
from the genuine  ?  It is a part of the education of 
each citizen to learn to know money, and it should 
be held as a rule that counterfeit money can not be 
readily recognized as such when many citizens are 
cheated by it. 
It is, therefore, in  the immediate interest of  the 
state,  and  a  part  of  its  police  laws,  to discover 
counterfeiters and to prevent  the counterfeiting of 
money.  How is this to be done ?  It can not be 
accomplished  by means of passes ;  for  no  one can 
say from whom  he has  received  certain  pieces of 
money, unless  he has received them  in very large 
quantities.  Hence, it  must  be  accomplished  by 
keeping  a  strict watch  over  the  materials  which 
may  be  used  in  counterfeiting  coin,  and  which 
chemistry  can  designate,  and  by  providing  that 
such materials shall not be  issued except  to such 
as present theirpass and give notice of the use they 
intend to make of  them.  This is all the easier for 
the state, since the state is excIusive possessor of 
aii mines, as has been shown above. 
Besides  these  duties,  the  government  has  the 
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police laws-are  properly executed.  The state has 
to indemnify for  each offense which  is committed 
within its limits, and to bring the offender to jus- 
tice.  It is clear, however, that no particular or ad- 
ditional arrangements. are necessary for this guar- 
dianship over  the laws; for, in each  case of  such 
violation of  the laws, there is some one who  must 
be protected, and hence all the arrangements made 
for protection cover these cases. 
The exclusive condition of  the efficiency of  leg- 
islation, and hence of  the whole state organization, 
is this, that each citizen shall know beforehand that, 
if  he  commits  a  crime,  he will  be  surely discov- 
ered and punished in the manner prescribed by law. 
For, if the criminal can entertain hopes of escaping 
detection, what is  to deter him from committing a 
crime ?  In such a case, we merely continue to live, 
no matter how wise the laws we have, in our previ- 
ous condition of nature, wherein each depends upon 
the good intention of  the other ; and it is injustice 
to punish  the detected  criminal  according to the 
t  strict letter of the law, since we allowed him to hope 
that he would escape unpunished, like a11  the other 
criminals whom  he knows to have escaped unpun- 
ished.  How could a law deter him which he could 
not but consider null and void ?  The sarcasm which 
the common people love to levy against  our laws 
and government-namely,  that they do not punish 
men for  having  committed crimes, but for having 
been foolish enough to allow themselves  to be de- 
tected-is  just and appropriate.  It  is an indispen- 
sable requirement  addressed  to the police, as the 
servant  of  the government, that each guilty  per- 
son, without exception, should be brought  to trial. 
I have heard many objections raised to the possi- 
bility of  satisfying  this  requirement.  If  such ob- 
jections were  grounded,  I  should  not  hesitate  to 
draw the conclusion : In that case government and 
law are equally in~possible  among men ;  all so-called 
states are nothing else and never will be any thing 
else  but the oppression of  the weak by the power- 
ful  under the pretense of  law; and the science of 
law is nothing but the science of how the stronger 
may  be  unjust  without  injnry to  themselves,  as 
Montesquieu ironically describes  it.  But is  there 
really any valid reason for this assertion of  the im- 
possibility of satisfying that requirement ?  Whence 
does that assertion arise  ?  It  arises from this, that 
the conception of  a state as here established, that 
is, as an organic whole, is not firmly entertained, but 
is constantly darkened by the image of  our modern 
states.  In our modern states, as they are constitu 
ted now, it would, of  course, be impossible to bring 
to trial  the author of  every offense ;  or if  it coultl 
be done, that is  to  say, if  some one state should 
make  use  of some of  the police  regulations  sug- 
gested by us, it would involve an injustice which no 
people  would  be  content to suffer.  For a  state 
wherein disorder and injustice rule, the government 
ran maintain itself only by also allowing the people 
a good deal of  disorder, provided that disorder does 
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The source of  all  evils  in our present states, as 
they are constituted,  is disorder, and the impossi- 
bility to produce order.  The fact that it is so very 
difficult  to discover  a  criminal  arises solely  ftom 
the fact that there are so many persons in a state 
who  have  no fixed  position, and about whom  the 
state does not concern itself.  In a state such as we 
have described, each citizen has his fixed position ; 
and the police  know pretty  well  where  each citi- 
zen is, and what he does at every hour of  the day. 
Each one must work, and each one who does work 
has enough to live.  Loafers (chevaliers d'industric) 
are not tolerated in any  part of the state.  By means 
of  his pass, each citizen  can be identified at a mo- 
ment.  Crime is something very unusual in such a 
state ;  and  is preceded  by a  certain unusual  emo- 
tion, which  the police,  quickly  observing, proceed 
to watch.  I, for my part, can not see how, in such a 
state, an offense and the offender can remain undis- 
covered. 
It  is also to be considered, that, with such a police 
establishment, detectives  or  spies  are not  needed. 
Secrecy is always petty,  low, and immoral.  Each 
one should  have the face  to do before  the whole 
world whatever he dares to do at all.  Moreover, to 
whom  could  the state intrust such a dishonorable 
occupation ?  Shall the state itself  encourage infa- 
my and immorality ?  If  the state authorizes secre- 
cy in the conduct of  some men, who will guarantee 
that these men may not  make use of  that secrecy 
for their own purposes and for the commission of 
crimes by themselves ? 
Again : Why should a government secretly place 
a watch over its citizens ?  In order that they may 
not  believe  themselves watched.  But why should 
they not  believe  themselves watched ?  That they 
may discover their thoughts respecting the govern- 
ment and its plans, and may thus become their own 
betrayers ; or may betray whatever they  know of 
other secret and illegal acts.  The former is neces- 
sary only where  government  and  citizens  live  in 
perpetual war with  each  other ; where the citizens 
are unjustly oppressed, and seek to regain their free- 
clom again by employing all the means and tricks of 
war: the latter is necessary only where the police 
are not watchful enough. 
The Paris chief of  police, who proposed to clothe 
his detectives in uniform, became the laughing-stock 
of a corrupt people, and saved his life thereby.  But 
in my opinion  he evinced  healthy common  sense. 
In a state organization such as we have described, 
the police official can be uniformed.  They are quite 
as much  the venerable  witnesses of  innocence as 
the accusers of  crime.  Why should  honesty hate 
the eye of  watchfulness ? FIRST  APPENDIX 
TO THE 
SCIENCE OF RIGHTS. 
-t- 
FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES 
OF THE 
RIGHTS OF FAMILY, DEDUCTION  OF MARRIAGE. 
PRECISELY  as we were  compelled to deduce  the 
necessity of  the coexistence of rational beings, and 
their  relation to a sensuous world, in  order  to  ob- 
tain an object for the application of  the conception 
of  rights, so shall we now be compelled to obtain a 
knowledge of  the nature of  marriage by its deduc- 
tion, in order to be enabled to apply the conception 
of  rights  to it  understandingly.  It is not  to  be 
understood as if  the conception of  rights gave rise 
to marriage ;  for marriage is hot merely a legal as- 
sociation  like the state, but  rather a  natural and 
moral association.  Hence, the following deduction 
is not legal, but is necessary in a Science of  Rights, 
as giving  an insight  into  the  legal  propositions 
which follow it. 
Nature  has  based  her end of  propagating  the 
human race upon the existence of a natural impulse 
in two different sexes, which  impulse seems to ex- 
ist only for its own  sake, and to crave only its own 
satisfaction.  That impulse is itself  end of  our na- 
ture, although it is only means  for nature in gene- 3g2  THE  SCIENCE OF RIGHTS. 
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ral.  While men  have no other object than to sat- 
isfy this impulse, the natural consequences of  this 
satisfi~ction  result  in the end which  nature  had in 
view, without any additional cooperation of  man. 
The ground why nature  must  separate two dif- 
ferent sexes, through the union whereof  alone the  - 
propagation of  the race is possible, I shall suggest 
here only in  outlines, since it  is an investigation 
not properly belonging  here.  Tlle formation of  a 
being of  its own kind is the last degree of  creative 
power  in organic nature ;  and that power  neces- 
sarily works whenever the conditions of  its causa- 
lity are given.  If these conditions, therefore, were 
always given, nature would be an everlasting transi- 
tion  into other  forms, but never a permanency of 
the same form ;  would be an everlasting Becoming, 
but never a  Being ;  nay,  even  transition  and  be- 
coming would  be impossible, since there would  be 
nothing to change and to become ; all of  which is, 
indeed, an unthinkable and contradictory concep- 
tion. 
If a  nature was to be possible, it was  necessary 
that the species should  have another organic exis- 
tence besides  that of  the species, and yet that it 
should remain species, so as to be able to propagate 
itself  This was  possible only  by separating  the 
organic power, which  forms  the species, into two 
absolutely connecting halves, as it were, which only 
in their  union  would  form  an  itself  propagating 
whole.  In this separation that organic power forms 
only the individual.  The individuals are and form 
the species only, (for to be and to form is the same 
in organic nature,) in so far as they are united  and 
can be united.  The individual is permanent  only 
as a tendency to form the species.  Only thus did 
rest and permanency of  power  enter nature,  and 
with  that permanency form, and made it nature ; 
and hence this law of  a division  into two separate 
sexes necessarily pervades all nature. 
The particular determinedness of this institution 
of  nature is this, that in the satisfying of  the ini- 
pulse, or in the promotion of  the end of  nature, so 
far as the real act of  generation  is concerned, the 
one sex keeps  purely active, and the other purely 
passive. 
The ground of  this  determinedness also can be 
discovered.  The system  of  all  the conditions for 
the generation of  a body of  the same species had 
to be completely united somewhere, and, when put 
in motion, to develop itself after its own laws.  The 
sex which  contains  these  complete conditions is 
called throughout all nature the fcnznle  sex.  Only 
the first moving  principle could  be separated  from 
it.  The sex in which this principle generates itself, 
apart from  the substance to  be vitalized  by it,  is 
called throughout all nature the male sex. TIIE  SCIENCE OF RICIITS.  TIIE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  395 
111. 
The character of reason is absolute self-activity ; 
pure passivity for the sake of  passivity contradicts 
reason,  and utterly  cancels  it.  Hence,  it  is  not 
against  reason that the one sex should propose to 
itself the satisfaction  of its sexual  impulse as an 
end in itself, since it can  be satisfied through acti- 
vity ; but  it is  absolutely against reason  that the 
other sex should  propose to itself the satisfaction 
of  its  sexual impulse  as an end, because  in  that 
case it would make a pure passivity its end.  Hence, 
the female sex is either not rational even in its ten- 
dencies, which contradicts  our  presupposition that 
all men should be rational, or this tendency can not 
be developed  in  that  sex  in  consequence  of  its 
peculiar  nature, which is a self-contradiction, since 
it assumes a tendency in nature which nature does 
not accept ; or, finally, that sex can never propose 
to itself  the satisfaction of  its sexual impulse as its 
end.  Such an end and  rationality  utterly  cancel 
each other in that sex. 
Nevertheless, the sexual impulse  of  this female 
sex, as well  as its  manifestation  and  satisfaction, 
are part of  the plan of  nature.  Hence it is neces- 
sary that the sexual impulse  should manifest itself 
in woman under another form ; and, in order to be 
conformable to reason, it must appear as an impulse 
to activity ; and as a characteristic impulse of  na- 
ture, it must appear as an activity exclusively apper- 
taining to the female sex. 
Since our whole  subsequent  theory rests  upon 
this proposition, I shall  endeavor to place it in its 
proper light, and to disarm possible misunderstand- 
ing of  its meaning 
Firstly : we  speak here of  nature and of  an i7e- 
pulse of  nature;  that  is,  of  something  which  a 
woman  will  find  in  herself  as  something  given, 
original, and  not  to  be  explained  by any previous 
act of  her own, nor originated  by any application 
of  her freedom whatever;  something which woman 
will thus find  in herself  as soon as its two  condi- 
tions,  reason  and  activity of  the  sexual  impulse, 
exist.  But we do  not  at all  deny the possibility 
that woman  may not sink below this condition of 
nature, or may not through freedom elevate herself 
above  it,  which  elevation,  however,  is  itself  not 
much  better than the sinking below it.  A woman 
sinks? below  nature when  she degrades herself  to 
irrationality ;  in which condition the sexual impulse 
may  manifest  itself  in  consciousness  in  its  true 
form, and  may become a well-considered  object of 
activity.  A woman  elevates herself above her na. 
ture when the satisfaction of  the sexual  impulse is 
not an end for her, neither in its coarse form nor in 
that form which it receives in a well-formed female 
soul ;  hence, when it is considered by her as means 
for another end, which she has with free conscious- 
ness proposed to herself.  Unless this other end is 
to be an utterly wicked and degrading end-as,  for 
instance, if she should have done it for the purpose of 
becoming a married woman, and in view of a pros- 
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pect of a secure income, thus making of her person 
the means to obtain an enjoyment-we  must assume 
it to be the same end which nature has in view, that 
is, to have children, and which some  such women, 
indeed, claim to have been their motive.  But since 
she could attain this object with every possible man, 
and since thus there is no grouncl to be discovered 
in her principle why she should have chosen pre- 
cisely this man and none other for that purpose, we 
must assume, as, after all, the least degrading mo- 
tive, that she chose this  man because he was the 
first one she could get, which surely does not evince 
great personal  self-respect.  But even apart from 
this grave circumstance, and admitting for the mo- 
ment that such an end would  justify the resolve to 
cohabit with a man, the serious question tvould still 
remain : Whether the end will be produced by such 
means, or whether  children  are really begotten by 
the resolve to beget them ? 
We hope this plainness will be pardoned in our 
endeavor to show up certain dangerous sophistries 
in all  their  nakedness, by means of  which  sophis- 
tries many seek to palliate the repudiation of  their 
true destination, and to perpetuate it forever. 
Let me characterize  this whole  relation  in  an 
image: The female sex stands one step lower  in 
the arrangement of  nature than the male sex ;  the 
female sex is the object of  a power of the male sex, 
and no other arrangement was possible if both sexes 
were to be connected.  Rut at the same time both 
sexes, as  moral beings, ought to be equal.  To  make 
this possible, a new faculty, utterly wanting in the 
male sex, had to be given to the female scx.  This 
faculty is the for111 in which the sexual impulse ap- 
pears  to woman, ~vhereas  to man it appcnrs  in its 
true form. 
Man  may  confess  to himself  that impulse,  and 
may  seek  its  satisfaction without  thereby  losing 
his self-respect or the respect of  others.  I spcak, 
of  course, of  the sexual impulse in its original con- 
dition ;  for  a  man who  should  propose  to himself 
the satisfaction of  that impulse  for  its own  sake 
with  a  loving wife,  would  show  himself  to be  a 
coarse  character, xvl~ereof we  shall  cliscover  the 
ground  hereafter.  But  a  woman  call  not  confess 
that impulse to herself.  Man  may court,  but  not 
woman.  A woman who were to do so \vould  exhi- 
bit  the highest  self-contcmpt.  For a  refilsal  re- 
ceivecl by a  Inan  signifies merely, "  I will not sub- 
mit myself  to thee !" ancl this may be borne.  13ut 
a  refusal  received  by  a  woman would  signify, " I 
will  not  accept  the submission  thou  hast  offcrecl 
me !" and this is insupportable.  It is  nonsense to 
apply legal arguments in this case.  If some vJonlell 
claim  that they ought to havc  the same right  to 
court as men, we would answer : "  No one disputes 
you that right ; why, then, do you not make use of 
it  ?"  The truth is, such arguments are as absurd 
as it would  be  to question  whether man  has the 
same right  to fly as the birds have.  Of  course he 
has ; so let hiill fly ! 
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diffierence of  the sexes.  It  is this natural constitu- 
tion of  woman which gives rise to female modesty, 
which  modesty  is by no means  developed  to the 
satile  extent  in  the male  sex.  Vulgar men some- 
times  boast of  their deeds of  voluptuousness ; but 
even in the times of  the worst  demoralization  into 
which the female sex has repeatedly sunk, and then 
by  far  exceeded  the  demoralization of  the  men, 
women have never been known to do so ; and even 
the prostitute will rather confess that she carries on 
her horrible  trade from lust of  gain than from vo- 
luptuousness. 
IV. 
Woman can not confess to herself that she gives 
herself  up-and  since, in  a rational  being,  every 
thing is only in so far as it arises in consciousness- 
woman  can not  give  herself  up to the sexual im- 
pulse  merely  to  satisfy  her  own  impulse.  But 
since she can give herself  up only in obedience to 
an impulse, this impulse must assume in woman the 
character of an impulse to satisfy the man.  Woman 
becomes, in this act, the means  for  the end of  an- 
other, because she can not be her own end without 
renouncing her  ultimate  end-the  dignity of  rea- 
son !  This dignity she maintains, although she be- 
comes  means,  because  she voluntarily makes her- 
self  means in virtue of  a  noble  natural  impulse- 
love ! 
Love, therefore, is the form  in which the sexual 
impulse appears to woman.  But love is, to sacrifice 
one's  self  for  the sake of  another  not  in conse- 
quence of  a  reasoning,  but  in  consequence of  a 
feeling.  Mere  sexual  impulse  should  never  be 
called love ; to do so is a vulgar abuse of  language, 
calculated to cause all that is noble in human nature 
to be forgotten.  In fact, my opinion  is  that noth- 
ing should  be  called  love  but what we  have just 
now described.  Man origi7tal& does not feel love, 
but sexual impulse ; and love in man is not an ori- 
ginal,  but a commu?zicnted,  derived impulse,  name- 
ly, an impulse developed through connection with a 
loving woman ;  and has, moreover, quite a different 
form in man to what it has in woman.  Love, the 
noblest  of  all  natural  impulses,  is  inborn  only in 
woman ;  and  only  through  woman  does  it,  like 
many  other social  impulses,  become  the common 
property of mankind.  The sexual impulse received 
this  moral  form  of  love  in woman, because  in its 
original  form  it would  have  canceled  all  morality 
in woman.  Love is  the closest  point of  union  of 
nature and reason ; it is the only link wherein na- 
ture connects with reason, and hence it is the most 
excellent of all that is natural.  The Moral Law re- 
quires that man should forget himself  in the other ; 
but love even sacrifices itself to the other. 
Let me  state it concisely:  In an uncorrupted 
woman the sexual impulse does not manifest itself 
at all, but  only love; and  this  love  is  the natural 
impulse of  a woman  to  satisfy a  man.  It is  cer- 
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isfied, but its being thus satisfied is not the satisfac- 
tion of  the woman.  On the contrary, it is the sat- 
isfaction of  the man, and for woman it is only the 
satisfaction of her heart.  Her only requirement is 
to love  and to be loved.  Only thus does the im- 
pulse  which  the woman  feels  to sacrifice  receive 
that character  of  freedom  and  activity  which  it 
must have in order to be rational.  Perhaps there 
does not exist a man who does not feel the absurd- 
ity to turn this around  and  to  assume in man  a 
similar impulse to satisfy a need of  woman ; a need, 
in fact, which he can neither presuppose in woman 
nor consider himself as its tool without feeling him- 
self disgraced to the innermost depths of  his soul. 
Hence, also, woman in the sexual union is not in 
every sense means for the object of  the man.  She 
is means for her own end, to satisfy her heart ; and 
she is means for the end of  the man only in so far 
as physical satisfaction is concerned. 
The attempt to hold  up this mode of  regarding 
woman as deceptive, and to say, for instance, "  Af- 
ter all, it is only the sexual  impulse which  impels 
woman, under the deceitful cloak of lov,e,"  is a dog- 
matic error.  For woman sees no further, and her 
nature goes no further, than love ;  hence woman is 
only love.  It does not matter to woman whether 
man-who  does not possess that female innocence, 
nor is intended to possess it, and who may become 
conscious of  all  that  is  within  him-proceeds  to 
analyze that impulse or not ; it suffices to woman 
that the sexual  impulse is  to a woman  only love. 
If  women were mcn, it would  certainly be  other- 
wise. 
Woman, in making herself  the means to satisfy 
man, gives  up her  personality;  and  she receives 
this and her whole dignity back again only by thus 
making herself  means to satisfy man from love for 
a particular one. 
If  this sentiment  ever should cease; if  woman 
ever shoulcl  cease to regard in the man whom she 
satisfied  the  most  lovable  of  all  his  sex,  this 
thought alone would make her contemptible in her 
own eyes.  If it were possible that he should ever 
not  be in  her eyes the most lovable of  all his sex, 
then the presumption would  be, that in giving her- 
self up to him she gave herself up only from a con- 
cealed  natural impulse  to give  herself  up  to the 
first one who might come-a  thought which would, 
doubtless, dishonor her in her own eyes.  As sure- 
ly,  therefore,  as  she  thus  gives  herself  up with 
f~~ll  preservation of  her dignity, she does it under 
the presupposition  that  her  present  feelings  can 
never change, but that they are as eternal as she is 
herself  The woman  who  gives  herself  up once, 
gives herself up forever. 
VI. 
The  woman who thus surrenders her personality, 
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sarily gives up to her lover all  that she has.  For, 
if she retained the least for her own self, she would 
thereby confess  that it had a higher value  for her 
than her own person ; and this undoubtedly would 
be a lowering of that person.  Her own dignity re- 
quires  that she should  give herself  up entirely as 
she is, and lives  to her choice and  should  utterly 
lose  herself  in  him.  The least  consequence  is, 
that  she should renounce to him all  her property 
and all  her rights.  Henceforth  she has  life  and 
activity only under  his  eyes and  in  his  business. 
She has  ceased  to lead  the life of  an individual; 
her life has become a part of  the life of  her lover. 
(This is aptly characterized  by  her  assuming  his 
name.) 
VI  I 
The position  of  the  man,  meanwhile,  is  this: 
Since he may confess all to himself, and hence finds 
in himself the whole fullness of humanity, he is able 
to overlook his whole relation to woman, as woman 
herself  can never overlook  it.  He, therefore, sees 
how  an  originally  free  being  voluntarily  submits 
itself  to him  with  unlimited  confidence, and  that 
she makes  not  only her whole  external fate,  but 
also her internal peace of  soul and moral character 
-at  least  her  own  faith  in  it-dependent  upon 
him, since the faith of woman in herself  and in her 
own innocence and virtue depends upon  this, that 
she may never cease  to esteem and love  her hus- 
band above all others oi his sex. 
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As the moral impulse of  woman manifests itself 
as love, so in  man that impulse manifests itself  as 
generosity.  His first wish  is to be master ; but if 
another being  surrenders  itself  to him  in perfect 
confidence, he lays aside all  his power.  For to be 
strong against the vanquished  is  fit  only for  the 
weak-hearted who  can not oppose force to resist- 
ance. 
In consequence of  this  natural  generosity, man, 
in his relation  to his wife, is compelled, first of  all, 
to be worthy of  esteem, since her whole  peace  of 
mind  depends  upon  his  being  held  in esteem by 
her.  Nothing so irrevocably kills  the love  of  the 
wife  as the meanness  or infamy  of  her husband. 
Indeed, the female sex will pardon in our sex every 
thing  but  cowardice  and  weakness  of  character. 
The ground of this is by no means a selfish calcu- 
lation upon our protection ; but solely the impossi- 
bility to submit to such men, as woman's  destiny 
nevertheless requires her to submit. 
The peace of  the wife depends upon  her being 
utterly  submitted  to her husband, and  having  no 
other will  than  his  own.  Now,  since  he  knows 
this  to  be  so, his  character  of  manly  generosity, 
which  he can not deny without denying his own 
nature and dignity, requires that he should make it 
as light as possible  for  her to do so.  This he can 
not do by allowing  his wife  to rule him ;  for  the 
pride of  her love consists in being and seeming to 
be submitted and not  knowing  otherwise.  Men 
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thereby make themselves contemptible in the eyes 
of  their  wives,  and destroy all  their  matrimonial 
happiness.  He can  do it only by attentively dis- 
covering her  wishes,  and causing  to  be  done, as 
if it were through his own will, what he knows she 
would most gladly have done.  It  is not to be taken 
that he thus gratifies her notions and whims merely 
in order to have them gratified, but that he has the far 
higher purpose of  thereby making it easier for her 
to love her husband always above every thing, and 
of thus retaining her innocence in her own  eyes. 
It can not  fail  but that the wife-whose  heart can 
not be satisfied by an obedience which calls for no 
sacrifice on her part-will  seek to discover, on her 
part, the concealecl  higher wishes of  her husband, 
in  order to satisfy them at some sacrifices.  For 
the greater  the sacrifice,  the more  perfect  is  the 
satisfaction of  her heart.  Hence arises connubial 
tetzd~y~zess;  that is, tenderness  of  sentiments, and 
of  the whole  relation.  Each  party wishes to give 
up  its personality, so  that the other one may rule 
alone.  Each finds content only in the satisfaction 
of  the other ;  the exchange of  hearts and wills be- 
comes  perfect.  It is  only  in  connection  with  a 
loving woman  that the heart of  the man opens to 
love, to the love which  confidingly surrenders  and 
loses itself  in the beloved  object ; it is only in the 
tie which connects the wife with the husband  that 
she learns generosity and  conscious self-sacrifice ; 
and thus  the tie unites them closer every day of 
their wedded life. 
COROLLARIA. 
I.  In the union of  both sexes, and  hence in the 
realization of man as a whole, or as a conlpleted pro. 
duct of  nature, but also o?z&  in this union, is there 
to be found  an exkr?zal impulse to virtue.  Man is 
con~pelled  by his natural impulse of generosity to be 
noble and venerable, because the fate of a free being 
which surrendered  itself to him in full  confidence 
depends upon his being so.  Woman is compelled to 
observe all her duties by her inborn modesty.  She 
can not  act contrary to reason  in any manner, be- 
cause it would lead her to suspect herself of having 
acted  so  in  the chief  manner, and  that  she had 
chosen her husband, not from  love-the  most  in- 
supportable thought  to woman-but  merely as a 
means  to  satisfy her  sexual  impulse.  The man 
in whom there still lingers generosity, and the wo- 
man  in whom  there still dwells modesty, are open 
to the utmost  degree of  culture ; but both are on 
the sure path  to all vices when  the one becomes 
mean and the other shameless, as indeed experience 
invariably shows it to be the case. 
We have,  therefore,  also  solved  here  the  pro- 
blem:  How the humail  race can  be  led  to virtue 
through nature.  This can be done only by restoring 
the  natural  relation  between  both  sexes.  Moral 
education  of  mankind  is  possible  only from  this 
point. 
2.  Such a union as we have described is called a 
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persons of  both  sexes, based  upon  the sexual  im- 
pulse, and having its end in itself 
It  has its ground in the sexual impulse in either 
sex, that is, for the external observation of  the phi- 
losopher; but it is not necessary that either of  the 
persons who desire to conclude marriage should be 
conscious of  it.  A woman can  never confess  this 
to be the case.  She can only confess  the motive 
to be  love.  Nor is the continuance of  marriage in 
any way conditioned by the satisfaction of  this im- 
pulse ; for  that  end  may vanish  utterly, and  the 
marriage relation may, nevertheless, continue in its 
whole intensity. 
Philosophers  have  hitherto considered  it neces- 
sary to assign some end to marriage, and have spe- 
cified  that  end variously.  But  marriage  has  no 
other end than itself; it is its own end.  The mar- 
riage relation is the true mode of existence of grown 
persons of both sexes, required even by nature.  In 
this relation all man's  faculties develop ; but out of 
it  many,  and  among  them  the  most  remarkable 
faculties  of  man,  remain  uncultivated.  Precisely 
as the whole  existence of  man  has no relation  to 
any sensuous  end,  so  neither  has  its  necessary 
mode, marriage. 
Marriage  is  a  union  between two  persons-orre 
man  and  orze  woman.  A woman  who  has  given 
herself  up to  one,  can  not  give  herself  up  to  a 
second,  for  her  whole  dignity  requires  that  she 
should belong only to this one.  Again, a man who 
has to observe  the slightest wish  of  one womar. 
can  not  conform  to  the  contradictory wishes  of 
many.  Polygamy presupposes that women are not 
rational  beings  like men,  but  merely  willess  and 
lawless means to gratify man.  Such is, indeed, the 
doctrine of  the religious legislation which tolerates 
polygamy.  This  religion  has-probably  without 
being clearly conscious of the grounds-drawn  one- 
sided conclusions from the destination of woman to 
remain  passive.  Polyandry  is  utterly against na- 
ture, and  hence very rare.  If it were not a condi- 
tion of utter brutishness, and if it could presuppose 
any thing, it would  have  to presuppose  that there 
is no reason and no dignity of  reason. 
The union  of  matrimony  is  in  its  nature inse- 
parable  and  eternal, and  is  necessarily  concluded 
as being eternal.  A  woman  can not  presuppose 
that she will  ever cease to love her husband above 
all of  his sex without abandoning her personal dig- 
nity ; nor can the husband  presuppose that he will 
ever  cease  to love  his wife  above all  of  her  sex 
without  abandoning  his  manly  generosity.  Both 
give themselves to each other forever, because they 
give themselves to each other wholly. 
3.  Marriage  is,  therefore,  no  invented  custom, 
nor  an arbitrary institution, but  a  relation  neces- 
sarily and perfectly determined through nature and 
reason in their union.  Perfectly determined, I say, 
that is, only a marriage such as we have described, 
and absolutely no other union of both sexes for the 
satisfaction of  the sexual  impulse  is  permitted  by 
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It is not the business of  the Science of  Rights, 
but of  the far higher  laws of  nature and reason to 
establish  and determine marriage.  To look  upon 
marriage as merely a legal relation leads to impro- 
per  and  immoral  conceptions.  The reason  why, 
nevertheless, it has been done, may be found, per- 
haps,  in  the consideration  that  marriage,  like  all 
that is determined by the conception of  rights, is a 
living  together of  free  beings.  But  it would  be 
bad if  this cohabitation had no higher ground, and 
no  other regulative principle,  than a  law of  com- 
pulsion.  Marriage must exist before we can speak 
of  any matrimonial  rights, precisely as man  must 
exist  before we  can  speak of  rights  at all.  The 
Science of Rights neither asks how matrimony ori- 
ginated nor where  men  came  from.  After mar- 
riage has been deduced, as has just now been done, 
the question first arises as to how far the concep- 
tion of  rights is applicable to it, what  law disputes 
may enter it, and how these disputes ought to be 
decided ; or, since we teach here an applied Science 
of  Rights, what  rights and duties the state has  in 
regard to the relation of  both sexes in general, and 
particularly  in  regard  to  the  marriage  relation. 
We now enter upon this investigation, 
LAW  OF IZARRIAGE. 
THE  conception of  personality involves the con- 
ception  of  all  the rights  of  man, and hence  it is 
the first and highest duty of  the state to protect 
the personality of  its citizens.  A woman loses her 
personality and her whole dignity when she is com- 
pelled to submit herself to the sexual lust of a man 
without l'ove.  It  is, therefore, the absolute duty of 
the state to protect  its female citizens against  this 
compulsion, a duty which is not  at all  based  upon 
any particular  arbitrary  agreement,  but  upon  the 
simple nature of  the case, and the immediate prin- 
ciples  of  municipal  law-a  duty as  holy  and  in- 
violable as the duty to  protect  the life of  citizens, 
for it is the internal, moral  life of  the female citi- 
zens which is thus to be protected. 
Such a compulsion  may be effected  upon  a wo- 
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is called rafe.  Of course, rape is a crime ;  for it is 
a most  brutal attack upon the personality of  a wo- 
man, and hence upon all her rights. 
The state has the right  and duty to protect  its 
female  citizens against  this  compulsion, and  does 
so partly through  the watchfulness  of  the police, 
partly by providing for its punishment.  This crime 
evinces, first of  all, brutality in the criminal, mak- 
ing him incapable of  living among human society. 
Violence of  passion  is no excuse, but, on the con- 
trary, increases the crime.  For a man who has not 
control over himself is a wild beast, and society, not 
being able to tame him, must not  tolerate  him in 
its midst.  It evinces, moreover, an unlimited  con- 
tempt for, and neglect of, all  human rights.  Some 
laws punish rape by death, and a  legislation which 
recognizes  the punishment  of  death certainly acts 
logically in  prescribing  it as a  proper punishment 
for this crime.  According  to my system, I should 
send such men to  the colonies for correction ; for, 
although their crime  is  equal to murder so far as 
the contempt of  human  rights is concerned, still it 
is not impossible for men to live together with such 
criminals. 
Restitution  is, of  course,  impossible.  For how 
can we restore  to the unfortunate woman  the con- 
sciousness  that she may  give  up, at some  future 
time, her whole  untouched  personality to the man 
she loves ?  Nevertheless, restitution must be made 
so far as it is possible,  and  since the criminal  can 
give  to the offended  woman  nothing  but  money, 
and since  she can  receive  from  him  nothing but 
money, I  should vote that he be compelled  to de- 
liver all his property to the woman he has violated. 
Unmarried women are, as we shall see hereafter, 
under the control of their parents ;  married women 
under that of  their husbands.  Hence, the parents 
or  husbands will be the plaintiffs in such cases.  In 
the former instance, if  the parents should refuse to 
prosecute, the woman might do so herself, but not 
if  the husband  should  so refuse;  for  women  are 
submitted  to their  parents  only conditionally, but 
to their husbands unconditionally. 
Or such  a  compulsion  may  be  effected  upon 
the female citizen i~zdirectly  through the moral  in- 
fluence of  her parents  or relations, in  compelling 
her to consent  to a marriage for which  she has no  - 
inclination, either  by means of  harsh  treatment or 
of  persuasion.  Harsh  treatment  is,  of  course, a 
legal offense ; but is persuasion also one ?  In this 
case-although  in no other possible case-persua- 
sion  is  an indictable offense.  For whereas  in  all 
other  cases  you  can  properly  ask, Why  did  you 
allow yourself to be persuaded ?  this question is not 
admissible here.  The ignorant, innocent daughter 
ha5 no knowledge of  love, knows not at all  the na- 
ture of the connection she is inveigled into ;  she is, 
therefore,  cheated, and  used  as  a  means  for  the 
ends of  her pareilts or relatives. 
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This Iiind of  con~p~~lsion  is the most dangerous, 
and far more insulting than violence, if  not in form 
at least in its results.  For, in the case of rape, wo- 
man, after all, regains her freedom afterward ;  but 
in the case of  a compulsion of  this Irind, woman is 
usually  cheated for  her whole  lifetime out of  the 
noblest  and  sweetest  sentiment, that of  love, ancl 
out of  her true female dignity and whole character, 
and lowered completely and forever to a tool. 
It can not, therefore, be at all  a matter of  doubt 
whether the state has the right and cluty to protect 
its young female citizens against  this kind of  com- 
pulsion, by severe laws  and strict vigilance.  The 
only question  is, Who is  to prefer  the con~plaint, 
since  the  unmarried  daughter  stands  under  the 
authority of  her parents, who are her legal  guard- 
ians, and who will not be likely to prefer complaint 
against themselves ?  The  solution of  this difficulty 
we shall find when we come to see that the daugh- 
ter escapes that parental authority the moment she 
marries.  Hence, the law can very properly provide 
that a daughter shall become independent  the mo- 
ment  her  parents  propose  marriage  to  her,  and 
shall, therefore, be full master of  her own rights in 
such case. 
The final  decision  of  the state in such a  case 
would  be  this : Parents  who  have  abused  their 
power  for  the purpose of  enslaving their children 
during their whole  lives, must  be deprived of  that 
power, and the children, together with their inheri- 
tance, must be placed  undcr the protection of  the 
state.  Gut  since  it  might,  nevertheless,  happcn, 
that young and inexperienced daughters, not accus- 
tonned  to disobey parental  authority, would  lather 
submit  than  prefer  public  complaint,  the  state 
ought  to retain  the right to officially interfere on 
its own account in such cases, even when  no com- 
plaint has been preferred. 
IV. 
It is quite different with  the male sex.  Firstly: 
No man can be compelled, in the true sense of  the 
word, to marry, for  it is  against  the nature  of  the 
thing.  If he is persuaclcd, it does not signify much, 
for real love  in man does not  precede, but follows 
marriage.  But if  he knows his own advantage, he 
will  not  permit  that  any woinan  should  be  com- 
pelled to marry him, since this would be a violation 
of his human rights, depriving him, as it would, of all 
prospects of a happy marriage, which he has a right 
to demand.  "  Love will come afterward," say many 
parents.  It  is certainly to be expected  in the case 
of  the man, provided he marries a worthy woman ; 
but in the case of  the woman it is very uncertain ; 
and it is terrible to sacrifice and degrade a whole 
human life upon the risk of  this bare possibility. 
The  result of our argument is, that marriage must 
be an absolutely free act ;  and the state, as the pro- 
tector of  the rights of  each individual, and part~cu- 
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to watch  over  this  freedom  of  all  matrimonial  al- 
liances. 
This jurisdiction  of  the state over  the freedom 
of all marriages involves, that the state must recog- 
nize and confirm all marriages of  its citizens. 
Every marriage must have legal validity, that is, 
it must not infringe upon the rights of the woman, 
who  must  give  herself  up with her free will, and 
from  love.  A  citizen  must  be  obliged  to  prove 
this to the state, unless he wishes  to render  him- 
self  suspicious  of  having  used  violence.  This 
proof  he can  not well  furnish  otherwise  than  by 
causing the woman  to declare the marriage  to  be 
her own  free will  before the law.  This is done in 
the marriage  ceremony.  The "  Yes !" of  the wo- 
man declares in  reality only that she has not been 
forced  to the act.  For all  the other obligations 
which are entered  into in the marriage  ceremony 
are  of  themselves  necessary  results  of  marriage. 
The significance of  the husband's "  Yes !" we shall 
investigate later.  That he is not compelled in the 
act appears  clearly from his leading the woman to 
the altar.  It is very  proper  and reasonable that 
marriages, being based upon and having their exis- 
tence  only  in  morality,  should  be  celebrated by 
clergymen ; but in so far as the ceremony has legal 
validity, the clergyman is an official of  the state. 
It is beyond comprehension why the state, or the 
clergy, should have the right to prohibit marriages 
between  persons  of  a  certain  degree  of  relation- 
ship.  If nature has provided  a prejudice  against 
such  mixtures,  the  laws  are  superfluous ;  but  if 
there is no such natural disgust, then we should not 
produce  it by our laws.  It is plausible why some 
nations should  believe such marriages to be an of- 
fense to their divinity, but that does not justify  the 
state in  prohibiting  such  marriages.  Those who 
believe  such to be the case will  not conclude such 
marriages ;  and those who do not believe it, or wish 
to risk it, will  be punished  by their own act if  the 
belief  of  the nation is a true one.  It is better to 
let the gods revenge their own insults. 
But, independently of all religious grounds, might 
there not be  political  reasons  for  considering cer- 
tain  marriages as not  allowable ?  It seems to me 
that the best that has been  said on this subject is 
to be found in Montesquieu.  (De rEs-rit  des Loix, 
liv. 26, chap. 14.)  It has always been the natural 
destination of  the fathers to watch  over the inno- 
cence of  their  children, and to keep them as pure 
in body and soul as possible.  Incessantly occupied 
with this care, the doing of  any thing which might 
seduce  these  was  furthest  removed  from  them. 
The same reason  implanted a disgust against mu- 
tual  intercourse in  son  and daughter ; and is also 
the source why marriages between cousins are pro- 
hibited.  For in the first times of  our race all chil- 
dren remained  at home,  and the  children  of  two 4x6  TIIE  SCIENCE  OF RIGIITS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS.  4I? 
brothers  coilsidercd  each  other  as  of  the  same 
father and mother. 
This preservation  of  chastity  in  families  was 
under the care of  the fathers of  the family, but on 
no account an affair of civil legislation-as  an actual 
violation of the rights of another family-or  of police 
legislation-as  merely facilitating such a violation. 
Hence,  those  who  did  not  keep such care  could 
merely be taught and educated  by the more culti- 
vated  people to do so, but  could not be compelled 
by force of  law to keep this care over the chastity 
of  their  families.  Again : the grounded  vanishes 
when the ground vanishes, which  in  our instance 
is  the living together  of  many  relatives.  So far 
as  marriage  between  parents  and  children,  and 
between  brothers  and  sisters  is  concerned,  this 
ground can never vanish in its generality.  So far 
as the marriage of cousins, or of uncles and nieces, 
etc., is concerned, this  ground rarely occurs in the 
present condition of  mankind. 
Cohabitation is the real actualization of marriage ; 
for only  through  it does the  woman  submit  her 
whole  personality to the husband, and  shows him 
her love, from which the whole  described  relation 
between  married  people  emanates.  Where this 
cohabitation has occurred, marriage is always to be 
presupposed ;  where it has not occurred, any other 
union  than a  union of  marriage has taken place. 
Hence, a mere engagement to be married, whether 
public  or private, does not  constitute a marriage ; 
and the breaking off thereof is not to be considered 
as a divorce.  It may entitle to damages.  The in- 
nocent  party  must  be  reinstated  in  her  previous 
condition  so far as possible.  Even  the  perform- 
ance of the marriage ceremony, if-as  is conforma- 
blc  to propriety-it  precedes  marriage,  does  not 
constitute  marriage, but  merely legally recognizes 
in advance the marriage to be culminated. 
VI. 
Man and wife are intimately united.  Their union 
is a union of  hearts and of  wiils.  Hence, it is not 
to be assunled at all that a  law dispute can  arise 
between  them.  The state,  therefore,  passes  no 
laws  regulating the relation  of  husband  and wife, 
their whole  relation  being of  a  natural and moral, 
but not  of  a  legal character.  Both  are one soul, 
and are presupposed  to be as little likely to quar- 
rel with  each other  or  to prefcr  suit against each 
other, as one and the same individual  is supposed 
lilcely to quarrel with himself. 
As soon  as a dispute arises, the divorce has al- 
ready been accomplished, and it is only legalized by 
the judicial decree of  divorce. 
VII. 
The conception  of  marriage  involves  the most 
unlimited  subjection of  the woman  to the will of 
the hilsbancl ; not  from legal, but from  moral  rea- 
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own  honor.  The woman does not belong  to her- 
self, but to  the  man.  The state, by recognizing 
marriage, that is, by recognizing a  relation  based 
upon something far higher than itself, abandons all 
claims  to consider  the woman  as a  legal person. 
The husband  supplies  her  place ; her marriage 
utterly annuls her, so far as the state is concerned, 
by virtue of her own necessary will, which the state 
has guaranteed.  The husband becomes  her  gua- 
rantee in the eye of  the law ;  or becomes her legal 
guardian.  He lives in all her public life, and she 
retains for herself  only a house life. 
The guarantee of  the man  is  a  natural conse- 
quence of the relation.  Its limits we shall discover 
hereafter.  Nevertheless, it might  be  advisable to 
have  him  so declare  himself  specially as the gua- 
rantee of  this woman.  The "  Yes !" of the man in 
the marriage ceremony may be  regarded as such a 
pledge, and obtains significance indeed, only when 
so regarded. 
VIII. 
The conception  of  marriage  involves,  that  the 
woman who surrenders her personality shall at the 
same time surrender the possession of  all  her pro- 
perty and  her exclusive  rights  in the state.  The 
state, in recognizing the marriage, recognizes  and 
guarantees the possessions of  the wife to the hus- 
band ; that is, lzot as against the claims of the wife, 
for a law dispute with  her is impossible, under our 
presupposition, but against the claims and attacks 
of  all other citizelzs.  The husband becomes, in sc 
far as the state is concerned, the sole proprietor of 
his  previous  possessions,  and of  those  which  his 
wife held at the time of  her marriage. 
These possessions of  the wife have  either  been 
held by her before marriage, in her own name, and 
are, therefore,  known  to be  hers  by  the state, in 
which case they are simply transferred to the hus- 
band ; or they are conferred upon  her at the time 
of  marriage by the parents, in which case the state 
is notified by the public transfer at the time.  The 
absolute property, money, and valuables, the state, 
as we have  shown  before, takes no cognizance of; 
nevertheless, for  the sake of  a  possible  future di- 
vorce,  which  necessitates  repartition, as we  shall 
see,  it  is  necessary  that  this  absolute  property 
brought  by the wife to the husband should also be 
known to the state, or at least  that arrangements 
should be made whereby it can be proved in future 
cases of  emergency.  A sealed document or con- 
tract, deposited in a court of  record, is sufficient. 
The conception of  marriage  also  involves com- 
mon residence, common labor ;  in short, living toge- 
ther.  To  the state both  husband  and wife appear 
as only one person ;  what the one does is as valid as 
if the other had also done it.  All public legal acts 
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It needs no law of  the state to regulate the rela- 
tions between married persons, or the relations be- 
tween them and other citizens.  My views on laws 
concerning adultery, in so far as those laws are in- 
tended, or appear  intended,  to  secure a property, 
the property of  a  man to his wife  and of  a wife to 
her husband, I  shall  express  hereafter.  Precisely 
as the state regards husband  and wife as only one 
legal person, externally represented by the husband, 
and their property as one property, so each citizen 
also must regard them and their property.  In law 
disputes citizens must deal with the husband ;  none 
have  a  right  to  immediately  appeal  to  the  wife. 
The only consequence of  this requirement  is, that 
husband  and wife  are obliged  to  lnakc their mar- 
riage  publicly known, which,  indeed,  is  necessary 
also  for moral purposes, to prevent the annoyance 
illegal, or supposedly illegal, counectiohs mijiht give 
rise to ;  and which is, thcrcfore, most properly made 
the duty of  the clergy. 
Originally, that  is,  so far  as his  mere  natural 
inclination  is  conccrned, man, it is  true, seeks to 
satisfy  his  sexual  impulse.  But when  he learns, 
either before  or after marriage, through  reflection 
or  through  the  teachings  of  others,  particularly 
through  actual  intercourse  with  esteemable  per- 
sons of the female sex, (above all, from his mother,) 
that woman loves, and o~ght  to give up her person- 
ality only froin  love, his mere  natural impulse will 
become ennobled.  He  will no longer desire merely 
to enjoy, but  also to be lovecl.  Knowing that wo- 
man  makes  herself  contemptible by surrcndcring 
herself  without love, and that lust in woman is de- 
grading, he no longer will wish to use her as mere 
means for sensual gratification.  He  would  neces- 
sarily have  to despise himself  were  he compelled 
to look upon himself  as the mere tool for the satis- 
faction  of  an ignoble  in~pulse.  These principles 
govern all juclgments  respecting the  effect  of  the 
wife's adultery upon the husband. 
Either such a wife, who  gives  herself  up to an- 
other man, does so from pure and whole  love.  In 
that case, since love  does  not  admit of  partition, 
she has ceased to love  her husband, and the whole 
rclation to him  is  broken of  itself.  Moreover, she 
has degraded  herself, although she pleads  love, for 
her first connection  with  her husband  must  now 
appear to her, if she is susceptible to moral feelings, 
as an ignoble and animal  connection  from the rea- 
sons assigned  before.  If she allows the sham of 
her relation  to her  husband  to  continue,  she de- 
grades herself still further to the utmost extent ; for, 
whether  she does so from  sensuous lust, or  from 
some external purpose, she certainly uses her per- 
sonality as a  means  for  a low purpose,  and  thus 
malres also a means of  the husband. 
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stranger from sensuous lust ; in which case it is to 
be  assumed that she also does  not  love  her hus- 
band, but  merely uses him  to gratify her passion. 
which is beneath his dignity. 
In either  case,  therefore,  adultery destroys  the 
whole  matrimonial  connection ; and  the husband 
can not continue to  keep the wife without  losing 
his self-esteem. 
(This, indeed, has shown itself in the universal 
sentiment of  all nations, even of the least civilized. 
A man who tolerates the dissipations of  his wife is 
held in contempt, and a peculiar expression of igno- 
miny has been  invented for  him.  The reason  is, 
that such a man acts dishonorably, and shows him- 
self to be mean and ignominious.) 
Man's jealousy has the character of  a  contempt 
of  the faithless woman.  If it has any other cha- 
racter, as, for  instance, that of  envy and jealousy, 
man renders himself  contemptible. 
Adultery  on  the  part  of  the husband  evinces 
either  a low mode of  thinking,  when  the woman 
with whom  he commits  it surrenders  herself, not 
from  love,  but  from  other motives ; or, when  the 
woman  gives  herself  up from  love, it  evinces  the 
grossest  injustice  toward  this woman ; for  by  ac- 
cepting  her  he  obliges  himself  to  fulfill  all  the 
duties of  marriage, to be unlimitedly generous and 
careful of  her peace of  mind, while  he knows that 
he can not be so. 
Now, although it is low in a man to merely gratify 
his passion, still to do so does not absolutely kill his 
character, as it does that of  the woman.  Neverthe- 
less, his wife, seeing him commit adultery for such 
a  low  purpose,  might  thereby  be  properly led  to 
suppose that he considers  her  in  a  like  manner, 
and  that  all  his  pretended  generous  tenderness 
is  merely  sexual  impulse-a  supposition  which 
would  materially lower her in her own estimation. 
Even apart from this, it would certainly be painful 
for a loving woman to know that the same sacrifice 
she has made of  herself to her husband has been 
made  by another woman.  (Hence the jealousy of 
woman has always a mixture of  envy and of hatred 
against  her  rival.)  It would  thus  become  very 
probable  that the wife's  heart would  be  alienated 
from  her  husband ; at least,  it  is  sure  that her 
relation  would  be  embittered  by such conduct on 
the part of  her husband, and hence it is not con- 
formable  to  the  generosity  which  the  husband 
owes to his wife. 
Whereas,  therefore,  the  wife's  adultery  neces- 
sarily destroys the whole relation between husband 
and wife,  the husband's  adultery  does  not  do so 
necessarily, but, nevertheless, may possibly destroy 
it.  His guilt  is  as great as that of  the faithless 
wife,  perhaps  even  greater, for  he evinces lack of 
generosity, that is, meanness.  The  wife  may par- 
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But it is painful  for  the husband to be pnrdoned, 
and still more painful for  the wife  that she should 
have  something  to  pardon.  The  husband  loses 
the  courage  and  power  to  be  the  head  of  the 
family ; and  the wife  feels pained that she can not 
esteem him to whom she has given herself.  Their 
relation  becomes  reversed.  The woman  becomes 
the  generous,  and  the  husband  the  sublnissivc 
party.  This is, indeed, shown  in  common  experi- 
ences.  A  wife  who  knows  and  tolerates  the 
dissipations  of  her  husband  is  not despised,  but, 
on the contrary, is held all the more in esteem the 
gentler and wiser she bears it.  The presupposition 
is,  therefore,  that  she  ought  not  to  seek  legal 
redress.  Whence does  this opinion  rise, which is 
so deeply rooted in men's  souls ?  From our legis- 
lation, or from our own sex ?  It seems not, since it 
exists also among the women, who complain  about 
that legislation.  It has its ground  in the funda- 
mental difference  between  both  sexes, as pointed 
out by us. 
XI. 
In order to get a thorough view concerning the 
civil  consequences  of  adultery, we must, above all 
things, investigate the relation of  the state, and of 
legislation,  towarcl  the  satisfaction  of  the  sexual 
impulse outside of the marriage relation. 
It  is the duty of  the state to protect the horzor of 
the female sex ; that is, to see that women are not 
compelled to give themselves up to a nman  whom they 
do not love ;  for this honor is a part, nay, the noblest 
part, of their personality.  But each woman has also 
the right to sacrifice her personality, that is to say, 
there is no e.rtr?;.znZ  legal ground against her doing 
so.  Precisely  as  each  person  has  an  unlimited 
external-not  internal,  or  moral-right  to  take 
away  his  own  life,  thq  state having  no right  to 
make  laws  against  suicide,  so  also  has  woman 
unlimited external right over her own honor.  She 
is  externally free  to  lower  herself  to  a  brute,  as 
the man is also externally free to think meanly and 
low. 
If, therefore, a woman chooses to give herself up 
from  mere voluptuousness  or  from  other  motives, 
and if  a  man can  be  found who  is willing  to dis 
pense  with  love,  the  state  has  no  right  to  pre- 
vent it. 
Strictly speaking,  therefore-we  shall see here- 
after how this may bc limited-the  state can  pass 
no laws against prostitution ancl adultery, nor affix 
any punishment to these offenses. 
(Such, indeed, was the original rule in all Chris- 
tian  states.  Offenses of  this ltincl were  punished, 
not as violations ~f a civil law, but of  a moral law, 
and hence were punishecl by the moral penal power, 
the church.  Their chief  punishment was always a 
church penance.  We do not wish  to discuss  the 
propriety  of  this conduct  here,  since we  do  not 
speak  of  the  church,  but  of  the  state.  The 
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a  great  consequence  in  inconsequence :  for  it 
is from  the church that sanction must be obtained 
for this mode of  life, if  it is to be at all permitted ; 
and  the money which is paid  is the penance paid 
in advance for sins to be committed thereafter.) 
XII. 
A relation, the end whereof  is mere gratification 
of  the sexual  impulse, and  which  is  based  upon 
egotism, may  be public  and  permanent, in which 
case it is called concubinage.  Its publicity results 
from  the living  together of  both parties in a suffi- 
ciently public  manner, at least, to be known  to a 
tvatchf~ll  police. 
The state, as we  have  seen, can  not  prohibit 
concubinage.  But as the protector of  women, the 
state must  be  satisfied  that the woman has voIun- 
tarily  entered  the  infamous  compact.  This can 
be achieved  only by the declaration of  such a wo- 
man, which declaration, however, on account of  its 
infamous character, must not be a solemn ceremony 
before the teachers of morality, as the marriage de- 
claration, but before  such officers of  the police  as 
may be intrusted with affairs of  this low character. 
The state must  also  know that this connection, 
although it has the external appearance of  a mar- 
riage, is none.  It has not  the legal consequences 
of  a marriage;  the husband does not  become the 
legal representative of  the woman.  The tie can be 
dissolved  whenever  either  party  pleases,  without 
any formality.  The state has not  guaranteed  it; 
nor does the state guarantee the conditions of  the 
arrangement ;  and hence, the woman obtains no le- 
gaIly valid  cIaim upon the man.  For such claims 
can be obtained  only in a relation  recognized  and 
guaranteed  by the state.  True, the state can not 
prevent such a relation as this of  concubinage, but 
neither  can  the  state confirm  it,  since it  is  im- 
moral.  If;  therefore, the man refuses to conform to 
the  obligations  given  to  the woman,  he  certainly 
caps  the climax  to  his  meanness, and, it is to be 
hoped,  makes  himself  universally  contemptible ; 
but  the woman can not substantiate  her claim  be- 
fore the law.  The courts will  refuse to entertain 
her complaint. 
XIII. 
A relation for the mere gratification of the sexual 
impulse  may  also  be  transitory  and  not  public. 
Two cases are possible. 
Firstly, the woman may submit to the will of the 
man without receiving any payment, or promise of 
payment-neither  money, presents, services, or any 
other kind of payment whatever, and  without  ex- 
pressly declaring  that  she does so from other  mo- 
tives than love.  In  this case, it is  to be assumed 
that she has done so from love ; for it is clear that 
she has not done it from motives of  gain ; and this 
is all  the more  to  be  presupposed,  because  it is 
against  the nature of  woman  to do it from volup- 
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tuousness, unless, indeed, it can be proved that she 
is known tb  have intercourse with every body.  She 
having thus surrendered herself from love, the rela- 
tion between both  persons is a true marriage rela- 
tion, although no specific promise to marry has been 
given.  The only thing wanting is the public recog- 
nition of  this marriage, that is, the marriage cere- 
mony.  This the state, as the protector of  woman's 
honor, owes to the woman.  She herself  is presup- 
posed not to have sacrificed that honor, and hence, 
the state can not sacrifice it either.  The man may 
be compelled to wed  her.  He  is not compelled  to 
marry  her,  for  he  has  already  married  her,  but 
merely  to  publicly  declare  this  marriage.  If  he 
evinces an insurmountable aversion, or if  there are 
other  reasons  which  form obstacles to a  continu- 
ance of  marriage, (for example, perfect  inequality 
of condition,) he may be divorced immediately after 
marriage, such divorce to be treated  according  to 
the general laws of  divorce, which we  shall  speak 
of  directly. 
Secondly, the woman who has thus  surrendered 
herself to the will of  a man may have had previously 
or afterward  intercourse with  other  men,  or  she 
may have  done so for money.  In the latter case, 
it must be evident that she has placed  that price 
upon her personality, and has given herself up only 
for the sake of  such price.  The fact that  she has 
received presents on other occasions from her lover 
is no proof against her virtue.  But if that proof can 
be furnished, she is dishonored, and has no  claim 
upon  the law for protection; for  the law can  not 
protect  an honor which  does not exist, and which 
she has surrendered herself. 
Prostitutes,  who  make  prostitution  their  sole 
business, can not  be tolerated  in a state, but  must 
be sent out of  its limits, (although their freedom to 
do with their body what they please remains unim- 
paired,) for  the following very simple reason : The 
state must know on what each person subsists, and 
must  extend to each  person  the right (license) to 
carry  on  a  certain  business.  A  person  without 
business  (means of  support) is no citizen.  Now, 
if a woman should assign prostitution as her means 
of support, she would properly be consiclered insane 
by the state.  Proprzn~~t  turpitudifze~tz  co7z$tezti  irzon 
creditzir  is a just rule of  law.  It is, therefore, the 
same as if  she had assigned  no business ; n7zd this 
is the reas07z why she can be expelled from the state 
unless she chooses to reform. 
In a  properly  arranged  state  such a  case can 
not well  occur.  Each  person  is rationally  taken 
care of.  If persons carry on another business than 
their  legitimate occupation,  the  state  ignores  it, 
because  it is  not  a  public  matter, and  hence  not 
subject to the law.  The state knows  nothing  of 
such irregularities.  The state does not guarantee 
to men  the enjoyment of  their dishonorable lusts, 
as it guarantees  to all  its citizens quiet and com- 
fortable highways.  Hence, it is not within the pro- 
vince of the police to be supervisors over the health 
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such a supervision unworthy of  a state.  Whoever 
chooses  to  be  dissipated  must  bear  the natural 
consequences of  such dissipation.  Nor  does  the 
state guarantee any contracts which  may be made 
concerning  these  matters.  A prostitute can  not 
prefer complaint in such things. 
XIV. 
Let us apply these principles to adultery.  The 
state can no more  prohibit  it or punish  it by law 
than any other illegitimate satisfaction of the sexual 
impulse.  For,  let me  ask, whose  rights  are vio- 
lated by this offense ?  The rights of  the husband 
whose wife, or of  the wife whose husband, commits 
adultery?  Is conjugal  fidelity  then an object of 
penal legislation ?  Or has it not, in fact, its ground 
in a connection of  hearts ?  But such a connection 
of hearts is free, and can not be compelled by penal 
laws ; and if  it ceases, the compulsion of  external 
fideZi9-which  compulsion alone is physically pos- 
sible-is  both illegal and impossible. 
xv. 
If  the  relation  which  ought  to exist  between 
married  people, and which constitutes the essence 
of  marriage,  consisting  of  unlimited  love  on  the 
part of  the woman and unlimited generosity on the 
part of  the husband-if  this relation  is destroyed, 
then  the marriage is already canceled.  Married 
people divorce themselves as tAey kave married tAem- 
selves, out of  tkezr own free  will.  If the ground of 
this, their relation, is canceled, their marriage does 
not continue, no matter whether they remain  toge- 
ther  or  not;  henceforth  their  cohabitation  is  in 
truth  only  concubinage ; their  connection  is  no 
longer end in itself, but has an external end, usually 
some temporary advantage.  Now, the law can re- 
quire no one to do that which  is  dishonorable, as 
concubinage  is ; hence, it can not require persons 
whose hearts have been separated, to live  together 
any longer. 
From this  it would  appear  that  the state  has 
nothing to do in cases of  divorce  beyond  making 
the divorce  public,  as it made  the first  marriage 
public.  The legal  results of  the marriage which 
the state guaranteed having ceased, of  course  the 
divorce,  which  causes  them  to  cease,  must  be 
equally made  known  to the state,  and  through  it 
to its citizens. 
XVI. 
Nevertheless, most  of  our states assume to have 
legal jurisdiction  over  divorces.  Are they utterly 
in the wrong? and if  not, what  is  the ground  of 
their right ? 
The following : It may happen  that the parties 
to be divorced call upon the state for aid, in which 
case the state has  to judge whether  it will  extend 
it to them or not.  The result would  be,  that the state gives no other decisions in divorce cases than 
decisions as to the assistance it must filrnish to the 
parties interested. 
XVII. 
Both parties may have agreed about their separa- 
tion and the partition of  their property ; in which 
case there is no dispute, and all  to be done is, that 
they should  declare  their  separation  to the  state. 
They have settled  the whole matter among them- 
selves ; the object of  their agreement is an object 
of  their  natural  freedom ; and  the  state, strictly 
speaking, has not even the right to ask for the rea- 
sons of their separation. 
Result: The consent of  both  parties  separates 
the marriage legally, without any further investiga- 
tion. 
XVIII. 
One of  the parties may not agree to the separa- 
tion.  In this case the notification  to the state is 
not merely a declaration of  the fact of such divorce, 
but also an appeal for its protection, and hence the 
state may now take legal cognizance of the divorce. 
What can the party demanding the separation re- 
quire of  the  state  ?  If  it is  the husband who  ap- 
peals for a divorce, the meaning of his request is : I 
want  the state to drive my wife  out of  my house. 
If, on the contrary, the wife sues for a divorce, her 
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appeal signifies : That, since the husband, as repre- 
sentative of  the family, owns the house and can not, 
therefore, be driven out of  it ; and since she, more- 
over, is willing to go, and possibly is also at liberty 
to go, the state should force her husband to provide 
for her otherwise. 
According to what  law is the state to settle this 
matter ? 
XIX. 
Let us assume the case of a  husband  suing for 
civil divorce on account of  the adultery of  his wife. 
According to the above,  it is against the honor of 
the  man to lieep up his relation with her ;  indeecl this 
relation is no longer a marriage, but a concubinage. 
But the state can not force a person to do any thing 
against his honor and moral feelings.  It is, there- 
fore, the duty of  the state in  this case to rid  the 
husband of  his wife.  What reasons, indeed, could 
the wife have to desire the continuance of  this re- 
lation ?  Love is not to be presumed in her ;  hence 
she must  have other ends in view.  But the hus- 
band can not allow himself  to be  made the tool of 
her ends.  Even  the church is  not interested  in 
persuading the husband to retain the adulteress and 
to pardon her, for the church can not advise him to 
do that which is dishonorable and immoral. 
Or let us assume that the husband sues for divorce 
on thc plea that his wife does not love him.  If she 
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for love only is the ground of  a legal marriage, and 
where there is no love the relation is merely a con- 
cubinage.  What reasons  could  a woman have, in- 
deed, to continue to live with a man whom she con- 
fessedly did  not  love?  These reasons could  only 
be of  an external character, and the man  can not 
allow himself  to be made  their tool.  If  she does 
not admit the plea, the state can not proceed direct- 
ly, but must either wait to collect sufficient grounds 
for a divorce, or until both parties come to an agree- 
ment. 
The refusal  on the part of  the wife of  what has 
been  very ignobly  called  "connubial  duty,"  is  a 
proof  of  want  of  love,  and  in  so  far  constitutes 
legal  ground  for  a  divorce.  For love  proceeds 
from  this submission of  the woman, and this sub- 
mission remains the constant expression of  love.  I 
have said in so  faras it proves this want of  love; for 
if  sickness  or some other physical obstacle can be 
proved, it does not prove want of  love ;  and in such 
a case the suit of a man for a divorce would be mean 
beyond  all  expression.  But  supposing  he is  so 
mean?  In that case the state can not consent to 
be the servant of  his meanness ;  but neither is it to 
be hoped  that the wife of  such a man will oppose 
any obstacle to a divorce. 
If the wife becomes subject to a criminal prose- 
cution, the very facts of  the case separate her from 
her husband ;  for the state takes her away from him. 
In all civil cases the husband is the legal represen- 
tative of  the wife ; but in a criminal, that is, an ex- 
clusively personal case, he can  not be so.  She is 
reinstated  in  her  full  personality, and  thereby di- 
vorced from her husband.  If  she is found to be in- 
nocent,  she returns  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
husband.  If  the husband wishes to take her bark 
again, after she has been found guilty and suffered 
punishment, he may do so ;  but he can not be com- 
pelled to do it, for she has dishonored him. 
XX. 
Let us  now assume that the wife sues for a di- 
vorce on the plea of  her husband's adultery.  We 
have shown  that it is certainly possible,  nay, even 
honorable,  to  the wife  to pardon  her  husband  in 
such  a  case.  Hence,  it  is  advisable  to  dissuade 
her, or to let  her wait awhile.  But if  she insists, 
the divorce must  be granted ; for she alone knows 
her own  heart, and  alone  can decide whether the 
infidelity of her husband has rooted out all her love 
for  him  or not ; and  it would  be utterly unjust  to 
force  the wife  to  submit  herself  to her  husband 
after her love has expired. 
The state, indeed, is generally obliged to grant a 
divorce to the wife, if  she insists upon it.  The fe- 
male sex must be favored by the law to this extent, 
for  the reason  that, although the suit of  the wife 
may prove nothing against the husband, it proves, 
at least, the absence of  love in her, and no woman 
should  be forced  to give herself up without  love. 
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and  love more than they are aware of, it is advisa- 
ble, as we have said, to first use dissuasion or tem- 
porary separation, (from bed and board.) 
That a woman  should  plead  impotency, etc., on 
the part of  her husband  is a dishonor to her sex, a 
sin against nature, and it may safely be called  bar- 
barism, if the state-or  the church-accepts  such a 
plea.  Experience confirms, moreover, that women 
are themselves  ashamed  of  this  plea,  and  usually 
put it forth merely as a pretense. 
A criminal  investigation, to which  the husband 
becomes  subject, does  not  necessarily cause a  di- 
vorce.  The relation  here is  a very different  one. 
Nevertheless, such an investigation is  a very valid 
reason for the wife to insist on a divorce, since she 
can  not  esteem  a  criminal.  Should  she choose, 
however, to remain with  him, to bear his fate and 
relieve  it as much  as the law  allows,  she is free 
to do so. 
Willful  desertion, where the deserted party has 
not  been made aware of  it or of  its grounds, is of 
itself  a divorce, if  used  as a  plea ; for the missing 
party  must  be  regarded  as  having  pronounced  a 
divorce, and hence as consenting to it. 
XXI. 
The final question is:  How shall the property be 
divided in cases of  divorce ? 
As my principles on this subject differ from those 
usually entertained, I would ask my readers well to 
consider the grounds of  my decision. 
The wife, together with  her personality, submits 
all  her possessions  to  the  husband;  and  he  can 
repay her  love only by also submitting his  person 
and  freedom, as well as all  his  possessions, to her, 
with this difference, however, that he retains exter- 
nal control  over  the whole.  The union of  hearts 
necessarily involves union of possessions under the 
chief control of  the husband. 
A  divorce separates  this  union; but  when  the 
ground  ceases,  so  also  does  the  grounded.  It 
seems,  therefore,  at first  sight,  as  if  each  party 
ought  to be placed  back again in its original posi- 
tion, and ought to receive back what it contributed 
to the common property. 
But there is this  to be considered:  both  parties 
have for  a  certain  time administered, enjoyed, in- 
creased, or diminished their property, presumptively 
under one will  and as one subject.  The effect of 
this  common  administration  can not  be canceled ; 
is  necessarily common  to both, and remains com- 
mon to both.  It is impossible to make a close cal- 
culation  as to what amount of  attention  and  care 
the one and the other party has stood  in need  of, 
etc. ; for, if  it has been a true marriage, the needs 
of  the one party were  those of  the other, and  the 
gains of  the one party those  of  the other.  Both 
were but one legal  person.  It is as impossible for 
husband  and wife  to make such a settlement with 
each other or to sue each other as it is for one in- 
dividual  to settle with  or sue himself.  True, this 
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before,  and  the effect  of  that  relation  can  not be 
annulled. 
Now, the external  condition of  this effect  is  the 
amount of  property each party had before the mar- 
riage.  According to the ratio of the property thus 
contributed, the whole  amount  of  property at the 
time of the divorce is to be redivided, as effect.  If 
the  wife,  for  instance,  contributed  one  third  of 
the common property at the time of  marriage, and 
the husband two thirds, then at the time of divorce 
the whole common property must be estimated, and 
one third  given  to the wife and two thirds to the 
husband.  The wife does not  get back the amount 
of  her original third, but plils  its gains or nzinus its 
losses during the time of marriage.  Other law pro- 
visions  may  have  excellent  political  reasons,  but 
they are not just. 
To whom  the children  are  to  be assigned  we 
shall see hereafter, when we come to speak of  thc 
relation between parents and children. 
CONCERNING  THE LEGAL  RELATION  OF BOTH  SEXES 
IN  GENERAL  TO  EACH  OTHER  IN  THE  STATE. 
Has woman  the same rights in the state which 
man has  ?  This question may appear ridiculous to 
many.  For if  the only ground  of  all  legal rights 
is reason  and freedom, how can a distinction exist 
between  two  sexes which  possess  both  the same 
reason and the same freedom ? 
Nevertheless, it seems that, so long as men have 
lived, this has been differently held, and the female 
sex seems not to have been  placed  on a par with 
the male sex in the exercise of  its rights.  Such a 
universal sentiment must have a ground, to discover 
which was never  a  more urgent problem  than in 
our days. 
If  we  grant  that  the female  sex,  so  far as  its 
rights are concerned, has really been  thus treated, 
it  by no means suffices  to assign as ground a less 
degree of mental and physical power.  For women 
would reply :  "Firstly, you men do not give us the 
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own sex ; and secondly, that statement is not even 
true; for  if  you will  make a  list  of  the nlen who 
are  the  pride  of  their sex,  we  can  make  one of 
women,  who  will,  justly  estimated,  be  their  peers 
in every thing ; but  finally, even if  this  inequality 
were as you state it to be, it would  on no account 
involve  such a  decided  inequality  of  rights, since 
there is also among men a great distinction of men- 
tal and bodily powers, which does not involve such 
an oppressive inequality of  rights." 
Hence, it  will  be necessary, above all things, to 
investigate  whether  women  are  really  treated  so 
badly and unjustly as some of them, and, still more, 
some uncalled-for advocates of  their cause, assert. 
The question, whether the female sex has really 
a  claim  to  all  the rights  of  men  and of  citizens 
which  belong  to the  male  ses,  could  be  raised 
only  by  persons  who  doubt  whether women  are 
complete human beings.  We do not  doubt it, as 
appears sufficiently from the above.  But the ques- 
tion may certainly be asked, whether and in how far 
the female sex cnu desi~e  to exercise all  its rights ? 
To  facilitate the answering of this question, we shall 
consider the several conditions of  women. 
As a rule, woman  is either  a  maid  or married. 
If  a maid, she is still under the care of  her  father, 
precisely  as  the unmarried  young  man.  Herein 
both  sexes  are perfectly equal.  Both beconle free 
by marriage, and in regard  to their  marriage both 
are equally free ; or if there is to be a favor shown, 
it should be shown to the daughter.  For she ought 
not even to be persuaded to marry, which may be 
permitted in the case of the son, as we have shown 
heretofore. 
If she is mnr~ica',  her whole dignity depends upon 
her  being completely subjected, and seeming to be 
so subjected, to her husband.  Let it  be well  ob- 
served, what my whole  theory expresses, but what 
it is  perhaps  necessary to repeat  once  more em- 
phatically-woman  is not subjected to her husband 
in  such a manner as to give him a rkht of  cor?z$z~Z- 
siotz  over her; she is subjected  through her  own 
continuous  necessary  wish-a  wish  which  is  the 
condition of her morality-to  be so subjected.  She 
has thepower to withdraw her freedom, if she coultl 
have the evill to do so ; but that is the very point : 
she can not rationally will to be free.  Her relation 
to her  husband  being  publicly  known, she must, 
moreover, will to appear to all whom  she knows a? 
utterly subjected to, and utterly lost in, the man of 
her choice. 
Her husband  is, therefore, the administrator of 
all her rights in consequence of  her own necessary 
will ;  and she wishes  those rights asserted and ex- 
ercised  only in so far  as he \vishcs it.  He is  her 
natural representative in the state and in the whole 
society.  This  is  her pzcblzc  relation  to  society. 442  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS 
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She can  not  even  allow herself  to think for a mo- 
ment  that she should  exercise  herself  her rights 
in the state. 
So far as her private  and itzternal relation in the 
house  is  concerned, the tenderness  of  the husband 
necessarily  restores  to  her all and more  than she 
has  lost.  The  husband  will  not  relinquish  her 
rights, because  they are his own ; and because, if 
he did  so, he would  dishonor himself  and his wife 
before  society.  The wife  has also rights in public 
affairs, for she is a  citizen.  I consider it the duty 
of  the husband-in  states which give to the citizen 
a vote on public matters-not  to vote without having 
discussed the subject with his wife, and allowed her 
to modify his opinion  through her own.  His vote 
will then be the result of  their common will.  The 
father  of  a  family,  who  represents  not  only his 
own but also the interests of  his wife and children, 
ought  indeed  to  have  a  greater  influence and  a 
more  decisive  vote  in  a  commonwealth, than  the 
citizen who represents only his own interests.  The 
manner  of  arranging  this  is  a  problem  for  the 
science of  politics. 
Women, therefore, do really exercise the right of 
suffrage-not  immediately,  however, in  their  own 
person, because they can not wish to do so without 
lowering their dignity, but-through  the influence 
which results from the nature of  the marriage rela- 
tion.  This is, indeed, proved  by the history of  all 
great revolutions.  They either emanated from, or at 
least were led and considerably modified by, women. 
If this  must  be  admitted to be the case, what, 
then, do women and their advocates really demand ? 
What is it whereof women are deprived, and which 
must be restored to them ?  The  rights themselves ? 
They are completely possessed of them, as we have 
shown.  It can only be the external show of  those 
rights.  They not only want to accon~plish,  but also 
to have it known that they accomplished  it.  They 
not only want their ideas to be carried out, but also 
to have  it publicly  known,  that  they,  even  they, 
carried  them  out.  They long for  celebrity during 
life, and after death in history. 
If this alone is and can be their object in prefer- 
ring those complaints, then their complaints ought 
to be unhesitatingly rejected ;  for they can not pre- 
fer them  without  renouncing  their  whole  female 
worth.  The fewest, however,  who prefer  them, do 
so seriously.  Most of  them  have  been  persuaded 
to utter such wonderful words, which they can not 
think  without  dishonoring  themselves,  by  a  few 
crack-brained  men,  most  of  whom  have  never 
thought sufficiently high of  a woman to make  her 
their companian through life, ancl who are therefore 
anxious to remedy the matter  by having  the whole 
sex, without exception, immortalized in history. 
Even the man who makes glory the chief or but 
one of  the ends  of  his life, loses  the merit of  his 
acts,  and  sooner  or  later, also,  that  very  glory. 
Women  ought  to be  grateful  that  their  position 
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precludes  the  very  suspicion  of  such  a  motive. 
But what  is  far  more: by  such thirst  for  glory 
women  sacrifice the amiable modesty of their sex, 
vhich  nothing can more disgust than to be put up 
ior a show.  Ambition and vanity are contemptible 
in a  man ; but in woman they are corrupting ; for 
they root out that modesty and self-sacrificing love 
for  her  husband,  upon  which  her  whole  dignity 
rests.  A  rational  and  virtuous  woman  caq  be 
proud  only of  her  husband  and children ; not  of 
herself, for  she forgets  herself in  them.  Add to 
this,  that  those women  who  seriously  envy  men 
their  celebrity,  are deceived  concerning  the true 
object of  their wish.  Woman  necessarily desires 
the love of  some man, and, in order  to attract it, 
she is anxious to attract the attention of  the male 
sex.  This is natural  and very  proper  in  an  un- 
married  woman.  But those  women  calculate  to 
increase  the  charms of  their  own  sex-perhaps 
not  having  much  confidence  in  them-by  that 
which  attracts the attention of  men  to men,  and 
seek in celebrity merely a  new means of  captivat- 
ing men's  hearts.  If  those  women  are  married, 
their object  is as contemptible  as the means  are 
unsuited to accomplish it. 
IV. 
If the husband can not or refuses to vote, there 
is no reason why the wife should not appear  in his 
place  and cast their common vote,  but always as 
the vote of  the husband.  (She could not cast it as 
her own without  separating herself from  her hus- 
band.)  For the grounded extends no further than 
the ground;  and the ground why the wife  could 
not vote was, because the husband voted  for  both. 
If he does not, she can, therefore, vote. 
This furnishes us the principle applicable  to wi- 
dows  and divorced women, and to maids who  are 
no longer  under  paternal authority and yet have 
never been  married.  All these classes of  women 
are not  subjected  to a  man; hence  there  is no 
reason why they should not themselves ekercise all 
civil  rights  precisely  as men  do.  In a  republic 
they have the right to vote, to appear in court, and 
to defend  their own cause.  If from  natural bash- 
fiilness  and modesty they prefer  to choose a guar- 
dian, they must be permitted to do so, but there is 
no  legal  ground  why  they  should  be  forced  to 
choose one. 
Every citizen  in the state is to possess property 
and to administer it according to his will ;  hence, 
also, the woman who  has no husband.  This pro- 
perty  need  not be  absolute  property,  money  or 
valuables,  but may also  consist  of  civil  rights  or 
privileges.  There is no reason why women should 
not have these.  Woman can own  land  and carry 
on  agriculture.  Or she can carry on  an art,  or 
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JI. 
Women are ineligible to public offices for the fol- 
lowing simple reasons : public officers  are respon- 
sible to the state ;  and hence must be perfectly free, 
and dependent  always  only upon  their  own  will; 
otherwise  such  a  responsibility  would  be  unjust 
and contradictory.  Woman, however,  is free  and 
independent  only  so long as she has no husband. 
Hence  the  exclusive  condition  under  which  a 
woman  might  become  eligible  to office, would  be 
the promise not to marry.  But no rational woman 
can give such a promise, nor can the state ration- 
ally  accept  it.  For woman  is  destined  to  love, 
and  love  comes  to  women  of  itself-does  not 
depend upon her free will.  But when she loves, it 
is her duty to  marry, and the state must not form 
an obstacle to this duty.  Now,  if  a woman, hold- 
ing a  public  office, were  to marry, two cases are 
possible.  Firstly, she might not subject herself  to 
her husband so far  as her official duties were con- 
cerned.  But this is utterly against female dignity ; 
for she can not say then, that she has given herself 
up wholly  to the husband.  Moreover,  where  are 
the strict limits which separate official from private 
life ?  Or,  secondly,  she  might  subject  herself 
utterly, as nature and morality require, to her hus- 
band,  even  so  far as her  official duties  are  con- 
cerned.  But, in that case, she would  cease to be 
the official,  and he would  become it.  The office 
would  become his by marriage, like the rest of  his 
wife's  property and rights.  But this the state can 
not permit;  for  it must  know the ability and the 
character of  the  person  upon  whom  an  office  is 
conferred, and can not accept one chosen merely by 
love. 
VI. 
This fact, that women are not intended for public 
offices, has another consequence, which  the advo- 
cates  of  woman's  rights put forth as a  new com- 
plaint against our political institutions.  For, very 
naturally, they are not educated for duties they will 
never have to perform ; are sent neither to colleges, 
nor to universities.  Now  they cry out, that men 
neglect their minds, and enviously and cunningly 
keep them  in ignorance, and hold  them  removed 
from the sources of enlightening culture.  We shall 
examine this charge carefully. 
The learned  man  by  profession  studies  not 
merely for  himself; as student he studies, on the 
contrary, not at all for himself, but for  others.  If 
he  wishes  to become a  preacher, or statesman, or 
doctor, he studies for  the purpose of  immediately 
applying what  he has learned ;  hence he learns at 
the same time the form, or the manner of  applying 
his science.  Or if  it is his intention  to become a 
teacher  of  future  students  in  schools or  univer- 
sities, it is also his intention to communicate again 
what  he  now  learns,  and  to  increase  the  stock 
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that culture may not come to a stand-still.  Hence 
he must know how to make these discoveries, and 
how to develop them out of  the human soul.  But 
this acquiring a  knowledge of  the fonn  of  science 
is precisely what they, women, can not make use of, 
since they are to become  neither teachers, preach- 
ers, doctors, or lawyers. 
For their  own  intellectual culture, men only re- 
quire the rcsults of culture ;  and these results women 
learn also in society : in each condition  of  society 
the results of  the whole  culture of  that condition. 
That which they envy us is, therefore, the unessen- 
tial, the  formal, the mere hull.  By their  position 
and by our conversation they are saved the trouble 
of  working  through  this hull, and can  receive  its 
contents  directly.  They could  not, indeed, make 
use of the form at all.  Women are not habituated, 
and can not be habituated, to look upon the form as 
means,  because  they  could  be  accustomed to do 
so only by making  use of  the form.  Hence they 
look upon it as an end in itself, as something noble 
and  excellent  in  itself.  This  is  the  reason  why 
really learned women-I  do not speak of those who 
reason  purely  through  their  common  sense,  for 
these are very estimable-are  usually pedantic. 
To prevent my being misunderstood, let me ex- 
plain  this further.  It  can not be maintained  that 
woman  is  inferior  to  man  in  regard  to  talents 
of  mind ;  but it can  certainly be maintained  that 
the minds of  man  and woman  have, by nature, a 
very different character.  Man  reduces  all that is 
in and for him  to clear conceptions, and discovers 
it only through reasoning-provided,  of  course, his 
knowledge is a true conviction, and not a mere his- 
torical  knowledge.  Woman,  on  the  other  hand, 
has a natural sentiment of  what is good, true, and 
proper.  Not  as if  this were  givcn  her  through 
mere feeling, for that is impossible ; but when it is 
externally given to her, she has the faculty of  judg- 
ing quickly through  her feelings, and without clear 
insight  into  the grounds  of  such judgment,  whe- 
ther it be  true and good, or not.  It may be said, 
that man must first make himself  rational ; where- 
as, woman  is already rational  by nature.  This is, 
indeed, clearly to be deduced from the fundamental 
distinction between woman and man.  Her funda- 
mental  impulse originally  unites with  reason,  be- 
cause it would cancel reason unless it clid  so unite ; 
it becomes a rational impulse.  And this is the rea- 
son  why woman's  whole  system of  feeling  is  ra- 
tional, and made to  correspond to reason, as it were. 
Man, on the contrary, must first subordinate all his 
impulses to reason, through exertion and activity. 
Woman, therefore, is especially practical, and not 
at all speculative in her womanly nature.  She can 
not and shall not go beyond the limit of her feeling. 
(This explains  the well-known  phenomenon,  why 
some women  have been  known  to become distin- 
guished  in  matters of  memory, as languages, and 
even  in mathematics, so far as they can be learned 
through memory ;  and some also in matters of  in- 
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writing, and even in the writing of  history.  But 
no women are known to have been philosophers, or 
inventors  of  new  theories  in  the  mathematical 
science.) 
A few words more concerning the passion of wo- 
men  to become  authors-a  passion which  is con- 
stantly on  the increase among them  in these our 
days. 
Literary labor  can have  only two ends in view: 
to make known new discoveries in sciences for  the 
examination  of  the  learned,  or  to  communicate 
that which has already been discovered to the peo- 
ple  at large  by means of  popular  representations. 
We have seen that women can not  make discove- 
ries.  Popular writings for women, writings on fe- 
male education, moral  books  for the female sex, as 
such, etc., can  certainly be  most  properly written 
11y  wornell ; partly  because  they know  their  own 
sex  better than  man ever can know it, (that  is, if 
they have the gift, also, of rising in part above their 
sex,) and  partly because such books  are generally 
n~ore  read  by women.  Even the learned man can 
extend  his  knowledge  of  female  character  from 
such writings.  Of  course, the woman  must write 
as a woman, and  must not  appear  in her writings 
as a badly disguised man. 
I have presupposed, as it will be seen, that a wo- 
man will  write  only  for  her  sex, and  only for  the 
purpose of being useful and to alleviate a discovered 
need of  her sex; but  on no account  for  our  sex, 
or  from  motives of  vanity or ambition.  Not only 
would  her works  have  little literary value  in the 
latter case, but the moral character of the authoress 
would  also  be  greatly  injured.  Her  authorship 
would be nothing but another means of coquetting. 
If she is married, she receives, through her literary 
celebrity, an independence which necessarily weak- 
ens and  threatens to dissolve  her relation  to her 
husband;  or,  if  criticism  is  unfavorable,  she will 
feel the reproof as an insult to her sex, and will em- 
bitter the days of  herself  and of  her husband. 
CONCERNING  THE LEGAL  RELATION  BETWEEN  PA- 
RENTS  AND  CHILDREN  IN A  STATE. 
The original relation  between  parents and chil- 
dren is not merely determined through the concep- 
tion of  rights, but chiefly through nature and mo- 
rality,  precisely  as the relation  between  husband 
and  wife.  Hence,  our  present  investigation  re- 
quires, as our previous  investigation required, that 
we proceed  from  principles which are higher  than 
those of  law, in  order  to obtain, first of  all, an ob- 
ject  for  the application of  law.  For this  natural 
and moral  relation  may very possibly  involve fur- 
ther  determinations, which  the conception  of  law 
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The attempts to constitute the whole  relation  a 
simply legal one have failed  by reason of  their ab- 
surd presuppositions ;  as, for instance, that children 
are pyoperty of  the father, by reason of  the act of 
generation being a species of  manufacture, etc. 
The fruit  generates  itself  in  the womb  of  the 
mother  as  a  part  belonging  to  her.  Her  own 
health and life are conditioned by those of the fruit ; 
and, what is important above all things here, in the 
case of  the mother, this condition is not merely so, 
as in the irrational animal, but is, moreover, K~zowrt 
to be so.  It is not merely mechanically necessary 
that  she should  generate  the fruit out of  herself, 
and form it in her womb, but her own  conscious- 
ness  forces  upon  her considerate  care of  its pre- 
servation. 
In virtue of  a  law of  nature, which  is  most  as- 
suredly universal, the child is not born without pain. 
The moment of  the child's  birth is for the mother 
a moment of  relief  from  pain, and  hence, necessa- 
rily,  a  joyful  moment.  Joy  connects  the mother 
with the existence of  the child. 
Even after the child is born, the organic tie which 
connects mother and child is not yet dissolved.  The 
mother continues to furnish the food from her body, 
which she finds the same need  to give to the child 
as the child to take it. 
(An organic body comprises  all  those  parts,  in 
one of  which is an impulse to satisfy a need in the 
other, which that other part can not satisfy of itself; 
and the other of  which  is an impulse to satisfy a 
need of  the first, which  the first can not satisfy of 
itself.  And this relation I call the organic tie of the 
parts.  Since it is only in the body of  the mother 
that nature prepares the food which is most advan- 
tageous for the child, and since nature has provided 
no other way of  relieving  the  mother of  her milk 
than through the mouth of the child, an organic tie 
connects  them  even  after  they have become two 
separate bodies.  It appears to me worth while to 
observe, how far this law of  nature prevails also in 
the vegetable kingdom, since the young plant does 
not separate at once from the mother-body.) 
This law of  nature, operating in the animal and 
vegetable  kingdom,  impels animals  and plants  to 
assist in the growth of  external bodies.  This im- 
pulse  impels them  necessarily;  the impulse and 
the activity required  by it arise at the same mo- 
ment.  But in intelligent beings there  arises  be- 
tween  the impulse  and  the  act required  by  it  a 
third  link-consciousness.  The intelligence  be- 
comes  conscious  of  this natural  impulse,  as of  a 
sentiment.  This  sentiment is the necessary pro- 
duct of  the natural impulse, and succeeds it imme- 
diately ;  or, to speak still more strictly, this senti- 
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The act required by the iiupulse or sentiment, howv- 
ever, does not succedd in this necessary and imme- 
diate manner, but is conditioned  by an application 
of  freedom. 
The natural impulse in  animals and plants im- 
pelled  them to take care of  a  strange body  as of 
their own.  How is this impulse likely to manifest 
itself  in human intelligence  ?  Doubtless as nfeel- 
ing of  the needs of  another body;  preciseZy  as  the 
mother  feels Acr own ~zeea's.  Such a feeling is called 
sympathy.  Syn~pathy,  therefore,  is  the  form  in 
which  the  natural  instinct of  the mother  for  her 
child  manifests  itself;  and this sympathy has the 
same  end which  the  instinct of  nature has-the 
physical preservation of  the child. 
A mother is impelled  by the sympathy which is 
an instinct of  her  nature to take care of  the pre- 
servation of  her child.  Nature and  reason  com- 
bined have established this mechanism for the pre- 
servation of  the child.  Of  course,  a  mother  may 
resist it, since reason or freedom assists also in this 
mechanism, but only by becoming unnatural.  Na- 
turally, no mother resists it. 
The question of  rights does not occur yet at alI. 
It  is as absurd to say that the child  has a right to 
demand this physical preservation from its mother, 
as it is to say that a branch has the right to grow 
on the tree; and as absurd  to say a  mother must 
be compelled  to preserve her child, as it is to say 
the tree must be compelled to bear the branch.  It 
is a law of  nature, although connected with reason. 
IV. 
There is an impulse in human nature generally, 
and hence, also, in man, to take care of  the weak 
and helpless.  This universal impulse will  doubt- 
less speak in the  father for his child ;  but since it is 
a universal impulse, based upon  the mere sight of 
helplessness, it will speak for every child, and there 
is no reason why a father  should feel a  particular 
preference for his own child.  Such a  preference, 
however, we  must  discover; and since the whole 
relation  is a physical  one, this love can only  have 
a physical ground.  But there is no physical  tie to 
connect father and child ; and hence it is to be as- 
sunled that the father has no immediate love for his 
child.  For the natural  relation in the act of  gene- 
ration  does  not  involve  it,  since as such act,  as 
generation of  a  particular  individual,  it does  not 
occur in consciousness at all. 
The special love of  a father for  his child results 
orip'tzal&-what  its sources may be in our opitzio?~ 
as influenced  by our social institutions, we do not 
investigate here-from  his tenderness toward  the 
mother.  This  tenderness  makes  all  the wishes 
and desires of  the mother his own, and hence, also, 
her wish  to take care of  the preservation  of  the 
child.  Precisely as this is naturally the necessary 
duty of  the mother, so does it now, by transfer, be- 
come that of  the father also ; for both are only one 
subject, and their will is one. 
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to compel the father to maintain  the child.  The 
ground upon which it has been believed that such a 
right could  be based  is not sufficient.  It  was be- 
lieved  that the  mother  might  say to  the father: 
I'  Thou art the cause of  my having a child ;  assume, 
therefore,  the burden  of  taking  care of  it."  Rut 
the father can justly reply : "  Neither I nor thou in- 
tended  it; nature gave the child  to thee,  not to 
me ;  bear the results which  have fallen  upon  thee 
just as I should have had to bear the results which 
might have fallen upon me." 
It  would be different if  both parties had arranged 
a contract about the maintenance of the child.  But 
even in such a case the state must have guaranteed 
the contract to make it legally binding. 
The parents live together, and the child, recom- 
mended  to the care of  both  by nature,  must  also 
live together with them. 
A natural  impulse leads man to apprehend rea- 
son in all  external nature so far as it is any way 
possible, and to treat objects (for instance, animals) 
as if  they had reason.  The parents will doubtless 
treat their child thus, and induce it to manifest free 
activity ;  and the child will  assuredly,  under  such 
treatment, soon manifest reason and freedom.  Ac- 
cording to the necessary conceptions of  men, free- 
dom appertains to welfare, and hence the parents, 
who desire the welfare of  their child. will doubtless 
give  him  freedom.  But  many  a  use  of  freedom 
might  be  detrimental to the preservation of  the 
child's life and health, which are also objects of the 
parents.  Hence, the parents will restrict that free- 
dom to such an extent that its exercise may not en- 
danger the preservation of the child.  This is the 
first conception of education.  The parents will edu- 
cate their child, because they both love it and wish 
to preserve it from danger. 
It  can not  be said  that the child  has a right  to 
compel education, or that the parents are compelled 
to educate.  Whether  the  state has any thing to 
do with the matter will appear hereafter. 
VI. 
It  is the universal moral duty of  every moral and 
good  man, to  diffuse and promote  morality every- 
where  about  him.  Each  free  being,  and  hence, 
also, the child, is  susceptible to morality.  Living 
together with  its parents, the parents, if  they are 
moral  themselves,  will  make  use  of  all  possible 
means to develop morality in the child ;  and this is 
the conception if /z@/zw>ducadion. 
(We do not teach  morality here, and  hence we 
can  not say, they shall  do  it ;  but only, they will 
do it.  We merely state natural and moral  facts in 
order to get objects for the application of  the con- 
ception of  rights.) 
This educatioil involves the following two condi- 
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loped and cultivated  for various uses ;  and zd, the 
morality of  the child must be awakened. 
To attain  the  first  object,  the freedom  of  the 
child  must be limited;  every use of  this  freedom 
which  conflicts  with  the  end  of  preserving  the 
health and life of the child, and with the end of cle- 
veloping the powers of  the child must  be prohibit- 
ed, and every use  thereof  which  tends to promote 
these ends must be insisted upon.  It is only for the 
purpose of  awaking the morality of  the child, that 
its freedom must not be restricted ;  for morality de- 
velops  itself  in man of  itself, and can not  be pro- 
duced by force or artificial measures. 
VII. 
Only the parents  have  a  full knowledge of  the 
end of  the children's  eclucation ; not  the children 
themselves, who are to be educated.  Hence, only 
the parents, and  not  the children, can judge what 
measures  are  necessary  for  that  end.  They  are 
their own  judges in their own  case so far as the 
child  is  concerned ; they  are  sovereign  and  the 
child  is  unconditionally  subject to them, in so far 
as they educate it.  It is  for their own conscience 
to tell them that they must use this sovereign pow- 
er only for  the purpose of  educating  the child  as 
they deem best. 
VIII. 
The possibility of  a state depends upon  the fact 
that its population remains pretty nearly the same 
numerically ;  for all its measures of protection, tax- 
ation, etc., are calculated with a view to that specific 
number.  If mortality  should  constantly  decrease 
that number, the calculation would turn out wrong, 
disorders would  ensue, and finally the state would 
utterly perish.  The numerical  equality of  popula- 
tion, however, is conditioned  by  the fact  that the 
dying-out generation is replaced by new citizens. 
Each  citizen of  a state promises, in  the original 
compact, that he will  promote, as far as lies in his 
power, all  the conditions  of  the possibility  of  the 
state; hence,  also,  the  condition  just  mentioned. 
This he can best do by educating children who may 
grow up  to realize various  ends of  reason.  The 
state has the right to make this education of  chil- 
dren a condition of the state-compact, and thus edu- 
cation becomes an external, legal  obligation, which 
the parents owe to the state. 
I have spoken of  the education of children gene- 
ral&;  for  the end of  the state is  realized  by  it. 
Now, it can not  be left  to the arbitrariness of  the 
citizen what particular child he chooses to educate, 
since  this would  involve  endless  and  unsolvable 
law  disputes.  A  general  law  must  be  made  to 
settle this matter, and the most  rational  provision 
is, that the parents  should be obliged  to educate 
their own children. 
0  GI 460  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHTS.  46 r 
IX. 
If the children are the offspring of  a lawful and 
rational marriage, there is no difficulty about  this. 
If, however, they come from a marriage which has 
not been  legally  solemnized  at first,  and  which, 
after having been solemnized, was  followed by an 
immediate divorce, or if  they are the offspring of  a 
concubinage, the care and education of  the child 
devolves upon the mother as the one whom nature 
herself  has intrusted with it ; for both parents-if 
separated-can  not  educate it.  The father, how- 
ever, contributes his  share to  the child's  mainte- 
nance and education in money. 
Infanticide  committed by  the mother is  doubt- 
less a monstrous, unnatural crime;  for  to commit 
it the mother must have silenced all the feelings of 
nature ; it is, however, no offense  against  the ex- 
ternal rights of  the child.  The child  has no legal 
rights  upon  its mother.  It is  an offense  against 
the laws  of  the state, which  provide that all  chil- 
dren must be educated, and in so far it is to be pun- 
ished.  This crime  belongs to the class of  crimes 
which  exhibit  an unnatural  brutality and savage 
disposition, and  hence to that class for which  the 
state must provide  institutions of  correction.  In- 
fanticide  is, therefore, to  be punished  with  impri- 
sonment in such institutions until reform has taken 
place. 
(Some ancient republics, fearing too large an in- 
crease of  population, especially  of  their privileged 
classes, their real citizens, permitted the exposition 
of  infants,  particularly  if  they  were  weak ; and 
hence,  indirect  infanticide  was  allowed  by  law. 
To  command it, no state has a right; for  it has no 
right  to command any thing that is immoral or is 
a  sin  against  nature.  Nor  has the state even  a 
right cxjress& to permit it ;  for such a permission is 
immoral, and dishonors the state and  its citizens. 
But if  a  state tacitly permits  it, no legal  objection 
can be raised ;  for it is not the state's  business to 
take positive  care of  the morali~  of  its citizens ; 
and new-born children  have no external  rights ex- 
cept in so far as  the state guarantees them  their 
life, which the state is bound  to do only so far as 
the  possibility  of  its  own  preservation  depends 
upon it.) 
XI. 
The state  has,  therefore,  the  right  to provide 
that children are kept alive, fed, clothed, and raised 
among men; for  these are exclusive conditions of 
their becoming eventually men and citizens. 
XII. 
The state makes  it the duty of  parents to edu- 
cate their  children.  Hence, the state necessarily 
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bility of  such education.  One of  these conditions 
is, thateno other citizen  shall  be allowed  to take 
their children from them in order to educate them. 
Hence, the state necessarily guarantees to allpamzts 
the exclusive rkht to Kc@  their own children.  If  a 
law dispute arises, the law must decide in favor of 
the true parents. 
Education  requires  also a  fixed  plan  and  uni- 
formity of  principle,  according to which  the chil- 
dren are to be educated.  This plan would  be dis- 
turbed if  strangers had a right to interfere, and to 
influence the children.  Complaint can be preferred 
against such interference, and the law must decide 
in favor of  the true parents. 
XIII. 
If the parents  are moral, the education of  their 
children  is to them a matter of  conscience.  They 
wish to educate them as morally good as possible ; 
but each one necessarily considers  his own  princi- 
ples  the best  and most correct; for if  he did  not, 
and retained them, he would act immorally.  Now, 
the state can not interfere in matters of conscience. 
The state itself  can not, therefore, interfere in edu- 
cation.  The state has the right to establish public 
schools ;  but it is for the parents to decide whether 
they will take advantage of  them or not.  The state 
has no right to compel them to do so. 
XIV. 
Neither the state, nor  any citizen, nor  the child 
itself-since  it is  the object of  education-has  a 
right  to decide  upon  the principles which  are to 
govern  the education  of  the children ; hence, the 
parents  are the sole judges.  No law dispute can 
arise between children who are being educated and 
their parents.  The parents are, in this matter, the 
final appeal, and sovereign.  The state has no more 
right to regulate this relation  than  that  between 
husband and wife by law. 
xv. 
Hence, the control  of  parents  over  children  is 
based solely upon the parents' duty to educate them. 
This duty of  education  is  established  by  nature 
and is guaranteed  by the state.  To consider  the 
children as property of  the parents is absurd. 
XVI. 
The state has the right to watch that the child is 
educated ; hence, also, the right to prevent any use 
of  the child which would evidently annul all educa- 
tion.  The state can  not, therefore, allow children 
to be  used  as property ;  for example, a son to be 
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XVII. 
Only free persons are responsible before the law. 
Children are not free, for they are under the guard 
dianship of  their parents.  Their father-as  equally 
the representative  of  their  mother-is  thus their 
legal  guardian.  They have no rights for  him  to 
defend, since they are not yet themselves citizens ; 
but when  they have committed any trespasses, the 
father is justly held  responsible;  for the children 
are under his  supervision, and  he ought  to have 
prevented them from committing such trespasses. 
Children can  be subjected  to no  public punish- 
ment ;  for they are not subject to the penal laws of 
the state.  They are subject only to the penal laws 
of  their parents, who punish them as they see fit. 
XVIII. 
The only ground for  the control of  parents over 
their children is the need of  education.  When the 
ground  ceases,  so does  the grounded.  When the 
education is  completed, the child becomes free.  Rut 
only the  parents can decide when  it is completed, 
since only they have  preestablished  its final  end. 
If they hold that the child  is sufficiently educated, 
they voluntarily give it freedom.  They should, in- 
deed, increase the freedom of  the child constantly 
during  the  progress  of  education, as  one of  the 
rules of  such education, and not as a  right which 
the child  has ; and when they cut the last tie, the 
child is wholly free. 
Or this tie may be cut when it appears, from the 
nature of  the case, that the end of  education is ac- 
complished.  The general end thereof is the utiliz- 
ing of  our  powers  for  rational  purposes,  and the 
external judge  of  the matter  is  the state.  True, 
the state can not directly liberate the children ;  for 
that would be interfering with their education ;  but 
it can do so indirectly, by giving  to the son a civil 
office or some other civil right or privilege.  Such 
an office liberates the child from parental authority. 
Or, finally, the education, and hence, the subjec- 
tion  of  children  may  be  annulled,  by  making  it, 
from  the  nature  of  the case,  no  longer  possible. 
This occurs in marriage.  The daughter is now un- 
limitedly subjected  to the will of  her husband, and 
can therefore no longer be subjected to the will of 
her parents.  The son has now to care for the hap- 
piness of  his  wife  with  unlimited  tenderness,  and 
can not, therefore, allow himself  to be disturbed in 
this care by the will of  his parents. 
But precisely because  marriage  puts an end to 
education, and because  parents alone  have a right 
to decide when  the education  is finished, the  pa- 
rents  must  also  have  the  right  to  refuse  their 
consent to the marriage of their children for a time, 
or to postpone their marriage. 
They have  not,  however,  the right  to  prohibit 
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for them in marrying, from the reasons stated here- 
tofore. 
XIX. 
Husband  and  wife  have  their property in  com- 
mon.  Children have no  property.  Where should 
they  get  it?  Their  parents  owe  them  food  and 
clothing, as means of  education; and  it is a duty 
they owe to the state, and which the state may en- 
force, to thus provide for their children. 
But children work,  it is  said, and  thus acquire 
property.  This would be correct under the presup- 
position, which we  have  shown  to be wrong, that 
formation  gives title to property.  But  the object 
of  this  labor is merely to exercise their  powers for 
educational  purposes, and hence, the parents very 
properly take hold of  its results  as their  property. 
The child  can  do  nothing without  the will of  the 
parents ; it  can  not,  therefore,  acquire  property 
without  their  consent.  Or does any one pretend 
that the right of  property is founded upon  a con- 
tract  with  the  parents?  Only  free  persons  can 
make a contract ; but children are not free in their 
relation to parents. 
XX. 
Each independent citizen must have property of 
his own, and must be able to tell  the state what he 
lives from.  Hence, the state can justly demand of 
the parents, who allow a child its full freedom, that 
they shall give a certain  amount of  property to it, 
or, to use a very characteristic word, that they shall 
endow it.  How much they ought to give it depends 
upon their own discretion. 
When two  persons  marry, the parents of  both 
parties must agree as to whether both shall receive 
something,  or  only  one  of  them,  and  what  the 
amount  shall  be.  It is  no business  of  the  state 
who furnishes the property, provided the new family 
can subsist. 
XXI. 
It is altogether arbitrary with the parents wheth- 
er one of  the children receives more than the other 
or not.  It  may be unfair, but it is not illegal.  What 
legal ground could the child have to complain  ?  All 
that it gets, it gets through  the voluntary kindness 
of  its parents. 
XXII. 
When the parents die, their rights in the sensu- 
ous world, and hence, also, their rights to property, 
utterly cease.  It  depends altogether upon the posi- 
tive  legislation of  a state whether  laws of  inherit- 
ance shall be established or whether  parents shall 
have the right to make wills ;  and if  so, to what ex- 
tent they may will away their property to strangers, 
etc.  These are questions purely of  expediency, and 
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XXIII. 
We  have deferred to reply to the  question, To  whom 
children are to be assigned when their parents are 
divorced ?  because  the reply was  not well possible 
before we had a thorough insight into the relation 
between parents and children. 
Since parents have unlimited  control over their 
children, parties who are being divorced must have 
the right to come to an agreement about it among 
themselves.  The state has nothing to say in the 
matter, provided  the education  of  the children  is 
secured.  It is only when the parents can not agree 
that the state decides.  Only two grounds of  such 
a  dispute  among  parents  are thinkable.  Either 
?leither of  them wishes to undertake the care of the 
children, or both wish to retain the children. 
In the former case the decision is this :  The duty 
to take care of  the children is immediate duty only 
for the mother, and for the father it is only a medi- 
ate duty derived from his love for the mother.  The 
latter, and hence the natural, ground of his paternal 
tenderness having  ceased,  the children  are to be 
returned  to the personal  care and attention of  the 
mother;  but  the father must  contribute  to  their 
maintenance ; and  the  state has  to  see that  he 
does so according to his means. 
In  the second case, the decision is this :  The  legal- 
ly grounded object of  the state is, that the children 
shall be educated in the best possible manner.  As 
a rule, the mother is the most proper person to edu- 
cate  daughters, and the father the most proper per- 
son to educate sons.  General laws can take cog- 
nizance only of  such rules ;  and hence the mother 
receives the daughters and the father the sons. 
As a  matter of  course,  the  child  generated  in 
adultery is not to be maintained  by the husband, 
but by its true father. SECOND  APPENDIX 
TO THE 
SCIENCE OF RIGHTS. 
INTERNATIONAL 
AND 
COSMOPOLITAN  LAW. CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 
EACH  individual, as we have shown, has the right 
to compel each other single individual to enter into 
a legal relation (state) with him or to remove from 
his sphere of activity.  If one of  the two is already 
a resident of a state and the other one not, then the 
former compels  the latter to become  a  citizen  of 
his state.  If neither is as yet a resident of a state, 
both unite to form at least the beginning of a state. 
From this it follows, that whosoever  is not  yet a 
citizen of  a state can be legally compelled, by the 
first state which chooses to do so, either to submit 
to its laws or to remove from its limits. 
The natural result of  this proposition would  be 
gradually to unite all  men  who  inhabit the earth 
under one single commonwealth. 
But it is equally possible that separate masses of 
men, unknown to each other, may gather together 
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This place has such requirements, and another place 
has other requirements, and these requirements are 
alleviated in each case without either party becom- 
ing aware of  the requirements  of  the other.  In 
this manner various states would arise on the earth. 
It  is a proof  that the state is not an arbitrary in- 
vention,  but is  established  by nature and  reason, 
when we actually find  that, in places  where  men 
have lived together for a time and have become edu- 
cated, states are erected, although the people in the 
one such place know not that the same thing has 
been done in other places. 
The surface of  the earth being, moreover, sepa- 
rated by seas, rivers, and mountains, this formation 
of  separate states became necessary likewise from 
geographical reasons. 
The people  in these several states know not of 
each other ; and hence are in no true legal relation 
to each other, since the possibility of  a legal relation 
is conditioned, as we have seen, by actual and con- 
scious reciprocal influence. 
IV. 
Two citizens from  these different independent 
states meet each other.  Each one will require of the 
other a  guarantee for  his security, and has a per- 
fect right to do so ;  which security consists in their 
both subjecting themselves to the chief government. 
But each one has a chief government ;  hence, each 
one has the same right to make the same request, 
and their rights thus canceling each other, neither 
party has a right to make it. 
Nevertheless, they must  give  each other mutual 
guarantee.  Since this can not be done in the man- 
ner suggested, how can it be  done?  Both are to 
submit to a  coinmon judge;  but each one has his 
particular  judge.  Hence, their judges must agree 
among themselves, and must become the One com- 
mon judge of  both in matters which concern both ; 
that is, both their states must mutually agree to pun- 
ish the injury done by one of its citizens to a citizen 
of the other country, as if it had been inflicted upon 
one of  its own citizens. 
COROLLARIA. 
I. The whole relation of states is based upon the 
legal relation of  their citizens.  The state in itself 
is nothing but  an abstract conception ; only  the 
citizens, as such, are actual persons.  Again :  this 
relation is based expressly upon the law, necessity, 
that citizens who  meet each  other in the sensuous 
world  must  guarantee  security  to  each  other. 
Hence, only those  states are related to each other 
which  are  adjoining.  How  states, separated  by 
space, may nevertheless be related  to each  other, 
we shall soon see. 
2.  This relation of  the  states  consists  in  their 
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mutually  securing  to  each  other  the security of 
their citizens.  And the formula of  the contract is 
as follows : I agree to hold myself  responsible for 
all  the damage which  my citizens may do to your 
citizens, provided you will make yourself  responsi- 
ble for  all the damage which your citizens may do 
to mine. 
3.  Such a compact is not involved in the original 
state organization, but must be specially concluded, 
and must  be made publicly known to all citizens. 
The citizen satisfies all the conditions of  the state 
compact by  simply  refraining  from  violating  the 
rights of  his fellow-citizen ; and it is only in virtue 
of  this special compact  that he is  obliged  by law 
also to respect  the rights of  citizens of  adjoining 
states, and that he makes himself  liable to punish- 
ment if  he does not do so.m 
Such a  compact  of  states necessarily  involves 
their mutual recog?zitiolz, since this is the presuppo- 
sition of  the possibility of  such a  compact.  Both 
states accept each the guarantee of the other for its 
citizens, and hence assume each that the other has 
a legal constitution and can be held responsible for 
its citizens. 
* (It is sufficiently clear from what we have before said regarding 
the  confederate  form  of  government as applicable  to the whole 
earth, how this doctrine  of  international  law must be modified  to 
become absolutely rational.-TRANSLATOR'S REMARK.) 
Each state has, therefore, the right to judge about 
the  legality  of  another  state,  with  the  citizens 
whereof  its  own  citizens  are  likely  to come  into 
contact.  But this right of  judgment extends only 
to the external, not  to the internal, administration 
of  such state. 
This is what is  signified  by the i?zdepe7za'etzce of 
states. 
VI. 
Each people, which does not live in a  condition 
of  nature, but  has  a  government, no  matter how 
constituted, has a  right  to compel its recognition 
from all adjoining states.  The  proof  of  this is in- 
deed contained already in the preceding paragraph. 
Not  to recognize a  state signifies, to proclaim its 
citizens as not possessing any legal form of govern- 
ment;  and  this  involves  the right  to subjugate 
them.  A  refusal  to recognize  is,  therefore,  suffi- 
cient ground for war. 
States are necessarily independent of each other. 
VII. 
When a  people  has no government,  and hence 
does not  constitute a state, the adjoining state has 
a right  either to subjugate it under its own juris- 
diction, or to compel it to establish some form of 
government, or to expel it from  its neighborhood. 
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other any guarantee for  the security of  his rights, 
has himself  no rights.  Such a  people, therefore, 
has no rights at all. 
(Let no one fear that this proposition is favorable 
to ambitious nations.  A people  such as we  have 
described most likely does not exist anywhere, and 
we  have established this theory more to complete 
our argumentation than for the sake of  its applica- 
tion.  If a  people  has only a leader in war, it has 
doubtless a government.  The  French Republicans 
whipped  the  armies  of  the  Coalition  again  and 
again, while the latter doubted whether the Repub- 
licans had any government, and were asking, "With 
whom  shall we  conclude  peace?"  Why did  they 
not ask those who  had  beaten them the name of 
their commander in battle ?  Perhaps the men who 
had issued the command to beat the Coalition could 
also have given the command to cease beating them. 
At  present, when they have been sufficiently beaten, 
the Coalition has finally hit upon this idea, and has 
thus discovered that the French have, after all, some 
kind of  government.) 
VIII. 
Adjoining  states  guarantee to each  other  the 
rights  of  property of  their citizens.  Hence,  they 
must have come to some agreement as to the limits 
of  these rights.  These limits  have already been 
fixed in each state by  the property compact of  all 
citizens;  and the treaty between  the states only 
adopts those limits.  Thus, what  before concerned 
only the citizens of  the one state has become obli- 
gatory, likewise, upon those of the adjoining states. 
Possible disputes must  be  settled by compromise, 
since there are no a priori  legal  grounds why one 
piece  of  property should belong to this citizen  and 
not to the other.  Hence, the first condition of a le- 
gal relation between two states is the fixing of  their 
boundaries ;  and not only of  the boundaries of  the 
land itself, but also of  certain rights, as, for instance, 
of  fishing, hunting,  navigation,  etc.  The bounda- 
ries  of  the property of  their citizens  becomes  for 
the states the boundaries of those states. 
IX. 
In this  treaty both  states  are perfectly  equal. 
What the one state does to protect the citizens of 
the other  state from damage, the other must also 
do in regard to the former ;  but neither is obliged 
to apply greater care than the other.  Hence, it is 
very possible that in some states the rights of  their 
own  citizens  are  more  protected  than  those  of 
strangers-perhaps  because  the  other  states re- 
fused to afford  sufficient protection  on their  side; 
nay, it is even possible  that  the property of  stran- 
gers from ofze adjoining state may be better protect- 
ed than that of  strangers from  another state, be- 
cause the other state, on its side, affords more pro- 
tection.  The  whole relation is one which is based 
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Through  this  conlpact  the states which  are  a 
party to it attain the right  of  n~utually  watching 
each other, to see whether its provisions  are con- 
formed with and carried out or not.  The ground 
of  this right  is clear  enough.  The agreement is 
valid  only  if  both  parties  conform  to  it;  hence 
each party must have a right to know whether the 
other has complied with it or not. 
This  watch can be realized only in the state which 
is watched.  Hence the states send  ministers  to 
each other to conduct this surveillance.  It  is true, 
states also send agents to  conclude  treaties;  but 
the office  of  such agents is partly temporary and 
partly accidental.  To distinguish  both, the latter 
are usually called ambassadors.  The original  cha- 
racter, however, of  a permanent, resident  minister 
(c/targd d'afaiy~s) consists in keeping watch as to 
whether the state to which he has been sent con- 
forms  to  its  obligations  or  not,  and  perhaps  in 
reminding it of  its duties.  Of  course,  he has  no 
right  to  interfere in  the internal arrangements of 
such a state, since his own  state has not even the 
right to interfere in them. 
XI. 
Holding this office of  watching  the conduct  of 
the state to which he has been sent, of  course the 
minister can not be dependent upon it, since, other- 
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wise,  he would  have to render  it obedience,  and 
since thus the object of  his mission would  not be 
accomplished.  Hence, so long as he preserves the 
character of  mere minister, he is subject only to the 
authority of  his own  government.  He is,  for  the 
state to which he has been sent, a holy and invio- 
lable person ; he  represents  his  own  indepenclent 
state.  Taxes, of  course,  he has none  to pay; for 
taxes are a contribution to the support of a govern- 
ment; but he is not a  citizen of  this government. 
If the minister steps beyond  the limits of  his offi- 
cial duties, either by seeking to acquire an influence 
in the internal affairs of  such a state or by creating 
disturbances  through bad  behavior  otherwise,  the 
state which has received  him does not become his 
judge, but may send him back and demand satisfac- 
tion. 
XII. 
If the treaty between both states is clearly and 
plainly  written-and  since  it  only  comprises few 
matters, it is easy to make it clear, and any indefi- 
niteness would at once indicate some evil intention 
not  to observe its provisions-error  and injustice 
are almost impossible.  Nevertheless, violation of 
the treaty  certainly gives a  right  to declare war, 
precisely as a refusal to recognize a state gives such 
right.  For in either case, the state which is thus 
made war upon, shows that a legal relation with it 
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XIII. 
The right of  war, like all rights of compulsion, is 
infinite.  The opponent has no rights because he 
refuses  to recognize  the rights of  the war-making 
power.  True, he may afterward sue for peace, and 
promise to recognize  those rights.  But how shall 
the other party be convinced that he is in earnest 
and is not  merely looking out for a  better oppor- 
tunity to subjugate him ?  Hence, the natural end 
of  war is always the a~znihilatio7z  of  the oppoaent; 
that is to say, the subjugation of his citizens.  True, 
a peace (or rather merely an armistice) may be con- 
cluded, because one party or both parties  are too 
much weakened ;  but mutual distrust remains, and 
the object of  subjugation remains also. 
XIV. 
Only the armed  powers of  both states carry on 
the war, not the unarmed citizens ; hence,  the war 
is not made upon them.  That part of a state's ter- 
ritory which its troops no longer protect is an acqui- 
sition of  the conqueror,  the object of  the war  be- 
ing the subjugation of  the hostile  state; and the 
conqueror can not plunder  his own  citizens or de- 
vastate his own possessions without acting irration- 
ally, and hence, also, against the laws of  war.  As 
soon as the conqueror has driven away the enemy's 
armed troops,  the unarmed  citizens of  the enemy 
are his subjects.  That part of  the state's territory, 
fiowever, which  its troops still protect, is not sub- 
ject  to the enemy.  The former part the enemy 
can not devastate, because it is its own ; the latter 
part he can not devastate, because it is physically 
impossible, being held by Its troops. 
The usual manner of carrying on war is certainly 
irrational and barbarous.  The  conqueror devastates 
the subjugated provinces in order to plunder them 
in all haste, as much  as possible, and to leave as 
little  as possible  to  the  enemy.  He  does  not, 
therefore,  calculate  upon  keeping  possession  of 
them.  But why, then, does he carry on war ? 
The disarmed soldier is also  no longer enemy, 
but subject.  Our mode  of  considering  him  as a 
prisoner of  war and keeping him  for  exchange, is 
an arbitrary arrangement of  modern  policy, which 
has no thorough, independent object in prosecuting 
war, and hence at all times considers the possibility 
of  treating with the enemy. 
The object of war  is not to kill,  but merely to 
drive away and disarm the armed force which pro- 
tects the country and its citizens.  In a hand-to- 
hand fight, one man  kills another to escape being 
killed  himself,  and hence, in virtue of  the r&ht  of 
self-d.fefzse, but not of  any m@t  co?zferreed by  the 
state to kill the enemy; which right, indeed, no state 
has, and hence can not, either, confer.  In the same 
manner we may regard the modern manner of con- 
ducting war by means of  cannons, guns, etc.  It  is 
not the object to kill with the bullets, but merely 
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the cannons or guns.  If, nevertheless, the enemy 
remains,  it is  his  own  fault  if  the balls  kill  him. 
(Reason would  seem to require that we should al- 
ways  advise the enemy when we intend to open a 
fire upon his posts ; precisely as we first send a de- 
mand to fortresses to surrender before opening fire 
upon them.) 
The only thing in our modern  mode of  warfare 
which is downright illegal, is the sharp-shooters, who 
from hidden places, where they are safe themselves, 
cold-bloodedly take aim upon a man as upon a tar- 
get.  With them murder is end.  (The first use of 
sharp-shooters, by Austria against Prussia, did, in- 
deed, create universal indignation  throughout Eu- 
rope.  We have now become accustomed to it, and 
imitate it; but it is not to our honor.) 
xv. 
The  aggrieved state  has aperfect right, as we have 
seen, to make war upon the unjust state, until it has 
subjugated it and united its citizens with its own. 
War would, therefore, seem a sure and legal means 
of  securing the legal relation between the several 
states, if  it were  only possible to invent a  contri- 
vance by means whereof  the party which  has  the 
just  cause  at hand  would  always  be  victorious. 
But since every state has not the same amount of 
strength as of  right, war may promote as often, if 
not oftener, the cause of  injustice  as the cause of 
justice. 
But war is the only means to compel a state ;  and 
hence the problem  must be to arrange matters in 
such a way that the just cause will  always be vic- 
torious in war.  Strength arises from  the masses ; 
hence a  number of  states must co?zfederate  among 
themselves for the maintenance of  law and for the 
punishment of  all  unjust  states.  It is clear  that 
such a combination will  result  in a  power  always 
victorious ; but the far higher question  is, how can 
it be arranged  that this  combination of  states al- 
ways will decree justly ? 
XVI. 
Many  states unite  and  guarantee each  to the 
other their independence and  the  inviolability of 
the compact just described.  The formula of  such 
a confederation would be as follows : We all  pro- 
mise  to exterminate with  united  force  any state, 
whether  it  belong  to  this  confederation  or  not, 
which  shall refuse  to recognize  the independence 
of  any one of  us,  or which  shall violate  a  treaty 
concluded between it and one of  us. 
I  say the formula  of  this  co~z$ederatio~z,  for  it 
woulcl  be  a  confederacy,  not a state.  The distinc- 
tion is this : Each individual can be compelled to 
become member of  a state, since otherwise it is im- 
possible to establish a leyal relation with him.  But 
no state can be  compelled to enter this confedera- 
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eign states without entering it.*  To  establish such 
a relation it suffices, indeed, to recognize them and 
conclude  a  treaty with them.  No state, however, 
has the right to compel other states to furnish to it 
positive protection.  Hence the confederation is an 
arbitrary, and not a compulsory union, and such a 
union is called a Confederation. 
XVII. 
Whether one state has recognized  the indepen- 
dence of  another state, appears from the fact whe- 
ther it has concluded a treatywith it or not.  Hence, 
the confederation has a sure means of deciding this 
question ;  and it is not to be presumed  that  this 
confederation will knowingly and intentionally pro- 
nounce  a  wrong  judgment,  since  all  the world 
would  see immediately the injustice of  such judg- 
ment.  The question whether a  state has fulfilled 
the conditions of  its treaties or not, the confedera- 
tion must decide partly from the facts brought  to 
its notice and partly from the terms of  the treaty. 
So far as the facts are concerned, each state being 
obliged to conduct its matters publicly, it will  not 
be difficult to obtain reliable knowledge concerning 
* Here we meet again the oversight which limits  Fichte's whole 
application  of  his  Science  of  Rights.  No state  can  establish  a 
Iegdrelation with foreign states, as we have shown, unless it estab- 
lishes also a common government and a supreme judiciary, that is, 
a  confederate republic.  Hence,  every  state  can  be  rmpeIZtd to 
become a member of a confederate ~~~U~~~C-TRANSLATOR'S  RE- 
MARK. 
them.  A state charged with  non-compliance with 
an obligation of  its treaties  must furnish positive 
proof  that it has complied with it.  If a state does 
not appear before the confederation to justify itself, 
it thereby virtually admits its guilt.  True, a state 
not  belonging  to  the  confederation  might  say: 
What have I to do with this confederation ?  It  is 
not my judge.  But the answer is : You are at least 
responsible to the state with whom  you have made 
the treaty, and that state has, doubtless, a right to 
appeal to us. 
The confederation being the judge of  violations 
of  treaties, must also supervise their  original con- 
struction so as to have them made clear and defi- 
nite.  This appears, already, from the fact that all 
treaties are concluded under its guarantee.  Inde- 
finiteness in the treaties can not be tolerated, be- 
cause there must be left no room for error of judg- 
ment.  Any injustice will thus be flagrant to all the 
world.  Such a  confederation,  however,  composed 
of  states which  all have private  interests of  their 
own, can not well  have  a  common  interest to act 
unjustly.  An unjust  sentence turns  against  the 
states themselves.  For the principles which  they 
apply to others will be applied to them. 
XVIII. 
The  confederation must have the power to exe- 
cute its decisions.  This is done, as appears from 
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state condemned.  Hence, the confederation  must 
be  armed.  The question  may  arise,  whether  a 
special standing army shall be  established, or whe- 
ther such an army shall be called out only in times 
of war by contributions from the separate states  ? 
Since it is to be  hoped  that war will rarely occur, 
and in future never, I should vote for the latter ;  for 
why have a standing army, whetl it will probably be 
idle most of  the time ? 
XIX. 
The absolute impossibility of  an unjust decision 
by the confederation has not yet been established. 
Nor can it be established, as we also could not show 
the absolute iinpossibility of  an unjust decision by 
the people assembled in convention.  Until reason 
herself appears in person upon earth and assumes 
judicial  power,  we  shall always  have a  supreme 
court, which, being finite, is liable to error or to evil 
motives.  The  problem is simply to discover a tribu- 
nal from which there is the least likelihood to ex- 
pect this ;  and such a  tribunal is for civil relations 
the nation, and for the relations of  states, the just- 
described confederation. 
XX. 
As this confederation extends and gradually em- 
braces the whole earth, etevrzal peacc  will be estab- 
lished-  peace,  the only  lawful  relation  of  states, 
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since war  is as likely to give victory to the unjust 
as to the just, or, at the very best, under the direc- 
tion of  a  confederation of  states, is  only a  means 
for the ultimate end-the  maintenance of  peace. 
CONCERNING  COSMOPOLITAN  LAW. 
Each citizen  has the right to practice  his occu- 
pation throughout the whole territory of  his  state. 
This right  is a  part  of  the rights guaranteed to 
him by the state.  The minister of  a foreign state 
has a  right,  by virtue  of  the treaty between  botb 
states, to travel also throughout thht foreign  state, 
this being the means for his end-to  watch over the 
performance of  the treaty stipulations.  He  shows 
his pass at the boundaries, and it is the duty of the 
state to which he is accredited to admit him.  His 
unconditional rejection would  be ground for a war. 
Private  persons  of  one  state visit  another  state 
either on business or pleasure,  Their residence in 
foreign states is regulated by the treaties with such 
states.  If  both  states have  guaranteed  to each 
other the safety of  their  citizens, the traveler-citi- 
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citizen of  his  own state he proves by showing his 
pass. 
But how,  when  a  stranger, who  is neither  the 
ambassador from some state nor citizen of  a  state 
which has a  treaty with it, enters a foreign state  ? 
The reply to this  only remaining  question  of  law 
furnishes the ground of  the Cosmopolitan law. 
All positive rights, rights to somethifzg,  are based 
upon an agreement.  Now this stranger has made 
no agreement at all with the state visited  by him, 
nor does he belong to a  state which  has made an 
agreement with it, fol  such is the presupposition. 
Has he, then, no rights at all? or, if  he has any, 
upon what are they based ?  He has that original 
right  of  man,  which  precedes  all  law-agreements 
and  first  makes  them  possible,  namely,  the right 
that all me72  mzcstpresz@pose  the possibility of  utter- 
ing into a legal relatio?~  with him ? 
This alone is the true right of  man, which  be- 
longs to  man  as man; the possibility to acquire 
rights.  This, and only this, right must be granted 
to every one who has not expressly lost it through 
his actions.  Let us illustrate it more clearly  by 
opposition.  The person  whose  citizenship  in  a 
state is  cancelled  by  that  state on  account of  a 
crime  committed  by  him,  thereby  loses  all  his 
positive  rights,  and  not  only  them,  but also  the 
right  to acquire  rights  in  that state,  he  having 
shown himself absolutely unfit for a legal relation. 
A new stranger has also no positive rights in that 
state ;  but he has the nght to acqzrire n'glits within 
that state, and to insist upon that right. 
From this right is derived his right to enter the 
territory of  a  foreign state ; for to have a right to 
the end is also to have a right to the means ;  and 
the attempt to enter a  legal relation in that state 
can not be made without entering its territory.  It 
is this right to wander freely over the whole earth, 
and to offer  himself  anywhere as candidate for  a 
legal  relation,  which  constitutes the  right  of  the 
mere cosmopolitan. 
The  ground of a stranger's right to enter the ter- 
ritory of  a state is his right to attempt and offer to 
the citizens  of  such  state a  legal  relation.  That 
state has, therefore, the right  to ask the stranger 
what he desires,  and  to force him  to declare  his 
object.  If he does not  do so,  the ground  of  his 
right ceases, and he is expelled from its boundaries. 
Again : If  he does declare himself, but if  his pro- 
posal  is rejected,  the  ground  of  his  right  also 
ceases, and he is justly expelled.  But he must not 
be otherwise harmed.  For the possibility remains 
that he may become citizen of  another state.  The 
right to this  possibility can never be taken away 
from him. 4g2  THE  SCIENCE  OF RIGHTS. 
IV. 
If his proposal is accepted, he then occupies an im- 
mediate relation to such state and the rights of  both 
parties are determined by this relation.  By recog- 
nizing the state, he has already recognized the right 
of  property of  all its citizens.  This he  does  not 
need expressly to reiterate, for it follows  from  the 
act of his entering into an agreement with the state. 
He is  subject  to  the other laws of  the state pre- 
risely in so far as he has  subjected himself to the 
state. 
Of  course, the state thus becomes his  judge, for 
no other state protects  him.  Disagreeable as this 




NATURE  OF ANIMALS. ACCORDING  to the Science of Knowledge, I trans- 
fer to mture the conception of  myself  as far as I 
can do so without canceling nature herself in her 
own  character, or  in other words, without  making 
nature an intelligence,  that is, an Ego, or a  Self- 
positing. 
To say the  intelligence  is a  higher  power  or 
manifestation of  nature may signify two things : 
I. If  I  arbitrarily  gather  together  all  that  is 
thinkable,  as known  to  me  already  empirically; 
and if I rise  higher  in  this gathering together of 
all the empirically known, I discover  that man has 
in him  altogether all that which  nature contains; 
but that man has, moreover, in him somethitzg else 
besides;  in  other words,  that man has in him a 
natural-the  mere determinability of  articulation, 
*The following few pages of  a fragment to the Sczence of  R~glrts 
are appended as eomplement~ng  the deduction of  nature contained 
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which connects nature and freedom-and  a szgm- 
natural.  In so far it may be said in such a System 
of  the Tkinka6Ze that the intelligence  is a  higher 
manifestation of nature ;  for in such a system, which 
merely narrates, but does not  furnishgrounds, nature 
and intelligence connect with each other, and there 
is no absolute kinks. 
11.  But when that proposition is made to signify 
that in a system of  nature the intelligence is itself 
a higher power  or manifestation of  nature, then it 
is evidently incorrect, and is refuted thoroughly in 
transcendental philosophy.  For the latter shows 
nature  to  be  product  of  the  intelligence;  how, 
then,  can  the  intelligence again,  through  an evi- 
dent circle,  be product  of  nature?  On the con- 
trary, in  man  himself, so far as he is nature, the 
power of  nature has not gone to its ultimate  ex- 
tent, for the very sake of  man's freedom. 
111.  It is  only  in  a  system of  the  intelligible 
world that this proposition would  have any signifi- 
cance.  For the finite  intelligence  is  certainly a 
lower power of  the absolute intelligence.  But this 
absolute intelligence involves, also, a merely deter- 
minable, whereof  the actual intelligence, or the em- 
pirical Ego, is the higher power.  This merely de- 
terminable is nature in her utterly  unexplainable 
and incomprehensible  fundamental elements. These 
latter elements, however, do not belong in a philo- 
sophy of  nature, the business whereof  it is to com- 
prehend nature only in so far as nature has become 
determined in actuality, or received into the ground 
form of  the intelligence ;  in other words, in so far 
as  nature has again become product of  the absolute 
intelligence. 
Hence, the above proposition is not really philo- 
sophical, but merely realistical and encyclopadical. 
In a  philosophy of  nature,  it is clearly  false.  It 
attracts only  through  its very poetical side, which 
poetry is always a presentiment of  the intelligible ; 
as, for instance, in Jacob Boehme. 
This transferring of  my own  character into na- 
ture I always  sensualize  sing& in  contemplation. 
Thus it becomes my experience. 
IV. 
The highest  within  me,  independently  of  con- 
sciousness and the immediate object of conscious- 
ness, is the iwuke. The  impulse is the highest rep- 
resentation of  the intelligence in nature.  Hence, 
the impulse is the immediatefeeloble,  (substance or 
element of  feeling,) but on no account feeling itself, 
since feeling is already a consciousness. 
The intelligence attributes to each atom in na- 
ture impulse ;  or,  to  speak  more  strictly, through 
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there arises for  the intelligence a world of  nature. 
Impulse is, therefore, a tendency to have externally 
causality, and to be the object of  an external caus- 
ality ;  which latter two links are, indeed, exchange- 
able, and differ only in accordance with the degree 
of  the product of  nature.  We shall find instances 
very soon-as,  attraction and repulsion ;  polarity in 
general ;  chemical affinities and hostilities. 
VI. 
Through  this  internal  and  immanent  impulse, 
the nature of  every atom is absolutely determined. 
This nature of  the atom I shall for the present call 
its chewzical nature, according to my own interpreta- 
tion of  the word. 
VII. 
It is clear that these chemical forces  in  nature 
will  remain  without  manifestation-precisely  like 
the  impulse  in  man-and  that,  hence,  they are 
posited merely  abstractly,  unless  the condition of 
their realization  is posited at the same time.  Posi- 
ted thus abstractly, they result in the conception of 
raw matter, which is nothing but an empty abstrac- 
tion from the causality of the impulse-as  again, the 
impulse in general, as not throughout determined, 
is also nothing but  an abstraction.  (Every thing 
posited in the intelligence must appear ifz concreto.) 
VIII. 
This conception of  raw matter is an abstraction 
of lower  degree,  because  the impulse  is put into 
operation by a union of  atom-affinities. 
It may thus be put into operation in a  twofold 
manner : 
I.  One-sided&:  in  which  case  the  impulse  is 
posited  as mere causality, resulting in  a  product 
which does not retroact upon  the impulse, and in 
which product  the impulse, therefore, posits only a 
quiet residuum of  exhausted power.  The product 
arising from such one-sided causality of the impulse 
we call minerals-crystallization  of earths and met- 
als-which,  for  that very  reason,  join  in straight 
lines.  For here there is mere result and no organ- 
ization  whatever; hence,  also,  no  continuous and 
thus itself-renewing reciprocity with the rest of  the 
universe.  The chemical force-speaking  abstract- 
ly-is  as yet held  in  confinement by the impene- 
trated and throughout similar mass. 
11.  Reciprocally:  in which case both or all chemi- 
cal forces  intimately penetrate each other, dissolve 
into each other, and melt together into a new whole- 
The product of  such a  reciprocal  causality of  the 
impulse is organization, as exemplified  in its sim- 
plest abstraction in the plant.  Such a new whole, 
which is neither a, nor b, nor c, but rather the result 
of  all of  them in their closest union-such  a sepa- 
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withir. nature-a  nature  of  its own,  finished  and 
completed in itself. 
IX. 
But nihilper  saltztm.  The  zcniolz is absolute ;  the 
ifzterpenetmtion, however,  proceeds  gradually.  In 
this  work  of  ifzterpefzetration  each  force  draws 
unto  itself  from  surrounding  nature that  which 
is  homogeneons  to  itself, and repels  that which 
is  averse  to the  tendency  of  the  interpenetra- 
tion.  Thus  it  influences  as  a  totality  the sur- 
rounding chemical  nature as far  as its sphere of 
causality  extends ;  and the result  of  this infinite 
reciprocity  within  itself,  and  with  the  external 
world,  we  call  Zqe:  here the life of  the plant,  or 
gyowtA,  and  the  absolute  interpenetration  mani- 
festing itself, we call here blossom. 
From  the moment of  this  highest  penetration 
the organic forces, as separates, are canceled, since 
they are concentrated in that product, the blossom. 
Hence, with it expires the impelling power of  de- 
velopment,  and the plant  ceases  to grow,  as,  in- 
deed, it grows less toward  the time of  bloom.  By 
this  stoppage  of  life and the expurgation of  that 
which can not be used  in the absolute interpene- 
tration, the plant retires from  its reciprocity with 
the rest of  the world ;  and while the result of  the 
interpenetration  remains  as dry seed,  the  plant 
itself dies as such separate plant. 
(Objections from actual life do not invalidate this 
conception.  Even those seeming exceptions  will 
be found to express the same conception, only in a 
somewhat weaker degree.) 
XI. 
The seed  is again  awakened  into life  through 
the universal movements of development in nature, 
warmth and wet ; and the same circle begins anew. 
The  chemical components lie in the seed ;  and that 
influence of  nature, which may be akin to fermen- 
tation, places them again in conflict with surround- 
ing nature.  The way  of  nature is an everlasting 
circular movement of analysis and synthesis.  Fer- 
mentation is analysis ;  development of  the indivi- 
dual, and self-assertion thereof, is synthesis.  Hence 
the fruitfulness of  plants ;  many of  them working 
together with united power against the influence of 
surrounding nature.  Here also can be established 
the distinction  between  dead (artificial) and living 
chemistry.  The former has only results, and not 
any separate forces ; it analyzes, but does not syn- 
thesize; and hence it can not  produce the condi- 
tions of  nature. 
XII. 
The  plant is, therefore, a central point of a chemi- 
cal-organic circle of attraction and repulsion, which 
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must be realized as posited in the impulse ;  in other 
words. this motion must appear in nature as an in- 
dependent principle. 
XIII. 
An in-itself-returning,  and hence itself-determi- 
ning impulse of  motion-which  arises  through  a 
synthesis of  parts working together  into a  totality, 
and which  is a  system of  a  more  complex organ- 
ism, to be conceived as articulation-we  call an  ani- 
mal. 
XIV. 
What, then, is the animal ?  First of all, a system 
of  plant-souls.  The unity  of  those  plant-souls, 
which  unity nature  itself  produces, is the soul  of 
the animal.  Its  world is therefore partly that of  the 
plants-its  nourishment, for  instance, it  receives 
partly  through  synthesis  from  vegetable,  and 
through  analysis  from  animal nature-and  partly 
that of the animals, whereof we shall speak directly. 
xv. 
To describe  the relation of  the  animal  to  the 
world, we must first recapitulate previous points : 
The sphere of  causality of  a growing plant is an 
everlasting vortex* of  a chemical attraction and re- 
* Compare  Swedenborg7s Prtlzcipin  and  the  theories  of  Dea 
Cartes and Leibnitz.-Ta~~s~~~oR's  REMARK. 
pulsion, the central  point  whereof  (or,  ideally ex- 
pressed, the soul whereof) is  the one force of  the 
plant itself. This everlasting appropriation of foreign 
elements, and expurgation of  what does not harmo- 
nize with the organism, we can not think otherwise 
than as  an invisible movement in space.  Hence, the  . 
soul of  the plant is not  only the principle of  a de- 
termined  organization, (is  not  only the interpene- 
tration and union of  different chemical forces,) but 
is, moreover, the first principle of a motio~z  in nature ; 
it is the moving principle. 
XVI. 
But, in the case of the plant, motion is altogether 
a passivity, a being driven or dragged onward, and 
hence it is not the predicate of  an absolutely inde- 
pendent organization.  This motion in nature must 
also be organized, and must occur  in a  complete 
system of nature as impulse and as a peculiar force. 
How is this achieved ? 
XVII. 
Each product of nature is an organically in-itself 
completed totality in space, like the plant.  Hence, 
the unknown x which we are looking for must also 
be such a whole or totality,  and in so far  it must 
also have a principle of  organization, a  sphere and 
central point of this organization ;  in short, the same 
which we have  called  the soul of  the plant, which 
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But it is, moreover, realization of  a movement in 
nature ;  first of  all within  itself.  This can signify 
only that the principle  of  the original motion, al- 
ready discovered in the plant, is  posited  in every 
part of  its organic body, and  that, hence, so far as 
determinability is concerned, this motion is thus in 
every part  of  its body;  and that this mobility is 
thus in every part of  its body by virtue of  its own 
nature,  as involving an  impulse; and hence, that 
part of  its  body can  draw along another part,  or 
the whole of the body. 
This is clearly the conception of  articulation, as 
explained  in the Science of  Rights  in relation to 
man.  But in the present case the principle of  an 
actual movement is to be-not,  as in man, the free- 
will, for in that case the body under  consideration 
would not be mere&  nature ; it is to be nature it- 
self determining itself with necessity ;  and thus the 
body is not man, but an animal 
XVIII. 
Abstracting from the fact  that the animal  is a 
plant-which  word may here receive another signi- 
fication-let  us now  compare this conception with 
the above-established conception of a plant.  In the 
plant  and its sphere of  causality, all motion  pro- 
ceeded from one central point and returned into it. 
But in the animal every possible point, involving, as 
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it does, a peculiar principle of motion, is the central 
point of a plant-atmosphere as its lower world. 
Hence, the animal is a system of plant-souls, and 
the plant is a separated, isolated part of an animal 
Both reciprocally affect each other. 